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Abstract 
The controversial Iranian nuclear dossier, the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme, 
and the challenge posed to nuclear security by non-state terrorist organisations, such as 
Al-Qaeda, acquiring nuclear weapons, all raise concerns for international peace and 
security. The use of Islamic legal, ethical and strategic discourses about nuclear 
weaponry to justify their respective leaderships’ positions is a common factor. While 
Iran presents shari’a law as a limiting factor, prohibiting nuclear weapons, Al-Qaeda 
has long justified its pursuit of a nuclear capability through the Islamic faith. Pakistan 
has given less attention to discussion of law, but became the first, and to date only, 
Muslim state to develop a nuclear arsenal, seeking to legitimise and secure funding for 
the development of its nuclear capability by characterising it as a Muslim endeavour. 
The strategic, political, and policy implications of the Islamic nuclear discourses of 
these three actors, including their impact on the non-proliferation regime, regional 
stability, and national and international security are vital issues. Islam has served as a 
vehicle to promote national and regime interests but can also have other implications 
and costs. Once an actor defines its nuclear programme or ambitions in Islamic terms, it 
can only reverse its position at great political cost.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The Middle East and South Asia remain volatile and give rise to a number of challenges 
to international peace and security. These include the overwhelming number of non-
democratic, fragile, and failed states, terrorism, and the proliferation and use of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in both international and civil armed conflicts. 
These challenges coexist and often overlap, leading to their reinforcement. For instance, 
the presence of the terrorist network Al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates in South Asia and, 
increasingly, the Middle East, the fragility of many governments, and the existence of 
the world’s fastest-growing nuclear weapons arsenal in Pakistan raise concerns 
regarding nuclear terrorism. Likewise, the proliferation of WMD has proved to be 
particularly worrisome in the Middle East. Indeed, the past three decades have seen the 
use of chemical weapons especially in the region on three separate occasions. These are: 
the Egyptian use of these weapons in Yemen in the 1960s, their use by Iraq against both 
Iran and its own citizens in the 1980s, and their use more recently in the context of the 
Syrian civil war. Hence, the proliferation of other WMD, including nuclear weapons, in 
the region is particularly concerning. In this context, the Iranian nuclear dossier, the 
creation of a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East, 
nuclear security and the prospect of nuclear terrorism, have gained a lot of attention 
since the end of the Cold War.  
The growing institutionalisation of the Muslim faith and Islamisation across and 
beyond1 the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and South Asia regions, as well as 
the general return of religion in the public and political spheres across the globe,2 have 
also created new challenges. Islamisation has led a number of actors to rely on the faith 
to justify their stances and actions on key issues in domestic politics and international 
affairs, to legitimise them and seek support. Hence, three main challenges to nuclear 
non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament -- Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran -- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Muslim communities in Western Europe and North America have demanded for issues relating to 
personal status and family right, ‘which enjoy constitutional status in a liberal democracy’, to be under 
the jurisdiction of Islamic law. These communities argue that they are merely claiming what they view as 
theur ‘cultural and religious rights’, while others view them as ‘concessions’ rather rights. ‘The 
accommodation Islam is a prominent example of “judicialized politics”.  
Joppe, Christian, and Torpey, John (2013), Legal Integration of Islam – A Transatlantic Comparison. 
Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press. P. 7/9  
2 Hawkin, David (2004), The Twenty-First Century Confronts Its Gods – Globalization, Technology, and 
War. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. P. 3 
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have developed very sophisticated Islamic discourses, shaping their nuclear and broader 
narratives. These discourses are often shaped around a pan-Islamic ideology, albeit to 
varying degrees.3  
This thesis examines the strategic implications of the Islamic faith shaping nuclear 
narratives, politics, and policies. It answers the following question: What are the 
strategic implications of Islamic legal and ethical discourses on nuclear weapons? It 
concludes that while the Islamic legal discussion around nuclear weapons in itself does 
not have a clear strategic implication, its use as part of a nuclear narrative certainly 
does. Indeed, the religious discourse has served to legitimise and fund nuclear 
programmes, and recruit scientists and engineers to work on them. The following 
chapters demonstrate that the Islamic legal stance taken by an actor reflects its 
ambitions. The thesis argues that by defining its nuclear ambitions in Islamic terms, an 
actor can only reverse its position at a great political cost. Before discussing the content 
of each chapter, it is important to note that this thesis does not seek to offer a conclusion 
to the controversies on the Islamic position on violence. 
The thesis has two main components. First, two legal chapters provide an overview of 
the international and Islamic legal frameworks, how they govern nuclear weapons, and 
where each case studied in this thesis falls in terms of international obligations and 
Islamic thinking. Together, these two chapters speak to the similarity of international 
and Islamic legal thinking on nuclear weapons. Indeed, despite their different 
methodological approaches and sources, the rulings on the legality of the production, 
possession, threat, and use of nuclear weapons stem from similar principles in both 
systems. Secondly, three case studies examine the key state and non-state actors who 
have developed an Islamic discourse justifying their nuclear ambitions. These three 
cases are Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran. The first two are similar in that they have each 
used Islamic law as an enabler, while Iran has used it as a limiting factor. All three 
cases, however, show that the discourse has served as a vehicle to pursue practical 
interests. In the cases of Al-Qaeda and Pakistan, these interests were legitimising, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ‘Pan-Islam is an ideology calling for the unity of Muslim peoples worldwide on the basis of their shared 
Islamic identity’. This shared religious identity is presented by pan-Islamic ideologists as a common 
denominator, generating common interests. ‘Apart from this basic definition, pan-Islam, historically and 
today, is characterized by great diversity of motives, goals and tactics. It ranges from what we could call 
solidarist visions at one end of the spectrum to pluralist visions at the other.’ Sohail Buzan, Barry. 
Gonzalez-Pelaez, Ana (2009), International Society and the Middle East – English School Theory at the 
Regional Level. Hamshire: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 170 
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funding, and recruiting scientists and engineers to develop a nuclear weapons 
programme. In the case of Iran, this practical consideration was to legitimise and 
highlight the peaceful nature of the country’s controversial nuclear programme in the 
face of evidence that Tehran had failed to comply by its international obligations.  
To this end, the first chapter examines the extant international legal framework 
governing nuclear weapons. The second chapter juxtaposes the findings of the first 
chapter on international law with Islamic law. The chapter seeks to provide an overview 
of Islamic legal methodology and sources, which can be confusing and contradictory. 
Different schools of thought, and even authorities within a given one, have opposing 
views on many matters. Together, these two chapters provide the reader with the tools 
to comprehend the case studies. They provide an in-depth look into Islamic law by 
offering a point of comparison with international law. Building on this discussion, the 
following chapters assess the stance of three non-state and state actors on the matter. 
These actors are relevant players in discussions relating to regional and international 
security and, more specifically, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. They 
have concrete nuclear ambitions and have sought to justify them according to the 
Muslim faith.  
Many scholars and experts describe nuclear terrorism as ‘a high-consequence, low-
probability problem.’4 The case of Al-Qaeda is particularly interesting because it has 
been argued that therein could lay ‘a rather primitive prototype of the terrorism to 
come.’5 Furthermore, the international community lacks control over such non-state 
actors. Pakistan is a de facto nuclear-armed state, which has developed its arsenal in the 
context of an arms race with neighbouring India and outside the framework of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It remains a fragile state, a terrorist safe 
haven, and, some argue, possesses the least secure nuclear arsenal of all nuclear-armed 
states as well as the fastest growing one. For its part, Iran, a Non-Nuclear Weapon State 
(NNWS) under the NPT with the obligation to reject a nuclear weapon capability, is 
actively pursuing a civilian nuclear programme (allowed under Article IV of the treaty) 
but has been widely suspected of harbouring weapons ambitions, pursuing a hedging 
policy. The programme’s possible military dimensions (PMD) remain controversial. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Masse, Todd (2011), Nuclear Jihad – A Clear and Present Danger? Washington D.C.: Potomac Books. 
P. XIV 
5 Bobbitt, Philip (2008), Terror and Consent: The Wars For the Twenty-First Century. London: Penguin 
Books. P. 63 
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This has led the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to impose several rounds of 
sanctions to date for Tehran’s refusal to suspend sensitive activities primarily related to 
enrichment. Enrichment is the frontend of the nuclear fuel cycle, and along with the 
backend, reprocessing, constitutes one of two paths to nuclear weapons. The former 
facilitates the development of highly enriched uranium-based nuclear weapons, while 
the latter facilitates the development of plutonium bombs.  
The common denominator in all three cases is the attempts by their respective leaders to 
justify their actions as compatible with the prescriptions of the Islamic faith or the Will 
of God. Over the past decade a number of authorities, political and religious, have made 
declarations regarding the topic. Some have stated that nuclear weapons are ‘prohibited’ 
in Islam,6 while others assert that the pursuit of such weapons is allowed under Islamic 
law, and even a religious duty.7 However, the Islamic discourse surrounding nuclear 




The scholarly literature discussing the Islamic discourse around nuclear weapons is 
extremely limited. This is due to the complex, multi-layered, and interdisciplinary 
nature of the enterprise. In Rolf Mowatt-Larssen’s words, ‘there is a lack of basic 
research on the issues that sit at the crossroads of nuclear proliferation, terrorism and 
religion. Perhaps this is due to the fact there are many experts in each of these domains, 
but very few experts in all three.’8 Mowatt-Larssen’s work on the status of nuclear 
weapons under Islamic law remains one of the few comprehensive attempts to assess 
the topic. However, perhaps due to the very challenges he identifies, the author himself 
falls short in offering a complete image of the legal status of nuclear weapons under 
Islamic law. He presents two of the sources of Islamic law: the Qur’an and fatāwā. This 
approach is problematic as the Qur’an, while the cornerstone of Islamic law, does not 
constitute its only source and fatāwā, while having gained a lot of attention in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Collier, Robert. ‘Nuclear weapons unholy, Iran Says / Islam forbids use, clerics proclaim.’ San 
Francisco Gate. 31-10-2003.  
7 Bar, Shmuel (2006), Warrants for Terror - Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. P. 70-71 
8 Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf (2011), ‘Islam and the Bomb – Religious Justification For and Against Nuclear 
Weapons’. Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. P. 10 
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western world since the 1970s, cannot be considered as a key source of law. As a result, 
Mowatt-Larssen omits substantial and critical insights by not considering other key 
sources. Furthermore, even the sources considered in his work are not examined 
thoroughly: in the case of the Qur’an, only a few relevant verses have been provided 
and none are examined or interpreted according to the Islamic legal tradition in order to 
examine relevance to the subject matter. 
Other works only offer a surface examination of the issue and none undertake to discuss 
legal aspects of the debate. Instead, most of the relevant body of work is centred on just 
war theory in Islam,9 one or several of the Muslim state actors’ nuclear programmes,10 
or the threat of nuclear terrorism.11 John Kelsay has written extensively on the topic.12 
The Iranian and Pakistani nuclear programmes have been examined from many angles 
by academics, including the narratives fashioned by each country to justify their nuclear 
programmes, as well as the role of the Islamic discourse in it.13 More generally, Steve 
Weissman and Herbert Krosney’s The Islamic Bomb provides a survey of various 
nuclear weapons programmes across the Muslim world. However, their work dates back 
to 1981. Some of the nuclear weapons programmes assessed in the book are no longer 
relevant or even in existence, including those of Iraq and Libya, while others, including 
the Pakistani and Iranian programmes, have greatly evolved since its publication. 
Likewise, Al J. Venter’s Allah’s Bomb attempts to provide the reader with an overview 
of Muslim nuclear ambitions. The book, which was published in 2007, constitutes a 
good and relatively up-to-date source of information for understanding nuclearisation in 
the world of Islam. However, both volumes only superficially discuss the importance of 
the Islamic discourse in the context of these programmes. 
Feroz Khan’s Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb provides an extensive 
history of the inception and development of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kelsay, John (2007), Arguing the Just War in Islam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
10 Venter, Al J. (2007), Allah’s Bomb: The Islamic Quest for Nuclear Weapons. Guilford: The Lyons 
Press. 
11 Ferguson, Charles. Potter, William (2004), The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey: The 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  
12 Kelsay, John (1991), Just War and Jihad. Westport: Greenwood Press; (1993), Islam and War: A Study 
in Comparative Ethics. Louiseville: Westminster/John Knox; (2007), Arguing the Just War in Islam. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
13 Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert (1981), The Islamic Bomb. New York: Times Books. 
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without fully exploring the nature and role of the Islamic discourse in shaping the 
Pakistani nuclear narrative and its role in fashioning the programme or nuclear policy.14 
Iran’s nuclear programme has been examined from many different angles.15  However, 
many fall short of providing an adequate overview of the country’s culture, domestic 
and foreign policies, and nuclear programme. They especially fail to discuss the role of 
religion in Iranian foreign and nuclear policy, often resorting to gross generalisations 
and re-cycled clichés, including the claim that the Iranian ‘obsession’ with martyrdom is 
a key piece of the puzzle in determining Iran’s behaviour should it weaponise.   
Since 9/11, nuclear and wider WMD terrorism have generated substantial debate. 
Jihadists have attempted to justify the possession and, sometimes, use of such weapons. 
Scholars have assessed different aspects of WMD terrorism, including the viability of 
the threat of the procurement and use of these weapons by terrorists and their incentive 
to invest in them, as well as appropriate counter-terrorism measures which would allow 
individual governments and the international community to counter such an attack. 
They have further attempted to offer analysis on whether such an attack could be 
justified under Islamic law and how the legal question has shaped terrorists’ discourse. 
Yet, when the Islamic legal debate comes into play, it is often shallow or ill informed. 
Philip Bobbitt, in an extensive study of what he calls ‘market state terrorism’16 briefly 
assesses the legality of the actions perpetrated by Al-Qaeda under Islamic law, 
concluding that they are indeed illegal. Abdel Bari Atwan’s The Secret History of al 
Qaeda provides an overview of the organisation’s history and activities in various 
geographical regions.17 Jessica Stern’s The Ultimate Terrorists discusses the threat of 
WMD being acquired and used by terrorists in a pre-9/11 era.18 Lastly, Shmuel Bar’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Khan, Feroz (2013), Eating Grass – The Making of the Pakistani Bomb. Stanford: Stanford Security 
Studies. 
15 Patrikarakos, David (2012), Nuclear Iran – The Birth of An Atomic State. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Gold, Dore (2009), The Rise of Nuclear Iran – How Tehran Defies the West. Washington, D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing, Inc.  
Tertrais, Bruno (2007), Iran – La Prochaine guerre. Pris : Le cherche midi. 
Delpech, Thérèse (2007), Le grand perturbateur – réflexions sur la question iranienne. Paris: Bernard 
Grasset.  
16 Bobbitt, Philip (2008), Terror and Consent: The Wars For the Twenty-First Century. London: Penguin 
Books 
17 Atwan, Abdel (2006), The Secret History of al Qaeda. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
18 Stern, Jessica (1999), The Ultimate Terrorists.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.  
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Warrants for Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty to Jihad provides an 
overview of the different fatāwā issued by Islamist militants.19  
More broadly, the existing nuclear proliferation literature falls short of addressing some 
of the specifics of the cases under scrutiny in this project. The contributions of Jacques 
Hymans20 and Scott Sagan21 to the study of proliferation drivers are invaluable to 
understanding states’ motivations in acquiring nuclear weapons. The drivers widely 
perceived as the most important rationales leading states to develop a nuclear capability 
are: the national security model, the prestige model, the domestic political model, 
technological determinism, and the economic model. The next chapters build on 
Sagan’s models to make three new contributions to the understanding of proliferation 
drivers. First, the drivers are generally understood as purely national. This thesis argues 
that they can also have a pan-Islamic dimension, as illustrated by the case of Pakistan. 
Second, while these drivers are generally used for state actors exclusively, Chapter Four 
argues that some of the same drivers could also be applied to non-state actors. Third, 
some of these drivers can be applied to nuclear technology, even without a military 
dimension. This is the case of Iran, which, regardless of its actual nuclear ambitions, has 
fashioned its nuclear narrative around technological determinism and prestige.   
Here it is important to note that the prestige and security models are applicable to the 
broader Muslim world in its support for the Pakistani quest for an Islamic bomb. 
Indeed, some Muslim states saw the bomb as an opportunity to deter Israel and the 
west, while others saw it as ‘a potent symbol for their importance on the world stage.’22 
It is clear from the existing academic literature that the Islamic legal position on nuclear 
weapons has been largely neglected. Moreover, the literature does not address the 
strategic implications of Islamic discourses related to nuclear weapons. In an effort to 
address this gap in the literature this thesis seeks to: draw an accurate picture of the 
Islamic legal debate surrounding the production, possession, threat, and use of nuclear 
weapons; examine this debate in the context of Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran; and assess 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Bar, Shmuel (2006), Warrants for Terror - Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad. Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.  
20 Hymans, J. E. (2006). The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign 
Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
21 Sagan, Scott. ‘Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’ in International Security 21, no 3 (Winter 
1996/97). PP. 55-86 
22 Frantz and Collins (2007), 23 
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the strategic implications thereof for arms control, non-proliferation, disarmament, and 
more generally regional stability and international peace and security. 
 
Research question, method, and structure 
The central research question the thesis seeks to answer is as follows: What are the 
strategic implications of the Islamic legal and ethical discourses developed by state and 
non-state actors to justify their nuclear weapon and/or energy ambitions? It argues that 
with the advent and institutionalisation of political Islam, as well as the increasing 
bearing of the debates surrounding the implementation of Islamic law across and 
beyond the Muslim world since the 1970s, Islam has become a major discourse and 
policy-shaping factor in international affairs. The thesis seeks to provide evidence of the 
relevance of Islamic discourses in shaping nuclear and foreign policy, as well as its 
impact on the non-proliferation regime, regional approaches to arms control, and 
international law and security. Indeed, the increasing radicalisation of the Muslim world 
provides grounds for various state and non-state actors to justify their actions according 
to the Islamic faith. This discourse can provide such actors with the religious validation 
required for their nuclear programmes or attempts to acquire a nuclear capability, as 
well as legitimacy among the Muslim community. Furthermore, the Islamic discourse 
developed by Iran and Pakistan can undermine international law and trust among 
nations, and consequently challenge regional power dynamics with implications for 
both regional and international security. Yet, the discourse can also be used to build 
trust and promote national and regional interests. Importantly, the role of such 
discourses within domestic debates on the legitimacy of these countries’ nuclear 
programmes cannot be overlooked. 
Several supplementary questions frame the overall project:	  
• Does Islamic law govern the production, stockpiling, possession, threat, or use 
of nuclear weapons? 
• Are any of these ends in fact legal or prohibited by the divine legal framework? 
• Which state and non-state actors have attempted to justify the acquisition or use 
of such weapons through the Islamic legal lens? 
• What are their motives for seeking a rationale to justify their means of combat 
through this particular discourse? 
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• How does the Islamic discourse shape the nuclear narrative of a given actor? 
Who are the target audiences of the Islamic nuclear discourse in each case? Has 
the discourse been effective? Does the discourse shape policy or politics? 
• Does the legality, or lack thereof, of nuclear weapons under Islamic law have 
policy or strategic implications, notably in terms of arms control, non-
proliferation, disarmament, confidence building, and the prevention of nuclear 
terrorism? If so, what are they? 
• To what extent does the Islamic debate in this area affect domestic, regional, and 
international peace and security? 
The topic of the legality of nuclear weapons under Islamic law and its credibility and 
effectiveness has been a source of political debate and speculation since 9/11. However, 
this debate has been limited to the political fora, while in the academic world the topic 
has virtually remained terra incognita. In fact, while some are quick to dismiss the 
importance of the Muslim faith in shaping discourse and policy, others believe it to be 
all-important. Yet, no concrete evidence of either of these claims has been presented by 
the parties. As noted previously, this is due to the fact that such a study confronts 
several challenges that must be addressed simultaneously, notably the requirement for 
applying a comprehensive set of legal, political, and strategic tools for analytical 
purposes. The single most significant challenge lies in the methodologies required to 
conduct the research. This project, therefore, bridges the gap between these different 
areas of study with the objective of producing a multi-disciplinary and multi-layered 
assessment.  
The project’s approach is qualitative and empirical. It incorporates a hermeneutical 
analysis.23 In other words, legal, ethical, and philosophical texts are interpreted. It draws 
on both primary material and secondary sources. The primary sources include semi-
structured interviews and notes from on the record roundtables and panels. Other 
primary sources include legal ones, such as the texts of conventions, treaties, and 
protocols, as well as political, philosophical, and religious texts, such as speeches, 
interviews, official records (Congressional hearings and intelligence reports). The 
methodology for the legal deductions will follow the generally accepted methods 
amongst international and Islamic jurists. Chapter Three provides an overview of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Grondin, Jean (1994), Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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methods, including the interpretation of the Qur’anic verses, the methodology followed 
to determine the accuracy of a deed or words attributed to the Prophet or Imams, and the 
deduction, based on the precedents set by these deeds and words, of new laws. As noted 
previously, fātāwa are not a source of law in Islam. However, they shed light on the 
ethical and legal reasoning behind a given ruling, as well as the political and policy 
stance of various actors, as they are increasingly commissioned or issued to legitimise 
policies and galvanise popular support. The primary material includes such texts as the 
Holy Muslim Text (the Qur’an), compilations of the teachings of the Prophet and 
Imams or ahādīth, and legal interpretations and recommendations or fātāwa, national 
constitutions, and the texts of various international legal agreements and treaties, 
including the NPT and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). 
Declarations made by various government officials, assessments and reports issued by 
governments, non-governmental organisations, and international organisations, and 
government statements and reports are also assessed. The secondary sources include 
scholarly articles, books, policy briefs, and reports.  
 
The Thesis 
The thesis is composed of seven chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter One has introduced the issue, reviewed the existing literature, and established 
the methodological framework. Chapter Two offers an overview of the evolution of the 
just war theory and the inception of the contemporary international legal framework, 
especially as relevant to the conduct of warfare. It then surveys the different institutions 
and instruments governing nuclear weapons. This section is based on various existing 
international legal instruments, including key treaties, such as the NPT and the CTBT, 
as well as key cases and advisory opinions, including the 1996 International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons. This chapter is not an attempt to reinvent the wheel, as various scholars and 
experts have covered the topic extensively. Instead, it provides a clear comparative 
basis for the Islamic law chapter, while placing the case studies in the context of the 
non-proliferation regime and the wider international legal framework. 
Chapter Three briefly presents the role of Islamic law in the Muslim faith, before 
presenting the different sources of Islamic law and their importance and relevance to the 
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understanding of conflict and the nuclear debate. It then discusses the development of 
the Islamic rules of warfare and reviews various Muslim authorities and public figures’ 
views and decrees on the matter. It is important to note that the Islamic legal system is 
an inherently complex framework, which cannot be studied and understood using the 
same analytical tools for evaluating modern legal frameworks. This section addresses 
Islamic legal issues relating to the question of the legality or prohibition of the 
production, possession, stockpiling, threat and use of nuclear weapons in the Islamic 
legal tradition. Key notions of Islamic law as well as its sources are identified, before 
providing relevant arguments from these texts. Furthermore, the cardinal norms of law 
of international armed conflict, introduced in Chapter Two are assessed in an Islamic 
context, in order to measure whether they are indeed relevant to this debate and can 
translate from one legal framework. Finally, historical illustrations of the conduct of the 
prophet and his followers in combat establishing precedents are provided. In doing so, 
the chapter tackles one of the main issues raised in this debate: whether there exists a 
single and coherent Islamic position or several different ones emerging from different 
schools of thought. This enterprise incorporates the assessment of the different sources 
constituting the Islamic legal structure. Given the very rudimentary stage of the Islamic 
legal debate surrounding nuclear weapons in scholarly discussions, it is important to 
note that the findings of this chapter are not final. Instead, the chapter serves to provide 
the reader with the tools to understand the discourses built on the framework.   
The two legal chapters establish the basis for the following chapters, allowing each case 
study to be examined through the international and Islamic legal lens, before being 
assessed through a strategic and policy one. Accordingly, the chapters shed light on the 
different state and non-state actors’ positions on the legal question and how they utilise 
the Muslim faith to promote their political and strategic goals. 
Chapter Four examines the viability of the threat of nuclear terrorism and the 
instruments in place to counter such a threat. It then discusses why the thesis focuses on 
Al-Qaeda and does not discuss other terrorists groups. The chapter argues that Al-Qaeda 
is the only Islamist group which has been widely believed to pose a nuclear terrorism 
threat. Indeed, unlike Al-Qaeda, a terrorist network transcending boundaries, groups 
such as Hezbollah and the Harakat al-Muqawwima al-Islami (HAMAS) are attached to 
a given territory and population. Perpetrating a chemical, biological, radiological, or 
nuclear (CBRN) attack could effectively destroy such groups, as it could be traced back 
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to them, leading to a retaliatory response. Such a response can target the territories and 
populations associated with or represented by these groups, leading to the 
delegitimisation of the group. Al-Qaeda, by contrast, has not been historically tied to a 
particular territory or population.24  What is more, other factors, such as the aims 
pursued by the group, play a vital role in its decision to use CBRN weapons.  
Not all religious terrorists are equally likely to pursue mass destruction-many 
religiously motivated terrorist organizations have political components, represent 
constituencies that are well-defined geographically (and thus are subject to retribution), 
or depend for financial or logistical support on state parties or Diaspora communities 
whose view may not be quite as radical as their own. Second, it is the theological and 
cultural content of the particular strand of religious belief that is of greatest significance, 
rather than the mere fact that a group has a religious predilection. It has been asserted 
that the ideologies that are the most conducive to the pursuit of catastrophic violence are 
those that simultaneously reflect an apocalyptic millenarian character, in which an 
irremediably corrupt world must be purged to make way for a utopian future, and those 
that emphasize the capacity for purification from sins through sacrificial acts of 
violence. 25 
While the assessment of the viability of the threat of such an attack by the group is 
beyond the scope of this project, the chapter is based on the idea that the threat of 
nuclear terrorism is real and Al-Qaeda remains the most likely candidate to perpetrate a 
CBRN attack. Hence, understanding its nuclear narrative is key to comprehending the 
motivations and goals of the leadership and how they fashion its nuclear ambitions. To 
provide a complete picture, the various statements and fatāwā issued by the network’s 
leadership are examined. The religious authority of these decrees is also the subject of 
scrutiny. The chapter concludes by identifying the strategic implications of the Islamic 
nuclear narrative presented by Al-Qaeda, including its use as a vehicle for recruitment, 
fundraising, and legitimisation.  
Chapter Five considers two key elements of the Pakistani case: Islam as an enabling 
driver and justification for the acquisition of the bomb, and the sale and transfer of 
nuclear kit to other Muslim states. To do so, it discusses the current status of the 
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25 Ackerman, Gary. Tamsett, Jeremy (2009), Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction. Boca Raton: 
CRC Press. P. xiv 
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Pakistani nuclear arsenal, before examining the nature and role of the Islamic discourse 
in its development. As such, the role and effectiveness of this discourse in galvanising 
the support of Muslim states and financing the development of the Muslim world’s first, 
and thus far only, nuclear arsenal are scrutinised. A brief history of the inception of the 
state of Pakistan and the origins of Pakistani national identity, highlighting the 
importance of the Islamic faith in shaping the state, the nation, and its values, is offered. 
The chapter also assesses the role of the Muslim faith in shaping the views of key 
figures and decision-makers in the Pakistani programme. This includes the Pakistani 
leadership, as well as Abdul-Qadeer Khan, the ‘father’ of the Pakistani Bomb and the 
leader of the A.Q. Khan Network, responsible for smuggling nuclear materials and 
know-how to a dozen countries, including many Muslim states. It also highlights the 
key role of the bomb in Pakistani national identity and its relationship to the Muslim 
faith. Furthermore, given the country’s on-going political instability, many fear that 
Pakistani nuclear materials and facilities are among the most vulnerable to terrorist 
exploitation.26 This would especially be the case if the current political system collapses 
and leads to what some have called ‘nuclear warlordism’.27 This risk of nuclear 
terrorism and its potential to occur with Pakistani nuclear weapons are discussed. The 
chapter concludes by providing a brief comparison with the following one. 
The sixth chapter begins by looking into the evolution of Iran’s nuclear programme 
from the 1970s, with a particular focus on its current status. It briefly discusses the 
Shah’s nuclear aspirations and narrative before reviewing the implications of the Iran-
Iraq War for the nuclear dossier. It then discusses the issue of the dichotomy of national 
identity and the Muslim faith in Iran, before applying this historically conflicting 
relationship to the nuclear debate. To do so, the Islamic Republic’s structure and 
approach to international law and its supporting institutions are discussed. This includes 
the checks and balances of the Islamic regime, and their applicability to the nuclear 
issue, including the relationship between power and Islamic law. The role and place of 
the Islamic legal discourse in Iran’s nuclear narrative are assessed. The Iranian case is 
central to the legal debate, as its leadership has essentially fashioned its nuclear 
narrative around the idea that Islam and WMD are fundamentally incompatible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Bunn, Matthew (April 2010), ‘Securing the bomb 2010 – securing all nuclear materials in four years’. 
Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 
School. Nuclear Threat Initiative. P. 28  
27 Kakutani, Michiko. ‘Surveying a Global Power Shift – “Strategic Vision,” by Zibniew Brzezinski.’ 29-
01-2012.  
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Furthermore, the country’s programme has generated substantial debate regarding its 
potential domino effect across the Middle East, as well as the danger it could allegedly 
pose to the existence of Israel. The Islamic legal discourse provides the grounds for an 
analysis of Tehran’s different target audiences. The effectiveness of this discourse in 
galvanising support and legitimising the programme at home and abroad are also 
scrutinised. Moreover, the chapter considers the implications of the Islamic legal 
dimension of the Iranian nuclear programme for international efforts to cap or roll it 
back. 
The final chapter draws together the analysis by comparing and contrasting the different 
legal stances and discourses across the three case studies. It also examines the 
cumulative impact of these findings on various strategic issues ranging from nuclear 
arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, to international efforts to prevent 
nuclear terrorism. It concludes that Islamic law views nuclear weapons through the 
same lens as international law, by essentially examining the same set of ethical and 
legal principles, including the obligation to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants, not to harm the latter, and to protect the environment. These are 
formulated in international law as the ‘cardinal norms’ of international humanitarian 
law, in Islamic law, they constitute precedents and principles jurists rely on for their 
rulings on the legality of classes of weapons. Yet, given its cultural specificity, Islamic 
law is not implementable on a global-level but various Muslim actors have effectively 
used it to promote their interests. Nevertheless, Islamic law does not ultimately shape 
policymaking, yet the Islamic narrative has been very effective in providing its users 
with financial and political support, and helped them recruit volunteers. However, the 
effectiveness of the discourse stems from realpolitik and not from the viability of the 
Islamic legal and ethical discourse itself. The conclusion highlights the importance of 
the Islamic legal discourse in confidence-building, and how difficult actors make it for 
themselves to change their position once they justify their nuclear activities using the 
Islamic legal system. 
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Chapter Two: The legality of nuclear weapons: International law 
 
This chapter provides the basis for the rest of the thesis. First, it offers a point of 
comparison to facilitate the comprehension of the Islamic legal system. Second, it 
places the case studies within the international legal context. This is key to 
understanding the position of each actor on international law and affairs and its 
utilisation of the Islamic discourse. Three thematic strands shape this chapter:  
• The role of the broader philosophical and ethical discussions around war in 
fashioning the legal approach to it historically, encapsulated by just war 
thinking.  
• How international legal instruments govern various stages of the development of 
nuclear weapons and their use.  
• The parallels and points of divergence between international law and shari’a.   
The chapter begins by providing an overview of the historical context in which the 
international legal framework has been developed. By doing so, it ties the existing 
international legal framework to the Christian tradition in which it was formed, more 
particularly, the just war tradition. It then surveys the different international legal 
instruments in place – or being developed – that regulate nuclear weapons.  
 
International law – a historical overview 
The modern international legal framework was established to govern relations between 
nation-states in both war and peace. These relations are founded on what is widely 
considered as both the cornerstone of international law and international affairs: the 
notion of sovereignty. Sovereignty is the idea of the ultimate right to decision-making 
without foreign involvement. 
1 This idea, in turn, holds the notion of mutual recognition as a precondition and entails 
that no state should be left to ‘disappear against its will’. Hence, since the end of World 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These ideas are encapsulated in Article 2§4 of the United Nations Charter, which states that ‘All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations.’ 
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War II, no state, except in cases of reunification (i.e. Germany, Vietnam) has 
disappeared, while a number of states have emerged.2  
The nation state [das Volk als Staat] is the spirit in its substantial rationality and 
immediate actuality, and is therefore the absolute power on earth; each state is 
consequently a sovereign and independent entity in relation to others. The state has a 
primary and absolute entitlement to be a sovereign and independent power in the eyes 
of others, i.e. to be recognized by them. At the same time, however, this entitlement is 
purely formal, and the requirement that the state should be recognized simply because it 
is a state is abstract. Whether the state does in fact have being in and for itself depends 
on its content – on its constitution and [present] condition; and recognition, which 
implies that the two [i.e. form and content] are identical, also depends on the perception 
and will of the other state.3 
International law was established to guarantee what Hedley Bull calls the elementary or 
universal goals pursued by all societies, which are the practical equivalent of natural 
law theory. They lie in the protection of life, insurance that promises are kept (contracts 
and agreements are honoured4 to facilitate human relations), and the assurance that 
possessions will be stable to some extent.5 International law, then, is a living and 
evolving body of law and serves to make relationships among peoples more 
predictable.6 Enlightenment German philosopher Christian von Wolff argued that the 
international community should serve as a supranational regulating body (civitas 
maxima). As such, the legal framework and the institutions supporting it, in their current 
form, is the product of centuries of evolution, with roots in the Hellenic philosophy of 
right and the Roman legal system. It was in the latter that the distinction between jus 
civile, the laws regulating the lives of the citizens of the empire, and those regulating 
matters transcending jus civile came into being. The second category comprised inter-
state laws (jus inter civitates) and jus gentium (also known as jus inter gentes) or the 
forefather of contemporary international law. The system and the justice it represents 
are the direct result of reforms undertaken by Christian theologians, political and legal 
theorists, and jurists. The framework is based on an understanding of the concept of 
justice, fashioned around the central idea that, ‘man is the measure of all things’. In that 
sense, this philosophical precondition framed by Protagoras distinguishes modern 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Müllerson, Rein (2000), Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International Society. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. P. 121 
3 Hegel, G.W.F (1991), Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Edited by Allen Wood), Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. §331 
4 This has been formalised in international law as the notion of pacta sunt servanda or the presumption 
that agreements are to be upheld in good faith (rebus sic stantibus). 
5 Bull, Hedley (2002), The Anarchical Society. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 4 
6 Ibid., 7 
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secular laws from divine laws, which recognise God as the measure of all things. Thus, 
in contrast to divine laws, secular ones can be universal. Yet, this secular framework 
was developed at the heart of the Christian tradition and some of its forefathers and 
most influential thinkers were men of the Church. Their contribution to legal theory and 
the development of the modern notions of law and justice were greatly informed by 
Hellenic philosophy.  
Protagoras’ humanist approach allowed fifth century theologian, Augustine of Hippo, to 
argue that, ‘that which is not just seems to be no law at all’.7 This in turn provided 
ground for thirteenth century Italian theologian, Thomas Aquinas, to state that, ‘a 
command has the force of law in so far as it is right according to the rule of reason.’8 
The centrality of the ‘rule of reason’ in turn led Aquinas to elaborate another 
fundamental idea: ‘human laws should be adapted to the common good. But the 
common good consists of many things, and so the law must take many things into 
account, having regard to persons and matters and times.’9 This evolution in legal 
thought became the source of the transition from the so-called ‘Old Law’ to ‘New Law’. 
Aquinas compares the latter to the former as ‘the perfect to the imperfect.’10 He notes 
that:  
Two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, […] and consequently 
the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not 
accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in 
words. […] Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is 
called the law of shadow or of figure.11 
Supporting this position, fifteenth century philosopher and theologian, Nicholas of 
Cusa, emphasised that ‘all legislation is based on natural law and any law which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Aquinas, Summa theologiae: IaIIae, q 95, a 2 
8 Ibid., IaIIae, q 95, a 3-4 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., IaIIae, q 107 a 4 
11 Ibid. 
Aquinas further breaks down the reasons why temporal laws (as opposed to divine laws) should be 
changeable by referring to Augustine. ‘Augustine says at De libero arbitrio I: ‘A temporal law, no matter 
how just it may be, can be justly changed in the course of time.’ As stated above, human law is a dictate 
of reason by which human acts are directed. Accordingly, there can be two reasons why human law may 
be justly changed: one having to do with reason, the other having to do with man, whose acts are 
regulated by law. As regards reason, it seems natural for human reason to advance gradually from the 
imperfect to the perfect. Hence in the speculative sciences we see that what the first philosophers taught 
was in some degree imperfect, and was afterwards made more perfect by their successors. So too in 
practical matters. For those who first set out to discover something useful for the community of mankind, 
because they were not by themselves able to take everything into account, made certain imperfect 
arrangements which were deficient in many ways, and these were changed by their successors, who made 
other arrangements which would fail to secure the common welfare in fewer cases.’ Ibid., IaIIae, q 96 a 4 
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contradicts it cannot be valid. Hence since natural law is naturally based on reason, all 
law is rooted by nature in the reason of man.’12  
In this evolution lies what the first Persian thinker to write a book about the law, 
advocating for codification in Persia, Mostashar al-Doleh, and his contemporaries were 
seeking to explain the reasons behind the west’s progress and the Muslim world’s lack 
thereof. Indeed, the main difference between the Islamic and Christian systems lies in 
the fact that while the second revolves around the idea of a natural law (lex naturalis), 
the former suffers from a lack of substantial debate on the topic.13 Islam, as all religions, 
has an embryonic natural law, which recognises human dignity. ‘Whoever kills a soul 
unless for a soul or for corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind 
entirely. And whoever saves one [soul] - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely.’14 
This illustrates Islam’s position on what international law would later define as ‘human 
dignity’ and the ‘right to life’. These can be subject to conditions as demonstrated in the 
next chapter. However, Islam’s positive divine law can be contradictory to its 
embryonic natural law.  
 
The emergence of the international system 
The current international order was founded on two key prerequisites granting political 
communities two fundamental rights: territorial integrity and political sovereignty. 
These are the ‘collective form’ of ‘individual rights (to life and liberty)’ and ‘rest on the 
consent of [the] members’ of these political communities.15 In fact, according to some 
theorists, including Fernando Tesòn, it is vital for international law and relations to be 
extrapolated from the notion of individual rights and to be centred on the individual.16 
This ‘consent’ is what Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau call ‘the social 
contract’, explained by Michael Walzer as ‘a metaphor for a process of association and 
mutuality’. It is this ‘contract’ that ‘the state claims to protect against external 
encroachment’.17 This social contract brings an end to the state of nature, which is one 
of bellum omnium contra omnes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Nicolaus Cusanus. The Catholic Concordance, II para. 130 
13 Commission théologique internationale (2009), 1.1 (17) 
14 Quran, 5:32 
15 Walzer, Michael (2006), Just and Unjust Wars. New York: Basic Books. P. 53 
16 Müllerson, Rein (2000), 60 
17 Walzer, Michael (2006), 54 
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During the seventeenth century, ‘the emerging international system was aided in its 
formation by the overriding necessity to territorialize religion, and by the will-to-power 
of state elites in the new wars of the sixteenth century.’18 Two principles helped shape 
the new international system: exclusion and mutual recognition. The first provided that 
any entity that was not ‘coherently territorial and exclusively sovereign within’ was 
‘progressively deligitimated and expelled’ from the system. The second required a 
state’s membership of the system to be based on its acceptance by other states as the 
sole authority of a definite territory.19 
The modern state has three defining characteristics. First, it has a definite territory with 
boundaries as its exterior. Second, it has exclusive control of that territory: 
“sovereignty” means that no other entity can substantiate a claim to rule in this space. 
Third, hierarchy, that is, the state is a superior political agency that determines the role 
and powers of all subsidiary governments.20 
The distinction between ‘internal and external policy’ is a defining factor in modern 
sovereignty and holds its roots in the Westphalian order, which allowed the 
‘depoliticization that structure[d] the international system up to 1914.’ The internal 
factor paved the path for a wider acceptance of ‘the norm of non-intervention’, which 
led states to control their societies and contain the level of domestic conflict. The norm 
contained inter-state interactions within the triangle of commerce, diplomacy, and 
war.21 The external factor steered states away from ‘ideology as the principle of their 
relations in favour of the primacy of reason of state.’ This meant that these relations 
could ‘be primarily a matter of the balance of power and the acquisition of territory in 
Europe and colonies abroad.’22  
The end of the Second World War and the acceleration of a rapid process of 
globalisation by the end of the Cold War entailed changing security concerns. This 
change was stressed by the technological revolutions of the second half of the twentieth 
century, not least by the advent of the nuclear age. ‘A variety of factors have 
contributed to this feeling of insecurity. Interactions between state and non-state entities 
within the international system, for example, are occurring at a faster pace.’ What is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hirst, Paul (2001), War and Power in the 21st Century, Cambridge: Polity. P. 54 
19 Giddens, Anthony (1985), A, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, Vol. 2: The Nation-
State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity. P. 282 
20 Hirst, Paul (2001), 45 
21 Ibid., 56 
22 Ibid., 54-57 
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more, non-governmental organisations and terrorist networks alike ‘are exerting an 
increasingly powerful influence in the international system.’23  
 
The development of the notion of raison d’État 
This section provides a brief overview of the emergence and significance of the notion 
of reason of state (raison d’État), as it is key to understanding the modern international 
affairs and the development of international law. Italian Jesuit monk Giovanni Botero 
formulated the notion, which became crucial to the understanding of foreign affairs and 
international relations in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries but lost its predominance 
until its reemergence in the contemporary era. This idea, while having been developed 
independently from realpolitik, is connected to the realist school of international 
relations, as implemented by Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. In this context, 
war can be explained ‘as simply the pursuit of the ruler’s – later a state’s – interest’. In 
other words, ‘sovereigns have the power to make war for their own purposes.’ This 
approach to war emerged in the late medieval period.24  
Reason of state is founded on the core assumptions of a realism discourse on foreign 
policy. Those assumptions are that conflicts are mainly phenomena generated by factors 
within the international system, that states are the primary actors in that system, and that 
member states of the system may be friends of enemies in the future as circumstances 
dictate.25 
The notion also serves other purposes. It ‘limits the enmity of interstate relations in that 
it makes them a matter of pure power technique: one’s enemy is not an implacable foe 
but an honourable opponent in a conflict of interest.’26 Yet, Paul Hirst argues that ‘the 
thinkers of the Enlightenment would come to see reason of state as cynical and as not 
merely morally neutral but immoral.’27 This view became more universal in the post-
Cold War era, as ‘pure reason of state was tempered by common moral sentiments’.28  
The following chapters argue that despite this evolution, reason of state continues to 
play a major role in determining the approach of states to their foreign policy. This is 
especially the case with regard to the nuclear issue.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Russel, James. Wirtz, James (2008), Globalization and WMD Proliferation – Terrorism, Transnational 
Networks, and International Security. London: Routledge. P. 8 
24 Reggner, Nicholas (2013), Just War and International Order – The Uncivil Condition in World 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 41 
25 Hirst, Paul (2001), 59 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 58 
28 Ibid., 69 
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The just war tradition  
The use of force is what distinguishes international politics from domestic politics, 
viewed as ‘pacified’.29 States have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but 
within the boundaries established by the international system.30 Indeed, a 
comprehensive set of rules and laws ‘separate war, as an awful but legitimate political 
process, from that which would otherwise be criminality, pure and simple.’31 As 
highlighted by James Gow, ‘the very notion of war crimes shows that warfare is subject 
to rules, and these rules, when cast as laws, define war crimes.’32 Furthermore, ‘the 
moral reality of war is divided into two parts. War is always judged twice, first with 
reference to the reasons parties have for fighting, secondly with reference to the means 
they adopt.’33 This section provides a brief overview of just war thinking in the western 
tradition and the two sets of moral codes it has given birth to: jus ad bellum (just cause) 
and jus in bello (just conduct).34  
The just war tradition is one of ‘remarkable longevity and great complexity’. A key 
element of the tradition lies in ‘its relationship to ideas about authoritative political 
community.’ Indeed, ‘legitimate force, for the just war tradition, is (whatever else it is) 
force used by a political community with “right authority”; that is to say, it is public 
(not private) violence, and it is exercised by those who have proper authority in the 
political community.’35 This authority’s decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) and the 
means it adopts in the conduct of warfare (jus in bello) are two independent components 
of just war thinking. Hence, a war waged with a just cause can be conducted unjustly.36 
In other words, breach of jus ad bellum does not justify breach of jus in bello. Yet, the 
opposite seems less clear.  
The chief British prosecutor at Nuremberg put this argument into the language of 
international law when he said, “The killing of combatants is justifiable… only where 
the war itself is legal. But where the war is illegal…there is nothing to justify the killing 
and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber 
bands.”37 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Rengger, Nicholas (2013), x 
30 Weber, Max (1946), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. New York: Oxford University Press. P. 78 
31 Gow, James (2013), War and War Crimes – The Military, Legitimacy and Success in Armed Conflict. 
New York: Columbia University Press. P. 3 
32 Ibid., 3 
33 Walzer, Michael (2006), 21 
34 Gow, James (2013), 3 
35 Rengger, Nicholas (2013), xi 
36 Walzer, Michael (2006), 21 
37 Ibid., 38 
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Walzer clarifies this point by stating that ‘superior orders are no defence’ in the case of 
violation of the ‘war convention’. This means that the combatant is responsible and can 
be held accountable for the war crimes he commits. However, he cannot be held 
responsible for the war itself.38 Walzer underlines the role played by the nature of the 
political system in the degree of guilt of the decision-makers. Indeed, as noted by J. 
Glenn Gray, the degree to which one can be held accountable for one’s actions depends 
on the degree to which one performs them freely. In other words, ‘the greater the 
possibility of free action in the communal sphere, the greater the degree of guilt for evil 
deeds done in the name of everyone.’39 
Arguments are made for the inclusion of a third criterion to complement jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello in defining whether a war is just. The proponents of this way of thinking 
contend that one must consider not only the cause of, and the means employed in, 
warfare, but also its end. Walzer critiques the Clausewitzian idea of ‘the overthrow of 
the enemy’, noting that ‘many wars end without any such dramatic ending, and many 
war aims can be achieved well short of destruction and overthrow.’ Hence, it is 
important to ‘seek the legitimate ends of war, the goals that can rightly be aimed at. 
These will also be the limits of a just war.’40  
The following section provides an overview of the evolution of the just war tradition 
and its relationship to the emergence of the international laws governing warfare. First, 
the origins of this tradition and its evolution throughout the centuries, leading to the 
twenty-first century, are assessed. Second, the creation of the atom bomb and the 
emergence of the notion of nuclear deterrence, as a turning point in the just war 
tradition, are overviewed. Third, the impact of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 and the formation of the idea of a ‘War on Terror’ in the reassessment of the just 
war tradition is examined.  
 
Defining war 
Before providing a historical overview of the emergence of the contemporary legal 
instruments governing warfare,41 and more specifically nuclear weapons, it is important 
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39 Gray, J. Glenn (1959), The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle. New York: Harcourt. P. 199 
40 Walzer, Michael (2006), 110 
41 Warfare: ‘the conduct of militaries’; in Gow, James (2013), 1 
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to define the term ‘war’. Roman philosopher Cicero defines war as a ‘dispute by force’. 
Clausewitz’s classic definition of war is ‘a true political instrument, a continuation of 
political inter-course, carried on with other means.’42 Seventeenth century Dutch jurist 
Hugo Grotius notes, ‘Custom has so prevailed, that not the Act of Hostility, but the 
State and Situation of the contending Parties, now goes by that Name; so that War is the 
State or Situation of those (considered in that Respect) who dispute by Force of 
Arms.’43 Gow defines it as ‘a social phenomenon involving specific, dedicated social 
organisations (armed forces) in the management of restrained coercive violence for 
political purpose, governed by rules and conventions.’44 Nicholas Rengger argues that, 
‘to use the term “war” at all is also to recognise that there is an ineliminably communal 
element involved. “War” is violence waged by, and on behalf of, communities. It is not 
simply violence as such.’45 He further notes that: 
On the one hand, war is a manifestation of disorder in international society, bringing 
with it the threat of breakdown of international society itself into a state of pure enmity 
or war of all against all. The society of states, accordingly, is concerned to limit and 
contain war to keep it within the bounds of rules laid down international society itself. 
On the other hand, war –as an instrument of state policy and a basic determinant of the 
shape of international system– is a means which international society itself feels a need 
to exploit so as to achieve its own purposes. Specifically, in the perspective of 
international society, war is a means of enforcing, of preserving the balance of power, 
and arguably, of promoting changes in the law generally regarded as just.46 
According to Gow, while the essence of war has not changed, ‘the character of its 
conduct changes periodically in relation to social and technical conditions.’47 Likewise, 
the rules and laws governing warfare change according to these social and technical 
transformations. It is important to note that technology generally evolves faster than the 
law and most technological innovations can be found on the battlefield before they are 
conceptualised within the legal framework. 
As mentioned previously, the basis for the modern framework governing warfare lies in 
the just war tradition, which has evolved to meet these new social and technical 
requirements. ‘The just war tradition goes back surely to Augustine and Ambrose, 
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43 Grotius, Hugo (1853), Rights of War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vol. 1. 
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Grotius further notes that the Latin word, Bellum, comes from Duellum or duel 
44 Gow, James (2013), 1 
45 Rengger, Nicholas (2013), 3 
46 Bull, Hedley (2002), 181 
47 Gow, James (2013), 3 
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perhaps as far back as Cicero, or even Aristotle.’48 Here, it becomes important to 
distinguish between the just war tradition and the just war doctrine. 
The just war tradition tout court indeed pre-dates the modern period but […] the just 
war doctrine – that is to say the tradition as an articulate, self-aware and considered 
whole – only emerges as a settled doctrine at the beginning of the modern period and 
changes rather dramatically throughout it, most especially in the period of its so-called 
“revival” after the Second World War.49 
Whether or not a war is just, argues Renaissance Italian thinker Nicollo Machiavelli, 
can only be defined by its necessity. Indeed, ‘War is just to whom it is necessary, and 
arms are pious to those for whom there is no hope save in arms’.50 Twentieth century 
American sociologist Charles Tilly argues that statehood and warfare are inherently 
linked. To borrow his words: ‘war made the state and the state made war’.51 Therefore, 
war became a permanent factor in international affairs. Yet, this paradigm seemed to be 
shifting during the last decade of the twentieth century, as ‘a cautious but growing 
optimism [indicated] that the worst aspects of war were at last being brought under 
some sort of control.’52 This was due to several factors.  
The growing reach and appeal of globalization, the growing “thickness” of international 
law and institutions, especially in the area of human rights and their protection, the 
evolution of notions of “humanitarian intervention”: all were credited, severally or 
collectively, with helping to tame war […] “sub-rationally unthinkable”’.53 
Nevertheless, warfare continues to be a permanent factor in international affairs. The 
next section defines and places the central notion of strategy in these two contexts.  
 
Defining strategy  
The term ‘strategy’ holds its roots in the Greek strategos. ‘The strategoi were mainly 
military leaders with combined political and military authority, which is the essence 
of strategy. Because strategy is about the relationship between means and ends, the 
term has applications well beyond war’.54 In the context of war, Clausewitz defines 
strategy as ‘the use of engagements for the object of the war’. According the 
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49 Ibid., 2 
50 ‘Justum est bellum quibus necessarium.’ 
Michiavelli, Niccolo, Discourses on Livy. III.12.248/458 
51 Rengger, Nicholas (2013), 33 
52 Ibid., 36 
53 Ibid. 
54 “Strategy”, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Encyclopedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. 
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Clausewitzian view, ‘the original means of strategy is victory’, defined by ‘tactical 
success’. Its ends ‘are those objects which will lead directly to peace’. Hence, strategy 
‘assigns a particular aim’ to engagement.55  
More broadly, strategy is commonly defined as ‘being about maintaining a balance 
between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the resources 
and methods available for meeting such objectives’. As noted by Lawrence Freedman: 
‘This balance requires not only finding out how to achieve desired ends but also 
adjusting ends so that realistic ways can be found to meet them by available means.’ He 
writes that the term ‘remains the best word we have for expressing attempts to think 
about actions in advance, in the light of our goals and our capacities.’ He argues that ‘by 
and large, strategy comes into play where there is actual or potential conflict, when 
interests collide and forms of resolution are required.’56   
 
Antiquity to the medieval period	  
As mentioned previously, the origins of just war thinking can be traced back to 
antiquity and the Greco-Roman traditions and biblical Israel.57 The theory ‘emerge[d] 
out of the encounter of such general practices of war fighting and legitimation with 
specifically Christian concerns about the legitimacy of fighting at all.’58 These roots 
provide the just war tradition with ‘its early logic, much of its power, a good deal of the 
tensions that still exist within it and, in particular, creates the assumptions out of which 
the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello grows.’59 Yet, this distinction, 
which is at the heart of just war thinking as we know today, is not articulated by such 
key just war thinkers as Augustine and Aquinas. In fact, the tradition, in its ‘coherent 
and systematic form’, only ‘came together in the Middle Ages, over roughly the three 
centuries from the canonist Gratian’s magisterial collection, the Decretum, in the mid-
twelfth century to the end of the Hundred Years’ War in the mid-fifteenth century.60  
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Aquinas identified three criteria for just war: ‘the authority of the sovereign by whose 
command the war is to be waged’, a just cause, and ‘rightful intentions’.61 Aquinas 
bases his first criterion on the foundations provided by Augustine, according to which, 
only those (sovereigns) with supreme authority can ‘declare and counsel war’. The 
second criterion requires that war be only declared to those ‘who deserve it on account 
of some fault’. The third criterion of rightful intentions provides that one engages in 
warfare with the intent to advance good or to avoid evil.62 The contributions made by 
Aquinas to just war thinking and the development of jus in bello paved the way for 
future advancement of the tradition.  
The School of Salamanca,63 particularly, Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez, 
greatly contributed to the emergence of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. They argued that 
‘while in truth (i.e. in the sight of God) there is no such thing as a war just on both 
sides, human knowledge is not up to judging this with any degree of accuracy.’64 This 
led them to undertake to place restraints on the causes of war. These arguments ‘[raise] 
the significance of the jus in bello and [begin] the process of separating out the two 
parts of the tradition as we understand today.’65 Moreover, Vitoria first elaborated the 
‘Augustinian notions of right intent and the existing contemporary restrictions via canon 
law and the customs of arms, taken together as a restriction on how we should 
understand who is legitimately a combatant.’66 The idea of distinction between 
combatant and noncombatant and the immunity granted to the second by jus in bello is 
therefore based on the Vitorian view that, ‘the sole and only just cause for waging war 
is when harm has been inflicted.’ The prince, Vitoria argues, ‘cannot have greater 
authority over foreigners than he has over own subjects; but he may not draw the sword 
against his own subjects unless they have done some wrong; therefore he cannot do so 
against foreigners except in the same circumstances.’ Vitoria further contends that ‘not 
every or any injury gives sufficient grounds for waging war.’67 Thereby this 
presumption ‘places a premium on the limitation of the destructiveness not merely for 
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moral reasons but for epistemic ones: we do not know who is in the right’.68 Vitoria’s 
contribution to just war thinking is revolutionary in that he did not merely focus on the 
right of the ‘civilised’ people (i.e. Christians) in warfare, but rather those of all peoples 
regardless of religion. In On the American Indians, he argued against the common belief 
of his time, according to which ‘barbarians’ could not be governed by the same laws as 
those applicable to Christians. In other words, the same laws should be applicable to 
non-Christians as to Christians.69 As such, Vitoria argued for a law of nations, which 
would be established by and govern ‘the whole world, which is a sense of 
commonwealth’.70 He also discussed the notion of a ‘divine mandate’ to wage war, and 
argued against the idea of conversion by armed conflict.71 These ideas are further 
assessed in Chapter Four in the context of the Jihadist justification of their struggle 
(jihad) under the banner of a divine mandate. 
The School of Salamanca paved the way for Hugo Grotius, Emmerich de Vattel, and 
other thinkers whose ideas have provided the basis for the modern legal framework 
governing warfare. The framework is shaped around the central idea and main purpose 
of the just war theory, of ‘limit[ing] the occasions of war.’ This goal is achieved by 
discounting all causes short of aggression as justifiable causes of war. Vitoria writes: 
‘There is a single and only cause for commencing a war, namely, a wrong received.’72 
Later, Grotius noted that one’s right to self-defence is inalienable.  
It is to be observed, that this Right of Self-Defence, arises directly and immediately 
from the Care of our own Preservation, which Nature recommends to every one, and 
not from the Injustice or Crime of the Aggressor; for if the Person be no Ways to 
blame, as for Instance, a Soldier who carries Arms with a good Intention; or a Man that 
should mistake me for another; or one distracted, or delirious, (which may possibly 
happen) I don’t therefore lose that Right that I have of Self-Defence: For it is sufficient 
that I am not obliged to suffer the Wrong that he threatens to do me, no more than if it 
was a Man’s Beast that came to set upon me.73 
Walzer notes that, ‘the theory of aggression restates the old doctrine of the just war: it 
explains when fighting is a crime and when it is permissible, perhaps even morally 
desirable.’74 In addition to the need for a just cause to wage war, Grotius identified 
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another key criterion, which falls under jus in bello, that of moderation in warfare 
(temperamenta belli).  
 
Post-Renaissance 
The following centuries saw the emergence of new responses to war. ‘By the mid 
eighteenth century, the dominant response to the interrelationship of war and politics is 
best seen as a synthesis of the heroic75 and the realpolitik responses’. During the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a persistent yet minority response was what 
Rengger qualifies as ‘compassionate’. This response held its roots in the objection to 
violence engrained in the Christian tradition, as well as the humanism of the 
Renaissance. It draws from Renaissance scholar Desiderius Erasmus and later l’Abbé de 
Saint Pierre’s La paix perpétuelle and views war as a ‘wasteful spectacle’ of ‘heroism 
empty’. This view of war ‘permeates much of the thinking of the Enlightenment on 
politics, especially for example, the writings on international relations of Rousseau and 
German philosopher Immanuel Kant’ and constitutes what Michael Barnett formulates 
as ‘the humanitarian big bang’, taking compassion ‘from private to public realm’.76 
Likewise, the just war response ‘never viewed war as heroic […], has never accepted 
that political communities can legitimately pursue their interests irrespective of what 
those interests are […], and has never supposed that war can be abolished or 
overcome’.77  
It is doubtful if any ruler or government ever decided whether a war should be waged 
by strictly applying Just War criteria. Yet these criteria provided a standard by which 
the rightness of going to war, and the manner of waging the war, conducted by ivory-
tower theologians, these criteria were deeply assimilated into the social consciousness 
of many “Christian” nations.78  
As noted previously, Hugo Grotius is one of the most influential figures in just war 
thinking. In his survey of the oeuvres covering warfare, he notes that while his work 
builds on the various works of the French and Spanish theorists and theologians, his 
enterprise distinguishes itself by introducing the notion of a ‘right of war’ for the first 
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time.79 Grotius notes that ‘there is some Right common to all Nations, which takes 
Place both in the Preparations and in the Course of War’.80 In response to the 
conventional wisdom of his time, which held that war is void of law, he writes that that 
is only the case insofar as these are ‘those Laws that are Civil and Judicial, and proper 
for Times of Peace; but not those that are of perpetual Obligation, and are equally suited 
to all Times.’ He bases this claim on the Roman approach to war, referring to Camillus: 
‘Wars ought to be managed with as much Justice as Valour.’81 Like his predecessors, he 
emphasises the importance of the ‘Consciousness of the Justice of the Cause’.82 
 
The Industrial Revolution and codification 
During the nineteenth century, the masses became involved in warfare, an enterprise 
previously reserved to ‘gentlemen’ and enforced through drafts. This popularisation was 
especially a product of the Napoleonic War (1803-1815) and American Civil War 
(1861-1855). It led states to seek to create guidelines to preserve chivalry by codifying 
the rules and regulations of warfare.83  These efforts focused on the jus in bello, leaving 
out the jus ad bellum, which remained outside the public realm. The U.S. General Army 
Orders No. 100, also known as the Lieber’s Code (1863), provided a model for these 
codification efforts.  
Lieber’s Code initiated a series of attempts to codify the law of war. Directly inspired 
by Lieber’s Code, a number of European jurists sought to create a similar military 
handbook for European warfare. To this end they convened the 1874 Brussels 
Conference on the Proposed Rules for Military Warfare. These developments 
contributed to a movement across Europe to codify the laws of war. This movement was 
helped off the ground by Henri Dunant, who was instrumental in convening the first 
Geneva Convention of 1864.84    
Two key developments had a great impact on codification. First, the technological 
progress of that era had tremendous effects on the conduct of warfare, greatly increasing 
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its ‘destructive capacity’. Starting the 1860s, a number of new inventions changed the 
nature of warfare.85  
New military developments’ began to take place, as ‘[t]he metal-hulled, screw-
propelled ship first came into service […], as did national railroad services across 
Europe. These inventions revolutionized strategy by increasing the mobility and reach 
of armies. On the battlefield, the needle-gun, the chassepot, and the machine gun also 
first appeared around this time.86  
Second, ‘formal international law’ became more significant in that period.87 As a result, 
in the nineteenth century, war became increasingly regulated. This process allowed for a 
framework independent of the Christian faith to emerge. This independence, in turn, 
facilitated the universalisation of the laws of war, which were previously seen as merely 
applicable to Christendom.88  
Nevertheless, the main focus of nineteenth century jurists was jus in bello. In fact, from 
Vattel to the end of World War I, ‘there was hardly any meaningful talk about jus ad 
bellum’, the language of which ‘was virtually anathema to international law’. In fact, 
‘the terms “just” and “unjust” fail to appear even once in the Geneva Conventions and 
Hague Regulations.’89 This was due to two reasons. First, the development of jus in 
bello was perceived as ‘the best way to limit the destructiveness of war’, while 
developing the idea of jus ad bellum seemed much more difficult. Indeed, in a 
‘pluralistic system, […] it is easier to agree to limit the destructiveness of war when it 
arrives than it is to forge a consensus on what would constitute a just cause for the 
resort to war’.90 Second, ‘the existence and viability of international law was understood 
to “depend upon the un-stated assumption that each party is neither more right than 
wrong in having gone to war in the first place; all laws of war must assume that both 
parties are equally in the right.”’91 This assumption, as discussed above, holds its roots 
in Vitoria’s thinking. The process of codification and ‘the progressive development of 
international law’ continue to remain a tremendous endeavour and, since the end of 
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World War II, it has become ‘one of the tasks of the United Nations (U.N.), performed 
mainly by the International Law Commission (ILC).’92 
 
The world at war (1914-18 and 1939-1945) 
The First World War’s ‘scale and duration […] damaged the legitimacy of war as a 
morally neutral power technique in relations between states’.93 Until then, ‘States were 
presumed […] to have a right of war in defense of their interests, which therefore made 
the traditional questions of the jus ad bellum irrelevant.” Therefore, where previously 
the doctrine of compétence de guerre’ entailed ‘an absolute right of war’, the end of 
World War I led to ‘state leaders and international lawyers [seeking] more radical 
solutions in the jus ad bellum.’94 Hence, ‘[in] the years immediately following World 
War I, wars of aggression were defined as ipso facto illegal, and self-defense was 
enshrined as the only legitimate cause for lawful resort to war.’95 
Conversely, ‘the Second World War became a fight for survival between states and 
ideologies’. War now had unlimited objectives: policy required absolute war and the 
elimination of the enemy.’ In fact, ‘the logic of war to ascent to the extreme was 
doubled by the logic of extreme political goals.’96 The end of World War II, precipitated 
by the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, shed a new light on the conduct of 
warfare, as the extent of the damage war could induce was taken to a whole new level. 
This understanding led the drafters of the U.N. Charter to only take ‘one legal basis for 
war, that would be self-defense, and that all other recourse to war would be equated 
with aggression.’97 In Walzer’s words: ‘Aggression is remarkable because it is the only 
crime that states can commit against other states; everything else is, as it were, a 
misdemeanor.’98 Thereby, ‘the distinction between just and unjust wars, de-emphasized 
by nineteenth century jurists, was reestablished over the course of the twentieth century, 
only this time it was stated in legal terms.’99 This development led to the 
institutionalisation of ‘the legalistic parlance of the twentieth century’, which led to ‘just 
wars [being] equated with wars of national defense while wars of aggression became 
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synonymous with unjust wars.’100 This in turn led to a significant change in the 
understanding and a narrower scope of jus ad bellum. The jus ad bellum were 
‘constrict[ed] such that fewer just causes would be recognized for going to war’ and 
‘formal[ised]’, meaning ‘the right to war was restated in legalistic terms.’101 
 
Governing warfare in the nuclear age 
The first half of the twentieth century saw the division of the western world ‘between 
those who saw war as simply one aspect of state policy among many (in fact very few), 
those who saw it as anathema under any circumstances (equally few), and those who 
saw it – when they thought of it at all – as a terrible necessity.’102 This view translated 
into the belief that ‘war should only be fought when something considered really 
valuable is at stake and, given the ideological orientation of the century, that would 
more often than not translate into fighting war for basic “values”’. In this context, ‘the 
maxim that necessity knows no law is likely to be omnipresent. In other words, 
realpolitik wedded to ideology is likely to produce “total” war.103 The latter part of the 
twentieth century witnessed a departure from this mode of thinking, leading to a more 
‘compassionate response’ to war, according to which, ‘war must sometimes be fought, 
but it must also be possible to fight it justly and well. This is the only way to avoid the 
excesses of ideological war and of a wholly instrumental realpolitik.’104  
It is thanks to these political and strategic developments that the legal framework 
governing the conduct of warfare became more elaborate during the twentieth century. 
But this was also due to the profound shift in the very nature of warfare, as new military 
technology changed the conduct of hostilities on the battlefield and beyond. The 
conduct of warfare began to change during the nineteenth century, with the advent of 
new technologies. But no new technology had the same impact on the conduct of 
hostiles and the ethical and moral dilemmas surrounding war as the atom bomb. In this 
sense, ‘nuclear weapons made a fundamental difference to the nature of war because 
they undermined its rationality. Heretofore, war was a means to an end.’105 The advent 
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of the atomic age entailed a different approach to armed conflict not only in practice, 
but also on an ethical level.   
Nuclear weapons made the rapid escalation to absolute war likely, that is, a generalized 
exchange in which both the states and societies of the contending powers were 
destroyed. Nuclear weapons removed the constraints that had limited the 
destructiveness of war. But, far from reinforcing the offensive, these weapons led to 
military stalemate. These weapons undermined any possible political objective that their 
use could serve.106 
The addition of nuclear weapons to the equation not only changed the approach to the 
conduct of warfare and its legal governance, but also overall political strategy. Indeed, 
‘their use would signify that political strategy had failed. In this case the political effects 
of this innovation in military technology were fairly direct.’107 Likewise, ‘by holding 
forth on nuclear deterrence, arms control and East-West diplomacy, analysts could 
maintain that these were more important issues than the distractions of actual wars 
going on elsewhere in the world.’108 The advent of nuclear weapons and the emergence 
of a new form of warfare, the Cold War, led to a rise in the use of guerrilla warfare. Yet, 
nuclear war ‘remained the dominant form of war, the one that shaped the core strategies 
of the most powerful states.’ Nuclear weapons are viewed by some as a stabilising 
force, which have reduced the likelihood of another devastating conventional war, 
rendering events like the two World Wars of the twentieth century less possible.109 
However, they have been revealed ineffective in addressing the challenges posed by 
guerilla warfare, counter-insurgency, and non-state actors. While no global conflict 
since the end of the Second World War has matched its intensity, the second half of the 
twentieth century was marked by dirty wars, genocides, and terrorist attacks that these 
weapons could not prevent.  
 
The Cold War and just deterrence 
The advent of the nuclear age and the Cold War challenged many fundamental 
principles of warfare. Such norms as the distinction between combatants and 
noncombatants and proportionality could no longer be understood in the same way they 
were in the context of conventional warfare. To remedy that, some thinkers attempted to 
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rationalise nuclear decision-making within the realm of just war theory. Others went 
even further by trying to apply just war theory to nuclear weapons. One of these 
attempts was to propose a model of just deterrence, as deterrence was viewed as the 
atom bomb’s raison d’être. Deterrence was also a key component of nuclear and 
foreign policy during the Cold War. Yet, not only can the idea of a just deterrence be 
questioned, but also its morality. ‘The reason for our acceptance of deterrent strategy, 
most people would say, is that preparing to kill, even threatening to kill, is not at all the 
same thing as killing. Indeed it is not, but it is frighteningly close−else deterrence 
wouldn’t “work”.’ The moral problem with deterrence, Walzer argues, lies ‘in the 
nature of that closeness’.110 
Nevertheless, shortly before the end of the Cold War, Malcolm McCall argued that ‘the 
political and military leaders in those nations which possess strategic nuclear weapons 
have lacked moral guidelines by which to assess their own implementation of nuclear 
deterrence.’111 In an attempt to establish such criteria, applicable to nuclear weapons, 
McCall proposes a model based on jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which he qualifies as 
‘jus ad dissuasionem’ and ‘jus in dissuasione’. The first, he argues, encompasses 
‘conditions which concern the rightness of introducing (or maintaining) nuclear 
deterrence’, addressing the ‘Why? And When’. The second establishes ‘those 
conditions concerning the way deterrence should be conducted’, assessing the 
‘How?’112 McCall further argues that in order for deterrence, whether nuclear or non-
nuclear, to be just, it must meet the ‘peace and justice’ requirement, of which, the 
criteria are ‘just cause’ and ‘right intention’. That is defined as a war that is ‘permissible 
only to confront “a real and certain danger”.113 Arthur Hockaday, however, argues that 
McCall is over ambitious in his positing ‘peace with justice’ and contends that ‘it is 
unreasonable to stipulate that without this very ambitious aim deterrence cannot be 
characterised as Just.’114 McCall counters arguments presented by Hockaday and others, 
according to which just deterrence aims to prevent war and notes that the right intention 
in doing so is key.115 Furthermore, McCall highlights what he perceives as the ‘central 
point’ in the discussion, which lies in the fact that ‘successful deterrence depends upon 
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mutual perception, so, compared to traditional Just War thinking, there is a fundamental 
shift of emphasis in Just Deterrence towards mutuality and reciprocity.’116  
McCall goes on to apply the ‘cardinal norms’ of international humanitarian law, which 
hold their roots in the just war tradition, to deterrence. First, he discusses the impact of 
deterrence-failure and a subsequent nuclear detonation on the idea of proportionality.117 
Second, he questions the role of the idea of discrimination (distinction between 
combatants and noncombatants) in the decision-making, while raising questions 
regarding the meaning of ‘intentional’ in the targeting of non-military objects. In doing 
so, he discusses the challenges posed by nuclear weapons to this idea, but rejects some 
of them by claiming that, ‘all modern warfare tends to be indiscriminate in its effects.’ 
While such a statement is too broad and not nuanced, the uniqueness of nuclear 
weapons in this regard has been argued.118  
The end of the Cold War marked a new era in warfare, by ‘loosening’ the just war 
tradition. ‘This loosening amounts to a more favorable disposition toward 
interventionist politics and represents a reversal of the narrowing and tightening of the 
jus ad bellum that took place over the previous two hundred years.’119 This ‘loosening’, 
however, could arguably have started after the end of the First Persian Gulf War. 
According to Walzer, that war was ‘fought in strict accordance with the classic just war 
paradigm’, as the war was brought to an end ‘once the invasion of Kuwait had been 
decisively defeated.’120 
 
The age of post-modern terrorism 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks challenged the notion of just war theory. Much of the narrative 
U.S. President George W. Bush and U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair developed to 
justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003 revolved around the notion of a ‘bona fide just cause 
for war.’121 While scholars, analysts, and policymakers later challenged this narrative 
and the ‘just cause’ presented by Bush and Blair, they led to two developments in the 
field. First, the debate around the just war tradition, including just cause, just means, 
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and just ends, was revived and publicised. Second, a new scholarly movement seeking 
to explain war and its just conduct in the  
Islamic tradition emerged. The events of 9/11 entailed a number of political, strategic, 
legal, and ethical changes, which are discussed further in the following sections and 
Chapter Four.    
Kenneth Waltz has suggested that three basic facts about world politics seem 
remarkably unchanged by 9/11. The first is what he terms the “gross imbalance of 
power” in the world since the demise of the Soviet Union, namely unchallenged US 
primacy. The second is the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons in particular and to 
some extend weapons of mass destruction in general, a trend certainly made worse by 
events since 9/11 but firmly in place long before it and, indeed, in many respects a 
central feature of international politics almost from the beginning of the nuclear era. 
The third is the permanence and prevalence of crises in the world, crises in which, given 
its position, the US is almost certain to be involved to some extent, but which are, again 
a well-known feature of international politics in almost any era.122 
Waltz’ claim regarding the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons is incorrect. 
Indeed, no new state, except the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), has 
successfully developed a nuclear capability since Pakistan in the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
despite the consistency of these three factors, Reggner argues that 9/11 had significantly 
impacted: ‘claims about the character of the use of force.’ As discussed previously, the 
end of the Second World War led to ‘the rise of […] “the compassionate mode” of 
responses to the problem of war’. This ‘meant that, from the founding of the United 
Nations onwards, the official rhetoric and (at least arguably) much of the formal 
practice of international relations was devoted to the idea of the restraint, limitation and 
even abolition of war.’123 Reggner further contends that this is the ‘ideal that 
underpinned the foundation’ of the NPT and a ‘central theme in the Cold War’, 
according to which, ‘a direct confrontation was too horrific and too irrational to 
contemplate’ given the existence of nuclear weapons.124 
This trend was disturbed by 9/11, as the nature of warfare changed once again. First, 
‘the political space’, existing in the ‘post-Westphalian codes’, which ‘presuppose a 
political battlefield’ with ‘two states battling it out for a recognised political end’ have 
arguably ‘hollowed out since 2001.’ Second, as suggested by Christopher Coker, in the 
context of the ‘War on Terror’, the underlying assumption is that ‘there can be no 
compromise on Truth’. This further enhances the difficulty of evaluating ‘Islamist 
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terrorism in pragmatic or politically rational terms’, the difference in the understanding 
of the ‘role of human reason in political affairs, and having to compromise on 
‘everything […] that Western liberals themselves regard as “scared” as other layers of 
challenges.’125 This also creates another challenge, that of the lack of empathy, and 
consequently, that of knowledge of the adversary. In other words, many policymakers 
tend to take for granted that the adversary is irrational and to dismiss its concerns and 
values. This has been especially the case in the context of the War on Terror, but also in 
general western foreign policy toward the Muslim world. This also stems from the 
tendency to group all Muslim populations together as a single, coherent entity, 
disregarding their specificities and differences, which are further discussed in the case 
studies. This, in turn, is mainly due to the fact ‘our moral codes have traditionally been 
derived from religious injunctions […] in the last three hundred years the West has 
largely derived the laws of war from what philosophers have had to say, not the 
theologians.’ In fact, ‘it is philosophy which has carried the burden of the ethical 
debate’.126 Third, the nature of ‘our ethical and legal codes have tended to take the 
Weberian understanding that violence is legitimate only when exercised by the state’. 
This view ‘allowed Clausewitz […] to conceive war as a duel between states or moral 
equals.’ It assumes that states, like participants in a duel, ‘hold certain values in 
common and are prepared to defend their honour, at times at great risk to themselves. In 
a duel there is always a winner and a loser, unless one of the parties (or both) agrees to 
suspend the exchange’.127 This understanding of war has been challenged by the 
emergence of non-state actors in the realm of warfare. Coker argues that these factors 
underpin the arguments advanced in the western world, according to which the codes 
governing warfare cannot be applied to the ‘War on Terror’. These views hold true that 
wars are no longer symmetrical ‘even when it comes to traditional ideas of what is right 
or wrong’. What is more, the adversary is composed of individuals or groups that do not 
abide by ‘the etiquettes of war which most states, with only a few exceptions, have 
chosen to recognise for centuries – if sometimes only in the breach, not the 
observance.’128 Furthermore, not only are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks not 
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combatants129 in the traditional sense, they also do not target combatants or even states, 
but rather entire populations. This is further discussed in Chapters Three and Four. As 
highlighted by Coker, ‘Al-Qaeda’s fatwa of 1998 was issued not against the United 
States, but the American people.’130  
Nevertheless, ‘what is clearly new in the post-9/11 situation is the character of the use 
of force’. This character stems from al-Qaeda representing ‘“a new kind of threat” that 
departs from earlier kinds of “terrorism” in both its methods and its techniques.’131 
Hence, several arguments can be made. First, with globalisation, ‘this kind of long war 
must be fought at all levels, not merely in military action but also in financial, legal and 
ideological terms’. Second, ‘the much-hyped “revolution in military affairs” was – at 
best – overstated, for the 9/11 bombers did not use high-tech weaponry but turned basic 
and “everyday” technology against the West’. Third, and most importantly, ‘that the 
“nuclear taboo” is becoming eroded both by states and by the desire on the part of non-
state actors like al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons or at least some form of weapons 
of mass destruction’.132 The causes and consequences of these developments are further 
assessed in Chapter Four.  
As mentioned previously, these events led to the emergence of new discourses in the 
realm of just war tradition. These are unfolding in an era where ‘strategy, politics and 
law are changing simultaneously, where, previously, change has been in more 
sequenced steps.’133 Additionally, since the 1990s, one of the most important 
developments in warfare lies in the growing role of the media in the scrutiny of the 
conduct of military operations.  
International judicial developments, coupled with advances in communications, have 
changed the landscape for the future conduct of warfare. This has clearly been the case, 
from Bosnia to al-Qa’ida terrorists, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, and will be wherever 
else action has to be taken. No future war will be conducted […] without intense public-
particularly media-scrutiny and attention to potential war crimes.134 
For all these reasons, a re-examination of ‘our understanding of the self-defense needs’ 
was advocated in light of concerns that ‘that the nexus between transnational terrorism, 
rogue states, and nuclear proliferation poses a novel threat that requires “new thinking” 
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on how best to respond.’135 In fact, some argued that if the international community fell 
short of re-assessing its conventions, it would ‘risk continuing to fight twenty-first 
century conflicts with twentieth century rules.’136 In former British Defence Secretary 
John Reid’s words:  
We owe it to ourselves, to our people, to our forces and to the cause of international 
order, to constantly reappraise and update the relationship between our underlying 
values, the legal instruments which apply them to the world of conflict, and the 
historical circumstances in which they are to be applied, including the nature of that 
conflict.137 
These developments led to a shift in the approach to jus ad bellum. As noted by Walzer, 
‘it is a feature of just war theory in its classic formulations that aggression is regarded as 
the criminal policy of a government, not as the policy of a criminal government-let 
alone a criminal system of government’.138 This idea was challenged by the 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the goal was to overthrow and replace ‘a 
criminal government’.139  
 
Summary 
The previous section offered a brief overview of the developments leading to the 
establishment of the just war tradition, as we know it today. It discussed the Greco-
Roman and Christian roots of the theory and its formation in the bosom of the Church 
thanks to the contributions of theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas. It highlighted 
the questions and issues raised by the thinkers of the School of Salamanca and their role 
in determining the independence of a just cause from just means. It evaluated the 
evolution of jus ad bellum and jus in bello throughout the twentieth century. It 
identified four key events, which challenged and subsequently shaped the tradition and 
the laws it fashioned in their current form. First, the Industrial Revolution changed the 
conduct of hostilities on the battlefield. A number of new materials and technologies 
revolutionarised warfare. Second, the transition of warfare from an enterprise reserved 
to the elite to one open to all led to the codification of a legal body governing armed 
conflict. This was undertaken in the context of a broader international legal codification 
trend. Third, the end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the atomic age, 
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leading to a reevaluation of armed conflict, strategy, and international affairs. Nuclear 
weapons challenged the traditional understanding of such key notions as the prohibition 
against the unnecessary suffering of combatants, the distinction between combatants 
and noncombatants, noncombatant immunity, and proportionality. Finally, the terrorist 
attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 and the ‘War of Terror’ stirred 
the debate around just war tradition and the norms governing warfare.  
 
International law  
The following section provides a brief overview of the key general notions of 
international law, before defining the key norms of the law of international armed 
conflict or international humanitarian law. The section serves to offer the legal tools to 
better comprehend the international legal context of each case study, while providing a 




One of the key concepts in international law is that of jus cogens, which is defined in 
the 1969 Vienna Convention as  
A peremptory norm of general international law accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is 
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.140  
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in its 1998 decision in 
Prosecutor v. Furundžija noted that: 
One of the consequences of the jus cogens character bestowed by the international 
community upon the prohibition of torture is that every State is entitled to investigate, 
prosecute and punish or extradite individuals accused of torture, who are present in a 
territory under its jurisdiction.141 
Consequently, States have universal jurisdiction over breaches of jus cogens norms. 
While the question of which norms of international law fall under it is rather 
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controversial, some issues have been clearly classified as jus cogens by the 
jurisprudence. 
 
Pacta sunt servanda  
In order for the international legal system to function as designed, agreements need to 
be implemented in good faith. This prerequisite is formulated as pacta sunt servanda. 
The international framework, unlike domestic ones, lacks an enforcement mechanism. It 
is crucial to pinpoint that some member states are complicit in keeping the system weak, 
so as not to threaten their national sovereignty and interests. The Security Council 
Permanent Five members, composed of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States (P5), are often among the states aiming to maintain the status quo, 
at times at the expense of international system. What is more, international treaties, 
even unwritten ones, are binding. Members of the international community, among 
which are a number of Muslim states, do not always respect this idea. These states tend 
to sign and ratify international legal instruments, but fail to implement them nationally 
as they contain provisions which they see as incompatible with Islamic law. This has 
especially been the case with international human rights legal instruments.  
 
Sources  
The sources of international law are enumerated in Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ 
as follows:  
a. International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states; 
b. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. Subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.142 
Customary international law comes into being through the ‘evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law’. This second component of customary international law is 
known as opinio juris sive necessitatis. Opinio juris was described as ‘a belief that this 
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practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it’ by the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf case.143  
 
Jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
As mentioned in the previous sections, the laws of war are traditionally divided into two 
main components: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The former is a framework ‘governing 
the legality of war’, while the second draws the limitations to the means and methods of 
warfare.144 Both aggressor and aggressed, in breach of jus ad bellum can be found in 
breach of jus in bello.145 Jus in bello or law of international armed conflict provides the 
contemporary framework governing the conduct of hostilities. Laws of international 
armed conflict can be defined as a system of checks-and-balances system, ‘intended to 
minimize human suffering without undermining the effectiveness of military 
operations’.146 As stated in Article 35 (1) of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions (AP I), ‘In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the convention to 
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.’147  
Since the end of the Second World War, post conflict strategies, such as peacebuilding, 
have become increasingly important, leading some scholars to add a third category to 
the existing two: jus post bellum. This, however, has yet to gain the same prominence in 
the legal sphere as the political one and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Indeed, the 
idea of post conflict responsibility is rather new in the international legal arena, thus not 
quite established internationally and non-existent in the Islamic framework. The 
following sections discuss at the two traditional areas of the laws of war, jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello. 
 
Jus ad bellum 
The U.N. Charter is one of the few key international legal instruments regulating jus ad 
bellum. Article 39 of Charter provides that the UNSC is responsible for determining and 
regulating when it is legal for a country to initiate an armed conflict.   
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144 Dinsein, Yoram (2010), The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict. 
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145 Dinstein, Yoram (1996), Crimes Against Humanity. Tel Aviv: Brill Academic Pub. P. 2 
146 Ibid., 5 
147 Geneva Conventions: Additional Protocol I (1977), Article 35 (1) 
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The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.148 
Aggression is defined as ‘the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations’. It is a crime against peace.149 Yet, the Security 
Council’s ability and willingness to denounce wars of aggression and its legitimacy as 
an institution safeguarding international peace and security have been questioned a 
number of times. Some argue that this is due to the fact that the institution is a product 
of the post-World War II era and has failed to reflect the strategic and political realities 
of the modern world. What is more, the UNSC has often served as a vehicle to 
safeguard the political interests of the P5. For these reasons, a number of critics, 
including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have called for the body to be 
reformed.150 As discussed further in Chapter Six, this has been the case of Tehran, 
where the failure of the Security Council to effectively condemn Iraq’s act of aggression 
and its use of chemical weapons against Iran has left a lasting mark. What is more, the 
role of the divine mandate was theoretically downplayed in just war thinking during the 
Renaissance. Yet, the Security Council served as a vehicle for the reintroduction of the 
notion of the divine mandate following 9/11.  
[Vitoria] argued against the divine mandate on the grounds that there was no precedent 
and no direct proof that God had in fact commanded particular wars. Vitoria left open 
the possibility that God could theoretically issue a mandate for war but insisted that 
those claiming such a mandate provide evidence of its existence.151 
 
Jus in bello 
In 1964, a conference held in Geneva initiated the drafting of the first Geneva 
Convention (GC). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a non-
governmental organisation overseeing the implementation of the convention, was thus 
created.152  
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In this respect, international humanitarian law has a similar purpose as the laws of war 
revealed to the Muslim prophet, Muhammad. Indeed, Muhammad’s mandate was to 
reform the pre-Islamic practices and laws of Arab tribes. Muhammad’s reforms did not 
translate into the complete removal of the previous era’s culture and merely changed 
those practices viewed as the most ‘unethical’.153 Likewise, the proposed reforms 
concerning the laws of war in the west were for the most out-dated practices. However, 
the system was not merely a reformation but rather a codification of all existing and 
new laws. This codification held its roots in the Deuteronomy,154 which already codified 
the laws of war millennia before modern international humanitarian law coming into 
being,. 
Latter steps taken by the Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) to outlaw armed conflict 
and limit armaments were too idealistic. However, despite their failure to outlaw war, 
the Hague Conventions did have an impact on laws of international armed conflict and 
on international law in general.155 This is illustrated by the U.N. Charter’s avoidance of 
the use of the term ‘war’, in an effort to use a positive terminology. Nevertheless, in the 
century to follow, all new technologies were used as means of warfare.  
 
Principles of international humanitarian law 
The two traditional cardinal principles of international humanitarian law are that of the 
distinction between civilians and combatants and that of the avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering to combatants.156 As highlighted by Israeli scholar of laws of war, Yoram 
Dinstein, the ICJ in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons found these two 
principles to be ‘intransgressible’ under customary international law.157 In fact, ‘the 
adjective “intransgressible” seems to imply that no circumstances would justify any 
deviation “from the principle”’.158 Similar notions exist in Islamic law and are discussed 
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As stated by Leslie Green, ‘one of the oldest rules of the law of war provides for the 
protection of the civilian noncombatant population and forbids making civilians the 
direct object of attack.’160 Article 51(4) of AP I prohibits indiscriminate attacks, 
defining them as: 
Those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
Those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or 
Those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; 
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military objectives and 
civilians or civilian objects without distinction. 
The only exception to this rule is the killing of civilians as collateral damage, which 
must meet certain conditions to be just. 
 
Unnecessary suffering 
The notion of unnecessary suffering is at the heart of the prohibition on a number of 
weapons in international law. As discussed further in the next sections, this is the case 
of Dum-Dum bullets, which expand in the victim’s body, as well as chemical and 
biological weapons. Article 23 (e) of The Hague Convention IV prohibits the use of 
‘arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.’ Seventy years 
later, Article 35(2) of AP I confirmed this idea: ‘It is prohibited to employ weapons, 
projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering.’  
 
Neutrality  
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A third key principle identified by the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons 
is that of neutrality.161 Wartime neutrality is ‘the legal status arising from the abstention 
of a state from all participation in a war between other states, the maintenance of an 
attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents, and the recognition of this abstention 
and impartiality.’162 Its ‘modern […] conception had its birth in conflicts upon the sea, 
the common heritage of all nations and the exclusive possession of none.’163 Since, the 
notion has evolved. Grotius argues that, ‘the right of passage through neutral territory 
could, if denied, be taken by force’. Vattel, however, contends that, ‘it is a violation of 
sovereignty to enter territory without the consent of the sovereign, except in case of 
extreme necessity’. He defines such a case as one in which ‘an army, to avoid 
destruction, may force its way, “sword in hand,” through neutral territory’.164 
Nevertheless, the law was mainly developed in the nineteenth century but lost much of 
its importance in the latter half of the twentieth century.165 According to the law, as 
defined by Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Conventions, the neutrality of states is to be 
respected during armed conflicts and neutral states cannot to be invaded or used for the 
deployment of forces. Article 1 of the Hague Convention V reads: ‘the territory of 
neutral Powers is inviolable.’  
 
Proportionality 
The notion of proportionality is also key in the discussions around the use of weapons 
of mass destruction, and nuclear weapons in particular. Current customary law of 
international armed conflict definitely confirms the precept that an attack against 
military objectives expected to cause disproportionate collateral damage to civilians or 
civilian objects, in relation to the military advantage anticipated, is unlawful.166 
However, regardless of the quasi-consensus around the need for damage inflicted by 
warfare to be proportional to the anticipated military advantage, and despite nuclear 
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weapons not being in accordance with this norm, they have not been banned on these 
grounds.  
 
Protection of Civilians  
Articles 48 and 52 (1) of AP I prohibit the ‘direct and deliberate’ targeting of civilians 
and civilian objects. Article 52 (2) further prohibits ‘acts or threats of violence the 
primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population’, classifying 
such attacks as war crimes under Article 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). Such means and methods are prohibited under international law regardless 
of their success or failure.  
Traditionally, all able-bodied adult men were considered as combatants and only 
women and children were automatically considered for civilian immunity. Chapter 
Three discusses the notion of civilian immunity in the Islamic tradition and notes that 
this rule is also valid in the Islamic system. Walzer identifies the ‘first attempt’ to 
‘regulate the wartime treatment of women’ as a passage in the Book of Deuteronomy, 
providing that: 
When thou goest forth to battle against thine enemies, and the Lord thy god deliverest 
them into thy hands, and though carriest them away captive, and seest mong the 
captives a woman of goodly form, and thou hast a desire unto her, and wouldst take her 
to thee to wife; then thou shalt brig her home to thy house … and she shall … bewail 
her father and mother a full month; and after that thou mayest go in unto her, and be her 
husband, and she shall be thy wife. And … if thou have no delight in her, then thou 
shalt let her o whither she will; but thou shalt not sell her … for money, thou shalt not 
deal with her as a slave…167 
 
Protection of Combatants 
The law of international armed conflict protects combatants from punishment for 
participating in the hostilities. Combatants retiring or becoming hors de combat, either 
by surrendering or being wounded, sick or shipwrecked, are also protected. They have 
certain rights under international humanitarian law.  
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Weaponry 
A weapon can be defined as ‘an offensive capability that can be applied to a military 
object or enemy combatant.’168 The cardinal principles of international humanitarian 
law enumerated above determine whether a given weapon is legal under international 
law. However, some weapons fall into a grey area; this is especially the case for nuclear 
weapons. Technology typically progresses faster than legal precepts, thus leaving a void 
in the international law of armed conflict. Hence, if the explicit prohibition or 
authorisation of a given weapon or a class of weapons is not found under existing 
instruments of international humanitarian law, it must be sought in its general 
principles. The ICJ used this method to determine whether nuclear weapons are legal or 
prohibited by international law. Article 36 of AP I reads: 
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method 
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its 
employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by 
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.  
Article 8 (2) (b) of the Rome Statute prohibits the use of several classes of weapons in 
international and non-international armed conflict. Their use is considered a war crime. 
These include: poison or poisoned weapons, asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and 
all analogous liquids, materials and devices, expandable bullets, and more generally, all 
weapons which are inherently indiscriminate or of a nature to cause superfluous injury 
or unnecessary suffering. Expanding bullets, otherwise known as Dum-Dum bullets, are 
prohibited under the Hague IV Declaration III Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of 
Expanding Bullets  (1899) as they cause unnecessary pain and suffering. Likewise, the 
Ottawa Treaty (1997) bans anti-personnel mines.  
 
Summary 
This section provided an overview of the general principles and sources of international 
law, before applying them to the international law of armed conflict. It then discussed 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello in more detail, elaborating on the cardinal norms of 
international humanitarian law. The next section builds on the discussions of this 
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chapter thus far to offer a survey of the different international instruments in place to 
govern nuclear weapons.  
 
Contemporary international legal instruments governing nuclear weapons 
This section builds on the terms and notions defined previously to offer an overview of 
the various international legal instruments, which govern the test, production, 
possession, stockpiling, threat, and/or use of nuclear weapons.  
The atom bomb is the only WMD not currently prohibited by a universal international 
treaty. The other two, chemical and biological weapons, are governed by universal legal 
instruments. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
(BWC) and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) 
respectively entered into force in 1975 and 1997. However, while the prohibition on 
chemical weapons is total, that of biological weapons is more limited. Unlike the CWC, 
the BWC does not include a comprehensive set of verification provisions. While there 
have been debates regarding the potential development of a similar legal instrument for 
nuclear weapons, a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) has not yet materialised into 
something practical.169 A NWC would be modelled after the two above conventions and 
the Ottawa Treaty. It would prohibit the development, acquisition, stockpiling, threat, 
and use of nuclear weapons, and eventually eliminate existing stockpiles. 
  
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
The NPT (1968) is considered as the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation 
regime. It recognises five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), the permanent five members 
of the UNSC. All other states signed up as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). 
While Iran has signed and ratified the Treaty, Pakistan has not, along with India and 
Israel. The DPRK was a Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the NPT but withdrew in 
2003. It constitutes, thus far, the only case of NPT withdrawal.170 The DPRK, India, 
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Israel, and Pakistan are de facto nuclear-armed states, although Israel has not politically 
declared its widely suspected capability. 
The NPT has three ‘pillars’: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under the Treaty, NWS must refrain from transferring 
nuclear weapons or providing assistance for the development of such weapons to Non 
Nuclear Weapon States. Likewise, the latter are obliged to refrain from ‘horizontal’ 
proliferation or acquiring such weapons. For their part, the NWS agree to refrain from 
‘vertical’ proliferation or the increase in number and quality of nuclear weapons.171 
However, the NPT includes a commitment for NNWS to receive assistance in 
developing nuclear programmes for civilian use. This is guaranteed by Article IV, 
which states that, ‘nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable 
right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I 
and II.’ The NPT is, therefore, inherently discriminatory and all signatories have 
accepted this ‘Grand Bargain’.172  
NNWS are offered a set of negative and positive assurances. These assurances were 
adopted as United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), with negative 
assurances being provided by UNSCR 984 (1995) and positive ones by UNSCR 225 
(1968). The former includes commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons 
against NNWS, while the second includes coming to the aid of NNWS if threatened 
with nuclear weapons or subject to their use.  
Lastly, while some states have made political commitments regarding ‘no first use’ 
(NFU), these remain merely political and not legally binding.173 Hence, states can 
change their positions without any legal implications, albeit at a political cost. In fact, 
while no state has yet reversed its NFU policy in practice, there is a historical precedent 
for a state reversing its policy rhetorically. This was the case of the Soviet Union’s 
succeeding state, the Russian Federation in 1993.174  
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the international verification body 
charged with policing non-nuclear weapon states’ commitments not to divert nuclear 
material from peaceful to military applications. NNWS sign safeguards agreements with 
the IAEA to provide it with the authority to verify peaceful uses. 
 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
The CTBT, which opened for signature in 1996 at the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA), bans nuclear testing. Prior to the CTBT, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union signed a Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) in 
1993. The CTBT provides for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty 
Organisation (CTBTO), responsible for operating a global verification regime, the 
International Monitoring System (IMS). The Organisation is further responsible for the 
implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the treaty. In order for the 
treaty to come into force, all thirty-five states with a nuclear reactor on their territory 
must sign and ratify it. Eight countries are yet to do so. Three majority Muslim states - 
Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan - are among them, as well as China, India, Israel, the DPRK, 
and the United States. Therefore, the treaty is not yet in force, but has nonetheless been 
successful in establishing a de facto norm against testing. Besides the three tests 
conducted by the DPRK in the past decade, the last tests were conducted by Pakistan 
and India in 1998. The last NWS to conduct a nuclear test were China and France in 
1996.175 
 
The 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
The 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion assesses the legality of the 
threat and use of nuclear weapons. The Advisory Opinion was first requested by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), but was dismissed by the ICJ, on the grounds that 
the case was outside its competence. The case was accepted when it was brought before 
the Court by the UNGA. The Court held that the threat of nuclear weapons occurs more 
in the context of a policy of nuclear deterrence than the actual use thereof, as the 
weapons had only been used twice in the context of an armed conflict – in Hiroshima 
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and Nagasaki by the United States in 1945. Hence, the Court concluded that jus in bello 
is not applicable to nuclear weapons, since threats do not amount to a state of armed 
conflict. It did, however, rule that jus ad bellum is applicable (Art. 2.4). The Court 
criticised the very formulation of the question presented to it: ‘is the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons permitted in any circumstance under international law’.176 The ICJ 
further rejected the ‘Lotus principle’, according to which, that which is not prohibited is 
allowed. In an attempt to provide the UNGA with an answer regarding the legality or 
prohibition of nuclear weapons under international law, the Court first assessed existing 
international instruments and customary law.  
 
Universal international treaties 
The ICJ noted that there are no specific provisions prohibiting or allowing the use of 
nuclear weapons. It also highlighted the absence of universal instruments governing the 
threat and use of these weapons, and the existence of regional ones. These regional 
instruments are the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ). Currently, the entire 
southern hemisphere is covered by a number of NWFZ: Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), South East Asia 
(Treaty of Bangkok), Central Asia (Treaty of Semei), and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), 
as well as Mongolia (Mongolian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Status). The establishment of a 
NWFZ in the Middle East was proposed by Iran in 1974 and backed by Egypt. The idea 
has since evolved into that of a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and All Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDFZ) to accommodate the specific needs of the 
region. However, despite official support from regional states, the WMDFZ has not yet 
materialised.  
Some of the ICJ judges argued that the provision on poisonous gases (1929/1972) was 
applicable to nuclear weapons. Yet, the Court ultimately concluded that the provision 
was not applicable. Likewise, the NPT was judged not to address the use of nuclear 
weapons, but only the legality of possession.177   
 
Customary international law  
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177 Ibid. 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  62	  	  
The justices noted the principles of international humanitarian law, but concluded that 
no customary law prohibits or allows the use of nuclear weapons. According to the 
Court, UNGA Resolutions do not amount to customary law and a lack of state practice 
has prevented the formation of a custom. Instead, the Court argued that the formation of 
the principle of ‘no use’ has not been due to a consensus around the prohibition of 
nuclear weapons, but because the use of such weapons has not been necessary.178  
 
Other instruments and provisions 
The ICJ reviewed the different provisions and international legal instruments governing 
issues affected by the potential use of nuclear weapons. These included lex specialis 
(international humanitarian law), jus ad bellum, international human rights law (in 
particular 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) Article 6 
on the right to life),179 international environmental law,180 international criminal law 
(especially norms addressing genocide),181 as well as the case of Shimoda v. Japan 
(1955).182 The Court did not find any of the legal instruments and provisions it 
examined to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. 
 
Cardinal rules of international humanitarian law 
The Court maintained that the use of nuclear weapons is ‘generally contrary to the rules 
of international law applicable to armed conflict’, especially the two cardinal principles 
of distinction and unnecessary suffering. This entails the consideration of whether the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (1996) 
179 Article 6 of the ICCPR provides that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life. This shall be 
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life’. The term ‘arbitrarily’ limits the scope of 
the provision, as it merely applies to the intentional targeting of civilians, for instance. 
180 According to the Court, while international environmental law applies to armed conflict, it is not 
intended to deprive a state of its right to self-defence. Therefore, while states should take the environment 
into consideration in their military decisions, environmental treaties and customs do not prohibit nuclear 
weapons as such. 
181 The Genocide Convention (1948) provides that ‘any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of 
the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (…)’. This provision 
highlights the requirement of an element of ‘intent’, which a nuclear attack in the context of an armed 
conflict would not necessarily have. 
182 The case was brought before domestic courts in Japan by a Japanese citizen, victim of the U.S. nuclear 
attacks during World War II. The plaintiff accused the Japanese state of signing a peace agreement with 
the United States providing that Japan would not be able to claim compensation for attacks on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. 
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use of such weapons causes unnecessary suffering to combatants, fails to discriminate 
between civilians and combatants, causes excessive civilian losses with respect to the 
military advantage anticipated, or causes excessive damage to neutral states.183  
 
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005) 
Another example of an international legal instrument addressing the issue of the use of 
nuclear weapons can be found in the International Convention on the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. However, the scope of the Convention is limited to the use 
of such weapons by non-state terrorist actors. As such, the Convention does ‘not apply 
where the offence is committed within a single state, the alleged offender and victims 
are nationals of that State’ (Art. 3), nor are ‘activities of armed forces during an armed 
conflict’ (Art. 4.1) governed by it. Additionally, the ‘Convention does not address, nor 
can it be interpreted as addressing, in any way, the issue of the legality of the use or 
threat of use of nuclear weapons by states.’ (Art. 4.4). The scope of application of the 
Convention is therefore limited to international nuclear terrorism, as defined by Article 
2.  
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person 
unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) Possesses radioactive material or makes or possesses a device: 
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; 
(b) Uses in any way radioactive material or a device, or uses or damages a nuclear 
facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material: 
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or 
(iii) With the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or 
a State to do or refrain from doing an act. 
 
Conclusion 
The current international legal framework regulating nuclear weapons is relatively 
limited in scope. These weapons remain the only category of WMD not prohibited, 
partially or entirely, by a single, universal treaty. These limitations stem from the lack 
of an international consensus to further develop and implement additional instruments 
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to restrict nuclear weapons. Pakistan, for instance, has consistently blocked the 
proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), which would prohibit the production 
of more fissile material. While since beginning of the twenty first century, a number of 
states and leaders, including U.S. President Barack Obama,184 have called for a more 
active global nuclear arms control and disarmament policy, the current political 
landscape does not seem to hint at a major shift in the current trend. In fact, the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in eastern Ukraine has raised several questions. First, Kiev gave 
up the nuclear weapons and materials on its territory and joined the NPT as a NNWS in 
1994. In the Budapest Memorandums, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Russia ‘reaffirm[ed]’ their ‘obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.’185 Many argue that 
Ukraine should not have given up the nuclear weapons on its territory and that it should 
acquire such weapons again. This raises questions for the future of non-proliferation 
from the perspective of nuclear newcomers.186 Second, since the annexation, relations 
between Moscow and Washington have worsened. This development has complicated 
arms control and nuclear cooperation and impacted the prospect of future steps toward 
nuclear disarmament.187 
The following chapter shows that Islamic law, despite having a comprehensive set of 
norms governing the conduct of warfare, does not provide for the careful regulation of 
weaponry. This is in contrast to international humanitarian law, of which a ‘core rule’ is 
that the means and methods of warfare must be limited.  
Parties to an armed conflict do not have an unlimited choice of methods and means of 
warfare.  All weapons must be used – and indeed must be capable of being used – in 
accordance with international humanitarian law’s general limitations on the conduct of 
hostilities, notably the rules aimed at protecting civilians from direct or indiscriminate 
attacks and otherwise sparing them as far as possible the effects of the hostilities, and 
the rules aimed at protecting combatants from superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering. In fact, all new weapons require assessment and legal review before they are 
developed, acquired and introduced by the military to ensure that they are compatible 
with these core rules and thus to prevent the use of weapons that would violate 
international law.188 
Islam does not govern the development and use of all weapons. Instead, the faith 
provides general principles similar to the cardinal norms of international humanitarian 
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law, which dictate whether various means and methods of warfare are legal or 
prohibited. This shortcoming has become visible in the past three decades, as a number 
of views regarding the legal status of chemical and nuclear weapons under Islamic law 
have manifested themselves in the international arena.  
Chapter Three: The legality of nuclear weapons: Islamic law 
An introduction to Islamic legal reasoning 
 
While the international legal framework governing nuclear weapons has been 
thoroughly examined by academics, policymakers, and lawyers alike, the Islamic 
framework has never been subject to a comprehensive examination. This chapter 
attempts to make an original and distinctive contribution to knowledge and 
understanding by providing a thorough overview of Islamic jurisprudence and its 
applicability to the nuclear issue. To do so, this chapter first offers a background 
section, which will discuss the evolution of the Islamic faith and its approach to 
warfare. It then surveys the different Islamic legal sources and highlights the different 
concepts and excerpts that can be viewed as relevant to the nuclear debate.  
This chapter seeks to address the following questions. How has Islamic law historically 
governed armament? Does it address the development, procurement, stockpiling, threat, 
and use of indiscriminate weapons, and particularly, nuclear weapons? Where do 
different Muslim authorities stand on the topic? It argues that while the acquisition and 
stockpiling of nuclear weapons can be viewed as allowed and even encouraged by 
Islamic law, their use can only be justified under certain exceptional circumstances. The 
notion of the threat of using nuclear weapons remains a gray area in Islamic law and 
cannot be addressed with the tools provided by the faith. Hence, as discussed in the 
following chapters, various actors use this gray area to justify their divergent positions 
on deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons.  
It is important to note that this thesis does not attempt to interpret the laws but merely to 
provide the reader with an understanding of the Islamic legal framework and the 
arguments and interpretations generally presented by scholars and analysts in the legal 
debate around nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the aim of this thesis is not to provide a 
conclusive response to decade-long debates regarding the Islamic position on violence 
and warfare. Indeed, ‘some political doctrines’, including those stemming from 
religions, ‘predispose their adherents to the use of violence’. This has been argued in the 
case of Islam, increasingly so since the 1970s, with a peak reached after the events of 
9/11. ‘Since religious traditions are extraordinarily inclusive in encompassing and 
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justifying quite varied human behavior […] it is unlikely that such a debate about Islam 
will be quickly resolved.’1 
This chapter first provides a brief comparative analysis of the Islamic and international 
legal systems, before offering a conceptual overview of the shari’a. It then briefly 
discusses the place of jihad in Islamic philosophy and law. After setting out the 
foundations of the Islamic ethical, philosophical, and legal approaches to war, the 
chapter defines and examines the three agreed-upon and major sources of Islamic law 
(the Qur’an, ahādīth, and ijma’) and the minor sources, including ijtīhād and ‘aql, as 
well as other relevant notions.  
 
Shari’a: the path 
As noted in the previous chapter, international humanitarian law has been developed to 
govern all aspects of warfare, including weaponry. However, nuclear weapons are yet to 
be regulated by a single international legal instrument. Across the Muslim world, 
various political and religious authorities, as well as jihadists, claim that Islamic law 
governs nuclear weapons. Yet, they do not seem to have reached a consensus regarding 
the legal status of these weapons. Hence, while some see Islam as an enabler, allowing 
the use of nuclear weapons, others see it as prohibiting them. Accordingly, two different 
and opposing stances on the acquisition of nuclear weapons have emerged in the 
Muslim world in the past few decades. The first one, championed by Al-Qaeda and, on 
a different level and indirectly, Pakistan, which considers the acquisition, threat, and use 
of these weapons as legal under Islamic law. The second, and official Iranian, position 
considers them to be prohibited by shari’a, on one level or another.  
The Islamic legal discourse around nuclear weapons has gained more attention in the 
west. This has especially been the case since the intensification of the disagreements 
between the west and Iran over its nuclear dossier and the promotion of the nuclear 
fatwā by Tehran as evidence of the peaceful nature of its nuclear endeavours.2 The 
Islamic discourse has either been completely dismissed as irrelevant3 or hailed as all-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Esposito, John (1997), Political Islam – Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform? Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. P. 17 
2 Ansari, Ali, ‘To be or not to be: Facts and Fiction in the nuclear fatwa debate’, RUSI Analysis, 25-02-
2014.  
3 Eisenstadt, Michael. Khalaji, Mehdi (2011). ‘Nuclear Fatwa – Religion and politics in Iran’s 
proliferation strategy’. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus #115. 24 
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important4 in policy and academic circles, both in the west and throughout the Muslim 
world. Regardless of the views on the existence and authority of the fatwā, the Obama 
administration has decided to recognise it and interpret it as a confidence-building 
measure,5 albeit with scepticism. In Gary Samore’s words: ‘I hoped the fatwā would 
give Iran a face-saving reason to accept limits on its nuclear programme but I never 
believed the substance of the fatwā had any bearing on Iran’s desire for nuclear 
weapons.’6 Nevertheless, the legal debate itself and the understanding of the scope of its 
policy implications continue to remain embryonic. What is more, the legal debate is 
sometimes misguided. This can be explained in light of the increasing Islamophobia 
displayed in the west and the effort of scholars to distance themselves from it.7 Hence, 
in an attempt to remain within the boundaries of political correctness, some scholarly 
and analytical pieces shape the debate with erroneous data. The Qur’an, they argue, 
‘limits the legitimate grounds for jihad to defensive actions’ and ‘the destruction of 
combatants.’8 As this chapter argues, such claims are incorrect and do not provide 
accurate basis for an informed discussion.  
As mentioned previously, since 9/11 and the subsequent increase of interest in the role 
of jihad in the Islamic tradition and faith, a lot of attention has been paid to the norms 
governing the conduct of warfare in Islam. Likewise, the utilisation of the faith and its 
laws to justify the pursuit of nuclear weapons by Al-Qaeda and Pakistan, and to provide 
evidence for the lack of a military dimension in its nuclear programme by Iran, have 
generated substantial debate in academic and policy circles. A number of scholars have 
attempted to determine whether an equivalent to the Christian just war theory can be 
found in the tradition established by Muhammad. Yet, scholars and policymakers have 
either dismissed the importance of the religious nuclear discourses or they have 
concluded that they are all-important, without carefully examining them and their basis. 
This section examines the key Islamic concepts and rules governing warfare in Islam. 
By doing so, it establishes the foundations upon which the following chapters rely to 
dissect Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran’s religious nuclear discourses.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Mousavian, Hossein (April-May 2013), ‘Globalising Iran’s Fatwa against nuclear weapons’, Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy. Volume 55, Edition number 2. 147-162 
5 ‘Obama U.N. speech transcript 2013 (Text, Video)’. Politico. 24-09-2013.  
6 INT007SNT  
7 ‘Islamophobia: understanding anti-Muslim sentiment in the West’, Gallup. 2011.  
‘The growth of Islamophobia – Can careless talk cost lives?’ The Economist. 30-07-2011.  
‘Islamophobia growing in America’, RT. 01-09-2010.  
8 Bobbitt, Phillip (2008), 81 
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The Sunni-Shiite divide 
As discussed throughout this chapter, there is no single, coherent community of 
Muslims. Instead, Islam has two main branches: Sunni Islam and Shiite Islam. Each one 
of these two strands is divided into a number of schools of thought. Within Sunni Islam, 
there are four main schools of thought: Hanafī, Hanbalī, Malikī, and Shafi’ī, each 
named after their respective founders. These four schools are mainly distinguished 
politically and geographically and tend to agree on the sources and methodologies of 
Islamic law. The Hanafī school is mainly adhered to in Central and South Asia, as well 
as the Levant. The stricter Hanbalī school9 is predominant the in the Arab states of the 
Persian Gulf. The Malikī school was historically dominant in Andalusia but continues to 
remain so in Sahel and the Maghreb. The Shafi’ī school, which prevailed in Persia 
before the Empire became predominantly Shiite,10 continues to be popular in Egypt and 
the Horn of Africa. The Shiite branch is composed of three main schools of thought: 
Ismāilī, Ja’farī, and Zaidī. The Ja’farī school is by far the most predominant. All these 
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Gold, Dore (2003), Hatred’s Kingdom – How Saudi Arabia Supports the Global Terror. Washington, 
D.C.: Regnery Publishing Inc. P. 25 
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return of the Mahdi, as-Sirāt (a bridge taking believers and nonbelievers to heaven or hell (Chivnat 
Bridge in Avestan). Furthermore, this adoption of Shiite Islam facilitated the revival of Persian monarchy, 
as the caliph succeeded to the Prophet, while the Persian King was viewed as directly elected by God.  
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Keddie, Nikki. Richard, Yann (2006), Modern Iran: roots and results of revolution. New Haven: Yale 
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Mafizullah, Kabir (1964), The Buwayhid dynasty of Baghdad, 334/946-447/1055, Calcutta: Iran Society. 
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Momen, Moojan (1985), An Introduction to Shi'i Islam, Yale University Press. PP. 75–76 
Ward, Steven (2009), Immortal – A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces. Washington D.C.: 
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schools of thought deduct different laws from the Divine Text and the teachings of the 
Prophet.  
Nevertheless, several key differences between the two main branches of Islam exist. 
Importantly, as discussed in the following sections, the two branches separated 
following Mohammad’s death and the dispute over his succession. Shiites believe Ali 
ibn Abi-Talib, Muhammad’s son in law, to be his natural and designated successor. 
Sunnis recognise Abu Bakr as the prophet’s successor and first Caliph. As such, Shiites 
believe rightful succession to stem from bloodline, while Sunnis recognise the caliphs 
as Muhammad’s legitimate successors and authorities.11  
The core principles of the faith are shared by both Sunnis and Shiites. However, the two 
branches have divergent views on the sources of shari’a, the interpretation of 
prescriptions, the centrality of certain ideas in the faith, as well as the practice of certain 
rituals. What is more, as discussed further in the following sections, the two branches 
have opposing views on leadership and who can wage war on behalf of the ummah.  
 
Methodology of Islamic law 
‘Islam is a complete way of life; a religion, an ethic, and a legal system all in one.’12 
The Islamic system of law is drastically different from modern legal frameworks. This 
difference has been best described by Mostashar al-Doleh. He enumerated four areas of 
divergence between what he identified as ‘western’ legal systems (which he based on 
the French and Belgian legal systems, stemming from the Roman tradition of legal 
codification) and the shari’a.13 While his observations cannot be applied to all modern 
western legal systems, as Common Law is drastically different from the Roman 
tradition, they can be applied to modern international law, a codified system.  
First, codification is a collection of several books covering different laws, while the 
shari’a is a single book, comprising both private and public matters, such as trade, civil, 
penal, and rules of jihad. In fact, ‘Muslim law does not distinguish between a treaty, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 “Islam”, Encyclopaedia Britannia. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online Academic Edition. Encylopaedia 
Britannica Inc., 2014. Web. 23 May 2014.  
12 Anderson, J. N. D. (1959), Islamic Law in the Modern World. Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers. 
P. ix 
13 Mostashar al-Doleh (1984), Yek Kalameh, Persian text ed. by S. Sajjadi, Tehran: Nashr-e Tharikh. P. 
26. 
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contract of public or administrative law and a contract of civil or commercial law.’14 
Second, while the former ‘was written with the consent of the government and the 
nation, the second was written according to a single [jurist’s] opinion’. In international 
law, the consent between a single government and the nation it represents is replaced by 
that of the international community. In theory, international law transcends national 
identity and interests, religious and cultural values. Unlike shari’a, it embraces 
universality, not specificities. Third, the level of difficulty of each system constitutes 
another point of divergence. The western system is written in the ‘common language of 
the people’ in order to be understood by them, while positive divine law requires 
explanations and commentaries in order to be clear and understandable for all. In fact, a 
key component of shari’a consists of ‘the dominant doctrines of the schools of law 
[which] are recorded in the founding texts’, known as matn (pl. mutūn), while the 
second component lies in the ‘contributions’ (sharh) of ‘each generation of scholars 
within the school’, which are ‘written in the margins of the main text.’15 As rightly 
emphasised by Mostashar al-Doleh, shari’a is even complex for Islamic jurists, let 
alone the masses, which must, nevertheless, comply by its laws. Therefore, the masses 
are granted rights and required to act in accordance with the laws, which are beyond 
their reach and understanding, making them dependable on the jurists’ opinions.  
All these differences highlight the difficulties of assessing shari’a, which, as discussed 
previously, is divided into several systems due to the existence of a number of schools 
of thought, making it even more complex. This explains why such an enterprise requires 
a completely different methodology than the one used in the study of international law 
or other modern legal systems. Another key characteristic of Islamic law, differentiating 
it from modern legal systems, lies in its eternal and perpetual nature. ‘It is not society 
that influences law, but the law that provides a divinely revealed norm and standard to 
which Muslim society is under a perpetual duty to conform.’16 While this thesis is not a 
purely legal enterprise, it attempts to follow the Islamic legal methodology in order to 
provide the reader with a comprehensive picture of Islamic reasoning. Islamic legal 
reasoning begins with the Qur’an, as the primary source of shari’a and is 
complemented by aḥādīth and ijmā. These sources and the methodology associated with 
them are assessed in the next paragraphs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Anderson, J.N.D. (1959), xv 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 7 
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The Qur’an, regarded by Muslims as the Word of God, revealed to His Messenger, 
Muhammad, is the first and most uncontested source of shari’a examined. The thesis 
provides the relevant āyāt (verses), complemented by commentaries by two of the most 
widely accepted Islamic scholars, Allameh Tabatabai (1904-1981, Persia) and Tabari 
(ninth century, Persia) in their respective tafāsir (interpretations) of the Qur’anic Text, 
Tafsir al-Mizan and Tafsir al-Tabari. Tabatabai and Tabari are the most widely 
accepted thinkers in their respective schools of thought. Furthermore, every āyah is 
checked with Tabatabai and Tabari’s interpretations before being cited in this work, in 
order to ensure that the Words are neither misinterpreted, nor taken out of context. 
Additionally, running the āyāt by these sources will ensure that they are compatible 
with both the Shiite and Sunni interpretations, as Tabatabai and Tabari are two of the 
most prominent and respected authorities on Shiite and Sunni jurisprudence 
respectively. If the two sects interpret an āyah differently, the two positions will be 
presented and the difference highlighted. Where relevant, excerpts are translated from 
the Persian and Arabic texts into English for more accuracy.  
The aḥādīth, or teachings of the Prophet (combined with those of the Imams for 
Shiites), are extracted from reputable sources, providing solely aḥādīth as-Ṣaḥīḥa, or 
the most correct aḥādīth. The sources used for the aḥādīth are Tabari, Bukhari, and 
Muslim’s respective collections. All these collections are widely regarded as some of 
the most accurate and precise efforts in the science of ḥadīth. Indeed, the enterprise of 
collecting aḥādīth is an intricate one, comprising research to establish the chain of 
events and figures involved.  
Ijmāʿ or the consensus of the ummah (community of Muslims), ʼijtihād, the deductions 
of general principles from particular cases, and fatāwā are assessed based on primary 
and secondary religious and scholarly sources, as well as interviews with Islamic 
scholars.    
These sources are explained in more detail in throughout the section.  
 
Shari’a, a historical definition  
Islam was founded on the shari’a (the path), a positive religious law revealed to 
Muhammad as the Word of God. John Kelsey defines shari’a as ‘a metaphorical 
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representation of a mode of behaviour that leads to salvation’.17 As noted in Chapter 
Two, the system developed by Islam is one built upon the foundations provided by pre-
Islamic Arabia (also known as the ‘age of ignorance’ - jāhilīyah). In other words, Islam 
is not a clear departure from the jāhilīyah, but rather a reformation of it. In Montgomery 
Watts’s words:  
The system as a whole had deep roots in Arabian society, and there could be no 
question of replacing it by anything else or even of radically altering it. Muhammad 
may be said to have accepted in general the principles underlying the system, and to 
have set himself to reform the most serious abuses.18 
Islam does not allow for a partition between earthly and spiritual matters and shari’a 
governs both.19 Yet, ‘by definition, the caliphate is a rule of shari`a and thus a rule of 
law; a caliph20 himself is nothing but the vicegerent of Muhammad, who supervises the 
former's praxis. Even Muhammad himself is not a lawmaker but only the messenger.’21 
This distinguishes Islam from Christianity, which was founded on faith rather than law. 
As such, Islam is a positive religion, lacking a philosophical distinction between natural 
law (jus naturale) and the law of nations (jus gentium). Hence, even though attempts 
have been made to demonstrate that Islam is also founded on a natural law theory, 
modern authors have fallen short of proving the existence of such a theoretical 
framework in the faith. Therefore, not only has the development of jus gentium, as 
established by Grotius in the Christian tradition and western thought, not taken place 
but one comparable to the just war theory has been lacking. Nevertheless, even if such a 
theory does have an equivalent in the Islamic tradition, it is important to note that 
Grotius’s distinction between ‘just or legitimate’ and ‘informal’ wars does not.  
Wars were introduced Jure gentium, by Natural Law: which we are to understand thus: 
that by the Jus gentium a certain form of war was introduced, so that wars which take 
this form, have, jure gentium, certain effects. And hence we have a distinction, of which 
we shall afterwards make use, into a war formal according to Jus gentium, which is also 
called a just or legitimate war, a complete war; and informal war, which may still be 
legitimate or just [in a more general sense,] that is, agreeable to justice. Informal wars, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kelsey, John (1991), 44 
18 Watt, Montgomery (1956), 262 
19 Lewis, Bernard (1988), The Political Language of Islam. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. P. 
2-3 
20 The duty of custodianship falls only on caliphal shoulders. That is to say, upon the shoulders of the one 
who, like Adam, has been ‘taught all the names’ (Koran 2:31). Only a prophet, or a prophet-like figure, 
may slay without murdering. For Rumi, and for the bulk of the Muslim tradition, the Prophet is a ‘Perfect 
Man because he represents not only God’s names of beauty, but His names of majesty. Perfection unites 
the mysterium tremendum et fascinans. Hence: God forgives, and the Prophet forgives. God judges, and 
so does His Prophet. This is lawful only because the ego is disengaged’ (Winter in Fisher and Wicker 
(2004), 12-13).  
21 Lewis, Bernard (1988), 2-3 
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if there be a reasonable cause for them, are not supported by Jus gentium, but neither 
are they resisted by it, as will hereafter be shown.22 
Warfare in the Muslim tradition is assessed through a different lens. Armed conflict has 
been an integral component of Islam, greatly contributing to its inception, development, 
and spread beyond the Arabian Peninsula, and becoming one of the major universal 
religions. Warfare played an increasingly central role in the faith as Muhammad gained 
more power, becoming a political and military leader, in addition to a religious one.23 
As a lifestyle shaping every aspect of the believers’ being, Islam encompasses an 
expansive legal framework, providing guidance on how Muslims should live. Naturally, 
shari’a regulates the conduct of hostilities, in order to keep the believer on the ‘straight 
path’ (sirat-al-mustaqim) even on the battlefield. 
 
Jihad 
Jihad (‘legitimate warfare’) for God – literally meaning struggle – constitutes one of the 
main components of the divine law and governs the conduct of warfare.24 The Qur’anic 
image of this endeavour is one of mankind going through a desert and reaching the right 
path.25 According to some Muslim scholars, jihad can only be for God, while others 
have a more general view of it.  
Prominent medieval Muslim thinker, Ibn Khaldoun (fourteenth century, Andalusia) 
argues that ‘people must be invited to Islam by choice or by force’ through jihad, or the 
struggle to expand the faith and preserve it. This is viewed as a religious duty (takleef) 
for Muslims.26 Thereby, avoiding jihad falls under the category of ‘great sins’.27 A 
saying attributed to the Prophet provides that, ‘Every prophet has his monasticism, and 
the monasticism of this community is the Holy war in the path of God.’28 Ibn Khaldoun 
pinpoints the idea of religious political duties as the distinction between Islam and other 
revealed religions, such as Judaism. Indeed, in these faiths, religious duties are not 
based on politics and religious leaders are not involved in them. Those leaders who do 
fall within the realm of ‘earthly’ affairs do so by ‘solidarity’. In fact, ‘their religion, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Hugo Grotius, Book I, IV. 2  
23 Karsh, Efrahim (2006). Islamic Imperialism: A History. New Haven: Yale University Press. P. 17 
24 Sarrami and Edalat Nejad in Great Encyclopedia Islamica (jihad sub verbum) 
25 Lewis, Bernard (1988), 17-18 
26 Tabatabai, Javad (2000), 9 
27 Lewis, Bernard (1988), 18 
28 Al-Muttaqi, Kanz al-‘Ummal, ii, pp. 252-286, in Watt, Montgomery (1974), Muhammad: Prophet and 
Statesman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Vol. 1 
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unlike Islam, does not set the defeat of nations and religions as a duty, rather it is asked 
of them to preserve the religion amongst those to whom it belongs.’29  
Indeed, in order for a society to be formed, men must become involved in public affairs, 
and be prohibited from corruption. This is the role of the king, and since Islam is a 
public invitation, to which all must adhere, jihad becomes a religious duty. Hence, in 
Muslim states, Caliphate and kingdom are intertwined. Yet, as noted by Javad 
Tabatabai, ‘Islam is an eminently political religion, but [...] the first treatise on politics 
drawn from the Qur’an and the traditions was not written until the mid-eleventh century 
when the caliphate was in deep crisis’. Likewise, ‘of all the prophets in the Qur’an, it is 
significant that only the Israeli king-prophets, like David and Moses, are depicted as 
kings, while Muhammad is only depicted as God’s messenger.’30 In fact, the Qur’an 
remains silent on whether his messenger ‘is also the political guide of the community’ 
and ‘what political power entails’. However, ‘because political Islam has prevailed as 
the sole authorized interpretation of Islam, less and less attention has been paid to this 
fact.’31  
What is more, ‘in the language of Islam’s primary sources, such as the shari’a and the 
positive law, statements having a political connotation are less frequent than those 
found in the language of ethical-civil law.’32 Modern interpretations of Islam have made 
it into a more collective religion, while the faith was intended to be and is, in its original 
form, an inherently individualistic endeavour. Ideological Islam, as incepted in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and other Islamic states, is based on a collectivist 
interpretation, which holds its roots in modern Marxist and even Christianised 
interpretations of the faith.33 Indeed, in Christianity, there is no salvation outside the 
Church, but in Islam, there is no notion of Church. Therefore, a Muslim, unlike a 
Christian can reach salvation by merely accepting that ‘there is no god but God’ and 
that ‘Muhammad is His Messenger’.34 This is also applicable to jihad. Hence, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Tabatabai, Javad (2000), 9 
30 Ibid., in Boroujedi, Mehrzad (2013), 108-109 
31 Ibid., 117 
32 Ibid., 109 
33 Abrahamian, Ervand (1982), ‘Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution’, Merip Reports, no. 
102, P. 24 
34 The first hadīth (his first statement to the people) attributed to the Prophet is the basis for this idea: ‘say 
there is no god but God and reach salvation’. This is in contradiction with the Christian idea ‘extra 
eccleviam nulla salus’, which was later challenged by Martin Luther, who argued that faith alone (sola 
fides) is enough for salvation. 
Majlesi, Bahar al-anwāl, Vol. 9, Part 1, P. 143.  
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following words written by Shmuel Bar are more representative of modern ideological 
Islam than the faith in its original form: 
The “straight path” of Islam is a public road, not a private one, and a Muslim cannot 
walk it alone. Islam is, in essence, a communal religion with a strong sense of 
interdependence. Therefore, a central obligation in Islam is to “command right and 
forbid evil”: a Muslim must set other Muslims on the “right” path.35  
As noted in the previous chapters, one of the intricacies of the Islamic legal enterprise 
can be found in the contradictory nature of the regulations provided by the faith. These 
inconsistencies are institutionalised, rationalised, and theorised in the Islamic tradition. 
Some Qur’anic verses and aḥādīth dissuade Muslims from engaging in armed conflicts. 
These are generally those dating back to before the Prophet’s migration from Mecca to 
Medina or ḥijrah36 – and the subsequent increase of his political and military power. 
Others, generally those revealed or stated after the ḥijrah, encourage the community of 
believers to bear arms and to fight infidels until ‘they say “There is no god but Allah”’. 
As noted by prominent Islamic scholar Montgomery Watt, ‘the earliest parts of the 
Qur’an did not contain any attack on paganism, but rather assumed in the audience a 
“vague monotheism”’.37 In fact, some early verses provided that nonbelievers should be 
converted through peaceful means, dialogue, and exchange. ‘Later, however, the unity 
of God was strictly insisted on, and a critique of increasing severity was directed against 
idolatry.’38 These provided the grounds for offensive jihad. Hence, after the ḥijrah and 
in the centuries to follow, Islam became one of the major universal religions, expanding 
well beyond the borders of the Prophet’s birthplace in the Arabian Peninsula. This 
expansion was predominantly achieved thanks to armed conflict, and in particular, 
offensive jihad.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bressolette, Claude (1984), Dictionnaire des religions. Paris: PUF. P. 484 
35 Bar, Shmuel (2006), 3  
What Bar is referring to holds its roots in aḥādīth, which call for believers to ‘command right and forbid 
evil’. One of these aḥādīth reads: ‘as long as people command to right and forbid evil and help each other 
in good deeds and taqwa [self-awareness] they will be in good and happiness, but if they do not do so, 
blessings will be taken away from them and a group will rule the other and they not have any allies on 
earth or in the heavens.’  
36 The ḥijrah marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar. 
37 Watt, Montgomery (1956), 309 
38 Ibid.  
39 ‘One Koranic text reads: ‘if they then withdraw from you, and do not fight against you, but offer you 
peace, God has not opened for you a way against them’ (4:90). Another, however, tells us to ‘fight the 
idolaters totally, as they fight you totally’ (9:36). The Prophet certainly fought against the idol-
worshipping Meccan elite and their clan allies, but whether he envisaged the wars which conquered the 
Near East after his death has not been easy for modern scholars to determine’ (Winter in Fisher and 
Wicker (2004), 15). 
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Jihad has two components: offensive jihad and defensive jihad. The former entails the 
launch of an attack by Muslims, in order to combat mushrikin (polytheists) and kuffār 
(infidels) and expand monotheism, Islam, and justice.40 Hence, contrary to that which 
Mowatt-Larssen claims, the Qur’an does not have ‘a clear injunction against taking 
offensive action’, which would imply ‘that WMD simply cannot be used as a first-strike 
engagement’.41 This, however, is contradictory, as the lack of a clear injunction against 
taking offensive action would also imply a lack of one against first-strike. In fact, for 
Sunnis, offensive jihad is wājib42, or obligatory, in the case of the interest of the faith 
and ummah under any ruler, whether ‘adil (just) or fasiq (corrupt).  
Classical Sunni law, when it came to be formulated three or more centuries after the 
Prophet’s death, typically decided [offensive warfare] on the basis of its theology of 
Islam’s caliphal and Ishmaelite responsibilities to all mankind. It read the Koran as 
justification for offensive war outside the Arabian peninsula, with the objective not of 
converting unbelievers by force (an act which Islamic law generally forbade) but of 
broadening the Abrahamic tent in which members of non-idolatrous religions could 
worship, under the aegis of gods latest law.43  
For Shiites, however, such an endeavour was traditionally only seen as legitimate in so 
far as it was conducted with the authorisation of an infallible Imam or the Prophet 
himself. In spite of this, some Shiite jurisconsults,44 including the ex-dauphin of the 
Islamic Republic, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, have argued that in the absence of the 
Twelfth Imam, his nāyēb, or lieutenant, can also issue this authorisation.45 This idea has 
emerged in the context of the inception of a religious political system in Iran and is 
rejected by a number of prominent clerics. As such, it cannot be viewed as the sole 
uncontested position in Shiism. Nevertheless, Muslim scholars, whether Sunni or Shiite, 
seem to have abandoned the notion of ‘offensive jihad’.  
Part of the background to this remarkable access of Muslim jurisdictions to a global 
legal framework of purely European provenance is the retreat by most late twentieth 
century Muslim legal theorists form the so-called ‘idealist’ interpretation of the Koran’s 
intentions. As Richard Martin summarizes the position, ‘the majority of contemporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Qur’an, 21:107. 
41 Mowatt-Larssen, Rolf (2010), 26 
42 Wājib is one of five ahkām or commandments, which are to guide the believer in all aspects of life and 
signifies what is obligatory. The other four ahkām include: makrūh or abominable, meaning it is not 
strictly prohibited, but better avoided; mubāh, which refers to what is neither recommended nor 
forbidden; mustahabb that which is recommended; and haram, illegal or prohibited. Additionally, the 
term halal describes what is legal. 
43 Winter in Fisher and Wicker (2004), 15 
44 Those qualified to provide advice Islamic legal advice. 
45 Sarrami and Edalat Nejad in Great Encyclopedia Islamica (jihad sub verbum) 
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Muslim jurists […] restrict jihad as it applies to modern Muslim nation-states to defense 
against outside attack and/or internal subversion.’46 
Regardless, Islam had expanded from the Arabian Peninsula to an estimated 1.6 billion 
Muslims across the globe by 2010.47 This expansion was achieved through many holy 
wars, both offensive and defensive. In other words, Muslims launched wars against 
nonbelievers, conquered their territories, and coerced them to adhere to their faith. In 
the early years, these attacks followed letters sent to the rulers of various territories, 
inviting them to join the faith or be invaded and forced to do so. One such example can 
be found in the letter to the Persian king: ‘Submit to our authority, and we shall leave 
you and your land and go by you against others. If not, you will be conquered against 
your will by men who love death as you love life.’ Likewise, a letter sent to the border-
chiefs of the kingdom threatens: ‘Become a Muslim and be saved. If not, accept 
protection from us and pay the jizya. If not, I shall come against you with men who love 
death as you love to drink wine.48’ Muslims also engaged in defensive warfare, to 
protect the conquered territories from relapsing into infidelity (kufr). This ‘was the 
action of a religious community against non-members of the community, and the 
community was expanding’.49 The first expeditions, led by the Prophet himself, 
including the Meccan raid, are the earliest examples of such offensive wars. 
‘Muhammad cannot have failed to realize that, even if the raids were only slightly 
successful, the Meccans were bound to attempt reprisals. In these little raids, then, he 
was deliberately challenging and provoking the Meccans.’50 Watt rightly highlights that 
such initiatives are difficult to understand in modern times, but they were an integral 
part of the Arab desert life in that era. Indeed, such offensive wars would be qualified as 
wars of aggression in the language of modern international law, which, as noted in 
Chapter Two, are prohibited under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.51  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Winter in Fisher and Wicker (2004), 16-17 – ‘Despite the willingness of mainstream jurists to redefine 
their reading of the Koran to reduce or abolish the scope for offensive war, the concept of jihad remains 
firmly part of Muslim discourse. Ann May notes that the clearest example has been the reaction to the 
occupation of Palestine, which has called forth a range of official religious pronouncements, such as the 
1973 fatwa (verdict) by the Shaykh al-Azhar, for many the highest religious authority in the Sunni world, 
to the effect that fighting for the liberation of Palestine was a religious duty, not just for Palestinians, but 
for all Muslims. The fatwa was reiterated at the Third Islamic Conference in Ta’if, in 1981’ (ibid., 17).  
47 ‘The Future of the Global Muslim Population – Projections for 2010-2030.’ The Pew Forum. 
27/01/2011.  
48 Lewis, Bernard (1974), vol. 1, 228 
49 Watt, Montgomery (1961), 108 
50 Ibid., 105 
51 U.N. Charter, Article 2(4)  
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While Islam, as a universal religion, transcending time and space, prescribes the deeds 
of its Messenger as the path to follow, one particular view among Muslim scholars 
contends that such wars can only be waged by the Prophet himself or his legitimate, 
infallible successors. Ibn Khaldoun notes that it was with the death of the Prophet and 
during Abu Bakr’s caliphate that jihad with the enemies of Islam began and united 
Arabs. However, until the end of Ali’s caliphate, this rule was merely a religious one, 
replacing the Prophet, not a kingship.  
Muslims did not only engage in combat to expand the faith or defend it against 
opponents. They also preserved the faith by sustaining the community thanks to wealth 
accumulated during the raids. Hence, with the Arab conquest of neighbouring 
territories, Muslims began ‘to have access to a vast sea of welfare and wealth, so much 
that one horseman’s part of the booty in some of the qazawat [raids] reached thirty 
thousand dinar in rice or its equivalent’.52  Before achieving this newfound wealth, most 
Arab tribes were so poor they ‘ate different kinds of scorpions’.53 Ibn Khaldoun further 
recounts that Arabs did not leave anything behind but water and soil, noting that these 
plunders were legal according to shari’a, as ‘they were obtained in an attempt to expand 
the religion’.54  
Historically, means and methods of warfare were not incredibly different in the Islamic 
and western traditions. For instance, during the Crusades, both Christians and Muslims 
engaged the other side similarly. From a weaponry point of view, some have used the 
example of the catapult, a non-discriminate weapon extensively used by Muslim armies, 
arguing that it sets a precedent.  
The catapult — precursor of artillery and air power — which was capable of sending a 
burning projectile into a populated city, where the resulting fire might kill women or 
children. Authorities differed on whether that tactic was permissible. Some disallowed 
the catapult when children or Muslim captives were in the city. In support, they cited a 
verse from the Koran that reads, “Had they been separated clearly, then We would have 
chastised the unbelievers among them with a painful chastisement.” According to this 
school of thought, the “separation” of permissible targets (i.e., non-Muslim men) from 
impermissible targets is the precondition for a general attack. Another school of 
thought, by contrast, permitted the use of the catapult regardless of collateral damage in 
order to serve the general interest of the Muslims.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Tabatabai, Javad (2013), 8 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Feldman, Noah (2006). ‘Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age’, The New York Times. 29-10-2006.  
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Likewise, many of the principles governing warfare in the two systems are similar and 
stem from comparable concerns.56 The following sections examine the foundations of 




Shari’a provides a very rigid and, yet, relatively flexible legal framework. This 
dichotomy is very noticeable in the Qur’an. Indeed, the āyāt are commonly separated 
into two groups: those with a very clear and straightforward meaning, known as 
muhkam and those with multiple interpretations, known as mutashabeh. What is more, 
Islamic scholars identify two categories of verses, according to when they were revealed 
to the Prophet: prior or after the ḥijrah, or his journey from Mecca to Medina. Meccan 
verses are those revealed to Muhammad before the ḥijrah while Medinan verses are 
those revealed post-ḥijah. While there is some debate surrounding the classification of 
some of the verses, the majority of verses have been identified as either Meccan or 
Medinan. Most scholars assert that the faith was merely private and apolitical during the 
Meccan period, becoming political with the Prophet’s ḥijrah and, according to some, as 
a result of his gaining power. Likewise, Medinan verses are far more detailed and 
explicit than Meccan verses.  
The notion of jihad emerged during the Medinan period and was purely defensive at 
first. Many of the verses concerning the conduct of warfare were revealed in the context 
of the military campaigns undertaken and led by the Prophet, either against Arab 
polytheists, or Jewish tribes.57 However, upon the completion of the conquest of Mecca, 
the war became ‘total’, meaning against all pagans, ‘in all places and at all times’. The 
fifth verse of Surat Al-Tawbah (Qur’an 9:5), referred to as, āyah at-Sayf58 or the verse 
of the sword, is said to take precedence over previous āyāt and abrogating them 
(naskh).59 This verse (5) of Surat al-Tawbah reads: ‘kill the polytheists wherever you 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 INT003SNT 
57 Sarrami and Edalat Nejad in Great Encyclopedia Islamica (jihad sub verbum). 22 
58 Qur’an, 9:5 
59 Sarrami and Edalat Nejad in Great Encyclopedia Islamica (jihad) 
Delong-Bas, Natana (2004). Wahhabi Islam - From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. P. 103: 'The legal principle of naskh considers that a Qur’an verse revealed at a 
particular time may have been overridden by a later revelation […] Naskh is a source of controversy 
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find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of 
ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on 
their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.’ 
Hence, the Qur’an has different, and sometimes contradictory, prescriptions regarding 
some key issues, including the faith’s universality and its relationship to paganism. In 
other words, the Prophet’s increased influence and power led to a different approach to 
the expansion of the faith. This issue is of crucial importance, as it is one of the sources 
of the complex and contradictory nature of the Text, and consequently, of its laws.60 
Furthermore, the fact that these are approached differently makes the laws governing 
the conduct of warfare more complex. Nevertheless, some argue that Islam is an 
inherently political religion and that ‘the foundations of Islam’s political thought were 
established in Mecca’.61 Hence, the Prophet’s main goal was to establish a Muslim 
community, which would negate the infidels’ reign and establish the divine rule, which 
he was not successful in doing in Mecca.62 The Prophet’s struggle against his tribesmen 
of Quraysh was for political power and divine rule in Mecca. In fact, Hamed Al-Tayjani 
argues that the difference between Meccan and Medinan verses is not one of essence 
but rather due to circumstance.63 There exists only one source of power and governance, 
which lies in God. This fact is the very root of the unity of the Muslim community. 
Hence, the divine order is for all of mankind and human beings are required to revolt 
against any leadership that is not one of God’s prophets, until their leadership is 
established.64 This ‘truth’ is held in the Qur’an, where the link between ummat al-sāliha 
(or the righteous community), the revealed Text, and divine governance is established:65 
‘Indeed, my protector is Allah, who has sent down the Book; and He is an ally to the 
righteous.’66 It is only through this divine reign that justice can be achieved. ‘O Prophet, 
strive against the disbelievers and the hypocrites and be harsh upon them. And their 
refuge is Hell, and wretched is the destination.’67 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
among theologians and legal scholars alike because of the implication that there is an error in the 
revelation itself.' 
60 Watt, Montgomery (1956), 309 
61 Abdollahi Aran, Abdollah, 1 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 2 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 6 
66 Qur’an, 7:196 
67 Ibid., 66:9 
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The Qur’an clearly addresses and encourages what is known as the notion of deterrence 
in modern international affairs. It is, however, important to note that deterrence as 
understood in this context is very different from our modern conception of it. Here, 
deterrence is defined as a means of protecting the ‘life, property, and honour’ of 
Muslims against the enemy.68 However, there is no consensus on the scope of 
deterrence among Islamic scholars. While some believe it allowed for Muslims to 
develop a deterrent in response to their enemies acquiring it, in order to defend their 
lives, others firmly reject any notion of deterrence encompassing nuclear weapons.69 
Prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you 
may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do 
not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend in the cause of Allah will 
be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged.70 
Several āyāt, revealed to the Prophet in the context of the war in Mecca, command him 
to wage war in a proportionate manner. 
Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does 
not like transgressors.71 And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them 
from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah72 is worse than killing. And do not 
fight them at al-Masjid al-Ḥarām until they fight you there. But if they fight you, then 
kill them. Such is the recompense of the disbelievers.73 And if they cease, then indeed, 
Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.74 Fight them until there is no [more] fitnah and [until] 
worship is [acknowledged to be] for Allah. But if they cease, then there is to be no 
aggression except against the oppressors.75 
According to Tabatabai, these āyāt were revealed simultaneously, and gave the 
permission for the first time to the Prophet to wage war against the pagans and idol-
worshippers of Mecca, who led the Muslims to leave the city.76 Consequently, the āyāt 
allow Muslims to fight those who are fighting them, and accordingly to engage in 
defensive warfare. The āyāt do not mention anything about civilian immunity or 
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. Tabatabai rectifies a 
misinterpretation of this lack, according to which women and children are to be granted 
immunity. He states that there is no mention of ‘women and children’, as the revealed 
Words solely address the case of those who ‘fight’ the Muslims. As it is taken for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Tabatabai, Seyed Mohammad Hossein (Allameh). Tafsir al-Mizan. Vol. 9, 153 
69 INT003SNT 
70 Qur’an, 8:60 
71 Ibid., 2:190 
72 Chaos 
73 Ibid., 2:191 
74 Ibid., 2:192 
75 Ibid., 2:193 
76 Tabatabai, Allameh, Vol. 2, 187 
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granted that women and children ‘do not have the power’ to engage in the conduct of 
warfare, there is no need to mention that they are granted immunity.77  
Another verse invites Muslims to: 
Fight those who do not believe in Allah or in the Last Day and who do not consider 
unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the 
religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture - [fight] until they give the 
jizyah78 willingly while they are humbled.79 
This verse provides evidence that the Qur’an does not only offer the Muslim 
community with grounds to defend itself against invasion, but to initiate jihad by 
waging wars of aggression in order to convert infidels to Islam. Tabatabai specifies that, 
‘those who do not believe in Allah’ refers here to the peoples of the Book,80 whom are 
granted a special status, above the pagans, by the Qur’an. In a different source, the 
divine Text explicitly states: 
We decreed upon the Children of Israel that whoever kills a soul unless for a soul or for 
corruption [done] in the land - it is as if he had slain mankind entirely. And whoever 
saves one - it is as if he had saved mankind entirely. And our messengers had certainly 
come to them with clear proofs. Then indeed many of them, [even] after that, 
throughout the land, were transgressors.81 
The Qur’an also addresses the issue of truces and peace treaties, and the potential 
breach of them. While forbidding Muslims to be in breach of such treaties, it is 
provided that they shall allow the violators to think about their actions and repent by 
giving them four months to change their decision in ‘the outmost freedom’ and join the 
faith, or be killed.82 ‘And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists 
wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at 
every place of ambush.’83 Surat At-Tawbah, or the chapter on repentance, further 
provides: ‘Fight them; Allah will punish them by your hands and will disgrace them and 
give you victory over them and satisfy the breasts of a believing people.’84 Moreover, 
‘if they break their oaths after their treaty and defame your religion, then fight the 
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78 Taxes paid by non-Muslims living in Muslim territories. 
79 Qur’an, 9:29 
80 Tabatabai, Allameh, Vol. 9, 315 
81 Qur’an, 5:32 
82 Tabatabai, Allameh, Vol. 9, 250 
83 Qur’an, 9:5 
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G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  84	  	  
leaders of disbelief, for indeed, there are no oaths [sacred] to them; [fight them that] 
they might cease.’85  
 
Sunnah and Ḥadīth 
Sunnah or the tradition established by the Prophet – combined with the Imams, 
succeeding him, for Shiites – is customary law complementing the Qur’an. It 
constitutes the second source of shari’a and stems from the deeds and words of the 
infallible Prophet (and Imams) and is provided by ḥadīth scholars, who must follow a 
certain methodology. Muhammad (and the Imams) is considered as infallible (ma‘sūm), 
fully inspired by God and never spoke or acted under the influence of passion. 
Therefore, their words and deeds constitute precedents, which provide the ummah with 
a model to emulate. For these precedents to be established, ‘the words and deeds of the 
Prophet Muhammad (his sunnah), being an embodiment of the divine command and an 
expression of God’s law (shari‘a), were preserved by his Companions, in the form of 
discrete anecdotes’. These anecdotes are referred to as aḥādīth (plural of ḥadīth).86 They 
have been ‘transmitted orally through the generations’ becoming ‘the source of juristic 
discussion (fiqh)’.87 Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is the compilation of Islamic norms 
from Islamic legal sources, literally translating to ‘deep comprehension’. Likewise, for 
Shiites, the collections of the Imams’ accounts complement the moral framework 
established by the Prophet and his Book. Ḥadīth scholars must confirm that the saying 
or deed attributed to the Prophet or one of the Imams was indeed approved or rejected 
by the Prophet or Imam himself.  
A ḥadīth has two components: the first one is the identification of the chain of people 
involved in the account, while the second lies in the actual account of the event. The 
first component determines the status of the ḥadīth, thereby establishing whether it is 
absolutely authentic, arguably authentic, or weak. This is achieved by identifying the 
people involved in the account and the reliability of their word. This leads to the ḥadīth 
being categorised by authenticity, ranging from absolutely authentic to weak. These 
different categories, such as saḥīḥ, hasan, dhaʻīf, show the level of authenticity of a 
ḥadīth and how reliable it is as a precedent. The most perfect or authentic aḥādīth are 
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86 Calder, Norman (1993), Studies in Early Islamic Jurisprudence, Oxford: Clarendon Press. P. vi 
87 Ibid. 
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referred to as al-ḥadīth al-Ṣaḥīḥ. Aḥādīth al-Ṣaḥīḥa (pl.) have been compiled by several 
scholars, whose work is relied upon as they undisputedly represent the most accurate 
source of ḥadīth.  
Some aḥādīth governing the conduct of warfare can justify offensive jihad. These 
suggest that God ordered the Prophet and his followers to fight to establish a dār al-
Islam88 (house of Islam).  
Outside the House of Islam, the dar al-Islam, there is no peace, there is only war and 
predation; and unless one is militarily prepared, that House of War will surely invade 
and destroy the believing realm. In this way, classical Muslim theorists adopted a 
somewhat Hobbesian view of the world as strongly tending to chaos and aggression, 
and honored the believing warrior as the indispensible earthly guarantor of tranquillity 
and justice.89 
As such, a ḥadīth quotes the Prophet as saying: ‘I have been commanded to fight 
against people till they testify to the fact that there is no god but Allah, and believe in 
me (that) I am the Messenger and in all that I have brought.’90 Another one, recounting 
the Second Pledge of Aqabah,91 reads: ‘Those present at the oath of Aqabah had sworn 
an allegiance to Muhammad. It was a pledge of war against all men. Allah had 
permitted fighting.’92 Another one tells us that, ‘Allah had given his Messenger 
permission to fight by revealing the verse “And fight them until persecution is no more, 
and religion is all for Allah.”’93  
Other aḥādīth allow for those who try to divide the Muslim community to be fought and 
killed: ‘If anyone comes out against my community when they are united and seeks to 
divide them, kill him, whoever he may be.’94 It is further provided that, ‘If anyone 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Kelsey defines dār al-Islam as the ‘territory of Islam’, indicating ‘the area within which Islam is the 
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means of war, especially with respect to the protection of noncombatants.’  
Kelsey (2007), 99 
89 Winter in Fisher and Wicker (2012), 12 
90 Muslim, C9B1N31 
91 The pledge made by some believers to the Prophet during a secret meeting in Mount Aqaba, where they 
took an oath to protect him and the faith. 
92 Tabari, VI:138 
93 Ibid.:139 
94 Al-Muttaqi, Kanz al-‘Ummal, iii, pp. 197-201 in Lewis (1974), vol. 1 
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shoots an arrow at the enemy on the path of God and his arrow reached his enemy, 
whether it hits him or misses, it is accounted equal in merit to liberating a slave.’95  
However, as stressed previously, the scope of application of these aḥādīth is disputed. 
This is a key source of contention between the Sunni and Shiite sects. Indeed, some 
schools, including the Shiite sect, only see the authority of the Prophet and his 
legitimate successors (the Imams in his bloodline) as valid to wage wars of conversion. 
In other words, only the Prophet and the Imams could lead such wars and in his 
absence, no one else has the authority to do so. Hence, for Shiite Twelvers, until the 
appearance of the Twelfth Imam, no one has the authority to give an order for jihad. 
Other schools, mainly Sunni, do not believe in such restrictions. Following the Prophet, 
the caliphs were seen as legitimate authorities to wage war. After the death of the last 
Caliph, many, including Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutb, claimed 
that jihad could and should be waged against new jāhilīyah or ignorance. Therefore, a 
number of political and military leaders and extremist figures have proclaimed 
themselves as Amir al-momenīn (leader of the believers), and have issued fatāwā or 
tried to incite their followers to engage in jihad against non-believers and those who 
have left the faith and oppose it. Furthermore, a ḥadīth attributed to the Prophet is a 
source, which has led some scholars to conclude that believers must follow any leader, 
whether just or unjust. ‘Jihad is incumbent upon you with every Amir, whether he be 
godly or wicked and even if he commit major sins.’96   
 
Ijmāʿ 
The third source of Islamic law lies in one as reliable as the previous: the consensus of 
the ummah on a particular topic, known as ijmāʿ. The foundation of this reliability can 
be found in a ḥadīth97 attributed to the Prophet, according to which ‘[his] ummah will 
never agree on error’. In order to reach a consensus, the mujtahidīn (jurists) of a given 
sect need to agree on the ruling. It is important to note that these jurists, unlike the 
Prophet, are not infallible individually, but their consensus elevates their ruling to the 
rank of the ones issued by the infallible Prophet himself. This implies that such 
consensus is not really that of the entire Muslim community, but rather of the given 
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96 Ibid. 
97 Al-Shafi'i, vol. 2, 187 
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sect. Consequently, ijmāʿ, as a source of shari’a, varies from one sect to the other. This, 
in turn, has become a source of confusion.98 
In the case of the legality or prohibition of weapons of mass destruction under Islamic 
law, there is no single, unified position across the Muslim world. Muslim scholars and 
jurists have presented and supported arguments for and against their production, 
possession, and use. In the Sunni world, especially, there hardly seems to be a 
consensus around the legality or prohibition of nuclear weapons. In Iran, only a few 
clerics have spoken about the topic of the legality of weapons of mass destruction. The 
debate has mainly been limited to nuclear weapons, as these weapons have become 
topical due to Iran’s nuclear programme and the controversy it has generated. This has 
especially been the case since Iranian leadership has attempted to use the Muslim faith 
and Shiite jurisprudence as evidence of the peaceful nature of its programme. However, 
none of the major marajeh99 seems to have engaged in the debate, let alone sanction the 
prohibition or legality of the bomb. Nevertheless, those marājeh who have been 
questioned on the topic and who have engaged in the debate, have affirmed that the 
indiscriminate ‘use’ of such weapons would be banned by the faith. As strategic nuclear 
weapons are by nature indiscriminate, their prohibition seems to be generally accepted 
by Shiite authorities. The positions of the main marajeh who have engaged in the 
debate are assessed in the following sections. However, whether this can be viewed as 
amounting to ijma’ remains unclear.   
 
Qiyās and ʼijtihād 
ʼijtihād is a method of interpretation of the divine law through the deduction of general 
principles from particular cases. Similar to ijmāʿ, ʼijtihād is based on the idea of 
reasoning through an analogical method of reasoning, qiyās. 
[The latter] was almost certainly a technique derived from rabbinical practice. For 
instance, grape wine was not prohibited in the Qur’an, but jurists outlawed it by 
analogy100 to date wine, which was. This practice of analogical reasoning to derive legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Keddie, Nikki (1983). Religion and Politics in Iran – Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. P. 36 
99 Plural of marja’: Shiite religious authorities, competent to interpret shari’a and can be followed and 
imitated by believers.  
100 The analogy held intoxication as its rationale. All analogy must be based upon a rationale.  
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judgments not explicitly found in the Qur’an or in the community’s collective memory 
of the Prophet’s practice was called ʼijtihād, or individual endeavour.101  
ʼijtihād, based on legal analogy, revolves around the primacy of the rationale behind a 
given ruling and is developed by personal opinion or judgment (ra’y). Ra’y is the 
judgment of a jurist, issued in the absence of customary law or consensus on a given 
matter. Since ra’y was not an agreed-upon conscious legal method, it was even less 
likely to result in a consensus than ʼijtihād-based on analogy. In the Sunni schools, 
analogy replaced personal opinion as a legal method.102 The method is composed of 
three main components: the root or principle contained in the revealed law; the issue 
that needs to be resolved; and the common denominator to both the root and the issue, 
along with the extension of the solution. The concept of ʼijtihād is comparable to that of 
the jurisprudence established by precedents in the Common Law system. The value of 
qiyās is not equal to that of ḥadīth, given that, as mentioned previously, the believers, 
including the mujtahidin, are not infallible like the Prophet. However, if the community 
of Muslims reaches a consensual agreement on a given solution, leading to ijmāʿ, it will 
gain the same value as the ḥadīth.  
An important consequence for jurisprudence is that a consensus reached by one 
generation of jurists is considered binding on their intellectual descendants. This 
becomes a mechanism of ‘traditionalization’, of consolidating and maintaining 
continuity in schools of law, and in the so-called ‘closure of the gate of ʼijtihād’.103 
The ‘closure of the gate of ‘ijtijād’ is also a source of contention.  
It is often stated, for instance, that the door of ʼijtihād was never closed for Shi’is. The 
closing of the door of ʼijtihād refers to the belief held by many Sunnis that absolute 
ʼijtihād was no longer possible after the death of ash-Shafi’i. But since Shi’is at first 
rejected personal opinion, ʼijtihād, and the validity of considered opinion (as opposed to 
a decisive judgment), their jurisprudents were theoretically far more constricted than 
those of the Sunnis.104 
Nevertheless, since the ‘gates of ʼijtihād’ were closed in the third or fourth century, 
Sunni jurists have been following ‘the authority of the founders’. This act is known as 
taqlīd and consists of seeking ‘arguments and rulings […] in the existing corpus.’ 
Hence, it is believed that ‘the authoritative ijmāʿ of previous generations [is] binding on 
jurists, thus further restricting the scope of ʼijtihād.’ This view is in contrast with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 34 
102 Ibid., 35 
103 Zubaida, Sami (2003), Law and Power in the Islamic World. London: I. B. Tauris. P. 14 
104 Keddie, Nikki (1983). Religion and Politics in Iran – Shi’ism from Quietism to Revolution. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. P. 36 
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Shiite position, ‘which sanction[s] and require[s] independent ʼijtihād, recognizing the 
rank of mujtahid as the highest in the clerical hierarchy.’105 Regardless, ‘this is also the 
position challenged by modern reformers and fundamentalists alike, asserting their right 
to practice ʼijtihād to arrive at novel formulations in line with their respective 
projects.’106 
In the case of nuclear weapons, qiyās could come into play if mujtahidin outlawed or 
allowed the acquisition, threat, and use of the bomb based on a previous explicit 
prohibition or validation, for instance of the catapult. However, the Qur’an and sunnah 
neither explicitly outlaw nor allow the use of any weapons which could be used as a 
precedent in the case of WMD. Nevertheless, arguments for the analogy of nuclear 
weapons and more generally, WMD, with poisoning water and other indiscriminate 
tactics have been made. Islam prohibits the poisoning of bodies of water and blocking 
the access of the adversary to such bodies during combat.107 Other principles, similar to 
the cardinal norms of international humanitarian law, as surveyed in Chapter Two, exist 
in Islam. First, the notion of distinction, as indicated previously, prohibits 
indiscriminate means and methods of warfare, including the use of poison (pouring it in 
water or spreading it through the air) and the burning of trees.  Hence, arguments are 
made, especially in Shiite Islam, that any indiscriminate tactic in nature is prohibited by 
the faith. As mentioned previously, in order for an analogy to be made, it must be based 
on a rationale. In this case, the rationale behind prohibiting the use of poison or the 
blocking of bodies of water has been based upon the idea that they inflict harm 
indiscriminately. Given the nature of weapons of mass destruction and their being 
designed to kill indiscriminately and disproportionally, it can be argued that these 
weapons are prohibited by the faith.108 Second, the notion of proportionality (as 
highlighted in the previous sections, appears in the Qur’an and ahādīth, which invite 
believers to wage war without ‘transgressing’.109 Muslims are invited not to target 
noncombatants, unless they serve as a human shield (tatarros), in which case, they are 
‘collateral damage’.110 However, in Islamic law, as in international humanitarian law, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ayatollah Fazel-Lankarani, ‘Eighth International Conference on Imam Khomeini’s Foreign Policy: 
Islam and the Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’. The Institute for Political and 
International Studies, Tehran. 2-06-2014. Author notes.  
108 Feirahi, Davood, in Popovski, Vesselin, et al. (2009), 272-273 
109 Qur’an, 5:32/2:192 
110 Feirahi, Davood, in Popovski, et al. (2009), 273 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  90	  	  
whether this is justifiable depends on a number of issues, including the number of 
noncombatants who become collateral damage, and the importance of the military 
target.111 
These principles serve as guidelines in discussions around the legality or prohibition of 
the use of technological innovations in warfare. The precedent set by using these 
principles as a rationale allows Muslims to conclude that certain means and methods of 
warfare are prohibited by the faith.  
 
Fatāwā proliferation 
A lot of attention has been paid to fatāwā – plural of fatwā – in the west since 1979, and 
especially since 9/11. This is due to the lack of understanding of the value of fatāwā and 
their general association with destructive actions and assassinations. Indeed, famous 
fatāwā in the west include that ordering the killing of British writer Salman Rushdi by 
Ayatollah Khomeini, those legitimising terrorist attacks, and those regarding the 
procurement of CBRN weapons by terrorist groups. Therefore, the authority of fatāwā 
has been blown out of proportion by a western audience which is unable to grasp the 
notion, foreign to its understanding of a legal framework.  
Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwā banning nuclear weapons has generated a lot of debate in 
policy circles in the west, especially the United States. Some view this fatwā as a 
potential confidence and security-building measure and solution to the Iranian nuclear 
issue, while others question its validity and existence.112 Even Iranian officials, 
including former Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman, Ramin Mehmanparast 
acknowledged this by stating that westerners ‘“don't have an accurate understanding of 
Islamic beliefs and fatwas issued by great scholars,” suggesting that the U.S. and its 
allies must take Khamenei's edict seriously.’113 Hence, while recognising that the 
language used by Tehran is too vague and incomprehensible for Iran’s interlocutors, he 
still insisted that this incomprehensible notion and abstract prohibition should be taken 
seriously.  
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112 Mousavian, Seyed Hossein, ‘Globalising Iran’s Fatwa Against Nuclear Weapons’. Survival, April-
May 2013, vol. 55, 2. PP. 147-162 
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113 ‘Iran: Religious Decree Against Nuclear Weapons Is Binding’. CBS News. 15-01-2013.  
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A fatwā is an ‘authoritative ruling’ or decree on a ‘matter of law or worship, usually 
issued in response to a question’.114 As noted by Bar, ‘modern Muslim regimes have 
used ‘ulama-issued fatwās to legitimize their policies, bolster their Islamic credentials 
against domestic opponents, and mobilize support against foreign enemies.’115 This is 
certainly true for the three cases studied in this thesis: Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran. In 
fact, it is the common denominator between these three otherwise very different actors 
and their nuclear ambitions. It is important to note that fatāwā do not constitute a source 
of Islamic law, as do the Qur’an, sunnah, ijmāʿ, and qiyās, but is merely a hūkm. Hūkm 
is the legal opinion of a mujtahīd, based on the general foundations of the shari’a, 
meaning the Qur’an and sunnah. However, if all marajeh and ulama accept this hūkm, 
it amounts to ijmaʿ, thus constituting a source of law.   
The proliferation of fatāwā has led them to become an ‘area of contested authority’. 
This is due to two factors. First, individuals and groups with varying levels of authority 
(often lacking the competence to issue such an edict) and knowledge of Islamic 
jurisprudence issue decrees with varying degrees of authority. Second, fatāwā issued by 
a single marja’ or figure now have an outreach, transcending the boundaries not only of 
the circle of followers of the given marja’ or the group, but also those of the faith. This 
is mainly thanks to modern technological tools, facilitating communication beyond 
national borders. What is more, fatāwā are now issued across the Muslim world and 
beyond it, and consumed and analysed throughout the world. It is further important to 
note that regardless of the actual competence of a given figure to issue religious decrees, 
many adhere to them and consider them binding. Hence, legitimate centres of Islamic 
scholarship and marāja’s authority are no longer uncontested, as Islamist groups and 
radical jihadists question their allegiance and issue countering fatāwa.116  
Hence, many countries throughout the Muslim world have established fatwā councils. 
Some of these councils were created within existing Islamic scholarly centres, others 
independently from them. These councils can further be a political entity. They are 
composed of Islamic jurists, who have the authority to interpret the divine laws and 
issue decrees in response to questions. The purpose of these councils is to ‘provide 
Islamic legitimacy to political decisions and secular laws.’ Bar argues that, challenged 
by the rise of radical Islam and its use of fatāwā as a tool to promote its agenda, the 
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authority of these councils has declined steadily. This has led ‘the religious 
establishment’ to respond by ‘providing edicts prohibiting the issuing of fatwas by 
“non-authorized” clerics.’117  
Given the reservations regarding his authority to issue a fatwā, the so-called decree 
issued by Khamenei seems to fall under this category. Indeed, as further discussed in 
Chapter Six, Khamenei is not a marja’ in the traditional sense118 and his status as Grand 
Ayatollah is disputed.119 ‘Khamene’i had neither emerged by popular consensus nor 
received the support of the leading authorities for his religious credentials, but was in 
fact “promoted” to successor [of Khomeini] by the religio-politicians.’120 During his 
presidency and until the late 1980s, Khamenei was merely a hojjat al-Islam121 and has 
not received the approval of any chief marja’ since.122 The scope of this so-called fatwā 
is also unclear, as according to the Iranian 2005 Communication to the IAEA, the 
wording of the fatwā is as follows: ‘the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear 
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118 In Shiite Islam, Marāja were traditionally recongnised by the clerical hierarchy – who provided a 
given person with the authorisation to become a mujtahid – before being chosen by the believers 
spontaneously according to their reputation, justice, and knowledge. However, since the inception of the 
Islamic Republic, the marāja are ‘appointed’ – albeit unofficially – by the government and those who 
were not, such as Ayatollah Sāneī, can be imitated, unofficially, by believers. This development was 
denounced by established clerics following the revolution. They ‘protested the government’s interference 
in selecting the marja’ [sic.] and its politically motivated departure from Islamic doctrine.’ 
Menashri, David (1997), 14 
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Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, Hassan Tabatabai-Qomi, Ya’sub al-Ddīn Rastegar-Juybari, and 
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notion of supreme leadership, led to their seclusion and, in some cases, imprisonment in the years 
following the Islamic Revolution. Since the 1990s, there has been a ‘crisis’ of marjaēyat in Iran, as the 
Islamic Republic eradicated a generation of jurisconsults, replacing them with ‘religio-politicians’, whose 
knowledge and justice would otherwise not qualify them to be at that level. 
Menashri, David (1997), 10/13 
119 To borrow Mohsen Kadivar’s words: ‘Ayatollah Khomeini became supreme leader based on his 
marja’īyyat, while Mr. Khamenei became marja’ based on his supreme leadership.’ 
Kadivar, Mohsen (2014), Ebtezal-e marjaīyyat-e shi’eh – Estizah-e marjaīyyat-e maqam-e rahbari – 
hojjat al-Islam va moslemin Khamenei. Official website of Mohsen Kadivar. P. 23 
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Politics and Regional Ambitions’. Policy Brief No. 43. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy. P. 11 
121 Khamenei speech before 42nd UNGA, ‘Iran President speech’, C-Span. 22-09-1987. 
122 Menashri, David (1997), 10/13  
Many prominent Shiite scholars stated they did not support his leadership, as they did not consider him to 
have the scholarly authority necessary to be a marja’.  
Kadivar, Mohsen (2014), 141-142 
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weapons are forbidden under Islam.’123 Yet, in his message, which was read by his 
international legal adviser, Aliakbar Velayati, at the opening of the 2010 International 
Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-proliferation held in Tehran, the 
Supreme Leader’s explicit prohibition merely encompassed the ‘use’ of these 
weapons.124 Statements issued later, by Khamenei himself, merely highlight a ban of the 
use, with a philosophical and ethical discussion about the production and stockpiling of 
these weapons, rather than a concrete prohibition. Nevertheless, despite his dubious 
credentials as an authoritative Islamic scholar, jurist, and cleric, Khamenei holds 
considerable power, given his role as the highest authority in the country. Therefore, his 
fatwā, may not have much religious weight, and would have been ignored under 
different circumstances, is a key political tool regardless of its religious validity (this is 
further discussed in Chapter Six). Nevertheless, according to Ayatollah Fazel-
Lankarani, had Ayatollah Khomeini been alive, he would have issued the same fatwā as 
his successor, as the decree is ‘based’ on the principles of the Qur’an and Shiite fiqh.125 
Shiite clerics in Iran ‘have generally agreed’ with Khamenei’s stance as expressed in the 
fatwā.126 As noted by Robert Gleave, ‘the standard Iranian view is that the legal 
classifications cascade if use of nuclear weapons is forbidden, then so is trade, and if 
trade is forbidden, then so production and possession.’127 
A number of decrees have been issued on the Sunni side too. These include the 2009 
fatwā by Egyptian Grand Mufti Ali Juma’ā, who deems the possession of nuclear 
weapons ‘with the intent to deter’ to be ‘permitted, which actual use is highly 
conditioned (if permitted at all).’ In other words, the Grand Mufti ‘does not lay out the 
circumstances under which WMDs could be legitimately employed, but he does not rule 
out their use absolutely.’128 This fatwā aims to offer a counter-argument to ‘those “other 
scholars,” who had stated that the legal evidence indicates that WMDs can be used 
against “un-Islamic nations”. Their view is fallacious and based on “false analogies” 
between the different legal situations of wartime and peace.’129 Likewise, the chairman 
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of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, argues that the use 
of indiscriminate weapons is banned by the faith. Referring to the Prophet’s behaviour 
during wars, he notes that, ‘you should not kill those who have not killed and have 
nothing to do with the war’. Nevertheless, al-Qaradawi presents similar arguments as 
Juma’ā, noting that the Muslim community is called upon by the faith to acquire these 
weapons for deterrence, if others possess them and threaten to use them. If the Ummah 
fails to acquire these weapons,’ he explains, ‘it becomes weak and subject to threats, in 
particular by the Zionist enemy, which has taken the Muslims’ land and the holy 
places.’130 Sa’d bin Abdullah al-Hamid concurs that the possession of WMD may be 
necessary to deter the adversary and preventing it from coercing Muslims. He explains 
that deterrence, as a political and military principle, is used in states’ defence doctrines. 
The possession of nuclear weapons is then required for Muslims states. However, he 
also agrees that the use of these weapons is prohibited by the faith, but adds a caveat: 
These weapons should never be used, unless all other options have been exhausted. He 
also highlights the ‘prestige’ factor in the possession of nuclear weapons. As such, he 
argues that Muslims should never enter treaties prohibiting the ‘possession, 
manufacturing, or production’ of these weapons so long as others continue to develop, 
stockpile, and possess them. This, he adds, would force Muslims into submission.131 
Sheikh Ali Nasser challenges the idea that the production of WMD can be justified 
under Islamic law. He notes that the production of such weapons can endanger the 
environment. For this reason, it is prohibited under Islamic law.132 Lastly, the Dar al-Ifta 
in Egypt (the official clerical body in the country) has issued an edict ‘requiring Islamic 
states to acquire these WMD as a tool of deterrence’.133 The decree calls upon Muslims 
both to prepare to stand against and to deter the adversary, who possesses WMD, by 
acquiring all such weapons.  All these decrees calling for Muslims to ‘be prepared’ by 
acquiring WMD are based on Qur’an 8:60, discussed previously, which tells Muslims 
to, ‘prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which 
you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy’.134 
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Others, including several Sunni Sheikhs at al-Azhār,135 along with jihadists rationalise 
the legality of the possession of WMD: 
A Muslim’s duty to “defend one’s soul,” to achieve military superiority over the enemy, 
to maintain reciprocity–at least—in types of weapons, to deter the enemy, or to “make 
the enemies of the ummah tremble.” Hence, no type of weapon is, by definition, 
illegal.136  
This group also justifies the use of WMD through lex talionis – an integral part of 
Islamic law137 – with the reasoning that if CBRN weapons are used against Muslims, 
then the ummah can retaliate, by means of the same weapon. In the words of Bar, ‘the 
Sheikh of al-Azhār, Muhammad Tantawi, drew an analogy from the ruling of the Caliph 
Abu Bakr (573-634): “to fight the enemy with a sword if he fights with a sword 
and…with a spear if he fights with a spear”’. He argues that if Abu Bakr lived in the 
contemporary world, he would consider it the duty of Muslims to retaliate against the 
use of nuclear weapons against fellow Muslims by launching an attack using the same 
weapon.138 This complements the Qur’anic verse, ‘And if you punish [an enemy, O 
believers], punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed.139 It is 
important to distinguish between the Sunni position on Abu Bakr’s authority, as the first 
caliph and an undisputable authority and the Shiite one, in which the first Imam, Ali, 
sets the example to follow rather than Abu Bakr.  
Saudi cleric, Shaykh Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd issued the first fatwā on the use of 
WMD on 21 May 2003, rejecting international law, as a non-Islamic framework, and 
basing his claims on two aḥādīth from Muhammad. ‘Allah has ordered you to do 
everything perfectly. Hence, if you kill, do it perfectly, and if you slaughter, do it 
perfectly. Everyone should sharpen his blade and ease his slaughter.’ And ‘If you are 
ordered to do something-do it according to your best ability’. He asserted that ‘if the 
Muslims could defeat the infidels only by using these kinds of weapons [WMD], it is 
allowed to use them even if they kill them all, and destroy their crops and cattle.’ 
Hence, al-Fahd argued that, ‘Muslims should act according to their abilities. If there is 
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no other way, the Mujahideen can defeat the enemy by every means possible. This 
principle is valid even if they have to kill women and children, or even Muslims.’140  
Several fatāwā, issued by jihadists promoting or committing acts of terrorism and Sunni 
authorities alike, address the question of the legality of the possession, stockpiling, and 
use of nuclear weapons in the greater framework of CBRN weapons. Some take the 
prohibition of such weapons for granted, stating that the killing of non-combatants and 
the potential killing of Muslims of distinguishing between belligerents and civilians, 
due to the impossibility with such an arsenal, are ḥarām, under Islamic law. This is the 
case of those Iranian clerics,141 who have expressed their views regarding WMD, such 
as Grand Ayatollahs Montazeri, Sāneī, and Makarem-Shirazi.142  
Two of Al-Qaeda’s most influential leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
issued an infamous fatwā on 23 February 1998, which sheds some light on the 
organisation’s position on the use of CBRN weapons. In this fatwā, they identified three 
justifications for Al-Qaeda’s acts of terrorism, urging other Muslims around the world 
to take part in them. The first justification presented by the terrorist organisation’s 
mastermind is that, ‘the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the 
holiest places’, of which he sees the humiliation of the people of the Arabian peninsula 
and the occupation of Iraq as the greatest examples. The second rationalisation lies in 
what they call the ‘crusader-Zionist alliance’. Lastly, this American support for Israel, 
they argue, leads to ‘religious and economic’ wars, of which the aim is to preserve ‘the 
Jews’ petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem and murder of 
Muslims there’. This in turn further pushes Washington to ‘endeavor to fragment all the 
states of the region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and 
through their disunion and weakness’ represents the final reason to wage war against the 
United States. These three reasons are at the heart of Al-Qaeda’s attempts to justify the 
killing of ‘Americans and their allies – civilians and military – as an individual duty for 
every Muslim.143 Yet, neither bin Laden nor Zawahiri have the religious authority to 
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issue a fatwā, as neither of them has a status of jurisconsult or any authority in the 
Islamic tradition.  
Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to justify the use of WMD, to include: the legality 
of killing women, children, and the elderly, the use of Muslim shields, the inevitability 
of environmental destruction, notions of retaliatory use and deterrence, attacking in the 
night and unintentionally harming noncombatants, among other such issues. Indeed, not 
only are the same scholars, clerics and quotations recounted an “Exoneration,” but 
many of the same examples are used nearly verbatim, including the Prophet’s reported 
sayings in the context of night raids and the harming of noncombatants, as well as the 
Prophet’s attack on the village of al-Ta’if using a catapult-thereby permitting the use of 
weapons of “general destruction” incapable of distinguishing between innocent civilians 
and combatants.  
He offers a meticulously researched case to support the judgment that using weapons of 
mass destruction should be judged on intent rather than results.144 
While Shiite-issued decrees indicate a consensus on the stance of Shiite jurisprudence 
on WMD, Sunni edicts show a wide variety of positions on the topic. For the most part, 
Shiites agree that the production, possession, and use of nuclear weapons are unethical 
and illegal in terms of the faith. Sunni views, however, range from a complete 
prohibition, similar to the Shiite stance, to complete legality of the production, 
possession, and use of these weapons. Many mainstream Sunni clerics fall into the first 
category or argue that the possession is allowed, while the use of nuclear weapons is 
either unethical, or illegal, or both. As indicated above, at the core of these discussions 
lie similar considerations to those in international law, including proportionality and 
distinction.  
Many have argued that these edicts do not matter, because they do not impact on policy. 
In reality, these critics are looking at the problem upside down. Indeed, these rulings 
may not influence decision-making, but they certainly reflect the actor’s ambitions and 
policies. Indeed, the edicts issued by Al-Qaeda’s leadership were a good indicator that 
the network would not refrain from using disproportionate and indiscriminate means 
and methods against the West. The Iranian edict supports the findings of the U.S. 
intelligence community: Tehran has not decided whether to acquire a nuclear weapon. 
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The Supreme Leader’s ruling is fairly vague on the production and possession of these 
weapons, mirroring his seeming lack of certainty on the matter. What seems to be clear, 
however, is that the country is willing to close the door to the use of these weapons for 
itself. As discussed further in the chapter on Iran, this is underlined by the country’s 
acquisition of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War and its red-line on their use.  
 
Other sources and relevant legal notions 
Other minor sources of Islamic law include istihsān or the preference of jurists, the 
more controversial ‘aql or reason, and ra’y or the jurist’s opinion.145 The notion of ‘aql, 
as a means of interpreting the shari’a is only accepted in certain Islamic schools of 
thought. For instance, while for Shiites it is a source of law, other beliefs, such as 
Wahhabism, fully reject it. According to Shiite Islam, a prescription under shari’a must 
be confirmed by ‘aql. In other words, said prescription must be in accordance with 
reason. It is further believed in all schools of Islamic thought that God does not 
prescribe anything that would be against reason. However, in order for humans to 
understand His prescriptions, they must use reason (insofar as it is a ‘sane’ reason) in 
the Shiite tradition.  
In addition to the major and minor sources of shari’a, some specific notions are worth 
considering. One of these notions has come into being due to the rigid nature of shari’a 
and its inability to change and evolve to adapt, which is the concept of hīlah or ruse. 
Hīlah does not have an equivalent in either the modern international legal framework, 
or any other modern western domestic legal system. Indeed, the notion was developed 
to enable deviation from the rigid, explicit norms incepted by the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
However, the stricter schools of thought, including the Hanbali school, are opposed to 
the idea of deviating from the prescriptions of the Qur’an and condemn the use of hīlah. 
Therefore, while the notion certainly provides an answer to the question of the evolution 
and adaptation of the Islamic system, its application has been quite limited. Exceptions 
under international law seem to serve the same purpose as hīlah to some Muslims 
states, which sign and ratify international legal instruments, by providing exceptions 
where the provisions are contrary to Islamic law.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Zubaida, Sami (2003), 12 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  99	  	  
A notion that has become increasingly debated in the west, especially in the context of 
the Iranian nuclear programme and Khamenei’s decree as evidence to its peaceful 
nature, is that of taqiyya. The word taqiyya can be translated as ‘keeping’ or ‘hiding’ 
and, in the Islamic legal sense, and signifies saying or doing something against one’s 
belief for a particular reason in an exceptional circumstance. In other words, taqiyya is 
‘keeping’ oneself from being hurt by asserting agreement with one’s adversary in words 
or deeds, in breach of the truth.146 Therefore, in order for the believer to be able to 
justify said statements or deeds, he needs to be in exceptional circumstances, where his 
life, freedom, or property is in danger. While taqiyya’s primary function is to avoid the 
individual from suffering as a result of his beliefs, the notion also has a communal 
dimension, which aims to protect Islamic unity (wahda), preventing division and 
conflict within the community.147 Taqiyya holds its foundation in several verses of the 
Qur’an and in several aḥādīth, especially Shiite aḥādīth. The reason why the notion has 
developed more in the Shiite tradition can be found in the circumstances unique to this 
branch of the faith, making it historically more vulnerable. Shiites have historically 
been prosecuted and given that they constitute a minority within the ummah, they have 
had to protect themselves accordingly and ensure their survival. Consequently, Shiite 
Imams found it imperative to use taqiyya to avoid the dispersion or demise of the Shiite 
community. Nevertheless, taqiyya remains an Islamic notion, not merely a Shiite one. 
Taqiyya is not limited to believer-unbeliever relations, but also those of Muslims with 
each other. It is even argued that taqiyya goes beyond the Islamic faith, holding its roots 
in examples set by monotheistic prophets and key historical believing figures. These 
include Abraham in his attitude towards the unbelievers, that of Joseph with his brothers 
in Egypt, the secret prayers of Asiya bin Muzahim, the Pharaoh’s wife, as well as 
Moses’ response to the Pharaoh.148 It is therefore argued that taqiyya is not only 
prescribed by religion, but also by reason or aql. Nevertheless, it can also be ḥarām as 
in cases that would undermine the very foundations of the religion, such as that of the 
Qur’an, the destruction of the Mecca, or deeds leading to murder and bloodshed.149 
Some mujtahidin go further by prohibiting taqiyya altogether, except in cases of 
absolute necessity.  
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Several āyāt address the issue of taqqiya. One of the foremost verses in which taqiyya is 
prescribed and its benefits identified recounts the story of some of the Pharaoh’s 
followers, who suggested killing Moses, 
And a believing man from the family of Pharaoh who concealed his faith said, "Do you 
kill a man [merely] because he says, 'My Lord is Allah ' while he has brought you clear 
proofs from your Lord? And if he should be lying, then upon him is [the consequence 
of] his lie; but if he should be truthful, there will strike you some of what he promises 
you. Indeed, Allah does not guide one who is a transgressor and a liar.150 
In another āyah, it is provided that, ‘whoever is forced [by necessity], neither desiring 
[it] nor transgressing [its limit], there is no sin upon him. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and 
Merciful.’151 This is because, ‘Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you 
hardship’152 and ‘strive for Allah with the striving due to Him. He has chosen you and 
has not placed upon you in the religion any difficulty.’153 Therefore, spend in the way of 
Allah and do not throw [yourselves] with your [own] hands into destruction [by 
refraining]. And do good; indeed, Allah loves the doers of good.’154  
Taqqiya is also justified in a number of aḥādīth. According to Shaykh al-Mufid, if one 
fears for one’s life, one is required to perform taqiyya, making taqiyya wājib or 
obligatory. In the case of fear for one’s property, it is mubāh (neither recommended nor 
forbidden).155 According to aḥādīth and fatāwā, taqiyya becomes imperative or wājib in 
grave cases, such as fear for one’s own life, or the life of one’s family and close friends. 
Therefore, it is merely applicable in the realm of individual and private affairs.156  
The applicability of taqqiya to the nuclear debate is has been debated in the west. Some 
have raised questions regarding the applicability of the notion to the Iranian stance on 
nuclear weapons. They argue that escalations between Tehran and Israel, as well as the 
threat of a war between the two countries, which would put the very existence of the 
Islamic Republic at stake, could justify use of the notion of taqiyya. In this case, the 
reasoning is that, raison d’État could make taqiyya wājib. In that sense, the notion of 
maslahat can be compared to state secrets.157 However, several arguments can be 
presented to counter these claims. First, the application of the notion of taqiyya to the 
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public sphere, especially in the context of modern international affairs, is complicated 
and problematic. Indeed, the application of shari’a to modern security issues is that the 
Islamic framework is an inherently private one, therefore, lacking a substantial 
theoretical structure. Second, some Shiite clerics believe that taqqiya is not longer 
relevant and should no longer be resorted to, as it was developed to ensure the 
continuity of the ummah in times when its existence was in danger.158 Third, taqqiya is 
only permissible in the case of threat to life. Fourth, according to Iranian Shiite cleric, 
Mohsen Kadivar, taqqiya is not allowed in ‘public religious matters’ and, quoting 
Khomeini, he argues that religious authorities are prohibited from resorting to taqqiya 
altogether.159  
The notion of bīd’ah is also relevant to the nuclear debate in the context of the 
emergence of the idea of raison d’État. The term, converse to sunnah, means 
innovation, seen as reprehensible in the faith. A quote attributed to the Prophet provides 
that, ‘the worst things are those that are novelties; every novelty is an innovation, every 
innovation is an error and every error leads to hell-fire.’160 As noted by Bernard Lewis: 
‘In its extreme form this principle meant the rejection of every idea and amenity not 
known in Western Arabia in the time of Muhammad and his companions’.161 This 
rejection of innovation as inherently erroneous has ‘been used by successive generations 
of ultra-conservatives to oppose tales, sieves, coffee and tobacco, printing-presses and 
artillery, telephones, wireless, and votes for women.’162 Mainstream Islamic schools of 
thought distinguish between ‘reprehensible’ and permitted innovations. Hence, Muslims 
have been able to adopt many innovations, which were not known and therefore 
endorsed by the sunnah. ‘But these innovations of doctrine and practice were always 
restrained and modified by the actions of ijma’, and from time to time drastically 
curtailed by a wave of religious conservatism.’ Therefore, while innovations can be 
viewed as good, they are generally viewed as bad unless otherwise specified.  
The principle of distinction, which is clear-cut under the laws of international armed 
conflict, is rather intangible under shari’a, even though it is as crucial in the second as 
in the former. Indeed, the main reasoning behind the prohibition of nuclear weapons 
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under shari’a is held in the fact that nuclear weapons are inherently non-discriminative. 
This view takes for granted that the killing of innocent civilians is prohibited under 
Islamic law. However, breaches of the principle of distinction and instances of massacre 
of noncombatants can be found in the history of various Islamic civilisations. This was 
certainly the case of the Crusades, but can even be traced back to the lifetime of the 
Prophet himself. The foremost example of the flexibility of the notion of distinction can 
be found in the case of the expedition of Bani Quraiza. The expedition was led during 
the Prophet’s lifetime and under his command. In response to the tribe of Bani Quraiza 
breaking its truce with Muslims, the Prophet allowed for hundreds of the tribe’s men to 
be executed, and for the women, children, and their property to be divided among the 
Muslims, calling this ‘God’s will’.163 The expedition sheds light on the ideas of 
distinction, collateral damage, and collective guilt in Islam, and their relation to the 
interests of the Muslim community.  
Where a tribe was at war with the Muslims, however, or had no agreement, they had no 
obligations towards it even of what we would call common decency. If contemporaries 
showed some surprise at the execution of all the males of Qurayzah, it was because 
Muhammad was not afraid of any consequences of such an act; the behaviour of 
Qurayzah during the siege of Medina was regarded as having cancelled their agreement 
with Muhammad. Similarly, the terms of the treaty of al-Hudaybiyah had been broken 
by the Meccans before Muhammad denounced it, and the individuals who were 
assassinated had forfeited any claim to friendly treatment by Muhammad through their 
propaganda against him.164 
Nevertheless, Muslim scholars justify taking women and children as a willingness to 
help those who are not viewed as apt to help themselves. Furthermore, in the Islamic 
doctrine of jihad, it is taken for granted that all men of age are belligerents. Therefore, 
distinction is based on gender and age, rather than whether or not one takes part in 
combat. As such, a ḥadīth commands Holy Warriors to ‘Go in the name of God and in 
God and in the religion of the Prophet of God! Do not kill the very old, the infant, the 
child, or the woman. Bring all the booty, holding back no part of it. Maintain order and 
do good, for God loves those who do good.’165 Another one highlights the prohibition 
against killing children: ‘Do not kill children! Do not kill children! Every soul is born 
with a natural disposition [to the true religion] and remains so until their tongue gives 
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There are differences and similarities between the notion of pre-Islamic Arab tribes and the ummah. The 
notion of ummah is essentially based on tribes. Yet, ‘the outstanding difference is that the ummah was 
based on religion and not on kinship’. Hence, ‘God is the head and director of the ummah’  
Ibid., 239 
165 Al-Muttaqui, Kanz al-‘Ummal, ii, pp. 252-286 in Lewis (1974), vol. 1 
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them powers of expression. Then their parents make Jews or Christians of them.’166 
Likewise, the Prophet further stresses the importance of the immunity of both women 
and children, stating that ‘He [God] has forbidden the killing of women and children.’167 
In addition to distinction based on gender and age, shari’a also distinguishes between 
believers and non-believers, and within that, Muslims having left the faith or rebelling 
against. According to fiqh there are three categories of opponents in jihad. Harbi kuffar 
are those who bear arms to combat the Muslims. Zemmi kuffar are those who live in 
Muslim territories and pay taxes to do so without combating the Muslim state – insofar 
as these conditions are accepted, this category of infidels does not count as an opponent, 
however, if they bear arms against the Muslims, they become an opponent. Baqi kuffar 
are those who revolt against the infallible Imam or leader who cannot err.  
A ḥadīth attributed to the Prophet further distinguishes people alluding to ethnicity: 
‘Treat an Arab as an Arab and a half-breed as a half-breed. The Arab has two shares and 
the half-breed one.’  
 
Summary 
This section provided a survey of the different Islamic legal sources, used by Muslim 
scholars to extract divine laws, which shape the believers’ behaviour. It was noted that 
several factors make the Islamic legal framework an intricate and contradictory one. 
First, while Islam considers itself a universal religion, the faith is composed of two main 
branches and several schools of thought, with their own interpretations of the divine 
Word. The sub-branches of these schools of thought, shaped by different external 
factors, further complicate this. These factors include the local culture and traditions of 
the populations that adopt a given school of thought. Second, different Islamic legal 
sources may contain different rulings on a single issue. Hence, one source may 
seemingly allow something, which can be prohibited by another. Third, a given source 
can be contradictory, as illustrated by the case of the Qur’an, which encompasses 
verses, which can simultaneously allow or prohibit something. Fourth, Islamic law is 
primarily private and not fit to govern international affairs and the conduct of warfare in 
their modern form.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid. 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  104	  	  
Based on the sources examined in the chapter, the acquisition of nuclear weapons could 
arguably be viewed as justified and even encouraged under Islamic law, while their use 
is not clear cut. Indeed, using indiscriminate weapons in the context of an armed 
conflict could be justified under the faith but only under certain circumstances. 
Nevertheless, as discussed throughout the previous chapters, the use of indiscriminate 
means and methods of warfare is generally viewed as prohibited by the faith in the 
Shiite school of thought, while no single stance exists in the Sunni world. The notion of 
threat in its modern international legal sense does not exist in shari’a. The use of these 
weapons seems hardly justifiable under the faith, whether in Sunni or Shiite Islam.      
 
Nuclear narrative and policy and the Islamic discourse 
The following section provides an overview of the different positions held by Muslim 
states and non-state actors in the debate regarding the legality of nuclear weapons under 
Islamic law. The context and narrative is reviewed for each case and the similarities and 
differences in their discourses are also highlighted. 
 
Iran’s ḥalāl nuclear programme  
Iranian authorities want the international community to take for granted the idea that the 
Muslim faith prohibits nuclear weapons and, more generally, WMD. According to the 
Iranian leadership, chiefly its Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, the reasoning behind this 
position lies in the failure of these weapons to distinguish between combatants and 
noncombatants. Yet, several issues overcast the discourse itself. 
First, as noted previously, Ayatollah Khamenei is said to have issued a fatwā, 
prohibiting nuclear weapons. However, it remains unclear which of the production, 
possession, stockpiling, threat, or use of these weapons are governed by the so-called 
decree. Some documents, including the 2006 Communication to the IAEA, recognise 
the ‘production, stockpiling, and use’168 of nuclear weapons as the scope of this 
prohibition, while others are merely limited to their ‘use’.169   
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Second, the gap between the original Persian statements and the very approximate, 
conflicting, and inaccurate translations provided by both Iranian and foreign media is 
tremendous. An example of the disconnect between the version presented to the 
international community and that targeting the Iranian audience can be found in the 
translation of one of Khamenei’s speeches, provided by the Iranian government-
sponsored English news channel, PressTV. The PressTV commentary claims that ‘as far 
as [the Supreme Leader] is concerned, to possess nuclear arsenal or WMD is going 
against the faith.’ In reality, the Ayatollah stated: ‘we do not believe in the atomic 
bomb, in nuclear weapons, we won’t pursue them. According to our principles, the 
principles set by our belief, our religious principles, the use of these instruments of mass 
murder is fundamentally prohibited, it is ḥarām.’ The subtitles provided by PressTV, 
however, read ‘our religious principles and beliefs forbid the acquisition and use of such 
weapons of mass destruction.’170  
A few years prior, the San Francisco Gate published an article, in which it quoted the 
Ayatollah as saying, ‘in contrast to the propaganda of our enemies, fundamentally we 
are against any production of weapons of mass destruction in any form.’ The same 
article quoted Grand Ayatollah Yousef Sānei stating that, ‘there is complete consensus 
on this issue. It is self-evident in Islam that it is prohibited to have nuclear bombs. It is 
eternal law, because the basic function of these weapons is to kill innocent people. This 
cannot be reversed.’171 Likewise, late Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, had assessed shortly 
before his death that WMD were prohibited by the faith. This prohibition, as voiced by 
Montazeri, remains one of the most precise rulings on these weapons by an Iranian 
Shiite cleric.  
Investing, producing, stockpiling, and using nuclear energy in weapon technology and 
the production of weapons of mass destruction’ was prohibited. He had noted that the 
indiscriminate use of weapons of mass destruction was prohibited by both ‘aql and 
shari’a.172  
Former President, Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, had declared in 1988 – marking the 
end of the devastating eight year war with Iraq, during which chemical weapons were 
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172 ‘Estefta az Ayatollah al-ozma Montazeri darbare-ye sarmaye gozari va be kar giri energy-e haste-I dar 
fanavari-e taslihati.’ Kadivar.com. 14-10-2009.  
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used by Baghdad – that ‘chemical bombs and biological weapons are poor man’s atomic 
bombs and can easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense.’173 
In 2010, he stated ‘curiosity, the need to defence and deterrence, and above all, greed in 
some human beings and societies have unfortunately led them to step on a path’ where 
they would hurt the health and life of their own kind.174  
A number of Iranian officials and clerics assert that Ayatollah Khomeini had made the 
decision not to use chemical weapons against Iraq in retaliation for Baghdad’s use of 
such weapons because he viewed them as un-Islamic. According to Kadivar, the 
founder of the Islamic Republic would not even allow the bombing of Iraqi cities, while 
Baghdad was bombing Iranian towns and cities.175 Former Iranian ambassador to the 
IAEA also quotes the first Supreme Leader saying that, ‘if states continue the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, the world will go toward destruction […] All people must get up and 
become aware. Intellectuals and scientists should stand behind non-proliferation.’176 
More specifically, Mohsen Rafighdoost, former Minister of the Revolutionary Guards, 
quotes Khomeini as asserting the prohibition of nuclear weapons under Islamic law: 
‘Imam [Khomeini] said don’t go after nuclear weapons. He said they are harām. We 
[some of the revolutionaries] wanted nuclear weapons.’177 
 
Pakistan’s Islamic bomb 
A contrasting example from the Iranian case is that of neighbouring Pakistan, also a 
self-proclaimed Islamic Republic, albeit of a different nature. Pakistan provides the  
most interesting counter-example to the Iranian narrative, one that the Iranian leadership 
has conveniently failed to address. Pakistan has developed a nuclear weapons 
programme, comprised of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, outside of the 
NPT framework and had stockpiled 90 to 110 nuclear warheads as of 2011.178 Pakistani 
leaders never engaged in an Islamic legal debate, and have not attempted to provide a 
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174 ‘Hashemi Rafsanjani: Combat against chemical and biological weapons with deeds not with speeches’. 
JARAS. 28 June 2010.  
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178 ‘Pakistan.’ Country profiles. The Nuclear Threat Initiative. Updated July 2012.  
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justification for the country’s programme under shari’a. However, Islam played a 
defining and enabling role in Islamabad’s nuclear narrative. Indeed, while Iran claims 
that nuclear weapons are prohibited by the faith, thus presenting it as a limiting factor, 
Pakistan presented its programme as an opportunity, not only for the country, but also 
for the Muslim world as a whole. As presented by Pakistan, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by the Muslim world would put it on an equal footing with ‘the Christian, 
Jewish and Hindu civilizations,’ as well as the ‘communist powers.’179 Hence, the 
Pakistani government claimed it was attempting to produce an ‘Islamic bomb’ rather 
than a ‘Pakistani bomb’. Pakistan could fund the development of a nuclear weapons 
programme thanks to the donations of Muslim populations, including Saudi Arabia. 
Thus, ‘Pakistan received several billion dollars in donations from Muslim and Arab 
nations during the mid-1970’s’.180  
Al-Qaeda’s Nuclear Ambitions 
Since the mid-1990s, and especially since 9/11, a widespread discussion in the policy 
world and an extensive body of scholarly literature has appeared regarding the potential 
access to, and use of, CBRN weapons by terrorist organisations. This idea holds its 
roots in attempts made by Al-Qaeda’s leaders to justify such an attack and to encourage 
their fellow jihadists to conduct it, as well as discussions on radical Muslim forums 
concerning methods of production of CBRN weapons, including nuclear weapons. The 
general consensus among experts seems to be that terrorists that exploit religion in 
pursuit of their goals tend to be more willing-and therefore likely-to violate traditional 
moral taboos against the use of CBRN weapons than their secular counterparts.’181 
Jihadists have ‘called for an attack on nuclear sites, such as power plants, nuclear 
reactors, and storage facilities for strategic weapons. The call included publication of 
information and maps of nuclear facilities belonging to NATO’.182 From an Islamic 
legal perspective, such an attack would not be different from a direct attack using 
CBRN weapons, as it could lead to the death and injury of a large number of people, 
combatants and civilians alike, regardless of age, gender and religious belief. As 
illustrated by Al-Qaeda’s previous assaults, this lack of distinction has never been a 
concern to the organisation, which justifies its attacks under shari’a, using Qur’anic 
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verses, as well as fatāwā issued by the terrorist entity’s leadership. Al-Qaeda’s rationale 
is found in the ‘west’s role’ in the ‘oppression’ of Muslims.183 Philip Bobbitt notes that 
Al-Qaeda’s rationalisation for the killing of civilians lies in the fact that, ‘the American 
people are the ones who choose their government by way of their own free will, a 
choice which stems from their agreement to its policies. Thus, the American people 
have chosen, consented to, and affirmed’ the U.S. foreign policy in the Muslim world, 
making the nation as a whole a legitimate target.184 Therefore, as discussed in the 
following chapter, the network made attempts to procure uranium in 1993.185 Several 
Saudi clerics issuing fatāwā in support of the use of WMD had been requested to do so 
by Al-Qaeda, in an attempt to provide the terrorist organisation’s position with more 
legitimacy. These include the 2003 fatwā issued by al-Fahd authorising Muslims to use 
WMD.  
III. Conclusion 
Are the production, possession, stockpiling, threat, and/or use of nuclear weapons 
tolerated, allowed, or prohibited under Islamic law? As shown in the previous chapter, 
the response is not clear in the context of international law, where the issues of nuclear 
arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament have been widely discussed since the 
creation of the atom bomb and its uses in combat during the Second World War. As 
discussed throughout Chapter Two, this is due to a lack of a political will, which has 
prevented the debate from developing beyond its embryonic stage on a practical level, 
while it has been thoroughly discussed in academia and policy circles. States with the 
ability to play a key role in shaping legislation and policy with respect to nuclear arms 
control and disarmament are also major stakeholders. They continue to rely on their 
nuclear postures as a chief element of their defence and foreign policy. Against this 
backdrop, it is not surprising that the Islamic faith does not provide a single, clear, and 
explicit answer to this question. As noted in this chapter, shari’a can be categorised 
mainly as private law, making it a limited system, addressing certain issues. This is 
especially the case regarding technological progress, including the development of 
weaponry, which cannot be governed by the faith in the same manner as in international 
law. As noted in Chapter Two, international humanitarian law is designed to evolve and 
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apply to new technological developments in warfare.186 This is the product of over one 
hundred years of focused development in a particular legal field. These nuances are 
established by lawyers specialising in this particular strand of international law, rather 
than traditional Islamic clerics, with an opinion on all and no real expertise on any 
social, scientific, ethical, political, and legal matters, ranging from personal hygiene 
issues to the conduct of warfare.  
Nevertheless, while the pursuit of knowledge is highly regarded in the Islamic 
tradition,187 and technological and military innovation constitutes an important 
endeavour, the development of the law to govern these scientific and technological 
advances is not a requirement. This is a shortcoming of a stagnant religious framework, 
which is addressed in modern international law. Furthermore, not only do different 
schools of thought within the Islamic faith offer different answers, different clerics 
belonging to the same school of thought also seem to have divergent interpretations of 
the Word of God and the teachings of the Prophet and his successors. The Shiite stance 
on the possession of nuclear weapons remains vague, but most Shiite authorities, having 
expressed their views on the matter, seem to agree that the production and possession of 
nuclear weapons are not allowed by the faith. Sunni scholars seem to have divergent 
views. Many believe that the faith not only allows but also encourages Muslims to be 
‘prepared’ and to develop nuclear weapons to deter the enemy. Others are closer to the 
Shiite position and challenge this view, but state that even the production of these 
weapons is prohibited. The notion of threat was not discussed in this study, as it does 
not appear in any of the Islamic legal sources. This is due to the fact that the notion of 
threat as a legal concept is relatively new, exclusive to modern legal systems, and as 
such, remains a gray area in Islamic law. The use of nuclear weapons constitutes 
perhaps the most important yet challenging question of all. The question of whether this 
use would be in response to a war launched against the ummah or as first strike is of key 
importance. Furthermore, scholars have qualified the indiscriminate use of fire against 
the enemy and the flooding of the enemy’s territories and camps as makrūh; the use of 
poison as ḥarām; the killing of women and children, even if they assist the enemy, as 
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prohibited.188 Yet, in Iran, there seems to be a consensus among Shiite jurists who have 
expressed their opinion on the matter that the use of such weapons is prohibited by the 
faith. No such consensus exists among Sunni scholars.  
Ultimately, the legal debate is unlikely to be settled, not only because of its lack of 
clarity, but also due to a general lack of a scholarly discussion around the topic. Very 
few clerics have engaged in the debate and expressed their views. Those who have 
taken a stance on the matter have generally done so due to the political nature of the 
topic. This also means that the ethical and legal discussion is shaped by politics, rather 
than the opposite. In fact, while we often hear statements seeking to convince us one 
way or the other, the foundations of these claims are scarcely discussed. However, 
whether or not the Islamic faith truly allows or prohibits nuclear weapons is not as 
significant as the discourse that is shaped around the legal debate. For all its rigidity, the 
Islamic legal framework is ambiguous and thus flexible enough to be moulded into any 
position. As such, shari’a can be presented as a limiting factor, as in the case of Iran’s 
nuclear narrative, or an enabling one, as in the case of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
programme or Al-Qaeda’s nuclear aspirations (albeit differently). The three following 
case studies build on this argument and demonstrate that the political circumstances and 
interests of each state are the main drivers behind the way the Islamic discourse is 
fashioned. As will be seen in the second part of this study, only Al-Qaeda finds itself 
rigorously bound by its Islamic narrative, one developed around the principle of the 
‘obligation’ of Muslims to develop a nuclear weapon capability. Pakistan and Iran, 
however, present much more nuanced and instrumentalist approaches. This difference 
stems from the fact that while Al-Qaeda is a violent non-state actor, Pakistan and Iran 
are state actors pursuing their interests. The discourse serves as a vehicle promoting 
these interests but can also have other implications and costs. Once an actor defines its 
nuclear programme or ambitions in Islamic terms, it can only reverse its position at 
great political cost.  
What impacts national, regional, and international security is not the outcome of this 
legal debate but rather the way in which it is utilised to promote a given actor’s 
interests. Indeed, shari’a as a legal system that transcends time and space takes 
precedence over other national and international legal frameworks. Hence, when it is 
implemented in a country, other laws become secondary, including international norms, 
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which are supposed to take precedence over particular laws. Hence, nuclear arms 
control and the inception and improvement of an international legal system and its 
supporting international institutions have a far more intimate relationship in the west 
than they do in countries where Islamic law is implemented. This is why former Iranian 
Chief Negotiator and President Hassan Rouhani, stated ‘This fatwa [Khamenei’s on the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons] is more important to us than the NPT and its Additional 
Protocol, more important than any other law.’189 Naturally, if an Islamic norm is 
contradicted by an international piece of legislation, the former will be implemented and 
the second ignored. The next chapters assess the religious nuclear discourses of Al-
Qaeda, Pakistan, and Iran in the context of their respective nuclear aspirations. 
Furthermore, the challenges presented to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, a 
potential future nuclear disarmament process, and other specific policy implications are 
identified.  
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Chapter Four: Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions 
 
Bruce Hoffman defines terrorism, ‘as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear 
through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.’ As noted 
by Hoffman, ‘terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological 
effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack.’ Its aim is to 
‘instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include a 
rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political 
party, or public opinion in general.’ In fact, ‘terrorism is designed to create power where 
there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little.’ Hence, ‘through the 
publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, 
and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or 
international scale.’1 
Al-Qaeda's leadership has made a number of attempts to acquire a nuclear weapons 
capability and has developed a thorough narrative to justify its nuclear ambitions in 
Islamic terms. The nuclear discourse is part of the organisation's greater pan-Islamic, or 
‘pan-Islamist’, narrative. It is fashioned around the central idea of the unity of the 
‘House of Islam’. It seeks to mobilise Muslims, its target audience, in the struggle 
against the ‘House of War’. This chapter analyses Al-Qaeda's nuclear discourse by 
placing it in the context of the organisation's broader narrative, formulated in Islamic 
legal and ethical terms, as well as the Muslim community’s strategic interests. The 
question this chapter investigates is the following: What are the goals and impact of Al-
Qaeda's Islamic nuclear discourse? The chapter concludes that the organisation has 
made a number of failed attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and has sought to justify 
these ambitions in Islamic terms, both legal and strategic. It has done so to rally its 
target audience, Sunnis worldwide, around the idea of an ‘Islamist bomb’. The 
discourse seeks to motivate Muslims to support these endeavours, politically and 
financially, and to volunteer to join the group in its 'struggle' to restore an Islamic 
caliphate.  
The chapter argues that Al-Qaeda’s attempts to justify its nuclear ambitions in Islamic 
terms have been relatively successful. The organisation has convinced a number of its 
agents to try to pursue CBRN weapons and certain elements to provide it with enriched 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hoffman, Bruce (2006), Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press. P. 40-41 
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uranium or warheads. However, despite the use of the religious discourse, no Muslim 
state is known to have officially endorsed these aspirations and assisted the group to 
obtain nuclear weapons. Additionally, while Al-Qaeda’s leadership has successfully 
approached a number of individuals, including Pakistani nuclear scientists, these efforts 
have not been fruitful. Three main hypotheses can be presented to explain this failure. 
First, nuclear facilities and materials may be adequately secured. Developments in 
nuclear security, including Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) and the Global Threat 
Reduction (GTR)2 initiative are further contributing to the security of nuclear materials. 
Hence, it has become increasingly difficult for non-state actors to procure nuclear 
weapons or materials. Second, the decline of Al-Qaeda core and the subsequent 
delegation of many of the group’s activities to the affiliates have decreased the 
likelihood of a nuclear terror attack by the organisation. Third, the group’s attempts to 
justify its actions in Islamic terms, whether legal or otherwise, to the Muslim world 
seem to have failed. As discussed further, even other Islamist terror groups have 
denounced the organisation’s tactics. This, in turn, is due to several reasons enumerated 
in this chapter. Chiefly, most other terrorist groups and governments have little interest 
in supporting nuclear terrorism.   
The chapter is structured around several key questions. First, to what extent is nuclear 
terrorism a threat to international peace and security and how has this threat been 
addressed internationally? Second, to what extent is Al-Qaeda’s nuclear threat viable? 
In other words, why is Al-Qaeda perceived as the greatest nuclear terrorism threat? 
Third, what are the core arguments presented by Al-Qaeda core's leadership to justify 
the group's nuclear ambitions? Fourth, how are these arguments framed into the greater 
legal, moral, and strategic Islamic framework? Fifth, what purpose does Al-Qaeda's 
Islamic nuclear discourse serve? Lastly, how effective has the discourse been?  
 
Nuclear terrorism as a security issue 
Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of threats to international peace and security 
and our traditional understanding of the international security landscape have been 
challenged. This was especially the case with the 9/11 attacks. Prior to the fall of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The GTR initiative aims to minimise the threat of nuclear terrorism by reducing and repatriate nuclear 
and radiological materials located in various civilian facilities. The initiative further converts research 
reactors and isotope production facilities using highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium.  
‘Global Threat Reduction Initiative’, The National Nuclear Security Administration.  
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  114	  	  
Soviet Union, state-actors were perceived as the main threat to each other and regional 
stability, and consequently international security. More specifically, the greatest threat 
to international peace and security during the Cold War lay in the use of nuclear 
weapons in a conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. In 1962, the 
conflict between the two superpowers escalated, bringing them very close to a nuclear 
war in what has become known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even after the fall of the 
USSR, and until 9/11, the greatest threat seemed to be that of ‘all-out combat with the 
well-equipped armies of a modern state’. Since 9/11, however, ‘an entirely new system 
of warfare’ has changed conflict from ‘industrial-style fighting methods’ to ‘post-
industrial warfare’.3 The nature of security challenges has evolved since the 1990s to 
encompass ‘a greater number of smaller, more amorphous sources, such as regional 
states in pursuit of regional political ambitions, inter-ethnic civil wars, and transnational 
threats from non-state actors particularly terrorism, narcotics, and crime.’4 Likewise, the 
possibility of the use of WMD by non-state actors has increased.  
In 2004, the U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Report 
identified terrorism as one of the key threats to international peace and security, with a 
particular focus on the role played by Al-Qaeda.5 ‘Attacks against more than 10 
Member States on four continents in the past five years have demonstrated that Al-
Qaida and associated entities pose a universal threat to the membership of the United 
Nations and the United Nations itself.’6  
To borrow Walzer’s words, ‘in war, terrorism is a way of avoiding engagement with the 
enemy army. It represents an extreme form of the strategy of the “indirect approach.” It 
is so indirect that many soldiers have refused to call it war at all.’ Hence, ‘one might say 
that it represents the continuation of war by political means.’7 Therefore, with the 
advent of this strategy as a key means of engagement, ‘the “clash of civilizations” 
between “the West and the rest” predicted by Samuel Huntington is unlikely to take 
place exclusively – or even principally – on the battlefield’.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Kalare, Michael, in Kegley, Charles (2003). The New Global Terrorism – Characteristics, Causes, 
Controls. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Practice Hall. P. 27 
4 Cole, Benjamin (2011). The Changing Face of Terrorism – How Real Is the Threat from Biological, 
Chemical and Nuclear Weapons? London: I.B. Tauris. P. 11 
5 ‘The United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’, A/59/565 (2004), 47 
6 Ibid. 
7 Walzer, Michael (2006), 197 
8 Stern, Jessica (1999), The Ultimate Terrorists.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press. P. 5 
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The aforementioned U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 
identified terrorism as one of six clusters of threats to international peace and security.9 
The same report further identified CBRN weapons as another cluster of threats to the 
peace. Naturally, the combination of these two threats, namely CBRN terrorism, 
constitutes one of the foremost challenges to international peace and security in the 
twenty-first century.  
In a speech delivered in Prague, U.S. President Barack Obama highlighted the 
importance of pursuing the ‘peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons’ as 
well as assuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of existing arsenals.10 The speech 
emphasised the significance of nuclear security and preventing nuclear terrorism. 
We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most 
immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear weapon 
could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and it would have 
no problem using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the 
globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay.11 
The 2010 United States Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reflected this and ‘place[d] the 
prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the U.S. policy agenda’.12 
In an effort to implement the Prague speech and prevent nuclear terrorism, the United 
States has undertaken ‘to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide’ and to 
enhance ‘national and international capabilities to disrupt illicit proliferation networks’ 
and ‘expand […] nuclear forensics efforts’.13 One such step lies in the NSS process, 
which began a year after the Prague speech and aims to reduce the threat of nuclear 
terrorism.  
Despite all these efforts and progress, ‘in twenty known cases over the past twenty 
years, officials have seized plutonium or highly enriched uranium outside of authorized 
control.’ None of these incidents provided enough material for a nuclear weapon. 
However, two problems remain.  
First, in many instances, the seized material was advertised as a sample of a larger 
quantity for sale; material which, if it exists, authorities have never recovered. Second, 
the presence of fissile material outside of security measures is physical evidence of 
failure that might be recurring.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 ‘The United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change’ 
10 ‘2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report’. April 2010. iii 
11 ‘Obama Prague Speech On Nuclear Weapons: FULL TEXT’, The Huffington Post. 06-05-2009  
12 ‘2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report’. April 2010. i 
13 Ibid., vii 
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Other incidents reinforce the fact that nuclear facilities and materials are not secure 
enough. These include ‘two attacks within minutes of each other on a site housing 
hundreds of kilograms of HEU’14 at Pelindaba, South Africa in 2007 and an 82-year-old 
nun’s intrusion into ‘the U.S. repository for weapons-grade uranium’, the Y-12 National 
Security Complex.15 
 
The growing lethality of post-modern terror groups (1990s-2014) 
Two major developments in its paradigm have also changed the face of terrorism as a 
whole.16 First, there has been a transition from ‘modern’ terrorism to what some 
scholars have labelled as ‘post-modern terrorism’. From the 1950s until the 1980s, 
terrorism was limited to non-state actors linked to particular territories, struggling to re-
establish a given state or gain independence for it. ‘It was Algeria’s Front de libération 
nationale, seeking liberation from France, that defined modern terrorism, deliberately 
spilling the blood of random French civilians.’17 This trend began to change during the 
1980s and became more dominant with the creation and strengthening of Al-Qaeda. Al-
Qaeda was established and continues to perform as a ‘global network’, with no ties to a 
particular nation-state, although it has been based in Afghanistan and Pakistan and has 
received considerable support from individuals close to the Saudi establishment, 
including the royal family.18 As such, Al-Qaeda is the example of a post-modern 
terrorist organisation par excellence. Bobbitt uses a different term to qualify non-state 
actors such as Al-Qaeda and defines them in relation to the ‘market state’.  
Market state terrorism will be just as global, networked, decentralized, and devolved 
and rely just as much on outsourcing and incentivizing as the market state. It does not 
depend upon state sponsorship; indeed, in some cases it would appear that al Qaeda had 
more influence over the government in whose jurisdiction it worked than did that 
government over it.19  
Another factor distinguishing modern terrorist groups from post-modern entities is that 
‘historically, terrorists have attempted to force the hand of political leaders by fuelling 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) 
15 Tobey, William H. ‘We Are Failing at Nuclear Security’. Nuclear Security Matters, The Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University’s Kennedy School. 01-03-2014.  
16 The terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’, often used interchangeably, in fact refer to two different phenomena. 
Brian Jenkins defines ‘the former [as] the act of events and the latter being about imagination and fear.’  
Masse, Todd (2011), 8 
17 Bobbitt, Phillip (2009), 43 
18 Evidence of Financial Links Between Saudi Royal Family and Al Qaeda’. The New York Times. 23-06-
2009.  
19 Bobbitt, Phillip (2009), 45 
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fear in a wider audience.’ Hence, where modern terrorist groups are limited in the 
means they employ and the number of casualties they inflict, post-modern terror 
organisations are not. Indeed, ‘trends dating from at least the 1990s indicate that 
political considerations may no longer be the major driving force behind today’s most 
dangerous terrorism threat, although instilling fear in a larger audience still motivates 
terrorists.’ This in turn is due to the second change in terrorism: ‘Today’s terrorism is 
often fuelled by extremist religious ideologies that rationalize destruction, vengeance, 
and punishment as both necessary ends in themselves and as tools to achieve a better 
world.’20 As explained by Hoffman, the intersection between religion and terrorism is 
not new: ‘More than two thousand years ago the first acts of what we now describe as 
“terrorism” were perpetrated by religious fanatics.’21 Nevertheless, ‘as the number of 
religious terrorist groups was increasing’ in the 1990s, ‘the number of ethno-
nationalist/separatist terrorist groups declined appreciably.’ It is not surprising, 
Hoffman notes, ‘that religion should become a far more popular motivation for 
terrorism in the post-cold war era as old ideologies lie discredited by the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and communist ideology,’ and that ‘the promise of munificent benefits 
from the liberal-democratic, capital state, apparently triumphant […] fails to materialize 
in many countries throughout the world.22 Second, terrorism has become increasingly 
connected to Islamism. This Islamisation is part of the ‘fourth wave’ of terrorism, which 
began in 1979.23 This development is not possible in modern terrorism, as most modern 
terrorist groups have traditionally been linked to particular nation-states. The core of Al-
Qaeda’s ideology lies on the fundamental reformation of all non-Islamic concepts and 
models, including the notion of the nationhood, which clashes with the idea of the 
ummah. The ‘Al-Qaeda Training Manual’ makes this very clear: 
The young men returning to Allah realized that Islam is not just performing rituals but a 
complete system: Religion and government, worship and Jihad [holy war], ethics and 
dealing with people, and the Koran and sword. The bitter situation that the nation 
[ummah] has reached is a result of its divergence from Allah's course and his righteous 
law for all places and times. That [bitter situation] came about as a result of its 
children's love for the world, their loathing of death, and their abandonment of Jihad 
[holy war]. Unbelief is still the same. […] It is the same unbelief that drove Sadat, 
Hosni Mubarak, Gadhafi, Hafez Assad, Saleh, Fahed--Allah's curse be upon the non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ferguson, Charles. Potter, William (2004), 16 
21 Hoffman, Bruce (2006), 83 
22 Ibid. 85 
23 David Rapoport identifies four waves of terrorism: the ‘anarchist wave’, which began in the 1880s and 
lasted until the 1920s; the ‘anti-colonial wave’ of the 1920s-1960s; the ‘new left wave’ of following 
decades until the 1990s; and the ‘religious wave’, of which Islamism is a part of.  
Rapoport, David in Kegley, Charles (2003), 37 
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believing leaders--and all the apostate Arab rulers to torture, kill, imprison, and torment 
Moslems. These young men realized that an Islamic government would never be 
established except by the bomb and rifle. Islam does not coincide or make a truce with 
unbelief, but rather confronts it. The confrontation that Islam calls for with these 
godless and apostate regimes, does not know Socratic debates, Platonic ideals nor 
Aristotelian diplomacy. But it knows the dialogue of bullets, the ideals of assassination, 
bombing, and destruction, and the diplomacy of the cannon and machine-gun.24  
 
The 9/11 attacks ‘inevitably, redefined “terrorism” yet again.’ The attacks killed ‘a total 
of nearly three thousand people’. As noted by Bruce Hoffman, ‘to put that death toll in 
perspective, in the entirety of the twentieth century no more than fourteen terrorists 
incidents had killed more than one hundred people. And until 9/11 no terrorist operation 
had ever killed more than five hundred people.’25 This meant that the 9/11 attacks 
‘raised the lethality of terrorism to a new level. The terrorists clearly were determined to 
cause catastrophic casualties-tens of thousands of casualties-confirming a long-term 
trend toward increasingly large-scale, indiscriminate attacks.’ As argued by Brian 
Jenkins, while the worst attacks of the 1970s left tens of casualties, the 1980s and 1990s 
saw hundreds of deaths in terrorist attacks. The number rose to thousands in Al-Qaeda’s 
9/11 attacks, thereby indicating the perpetrators’ willingness to use WMD to inflict 
greater casualties.26 This is while Jenkins had noted in 1975 that ‘acts aimed at causing 
thousands or tens of thousands of casualties, for a variety of reasons, may be the least 
likely.’27  
These changes are crucial in the examination of Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions. To be 
sure, religious ‘global networks’, with no attachment to a land or people, are the most 
likely to launch CBRN attacks. To borrow Bobbitt’s words: ‘terrorism will become a far 
more important security issue because market state terrorists, unlike their twentieth 
century predecessors, would actually use WMD against civilians.’28 Zawahiri’s words 
confirm this idea. He argues that western political governments rely on the popular vote 
to shape their policies. Hence, the electorates of these countries are responsible for 
every questionable decision made by their government. Such decisions include the 
inception and support of the state of Israel: ‘These people have willingly called for, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 ‘The Al Qaeda Manual.’ UK/BM-6 – Translation.  
25 Hoffman, Bruce (2006), 18-19 
26 Jenkins, Brian (2002), ‘Countering al-Qaeda’. Arlington, VA: The RAND Corporation. P. 6 
27 Jenkins, Brian. ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?’ Testimony before the Committee on Energy and 
Diminishing Materials of the California State Assembly, November 19, 1975. November 1975. Santa 
Monica: The Rand Corporation. P. 2 
28 Bobbitt, Phillip (2009), 9 
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supported, and backed the establishment of and survival of the State of Israel.’29 
Therefore, while all the populations in the western world may not be actively taking part 
in the ‘war on Muslims’, they are guilty by virtue of their role in decision-making. As 
such, Al-Qaeda’s definition of who is a combatant and who can be legitimately targeted 
are very different from the traditional Islamic definitions discussed in Chapter Three. 
This worldview has led Al-Qaeda to conduct much more lethal attacks than modern 
terrorist groups, as it considers all western constituencies as legitimate targets. During 
the 1980-90s over a quarter of terrorism-related casualties resulted from attacks 
conducted by Shiite terrorist groups. Yet, these groups were not responsible for the 
CBRN attacks perpetrated during that period. According to Benjamin Cole, this 
provides evidence of the fact that the correlation between ‘the general trend of the 
increasing lethality of contemporary terrorism’ and the use of WMD is ‘equivocal at 
best’.30 Yet, global terrorist networks, such as Al-Qaeda, also differ from their 
predecessors in another way. Whereas ‘modern’ terrorist groups, such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), were reluctant even to launch deathly attacks with minimal 
casualties, and would in some instances even issue apologetic statements after 
perpetrating attacks, Al-Qaeda has not hesitated to inflict mass casualties and has stood 
by these acts. Hence, the network would be more willing to perpetrate nuclear and other 
WMD attacks.31 
The willingness to inflict mass casualties stems from historical, cultural, and ideological 
factors.  
Groups motivated by apocalyptic millenarian religious doctrines seem to be particularly 
dangerous, since such doctrines postulate (1) the imminent destruction of the existing 
world order, which is viewed as thorough and irremediably “evil”; (2) a terrible fate for 
the immoral, unenlightened majority; (3) a key role for a select group of very special 
people-the true followers of the doctrine, namely, themselves-who will be spared the 
fate of others; and (4) the collapse of the existing order followed by the creation of a 
worldly paradise in which the same special people will be freed from want, hardship, 
suffering, strife, oppression, immorality, and everything else that is “evil”.32 
These factors do not only determine whether a terrorist group would engage in CBRN 
terrorism, but also, how it would use WMD. For instance, a global network such as Al-
Qaeda, and in particular Al-Qaeda core, would be more willing to use these weapons 
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30 Cole, Benjamin (2011), 15 
31 Maurer, Stephen (2009), WMD Terrorism – Science and Policy Choices, Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press, 4 
32 Ibid., 21 
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strategically to inflict mass casualties. Smaller groups, however, would be more 
reluctant to inflict mass casualties and more likely to use these weapons tactically, 
mainly to impact society psychologically and economically.33 Al-Qaeda meets all these 
requirements and it utilises the Islamic legal framework to shape its discourse 
promoting these ideas to concretise its goals. In addition to the aforementioned 
ideological changes, which have occurred in the past two decades, technical and 
technological progress also contributes to this new breed of terror. Al-Qaeda has 
mastered the art of proliferating its ideas through different media, communicating them 
to its audience across the Muslim world and beyond. The key to this achievement has 
been the advent of modern telecommunication technologies, including the Internet, 
facilitating communications between the various agents within the network and its 
affiliates. In fact, ‘the Internet allows terrorists to recruit from a larger pool of potential 
sympathizers and to communicate instantaneously.’34  
In order for Al-Qaeda to continue its activities, it is crucial for its leadership to justify 
its every action and position in Islamic terms. ‘Indeed, the network’s very existence is 
dependent of the support of Muslims. This support allows the network to accomplish 
two tasks, which guarantee its efficiency and longevity. First, without support from 
Muslim communities, the group would be unable to recruit volunteers (mujahidin). 
Second, the organisation relies on the funding it receives to continue its operations. This 
funding is raised from two key sources: ‘charitable contributions made by philanthropic 
and devout Muslims (who may not be aware of any diversion of their gift), and the 
operation of legitimate businesses (such as bin Laden’s network of companies).’35 The 
network’s attempts to appeal to Muslims in order to legitimise and fund its operations as 
well as their effectiveness are further assessed in the following sections.  
Whether or not Al-Qaeda does, in fact, need CBRN weapons to promote its goals 
remains controversial. For instance, some argue that if the goal pursued by the 
organisation is to inflict mass casualties, it does not need WMD. Al-Qaeda’s strategy is 
one of ‘terrorism-as-provocation’, which entails that ‘most of the killing (and dying) 
will be done by others’. Yet, even in that scenario, the use of such weapons against the 
west would probably be perceived as a victory for the network.36 What is more, with the 
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advent and fast progress of a former affiliate, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 
the network’s significance has been questioned. Acquiring and, perhaps, using WMD, 
especially nuclear weapons, could serve as a vehicle for the network to assert continued 
relevance.   
All the developments identified in the previous section are of tremendous importance in 
understanding why the case of Al-Qaeda is assessed in the context of this study, while 
HAMAS and Hezbollah are overlooked. Indeed, while some have argued that a nuclear-
armed Iran could provide such groups with nuclear weapons, there are several reasons 
why neither Tehran nor HAMAS and Hezbollah would choose to go down that path. 
First, neither of these groups has expressed any interest in nuclear weapons. Second, 
despite some arguments according to which Iran could provide these groups with 
nuclear weapons,37 this seems very unlikely. Regardless of the ties between the Islamic 
Republic and HAMAS and Hezbollah, Tehran does not have any incentive in providing 
these groups with fissile materials or nuclear technology, as it would likely backfire. If 
such weapons are traced back to Iran, and they would be,38 the regime and the nation 
would pay a very high price.39 The government has no incentive in providing the 
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Lieber, Keir. Press, Daryl (summer 2013). ‘Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons To Terrorists’. 
International Security, Volume 38, issue 1, PP. 80-104. P. 81 
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39 Daniel Byman offers compelling arguments why the arguments fashioned round the idea of Iran 
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real support for terrorism for more than the last 25 years and its possession of chemical weapons for over 
15 years, Tehran has not transferred unconventional systems to terrorists. Iran is likely to continue this 
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Byman, Daniel (June 2007). ‘Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 31:169-181, 2008. P. 169  
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‘ultimate’ weapon to non-state actors, which are unpredictable and out of its control.40 
Given the unpredictability of terrorist groups and their revolving outside the 
international legal framework, which, as discussed in Chapter Two, aims to render 
states predictable, trust between state and non-state actors is difficult. Hence, a state can 
never have a guarantee that its fissile material or weapons would not be used against it 
or its nationals in the event a non-state actor would no longer need its assistance, their 
interests would clash, or it would want to exercise pressure to receive more support.  
Trust and plausible deniability are inversely related when it comes to state backing of 
terrorists. Iran trusts Hezbullah and works openly with it, but this close relationship is 
far from secret. Iran also has ties to a range of Palestinian and Iraqi groups, but while 
these relationships are more covert, and thus more deniable, they are not built on trust. 
Thus, Iran lacks deniability for the groups to which it might transfer more advanced 
systems, but lacks the trust that would make it more likely to transfer advanced 
systems.41   
In fact, these groups’ support to the Islamic Republic has been inconstant to say the 
least. For example, Hezbollah announced it would not retaliate should Israel attack 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, despite Tehran being one of its chief sponsors. Furthermore, 
relations between these groups and Iran have been rocky throughout the Islamic 
Republic’s lifetime, resulting in Iran cutting its funding to them.42 Third, nuclear 
weapons programmes entail high costs and require many resources, thus becoming a 
state’s ‘crown jewels’.43 The Iranian nuclear programme, especially, has been a 
challenging endeavour with many costs, political and financial. Hence, Iran would have 
very little incentive simply to provide these groups with nuclear technology. Indeed, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, a key plank of the Iranian nuclear narrative has lain in the 
element of pride and sharing this element with rogue organisations would undermine 
these efforts. Likewise, Tehran’s argument according to which the use of WMD is 
strictly harām would also be undermined if it provides non-state actors with the 
technology for indiscriminate use. Fourth, the transfer of such technology would 
represent a great risk and would not be worthwhile for the state, as if used by 
organisations, which are beyond the control of Tehran and which often have clashing 
interests, would be traced back and cause retaliation. As suggested by Todd Masse, 
while the effectiveness of nuclear forensics leaves a lot to be desired, its combination 
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with other tools can allow for the fissile material or nuclear weapons used by a terrorist 
group to be traced back to the state of origin.44  
Nevertheless, even if these groups did manage to acquire such weapons, they would 
have no incentive to use them. Both groups have ties to particular territories and 
populations, which are vulnerable and would suffer substantial retaliation should these 
groups choose to inflict mass casualties indiscriminately, using WMD and more 
particularly nuclear weapons.45 As Stephen Maurer points out, unless these groups 
decide to wage ‘global jihad’, they can be deterred like ‘rogue’ states. However, the 
likelihood of these states traveling the same path as Al-Qaeda and launching global 
jihad also seems low, precisely due to the connection between these groups and the 
territories and populations they claim to fight for and their vulnerability.46  
Furthermore, these groups aim to have a say in national and international matters and 
decision-making. Hence, they cannot use CBRN weapons as freely as terrorist 
organisations, such as Al-Qaeda, that reject the status quo altogether and have no 
political aspiration. Accordingly, if HAMAS or Hezbollah launched an indiscriminate 
attack, resulting in the deaths of a significant number of people, they would lose all 
credibility and legitimacy among their constituencies. Modern terrorist groups would 
not be able to function as part of the establishment and would be alienated from the 
political process. What is more, as is noted in the following sections, Hezbollah 
denounced Al-Qaeda’s methods after 9/11. Hence, the common wisdom of the pre-9/11 
era still holds true in the case of modern terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and 
Hezbollah. They ‘want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead’. In fact, they 
aim to harass, not to kill in large numbers’.47 As noted previously, this trend has 
changed with the advent of post-modern terrorism. Al-Qaeda has been pursuing CBRN 
capabilities because their aim is to inflict maximum damage and kill many people. To 
borrow Jessica Stern’s words, their intent is ‘commit macroterrorism’.48 9/11 was the 
best illustration of this change, as it was a combination of these two goals: killing many 
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people while a lot of people were watching, thus creating one of the most memorable 
events in modern history.  
Another factor that makes Al-Qaeda so relevant lies in the network’s ‘robustness, in the 
face of sustained international counterterrorist efforts. This is reflected in the ability of 
the al-Qa’ida central command to regroup and ensconce itself in ungoverned spaces in 
Pakistan’s northwest provinces after their Taliban hosts were routed in Afghanistan.’49 
Al-Qaeda’s evolution in response to counterterrorism measures is assessed in the next 
section. In light of the network’s flexibility and ability to adapt and survive despite 
effective counterterrorism operations, the best way to deter the group perhaps lies in the 
deligimisation of its cause and the means it employs. As noted by Mowatt-Larssen, as 
long as Al-Qaeda’s message resonates ‘on the Arab streets’, the network will be 
successful.50  
Lastly, Al-Qaeda is one of three terrorist entities to have ever sought nuclear weapons. 
The two others are Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese group responsible for the 1995 Sarin 
attack in the Tokyo subway, and, possibly, a terrorist group based in the North 
Caucasus.51  
 
Motivations and goals 
Al-Qaeda’s goals and motivation have been misunderstood by security experts, leading 
to a number of foreign policy miscalculations and mistakes since the network’s 
establishment. This lack of understanding in turn is due to misrepresentations and 
distortions. In fact, the view that Al-Qaeda’s actions have been widely described as 
entailing a disdain for ‘our way of life’ is an oversimplification of the network’s 
motivation. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou argues that, ‘the answer is a deep 
and heavy sense of injustice harboured by a transnational armed group self-
championing the feelings of millions around the Arab and Islamic world.’52 What is 
more, until 9/11, many experts did not believe that the very nature of terrorism was 
changing.  
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Brian Jenkins wrote in 1976 that, ‘for reasons ranging from a sincere concern for public 
safety to personal aggrandissement, some have inadvertently or deliberately 
exaggerated the terrorist threat.’ This in turn, he argued, ‘may have the effect of making 
any sort of “nuclear action” more attractive to existing or would-be terrorists.’53 Jenkins 
noted that terrorists would not perpetrate a nuclear attack aiming to inflict mass 
casualties, but rather because such an attack would receive considerable attention.54 He 
described terrorism as ‘theatre’, arguing that contrary to popular belief, terrorists are not 
irrational killers, but rather perpetrators of violence attempting to ‘inspire fear, to create 
an atmosphere of alarm’.55 This would allow them to draw ‘attention to themselves and 
causes […] thereby gaining some political leverage’.56 Jenkins also points out that, 
‘terrorist actions have tended to be aimed at producing immediate dramatic effects, a 
handful of violent deaths – not lingering illnesses, and certainly not a population of 
terminally ill, vengeance-seeking victims.’57  
Even in the years leading to 9/11, experts rejected the possibility of an attack with those 
dimensions. As noted by Mowatt-Larssen, ‘had we taken the fatwās seriously, we could 
have prevented 9/11 – they [Al-Qaeda] were telling us everything, we just ignored it.’ 
This, Mowatt-Larssen argues, is because of the west’s tendency to project its ideas of 
rationality: ‘we think that it would be stupid for Al-Qaeda to conduct a nuclear attack 
and that it would be counterproductive. But we should be confident that Zawahiri is not 
thinking the same way.’58 
Since, the threat of nuclear terrorism has become more realistic, given the 
aforementioned growing lethality of terrorist groups and the attempts made by non-state 
actors to procure CBRN capabilities. Hence, Jenkins’ descriptions of modern terrorism 
are not applicable to Al-Qaeda. Yet, similar arguments have been presented about Al-
Qaeda. Mohamedou, for instance, rejects the ideas that the network is irrational, 
fundamentalist, and has a baseless hatred of the west.59 The network has justified its 
attempts to procure a nuclear capability by presenting two main rationales underlying it. 
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These two rationales are possession as a means of deterrence and, arguably, the use of 
these weapons to retaliate or inflict maximum damage.60 The network has emphasised 
the importance of the possession of CBRN weapons to deter the enemies of Islam. As 
discussed in chapter Three, bin Laden believed the possession of nuclear weapons to be 
obligatory (wajīb) for Muslims. William Browne argues that this should not lead one to 
extrapolate that the network intends to use these weapons. He further suggests that bin 
Laden did not state in ‘an unqualified manner’ that he would use these weapons against 
the west, merely making the case for their possession for deterrence purposes.61 
Nevertheless, bin Laden articulated at least two conditions which would lead the group 
to use CBRN weapons. First, Al-Qaeda core has declared that it would retaliate by 
using WMD against any chemical or nuclear attack launched by the United States.62 
Second, the network’s aim is to ‘inflict maximum amount of physical damage on the 
United States’.63 Yet, even semi-successful operations are a major political achievement 
if there is comprehensive media coverage of the event.64 Hence, if the network 
successfully acquires CBRN weapons but fails to achieve the impact it aims for in 
effect, it would still ‘win’ if it receives the media attention it seeks.    
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish between Al-Qaeda core and the various 
affiliates, as they tend to pursue different objectives. For instance, some of the affiliates’ 
leaders ‘want to establish Islamic emirates in specific countries or regions, while others 
want to replace current regimes and replace them with an Islamic one. To achieve these 
ends, some view broader violent jihad as a means, while others are ‘agnostic’ about it. 
Zawahiri’s main objective lies in the overthrow of regimes in ‘key Muslim countries’, 
in specific regions, rather than establishing a Muslim caliphate globally.65 Zawahiri 
pursues his aim of reviving a pan-Islamic caliphate through violent jihad, relying on 
‘guerrilla campaigns as [its] main vehicle’.66  
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The concept of nuclear terrorism 
Charles Ferguson and William Potter identify four ways in which terrorists ‘can exploit 
military and civilian nuclear assets around the globe to serve their destructive ends’. 
These four means can be divided into two categories: those less likely but with a much 
greater impact and those easier to achieve and more likely, but with less impact. The 
first category encompasses ‘the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon’ and 
‘the theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a 
crude nuclear weapon-an improvised nuclear device (IND)’. Such an attack is more 
difficult to achieve, therefore less likely to occur, but would have catastrophic 
consequences. It would lead to hundreds of casualties, the loss of billions of dollars in 
infrastructure, and radioactive contamination, leading to considerable health and 
economic impact. The second class includes ‘attacks against and sabotage of nuclear 
facilities, in particular nuclear power plants, causing the release of large amounts of 
radioactivity’ and ‘the unauthorized acquisition of radioactive materials contributing to 
the fabrication and detonation of a radiological dispersion device (RDD)-a “dirty 
bomb”-or radiation emission device (RED).’ It would be easier and therefore more 
likely, but with a lesser impact than the two aforementioned types. It would amount to 
billions of dollars of damage, radioactive contamination, and long-term health effects.67 
Likewise, nuclear terrorism itself remains a lower probability threat than conventional 
terrorism, but would entail graver consequences.68 Either of these are potential avenues 
for Al-Qaeda. However, the network seems to have been more interested in the first 
category, more difficult but with a greater impact, thus far. Indeed, as noted throughout 
the chapter, Al-Qaeda does not inflict mass casualty for the sake of killing a great 
number of people. It does so to achieve certain goals, which help promote its agenda. 
Therefore, if the network decides to launch a nuclear attack, it would be likely to do so 
not only to inflict maximum damage but also to showcase its capability to the west and 
receive support from radicalised Muslims. The most effective means of gaining such 
prestige and deterring the west would be to acquire and/or use nuclear weapon rather 
than use RDD or RED. Nevertheless, ‘the available open-source data clearly indicate an 
increased interest by terrorists in CBRN weapons and agents.’69 
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Nuclear security measures in place 
As discussed previously, nuclear terrorism is increasingly viewed as a serious threat to 
international peace and security. This has been confirmed by a series of events. ‘In 
Pakistan […] new investigations have revealed unauthorized sales of sensitive nuclear 
technology by Pakistani nuclear scientists supportive of a fundamentalist Islamic 
agenda.’70 Therefore, a number of steps have been taken to minimise the risk of nuclear 
terrorism. These include international instruments and organisations established to 
detect, deter, and prevent nuclear terrorism. The Convention on the Physical Protection 
of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), the aforementioned NSS, GTR, as well as instruments 
discussed in Chapter Two, such as CTBT, UNSCR 1540 and the International 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are among these 
instruments.  
As noted in Chapter Two, the CTBT aims to ban all civilian and military nuclear 
explosions. The treaty has yet to enter into force, which could arguably help prevent 
nuclear terrorism. 
Some argue that the absence of nuclear testing and the diminishing numbers of nuclear 
weapons decrease the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons or materials. 
The prohibition of testing will make it more difficult for proliferators to develop 
warheads that might be mounted on missiles. Because terrorism challenges the civilized 
norms contained in international law, a number of experts state that resolved 
commitment by the international community to such norms (including the CTBT) will 
contain radical terrorism.71 
The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was 
adopted in 2005 and entered into force in 2007. It provides that all States Parties must 
‘make every effort to adopt appropriate measures to ensure the protection of radioactive 
material, taking into account relevant recommendations and functions of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency’ (Art. 8).72 
The CPPNM, was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1987. Article 3 of the 
convention provides that: 
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Each State Party shall take appropriate steps within the framework of its national law 
and consistent with international law to ensure as far as practicable that, during 
international nuclear transport, nuclear material within its territory, or on board a ship or 
aircraft under its jurisdiction insofar as such ship or aircraft is engaged in the transport 
to or from that State, is protected at the levels described in Annex I.’73 
It was amended and renamed the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material and Nuclear Facilities in 2005. The amendment expanded the scope of the 
convention to cover the protection of nuclear facilities.  
The Amendment to the CPPNM makes it legally binding for States Parties to protect 
nuclear facilities and material in peaceful domestic use, storage and transport. It also 
provides for expanded cooperation between and among States regarding rapid measures 
to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological 
consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offences.74 
 
Al-Qaeda and nuclear terrorism  
Following 9/11, scholars and practitioners began to examine Al-Qaeda’s nuclear 
ambitions and the steps taken by the network during the 1990s to develop a nuclear 
capability. The U.S. intelligence community concluded that Al-Qaeda has ‘a strong 
interest in, and has attempted to acquire nuclear weapons.’75 In fact, during Operation 
Enduring Freedom76, the international coalition forces found documents confirming the 
organisation’s nuclear ambitions. However, the weapon designs contained in the 
‘Superbomb’ document were deemed unusable and other pieces of information 
retrieved in other documents contained mistakes.77 Hence, despite the organisation’s 
efforts to develop nuclear and radiological capabilities, it has so far failed to present a 
serious threat.78  
In 1998, while attempting to develop CBRN capabilities and training his men to launch 
an attack using chemical, biological, and radiological weapons, bin Laden declared it 
his religious duty to acquire WMD for deterrence purposes.79 Zawahiri even claimed 
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that the network had procured these weapons: ‘we sent our people to Moscow, to 
Tashkent, to other central Asian states and they negotiated, and we purchased some 
suitcase bombs’.80 While the intelligence community did not confirm the organisation’s 
success in obtaining such weapons, it is clear that it sought CBRN capabilities. Notably, 
bin Laden led the group’s efforts to procure enriched uranium in Sudan 1992-1996.81 
He employed a ‘point man’ responsible for nuclear matters, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim. 
Salim attempted to procure Russian enriched uranium in 1993, but was only able to 
purchase low-grade reactor fuel.82 Likewise, Jamal al-Fadl, who left the network and 
became an informant for the U.S. government, was instructed to facilitate the purchase 
of South African-origin uranium.83 However, the group’s efforts to procure enriched 
uranium failed as its unknowledgeable members were ‘subject of numerous other scams 
involving radioactive material’.84  
During his stay in Sudan, bin Laden invested in the local economy, established dual-use 
companies, and funded the country’s National Islamic Front (NIF).85 Despite suffering 
considerable financial loss, the network gained access to ‘laboratory assistance’ and ‘a 
sanctuary that allowed [it] to pursue [its] interest in CBRN weapons.’86 Al-Qaeda 
further approached the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and a number of Pakistanis for 
assistance to develop a nuclear capability. Among these Pakistanis were the ‘long 
beards’, experts having worked on Pakistan’s nuclear programme and who did not view 
their government keenly.87 Later, 1999-2001, Al-Qaeda conducted ‘crude but sensible 
conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in desert of Afghanistan.’88 These 
were conducted under the supervision of Abdel Aziz al-Masri (also known as Ali 
Sayyid al-Bakri), ‘the father of al Qaeda’s nuclear program.’89  
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These efforts were undertaken covertly through ‘a small group of operatives, the vast 
majority of which did not possess the capabilities of dealing with CBRN, except for 
crude homemade bombs.’ After the coalition’s intervention in Afghanistan, the fall of 
the Taliban, and subsequently, its loss of its Afghan safe haven, Al-Qaeda core lost its 
ability to pursue these weapons. However, some have argued that one area remains 
where such weapons can be developed-namely, among Muslim communities in the 
west, especially in Europe.90 
While pursuing a nuclear capability, bin Laden claimed that ‘to seek to possess the 
weapons that could counter those of the infidels is a religious duty.’91 As mentioned in 
chapter Three, Al-Qaeda core, led by bin Laden and Zawahiri, issued a fatwā declaring 
the pursuit of WMD a religious duty for Muslims.  
 
Al-Qaeda core and affiliates 
As discussed previously, the nature of terrorism has changed drastically since the end of 
the Cold War. One of the factors contributing to this change lies in the fact that modern 
terrorist groups were ‘comparatively well-defined, contained, and stable’. Post-modern 
terrorist organisations, by contrast, are ‘broadly spread out’ and ‘amorphous’, which 
‘while held together by a common ideology, may lack any strong or direct linkage 
among members.’92 Al-Qaeda is the first (and currently only) such ‘non-governmental 
terrorist organisation’.93 This has created a challenge for counter-terrorism experts in 
defining the network. It provides evidence for ‘the need for a clear and systematic way 
of articulating the important differences between [the] different labels’ used to describe 
the organisation.94 Al-Qaeda is further a ‘global organization’, with ‘significant 
heterogeneity’. There is ‘no consistency in what analysts are referring to when the term 
Al Qaeda is used.’95 It is ‘in reality a conglomerate of a number of terror groups and 
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their cells, of varying autonomy but who share a common ideology and who cooperate 
with each other.96  
Today, Al-Qaeda ‘can be divided into four tiers: central al Qa’ida, affiliated groups, 
allied groups, and inspired networks.’97 First, central Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda core is 
based in Pakistan and, as of October 2014, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, ‘there 
is no standardized definition of al Qaeda’s “core.”’98 The core serves as a hub for 
‘technical support.99 The core arguably the most likely to seek and use CBRN weapons. 
Second, the affiliates are the ‘formal branches’ of the network, whose leaders pledge 
‘bayat (loyalty) to the core leadership. The affiliates were established in the early 
1990s,100 while bin Laden was in Sudan and attempting to procure HEU. These groups 
include Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Somalia’s Al-Shabāb, and Jabhat 
al-Nusrah. Third, the allied groups are those with a direct relationship to Al-Qaeda but 
that ‘have not become formal members’, thus preserving their independence yet 
working with Al-Qaeda on specific operations. Lastly, the inspired networks are those 
without direct contact to the core, but ‘who are inspired by’ the network’s cause and 
share its motivation by ‘hatred of the West and its allied regimes in the Middle East.’ 
The Boston Marathon bombers could fall under this category.101 
Brian Jackson identifies three levels of authority, which can be exerted within terrorist 
organisations. These are strategic, operational, and tactical control or influence. The 
ability to control the organisation on all three levels strengthens leaders. First, strategic 
influence is the definition of ‘the top-level goals and aims of the group’. The statements 
and fatāwā issued and commissioned by bin Laden fall under this category as they 
‘defin[e] the strategic aims of the global jihad.’ Second, operation control is defined as 
the pursuit of strategic goals, via the approval and selection of operations and targets. 
Lastly, tactical control is the ability to influence the day-to-day activities of particular 
individuals within the group.102 With ‘larger, more complex terrorist organizations, 
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these classes of command and control authority can be usefully applied as three separate 
variables for modelling and categorizing them.’103 Based on the command and control 
structure, three types of terrorist organisations can be identified: tightly coupled groups, 
coupled networks, and loosely coupled movements. Categorising Al-Qaeda reveals 
itself problematic, however. 
First, there is the original network, the one that committed 9/11, which uses its own 
resources and people it has recruited and trained. Then, there is the ad-hoc terrorist 
network, consisting of franchise organizations that Al Qaeda created…The third 
network [is] a strategic union of like-minded companies…Finally, there is the fourth 
network, “imitators, emulators.”104 
Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda has ‘significant characteristics consistent with a loosely coupled 
movement: Actions taken by “imitators” or “emulators” are only strategically (and 
perhaps operationally) inspired, not tactically controlled.’105 
While terrorism as a whole has changed in the past few decades, Al-Qaeda itself has 
also changed since 9/11. This shows the group’s flexibility and ‘dynamic nature’. This 
stems from the counterterrorism efforts mainly led by the United States but also the 
organisation’s own ‘efforts to change and adapt.’106 In fact, Al-Qaeda ‘has become 
more an idea or a concept than an organization; an amorphous movement tenuously 
held together by a loosely networked transnational constituency’.107  
Since bin Laden’s death, the conventional wisdom has been that the network ‘is on its 
last legs’ and that its ‘remnants […] remain too weak for us to be concerned about.’108 
Al-Qaeda core (in Pakistan) has suffered the most and four out of five of its top leaders 
having been killed.109 ‘As a result, its regional affiliates in Iraq, North Africa, and 
especially Yemen, the base of [AQAP], currently pose the greatest threat.’110 The 2014 
‘Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community’ identified AQAP as 
posing ‘a significant threat’ to the United States and ‘remain[ing] intent on targeting the 
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United States and US interests overseas.’111 Yet, the threat remains significant, though 
its source has changed. Indeed, the network has become more decentralised and ‘its 
chief terrorist activity is now being conducted by its local and regional affiliates.’112 In 
fact, ‘there has been a net expansion in the number and the geographic scope of al-
Qaeda affiliates and allies over the past decade’.113 This, Seth Jones argues, is due to 
two factors. First, the Arab Spring, in particular the events in Egypt, have played a 
crucial role in weakening various regimes across the MENA, allowing Al-Qaeda 
affiliates to establish themselves throughout the region. As Islamic regimes have 
replaced secular autocracies, the path has been increasingly paved for Al-Qaeda to set 
foot in the region. This is tied to the growing sectarianisation of the region, with the 
Sunni side being funded by state and non-state actors alike, providing more resources to 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Mowatt-Larssen also highlights the role of the Arab Spring 
in Al-Qaeda’s resurgence:  
Al-Qaeda core is not deteriorating but, in fact, resurging. The Arab Spring helped it. 
Before, Al-Qaeda was the alternative ideology to mainstream Arab politics, then it 
collapsed with the Arab Spring. Now, it is back because of the disillusion resulting from 
the Arab Spring. The drone policy has not been as effective as one would think.114  
Second, as noted previously, the network has become increasingly decentralised, with 
various affiliates running their operations autonomously, while still communicating 
with the core. Hence, according to Jones, even if Zawahiri were successfully removed, 
he could be replaced by at least four individuals, thus ensuring the movement’s 
continuity.115  
In Thomas Hegghammer argues that, ‘the main threat in the [following] 2-3 years is ad-
hoc attacks by unaffiliated agents, which are harder to prevent, but less lethal on 
average.’ Deterrence seems to be working to some extent and these groups seem to be 
pursuing ‘local agendas’.116 As such, the possibility of the use of CBRN weapons is less 
likely. The use of such weapons against the United States, the European Union, and 
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their allies would be met with potentially vital retaliation by the west. Additionally, 
their use for tactical purposes and local operations seems to be not only not useful but 
also counterproductive, as it would antagonise local populations against these groups.  
Another argument lies in the affiliates’ ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Al-Qaeda 
core, which had more resources during the 1990s, failed to acquire or procure nuclear 
weapons and materials. Hence, smaller, less resourceful affiliates are less likely to be 
able to succeed where the core failed. In fact, these groups ‘are not operationally 
capable of circumventing the many countermeasures and detection systems that 
Western governments have put in place since 9/11.’ What is more, as noted in the 
beginning of the chapter, a number of nuclear security programmes have successfully 
secured nuclear weapons and materials since Al-Qaeda’s last attempts. However, 
Hegghammer also states that he expects ‘a “second wave” of serious plots in the West 
some 4-6 years down the line.’117 But such an attack, he argues, would be likely 
perpetrated by an organisation still unknown. Indeed, known groups’ activities are 
monitored and they would be unable to inflict the same level of damage as unknown 
groups. Such an organisation could succeed where Al-Qaeda has failed, as the bomb 
would provide it with more prestige and ability to attract both recruits and funding. This 
would fit into Al-Qaeda’s narrative, shaped by the network’s interpretation of Islam. 
One such candidate could be ISIS.  
  
The Islamic Discourse 
Justifying jihad 
Al-Qaeda’s inception holds its roots in two separate and even conflicting agendas led by 
the United States and Islamists in the context of the Cold War. While these two had 
fundamentally different ideologies, they shared a common interest: combating 
communism. This led the two opposing ideologies to join forces to combat a common 
enemy. In 1979, Afghanistan became the battleground of a war opposing the USSR, on 
the one hand, and the United States and what gave birth to Al-Qaeda, the mujahidin, on 
the other.118 Recruiting the mujahidin to combat the Soviet invasion were Osama bin 
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Laden and Abdullah Azzam. In 1984, they created the Maktab al-Khidamāt (MAK), 
which raised funds, recruited mujahidin, and helped train recruits. The United States’ 
agenda was to create a ‘green belt’ of Muslim states, which would help prevent the 
spread of communism in the region. The mujahidin, on the other hand, were working to 
stop communism to preserve Islam. Hence, what was a means to one was an end to the 
other. Given its single-minded efforts to contain the much-feared ‘domino’ of states 
joining the communist bloc, Washington failed to consider the potential of its support to 
the mujahidin to backfire. 
As noted previously, by the beginning of the 1990s, a series of events refashioned the 
international security landscape. First, the Soviet Union dissolved, effectively ending 
the Cold War. This led to a re-evaluation of nuclear doctrines and opened discussions 
around the security of nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons, spread out throughout 
the eastern bloc. This also left the mujahidin armed and without a cause in Afghanistan. 
In 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. The U.S.-led coalition 
forces intervened in response to this act of aggression in the First Persian Gulf War, 
codenamed Operation Desert Storm. Saudi Arabia played a key role in the war by 
deploying its forces and allowing the United States to deploy its forces on its territory. 
The war provided the mujahidin with a rationale for jihad and a new raison d’être. They 
began to construct a narrative, denouncing U.S. and broader western intervention in 
Muslim affairs and the passivity and cooperation of ‘puppet’ regimes, such as the Saudi 
monarchy, with the ‘imperialists’. These events continue to shape Al-Qaeda’s narrative.  
‘In the past, every terrorist organization recruited from a single national base or people. 
Al Qaeda seeks members from all parts of the vast Sunni world’.119 This key difference 
between Al-Qaeda and previous terrorist groups sheds light on the importance of 
developing a solid Islamic narrative. Indeed, where other groups could utilise 
nationalism as a motivating factor, Al-Qaeda’s diversity left a void for the 
organisation’s leadership to fill. Hence, the flag raised by Al-Qaeda to rally the recruits 
is not national but religious: ‘the first step in achieving Al Qaeda’s goal would be to 
strengthen rebel Islamic groups in various states of the Sunni world’.120 This could only 
be achieved by creating a solid Islamic narrative, based on legal justifications and 
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political incentives. This is especially the case of ‘recruitment and fundraising, vital to 
the MAK and, later, Al-Qaeda’s survival and to operate successfully, required a vision 
and a narrative, which key figures developed. The recruits ‘faced hardship and 
sacrifice.’121 Therefore, their faith was key in keeping them committed.  
On 23 February 1998, what is commonly known as ‘The Islamic Front’s Declaration to 
Wage Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders’ was published in the newspaper Al-Quds 
Al-Arabi. The declaration was signed by bin Laden, Zawahiri, Ahmad Taha, Sheikh 
Hamza, and Fazlur Rahman. It identified three ‘crimes and sins committed by the cans 
[which] are a clear declaration of war on Allah.’122 These include: the ‘occupation’ of 
‘the lands of Islam in its holiest places’, the sanctions imposed on Iraq, and the 
weakening and division of Arabs to ‘guarantee Israel’s survival’.123 These reasons 
provided the grounds for the issuance of ‘a decree to all Muslims’. The decree was ‘the 
ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilian and military’, describing it as an 
individual obligation incumbent upon every Muslim who can do it’.124 The basis for this 
ruling, the group argued, is held in a number of verses, including those referred to in 
chapter Three: 9:36,125 8:39,126 and 4:75.127 Likewise, the same year, another statement 
confirmed that, ‘every American man is an enemy-whether he fights us directly or pays 
his taxes.’128  
An essay entitled ‘Moderate Islam Is A Prostration to the West’, ‘authorized or written 
by Osama bin Laden himself’,129 argues that Muslims should ‘spread sharia law to the 
world – that and nothing else’ and that their defence is ensured ‘through jihad – not 
dialogue and coexistence’.130 Indeed, ‘practically everything valued by the immoral 
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West is condemned under sharia law.’131 The essay further promotes offensive jihad by 
claiming that: ‘it is, in fact, part of our religion to impose our particular beliefs upon 
others.’132  
Zawahiri’s 2002 essay, ‘Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and A Lost 
Reality’, interprets the ‘doctrine of Loyalty133 and Enmity134 in Islam’.135 According to 
Zawahiri, the enemies of Islam have launched a ‘Crusading campaign’ to ‘patch up the 
tattered fabric that represents the reigning regimes in our lands-in all their corruption 
and power to corrupt, and their submission to the international, tyrannical powers of the 
Crusaders and the Jews.’ This campaign, Zawahiri argues, is the War on Terror, which 
attempts to ‘wipe out the dividing line between truth and falsehood, till even friend and 
foe are intermingled.’136 Zawahiri argues that friendship with infidels is prohibited and 
that the shari’a ‘commands’ Muslims ‘to battle’ them. He claims that there is ijma’ 
among Muslim jurists that it is an obligation for Muslims to fight ‘those infidels who 
have usurped the lands of Islam’ and that ‘this is a duty considered second only to 
faith’.137 As discussed in chapter three, however, while the Qur’an states that Muslims 
are superior138 to other peoples, it also grants the ‘peoples of the Book’ (ahl al-kitāb), 
Jews and Christians, a different status than the pagans Muhammad fought.139  
A treatise entitled ‘Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents’, prepared for the 
Council of the Jihad Organisation under Zawahiri’s supervision, attempts to collect 
various verses from the Qur’an, ahādīth, and use qiyās, to justify killing oneself and 
others, particularly innocents, in jihad.   
Al-Qaeda’s strength lies in its leadership’s ability to provide a ‘potent but unfocused 
force [with] a sense of vision, mission, and strategy that combin[es] twentieth century 
theory of a unified Islamic polity with restoration of the Islamic Caliphate’.140 This 
sense of vision and mission heavily relies on the notion of a divine mandate. The 
leitmotif of jihadist groups can be found in the justification of their actions as being 
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carried out in the name of God, His Prophet, and the Muslim community. Pauletta Otis 
explains that, ‘Religion’s emergence as a critical dimension of twenty-first century 
warfare is a result of at least three principal dynamics.’ She identifies these as ‘(1) the 
seeming failure of other ideologies and institutions; (2) the power of religion in 
providing ideological resources supporting social justice; and (3) the power of religion 
in providing an ideological basis for social coherence and comprehensiveness.’141 The 
core argument presented by jihadist terrorist groups lies in ‘the claim that some killing 
is commanded by God.’ In other words, ‘much like the Christian crusaders in the 
eleventh century, religiously oriented terrorists often claim that they have been 
authorized by God to launch terrorist attacks’.142 Such claims are, however, 
problematic, as the notion of a divine mandate ‘is impossible to disprove, it can be 
claimed by almost anyone, and it can be used to justify anything. There is no limit 
whatsoever on what God can reputedly “command”.143 As noted by Alex Bellamy, ‘the 
divine mandate created problems for medieval and early Renaissance just war thinkers 
precisely because it could be invoked to justify anything’. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
Vitoria disputed the notion of a divine mandate ‘on the grounds that there was no 
precedent and no direct proof that God had in fact commanded particular wars.’ As a 
Christian theologian, Vitoria did not contest the ‘possibility that God could theoretically 
issue a mandate for war but insisted that those claiming such a mandate provide 
evidence of its existence.’ This idea continues to be valid and relevant today as terrorists 
use it to justify their operations. Hence, ‘Religious believers must accept the theoretical 
possibility that God could issue a mandate for war, but those invoking such a mandate 
are required to prove its existence by more than just faith.’ Providing such evidence 
remains challenging, however, because ‘today, as in Vitoria’s time, there remains no 
precedent for such a mandate, it must be admitted that the likelihood of a terrorist group 
furnishing compelling evidence to support its claim to a divine mandate is, at best, very 
slim.’144 
Nevertheless, Al-Qaeda has offered compelling evidence of its divine mandate to its 
constituency. Its vision ‘had operational utility. It recast the numerous local conflicts 
into a single struggle between an authentic Islam and a host of corrupt satraps who 
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would collapse without the backing of the West’. This provides a ‘single, easily agreed 
upon enemy, whose fate, when confronted with a unified Islamic struggle, would be the 
same as that of the Soviet Union.’ Al-Qaeda’s vision and successful attacks in the 
1990s, including in Africa, allowed the network to become ‘the banner carrier of 
Islam’s response to past defeats, frustration, humiliation, resentment, and fear.’145 Al-
Qaeda’s success becomes a vicious circle, where ‘each [successful] attack becomes a 
recruiting poster, demonstrating the power of al Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam, 
attracting more recruits.’146 Indeed, many throughout the Muslim world ‘who endorse 
AQ’s actions see it like this: how many people has the west killed? So, these attacks are 
justified, they are nothing in comparison’ to what they believe to be the west’s 
devastation of Muslim lands.147  
The bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993, the bombings of the U.S. embassies 
in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, the attack against the USS Cole, and Project Bojinka148, 
were among these events. These events, supported by the aforementioned statements 
and fatāwā shed light on the group’s view of shari’a, the west, the use of violent means, 
and the mass-killing of civilians. As noted in chapter Three, these fatāwā are not legally 
binding on Muslims, as these figures do not have the clerical status and therefore, the 
competence, to interpret the law and issue such decrees.  
Nevertheless, the true import of the fatwa as a genuine religious instrument for 
motivating terrorism has not been adequately appreciated. Many Western analysts tend 
to dismiss fatwas as little more than cynical religious terminology applied to political 
propaganda. This characterization, however, does not do justice to the painstaking 
process of legal reasoning invested in them or the religious gravity with which their 
authors and their target audience treat them.149 
The 9/11 attacks were popular in the Arab world, where many celebrated what they 
considered as an achievement.150 Even though a number of Muslims and Islamic 
institutions denounced the attacks; many applauded Al-Qaeda’s tactics and approved of 
its aspirations. This was particularly the case in Saudi Arabia, where the events were 
met with praise and admiration. In fact, Abdel Bari Atwan, recounting his encounter 
with ‘a close relative of the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia’, noted that ‘she confided to 
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[him] that she greatly admired bin Laden and the recent al Qaeda assault on the US’, an 
enthusiasm ‘shared by the general public of the kingdom.’151 He further notes that 
‘After 11 September a Saudi intelligence survey found that 95 per cent of a sample 
educated Saudis aged twenty-five to forty-one supported bin Laden’s cause.’ What is 
more, ‘in December 2004, CNN reported that a poll in the kingdom had found bin 
Laden’s popularity exceeded that of King Fahd.’152 Indeed, as noted in the introduction, 
many Muslim countries have experienced violent conflict throughout the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. For this reason, a violent solution seems to be viewed as the only 
viable one. ‘Extreme violence, as it has been ongoing in the Middle East, doesn’t lead 
people to think that a moderate solution is going to take care of everything.’153  
Al-Qaeda, ‘probably anticipated that the attack would provoke a major military 
response, which it could then portray as an assault on Islam.’ This would lead the 
Muslim world to rise against the west and an influx of new recruits. However, Al-
Qaeda’s leadership ‘repeated the folly of terrorists past’, a strategy that ‘has seldom 
worked’ and did not reveal successful this time either.  
In some respects the nomadic Arabs had a high ideal of conduct, but they had no idea 
whatsoever of a minimum standard of decent behaviour towards all men, simply 
because they were men. They had no conception of a universal moral law of the 
Kantian type. There were customary duties and obligations within the tribe (and this 
included those attached to the tribe as confederates, clients, or slaves); related to these 
matters was an ideal of honourable conduct. Outside the tribe, however, there were no 
duties or obligations. You could do what you liked with an unprotected stranger. When 
you were at war with another tribe, it was a case of “nothing barred.” The only 
restraints on your behaviour towards an enemy or even a stranger were those set by fear 
of retaliation or fear of supernatural powers.  
Now the Islamic community or ummah was thought of as a tribe.154 
This description of the Arab nomadic and tribal mentality, which fashioned the Islamic 
notions of the ummah, sheds light on Al-Qaeda’s approach to the ‘House of Islam’. Al-
Qaeda’s main goal is to mobilise all Muslims worldwide and to unify ‘the House of 
Islam’ to combat ‘the House of War’. However, the notion of ‘global jihad’ waged by 
the House of Islam against the House of War is problematic. Indeed, as stressed in 
Chapter Three, the shari’a prescribes limited warfare. In fact, ‘waging outright and 
comprehensive war appears to have no basis in Qur’anic text; on the contrary, conflicts 
were seen as having clear boundaries, waged to ward off aggression and undertaken in a 
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humane way’. The notion of distinction is at the heart of this limited discussion, 
‘sparing those who do not themselves participate in the war (Qur’an 60:8).’155 
Nevertheless, this dichotomy is at the very core of Al-Qaeda’s narrative, which opposes 
the ummah to the rest of the world, seeking to unify the House of Islam. Zawahiri sees 
the unity of the ummah as the prerequisite to the jihadist movement’s success. The 
network, especially Al-Qaeda core, has tried to develop a strategy and tactics. This 
strategy is founded on the idea that the movement ‘must come closer to the masses.’ 
Three factors are put forward to rally Muslims around Al-Qaeda’s flag: a trustworthy 
leadership, a ‘clear enemy to strike at’, and breaking the ‘shackles of fear and the 
impediments of weakness in the souls’.156  
To conclude, ‘[the] careful and long-standing efforts to legitimize their actions to the 
wider Muslim community […] suggest that al-Qaeda seeks some level of approval and 
support from a constituency’.157 In fact, ‘the primary reason al-Qaeda turned from 
targeting the “near enemy” (apostate Muslim governments) to the “far enemy” (the 
United States) was to gain support from and mobilize the Muslim masses.’ Browne 
argues that this ‘shift was the result of a pragmatic examination of past failed jihadi 
campaigns’, which had not been successful due to lack of support from the 
population.158 What sets Al-Qaeda apart from other jihadi movements and organisations 
is the ‘attempt to enlist as many of the world’s 1.3 billion Muslims […] as possible’. To 
be sure, the network’s goal is to ‘wag[e] a war for the hearts and minds of Muslims’.159 
The network has sought to achieve this end by justifying all its endeavours in Islamic 
terms. Its nuclear discourse is part of this greater Islamic narrative. In many ways, 
however, the nuclear discourse is a piece of the broader narrative, justifying the killing 
of noncombatants.  
 
Al-Qaeda’s Islamic nuclear discourse 
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As mentioned previously, between 1999 and 2001, Al-Qaeda conducted basic chemical, 
biological, and radiological training courses in its training camps.160 While taking 
practical steps effectively to develop the recruits’ ability to conduct attacks using 
unconventional weapons, the network’s core leadership also developed a nuclear 
discourse. As noted in Chapter Three, this discourse is fashioned in Islamic terms and 
around the central idea of collective guilt. It utilises ‘democracy’ as the basis for this 
collective guilt, arguing that because western societies are democratic, every citizen is 
responsible for the actions of the government. Therefore, indiscriminate attacks are 
legitimate against these societies. Al-Qaeda core also argued for the sole acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. In his interview with Time magazine on 24 November 1998, bin 
Laden stated that ‘acquiring weapons (WMD) for the defense of Muslims is a religious 
duty.’161 As discussed further, the possession of nuclear weapons for a non-state actor 
would have the same ‘benefits’ as for state actors in some instances. Notably, the 
traditional proliferation drivers of prestige and security, enumerated in the introduction, 
could be applied to non-state actors. Yet, Mowatt-Larssen argues that terrorist 
organisations would not simply acquire such weapons as a deterrent or for prestige. 
Instead, if successful, they would use the weapons immediately, as keeping them would 
be costly and dangerous.162 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the network’s nuclear discourse is not only based on 
general statements supporting the acquisition or use of nuclear weapons but also fatāwā. 
While neither bin Laden nor Zawahiri had the religious authority to issue such a 
religious edict, Al-Qaeda’s constituents and those who subscribe to the organisation’s 
message respect the two men’s authority. For this group of believers, the use of WMD 
is ‘pre-justified … on religious grounds’. Nevertheless, the fatwā remains void of 
religious authority. Hence, perhaps in an attempt to legitimise it, Al-Qaeda began 
‘making probes to quietly obtain a fatwa from clerics in Saudi Arabia to support what 
appeared to be a significant shift in tactics’, thereby, taking steps to substantiate the use 
of WMD on religious grounds’.163 The issuance of authoritative religious edicts by 
respected Islamic figures would allow the group to legitimise its endeavours and cause, 
expand its audience, thereby convincing new recruits to join their struggle, and to 
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convince potential donors to contribute to their plans financially. Therefore, Al-Qaeda 
core commissioned a number of clerics to support and legitimise its stance on the 
procurement and use of WMD.   
Radical Saudi clerics Nasir Sheik al-Fahd, Ali al-Khudayr, and Ahmed al-Khalidi had 
drawn up and co-signed a religious ruling (fatwa) authorizing the use of WMD against 
the U.S. and U.K. Nasir al-Fahd, a senior Muslim cleric who is closely associated with 
Al Qaeda, had written dozens of books and publications containing religious edicts 
against the U.S. and anyone cooperating with it. Among his well-known 
pronouncements is that “anyone assisting the Americans is an infidel.”’164  
Conversely, Abu Shihab al-Kandahari published ‘Nuclear War is the Solution for the 
Destruction of the United States’ in 2002. This publication was notable due to its being 
the first instance of such a threat being publically issued by the organisation’s 
supporters and, ‘a figure known to have been close to the propaganda apparatus of 
Global Jihad.’165  
Likewise, former Al-Qaeda trainer, Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri (also known as Setmariam)166, 
argued for the use of CBRN weapons, including nuclear and dirty bombs, in 2004, after 
a $5 million reward was issued by the United States ‘for information leading to his 
capture or killing.’167 Al-Suri lamented Al-Qaeda’s failure to use WMD during on 
9/11.168 He further sent requests to unlikely allies, communist DPRK and Shiite Iran, to 
continue the development of their nuclear programmes. This attempt to form such 
unlikely alliances held its roots in Suri’s belief that the ‘bigger devil’ [the west] should 
be overcome by all means, even if they include cooperation with Shiite and communist 
regimes. It is worth noting that Shiism is considered as ‘unholy’ as communism by 
fundamentalist Sunnis, including Al-Qaeda.169   
As noted in Chapter Three, Islamic law heavily relies upon the equivalent of precedents 
(qiyās). Al-Qaeda leadership has tried to justify its nuclear ambitions in Islamic terms 
by using precedents to legitimise the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons under 
shari’a. The network supports its CBRN ambitions by stating that the Prophet and 
caliphs did not always wage war according to the principle of limited warfare, at times 
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using indiscriminate means and methods to inflict mass casualty on their enemies. As 
Chapter Six demonstrates, precedents are also relied upon in the Iranian context to 
justify the prohibition of nuclear weapons under Islamic law. According to the Iranian 
position, the Prophet and Imams refrained from poisoning bodies of water and using 
fire, as these are indiscriminate tactics, which also destroy the environment.170 Al-
Qaeda core argues the opposite. Abu Bakr Naji writes: ‘we only accept that our policies 
in any jihadi action are Sharia policies, unless the Sharia permits us to use the plans and 
military principles of non-Muslims in which there is no sin.’171 He notes that jihad 
needs to be practical and jihadists must not refrain from using violence. He supports this 
point by stating that, ‘(Abu Bakr) and Ali b. Abi Talib (may God be pleased with them) 
burned (people) with fire, even though it is odious, because they knew the effect of 
rough violence in times of need.’172 He further refers to the Prophet’s campaign against 
the Jewish tribe of Bani Qurayza (discussed in Chapter Three), stating that the current 
times call for such actions and massacre.173 Naji qualifies the ‘sequential strikes against 
America, ending with the strike of September’ as ‘deserved according to the sharia’.174 
He criticises ‘some of the small groups in the previous stages of jihad’, which ‘ignored 
these military principles not out of fear of contradicting the Sharia; rather, their neglect 
was facilitated by random behavior and rigidity, along with the desire of the 
praiseworthy youths to attain unto the station of martyrdom as soon as possible.’175 
 
Implications of the weakening of Al-Qaeda core 
Over a decade after 9/11, ‘there is a remarkable lack of consensus among analysts’ 
assessments of al Qaeda’s current condition.’176 As discussed throughout the chapter, a 
number of factors provide evidence of the network’s increasing weakening. ‘The 
architects of 9/11 have been captured or killed. Al Qaeda’s founder and ritual leader is 
dead. Its remaining leadership has been decimated. The group’s wanton slaughter of 
Muslims has alienated much of its potential constituency.’ What is more, the group has 
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been unable ‘to carry out a significant terrorist operation in the West since 2005, 
although it is still capable of mounting plausible, worrisome threats.’177 The advent of 
ISIS has overshadowed Al-Qaeda. However, a number of reasons enumerated by 
terrorism experts support the thesis that Al-Qaeda remains a viable threat. These include 
the impact of the Arab Spring in strengthening the organisation and its ideology,178 the 
‘fluidity among the jihadist groups’, and its periphery’s strength ‘though its center has 
been hollowed.’179 Since bin Laden’s death, Al-Qaeda’s operations have been limited to 
tactical ones, carried out by Al-Qaeda affiliates, while Al-Qaeda central has remained in 
a semi-dormant state.  
Some argue that that it would not be in Al-Qaeda’s interest to conduct WMD attack, as 
the ‘current domestic and international political situation is more favorable now than 
could be expected after a WMD attack.’180 Such an attack would even be 
counterproductive for the organisation due to two reasons. First, it would provide the 
United States with ‘an even greater freedom of action than that granted after the 
September 11 attacks.’ Second, ‘jihadi and fundamentalist groups would either turn 
further away or be crushed by the international response.’181 It could also be argued that 
while the acquisition of nuclear weapons would have a positive outcome for the 
organisation, its use would have the opposite effect, leading the majority of Muslims to 
distance themselves from the group’s aspirations and ideology, and ultimately leading 
to its complete delegitimation.  Hence, some observers and experts believe that Al-
Qaeda’s perceived weakness could lead the group to carry out its most spectacular and 
devastating operations yet.182 Two contradictory theories have been developed by 
scholars to explain the potential impact of a nuclear-armed jihadi group. On the one 
hand, some argue that given the indiscriminate and disproportionate nature of a nuclear 
attack, the procurement and use of nuclear weapons would only deligitimise the group 
among Muslims.  
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Other still argue that given Al-Qaeda’s current status as ‘more of a nuisance than a 
serious threat’ and its ‘waning’ influence, the organisation could choose to go down the 
nuclear path to assert itself as ‘still relevant’. By doing so, it would show that it remains 
a ‘predominant international threat’ and that it is on a par with nation-states and should 
be respected as such.183 On the other hand, it is argued that the prestige model, 
developed in the context of the nuclearisation of state actors, would also be applicable 
to non-state actors and would rather garner support. Thus, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons could lead to Al-Qaeda’s rebirth. As the group’s legitimacy and influence 
declines, the ‘prestige’ factor becomes more relevant. Therefore, the organisation’s 
ability to procure and successfully detonate a nuclear weapon could generate support 
and facilitate fundraising and recruitment by it thanks to an enhanced prestige.184 In 
fact, that Zawahiri updated Fahd’s 2003 fatwā in 2008 ‘shows that Zawahiri thinks that 
there is a need to think about nuclear weapons.’185 The assassination of Al-Qaeda’s key 
leaders might inspire its new leadership to launch a ‘spectacular’ attack, not only 
showing that the group is still in business and still to be taking seriously, but also to 
‘maintain the integrity of the group or to meet their own psychological needs.’ This is 
especially the case as ‘terrorists might resort to more lethal tactics to avenge the deaths 
of members of their group or to retaliate against perceived slights.’186 
A number of other groups, including Al-Qaeda affiliates have proven more effective in 
conducting terrorist attacks. They include Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ), which ‘has driven 
much of this violence in Pakistan.’187 These groups have a more tactical and local 
approach than Al-Qaeda. ‘Where once Islamist militant organizations embraced al 
Qaeda core’s global ideology […], the targeting of internationally focused militants by 
the United States and its partners […] appears to have fomented a return to more locally 
focused ideologies.’188 Hence, the threat in the region seems to become more focused 
around ‘domestic enemies, be they local governments, ethnic populations, or religious 
groups.’189 This in turn could mean that nuclear terrorism is becoming less of a threat in 
the region, as terrorism in South Asia re-shifts from post-modern to modern terrorism. 
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However, the advent of ISIS, a group with a pan-Islamic agenda, employing more 
violent means than most other terrorist groups, may change this. In light of this, Al-
Qaeda core could seek to procure nuclear weapons for a ‘spectacular come back’. It 
could do so thanks to its regional affiliates. This represents a great challenge, given the 
Pakistani state’s fragility and the concerns over the security of its nuclear arsenal and 
facilities. These issues are discussed in the next chapter.   
 
Effectiveness of Al-Qaeda’s nuclear discourse 
Despite a lack of a total condemnation by Muslims,190 Al-Qaeda’s leadership has not 
been successful in convincing Muslim constituencies that its actions are indeed 
legitimate. This is due to two main factors. First, not only are the methods used by the 
organisation are not endorsed by the majority of Muslims, but they are even seen as 
contrary to the faith. Second, Al-Qaeda’s leadership is not seen as an authority 
competent to interpret Islamic law by the majority of believers, hence the fatāwā issued 
by the Bin Laden and Zawahiri do not convince the audiences the group has tried to 
reach. In fact, ‘only by their own claims does al-Qaeda possess this authority, because 
they do not possess widespread religious legitimacy.’191 Even ‘groups [which have 
been] historically at odds with the West (such as Hezbollah and Hamas), practitioners of 
suicide terrorism’ and other ‘terrorist’ organisations ‘issued denunciations of al-Qaeda 
and its attacks’ after 9/11. ‘What is striking in many of these condemnations is the 
assertion that al-Qaeda’s attacks violate Islamic law by targeting civilians.’192 These 
condemnations rose from even the least likely jihadi authorities, including Seyyed 
Mohammad Hussein Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s spiritual leader, who ‘debunk[ed]’ the 
‘transnationalized jihad’ of Al-Qaeda, despite he himself being ‘responsible for more 
American deaths than any other terrorist group’ prior to 9/11.193 ‘The differences 
between bin Laden and Nasrallah are obvious to the Arab masses, as the difference 
between al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. One group manipulates jihad while the other practices 
jihad.’194 Another factor contributing to the lack of Muslim support for Al-Qaeda’s 
endeavours lies in ‘pragmatic fear’ or the fear of western retaliation.195 As discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 INT004SNT 
191 Browne in Russel and Wirtz (2008), 86 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Sonbol, Amira, in Popovski, Vesselin; et al. (2009), 301 
195 Browne in Russel and Wirtz (2008), 86 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  149	  	  
previously, the majority of Saudis, including within the government, approved of the 
9/11 attacks. Yet, none would openly endorse the attacks. Interests trump ideology, 
leading Al-Qaeda’s position to be a minority one, if only due to the fear of retaliation. 
As such, the fatāwā issued by Al-Qaeda’s leadership and those issued by radical clerics, 
many of whom are in Saudi Arabia and essentially ‘commissioned’ by the terrorist 
network, seem to have only had a limited impact. The decrees are an attempt for Al-
Qaeda to justify its actions and advertise them as in accordance with the Islamic 
tradition. In addition to serving to help secure the support of constituencies, the Islamic 
discourse also helps justify the network’s actions to its own members, many of whom 
are devout and seek the authorisation of relevant authorities to take action.  
Since the mainstreaming and globalisation of violent jihad by Al-Qaeda, the concept of 
jihad, central to the Islamic faith, has become taboo even amongst Muslim populations, 
who try to distance themselves from it. Imams and religious leaders avoid engaging in 
the debate, for fear of being labelled as extremists. The term fatwā has also become 
distorted in western views and generally has a negative connotation (often associated 
with war, assassination, and terrorism), very different from its original legal meaning.  
On the one hand, many Muslims express their disapproval of Al-Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups’ actions and ideology. This is due to ‘Muslim publics [being] very 
discriminating in what they see as justified violence.’196 It explains why ‘in the wake of 
September 11, Bin Laden did not take immediate credit for what are the most 
spectacular terrorist attacks of all time.’ This ‘behaviour indicates they were aware the 
attacks were having an adverse effect on their constituency.’ Therefore, Bin Laden 
‘attempted to justify the attacks first as a reprisal for Muslim deaths. He then attempted 
to characterize the targets as “icons of military and economic power” instead of civilian 
targets.’197 As argued throughout this chapter, even those Muslims who endorse Al-
Qaeda’s actions are reluctant to voice this view, fearing retaliation from the west or 
alienation in their home-countries. Another key challenge to Al-Qaeda’s attempt to 
galvanise support from Muslims, and specifically Arabs, lies in identity politics. Islam, 
while the primary identity-shaping factor in many Arab states, does not constitute the 
only one. In fact, ‘identity has a range of meanings in the Arab world, and the impact of 
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globalization depends on context – that is, national and individual circumstances’.198 
Hence, several components shape Arab identity. On the one hand, ‘national identity 
provides a platform for the promotion and preservation, by the state and its agents, of 
specific sets of values.’ On the other hand, ‘tribal, religious, and other sectarian 
demarcations remain influential, of course, and are often subversive to the power of the 
state, especially in times of heightened social and political stress.’199 Hence, Al-Qaeda’s 
call for a unified Muslim ummah, which would transcend boundaries, does not resonate 
with Muslims across the globe. ‘For the overwhelming majority of Arabs, the notion of 
a geographically delimited and formally institutionalized national identity is consistent, 
at an individual level, with the desire to be “modern” as well as Arab and, in a growing 
number of cases, self-consciously Muslim.’200 What is more, in some instances, chiefly 
in Egypt, ‘in place of pan-Arabism, one can observe heightened level of Egyptian 
national sentiment-exaggerated’ in some cases.201 Additionally, support for Al-Qaeda is 
not necessarily caused by religion.  
Support for groups like al Qaeda is born from political, social and economic 
circumstances that people find unacceptable. Al Qaeda offers them the chance to fight 
back – something that, for the Muslim world as a whole, has not been possible for a 
very long time. Muslims might not like what al Qaeda has to offer in the long term – 
how many of them really want to live under a Taliban-style regime? – but that is not the 
issue at present. 
On the other hand, Al-Qaeda’s efforts have not been entirely unsuccessful. Indeed, 
prominent clerics have not gathered to issue clear, comprehensive, and total statements 
rejecting Al-Qaeda’s actions and ideology.202 In fact, as suggested before, the 9/11 
attacks were facilitated by ‘the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar-es Salaam 
[which] produced a great increase in support for al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia – more than 
11,000 recruits headed for the training camps in Afghanistan between 1998 and 
2001.’203 This is partly due to ‘the Saudi regime as well as Saudi society [being] 
underpinned and legitimized by Wahhabi204 doctrine.’205 This distinguishes Saudi 
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Arabia from other Muslims countries, which have embraced more moderate schools of 
thought, including countries in the Maghreb, Levant, and much of the Middle East. In 
fact, the ‘complex interdependence of Al Saud and Wahhabism has its roots in the very 
foundation of Saudi Arabia as a nation-state.’206 Following 9/11, Saudi Arabia 
undertook to support the United States in its War on Terror, which helped make Al-
Qaeda even more popular in the kingdom.207 ‘It has often been claimed that the Saudi 
security services themselves harbor many al Qaeda sympathizers. According to Saad al-
Faqih the official figures…attest to this.’208 The Saudi government has been under 
attack by Al-Qaeda core leadership, including bin Laden, who have denounced the 
kingdom’s leaders as corrupt. Still, ‘the Saudi regime has made fitful attempts to bring 
bin Laden back into the fold. In 1996, it offered ‘to return his citizenship in exchange 
for a public declaration that the king was a true Muslim’ along with financial incentives. 
Bin Laden rejected the offer.209 Hence, the reason behind the lack of Saudi subsequent 
support for Al-Qaeda does not seem to be one based on religious grounds but rather 
political and strategic ones. Indeed, bin Laden would have been in Al Saud’s good 
graces if he accepted to endorse the king’s faith and would perhaps even have supported 
Al-Qaeda if its strategic interests did not require otherwise. The Saudi monarchy judged 
that its interests lay in its partnership with the United States. This was especially the 
case when the War on Terror was beginning. Therefore, while the majority of Saudis 
see Al-Qaeda’s position as valid, the Saudi establishment’s interests have dictated its 
relationship to the network. First, Riyadh tried to use the network’s popularity by 
offering a deal to bin Laden. After 9/11, however, despite positive views of Al-Qaeda 
‘success’ in perpetrating the attacks, the Saudi monarchy distanced itself from the 
network to safeguard its interests.  
Among Muslim religious scholars who do not necessarily support or oppose jihadi 
movements, few have denounced them as incompatible with Islam. ‘The religious 
justification has been successful as no cleric has openly and deeply rejected Al-Qaeda’s 
claims – that means people buy into what they say’.210 Such demands ‘meet with 
reluctance, for social, political, and religious reasons.’ Shmuel Bar breaks these reasons 
down to a ‘tendency in Islam to search for common ground and to avoid civil war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 169 
208Ibid., 172 
209 Ibid., 176-177 
210 INT004SNT 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  152	  	  
among the ummah’, reluctance to condemn operations failing to discriminate against 
noncombatants (in order not to denounce actions led against Israel or the United States) 
and more ‘modernist’ approaches to Islam being outside the mainstream. 211   
Former Kuwaiti minister of information Dr. Sa’d Bin Tefla complained that “despite the 
fact that bin Laden has murdered thousands of innocents in the name of our religion and 
despite the damage that he has caused to Muslims everywhere…to this date not a single 
fatwa has been issued calling for the killing of bin Laden, on the pretext that bin Laden 




Experts continue to have divergent views on the threat of nuclear terrorism. In fact, out 
of the possible CBRN options available to terrorists, the latter (nuclear) is seen as the 
least likely to occur. Yet, as argued in this chapter, despite much progress on nuclear 
security, the risk of nuclear terrorism remains real. Indeed, while a number of steps have 
been taken to minimise, repatriate, and eliminate fissile material across the globe, it 
remains widespread. According to the Fissile Material Working Group, in 2013, there 
was enough fissile material globally for 100,000 additional nuclear weapons.213 For 
these reasons, nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism have gained political 
momentum since the beginning of the twenty-first century.214 Hence, while the 
international community may not be entirely convinced that the threat of nuclear 
terrorism is an immediate one, it believes its consequences to be too grave to ignore.  
Al-Qaeda’s core leadership has reiterated its willingness to gain access to nuclear 
weapons and even use them. Since 9/11, a number of steps have been taken to weaken 
Al-Qaeda core, dismantle its leadership, and deter the network. However, whether these 
efforts have been effective remains disputed. Indeed, the network seems to have adapted 
to the counter-terrorism efforts led by the United States. Even though a number of its 
leaders have been killed or removed, the network has effectively adapted to ensure its 
continuity. In the years following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks, the network’s operations 
shifted from strategic to tactical with a regional focusing, replacing the global one. After 
losing Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda’s ability successfully to assemble a nuclear weapon 
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diminished considerably. Yet, I argued in this chapter argued that the network could use 
nuclear weapons to regain its status and become a key global player. As concluded by 
the US Director of National Intelligence, the network ‘probably hopes for a resurgence 
following the drawdown of US troops in Afghanistan in 2014.’215 The advent of ISIS 
could be another reason for the network to actively seek a devastating attack to solidify 
its position and show western failure.  
Legal and ethical redlines have often been fluid in the face of politics. Jihadist groups 
and the religious ‘authorities’ endorsing them have often shifted the goalposts: 
Claiming, for instance, that while targeting civilians is not allowed under the faith, 
Israelis represent an exception. Al-Qaeda adopted this method from other jihadist 
groups but pushed the boundary even further, by arguing that representational 
democracies effectively generate ‘collective guilt’, legitimising the targeting of 
Americans, regardless of whether or not they have taken part in wars in the Muslim 
world. The network’s justification in Islamic terms enabled it to recruit those who 
proceeded to execute its 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. In that sense, this use of shari’a has been 
successful. Likewise, the network has successfully recruited a number of people to 
assist it with nuclear material and weapon acquisition and procurement, including 
nuclear scientists.216 Yet, Al-Qaeda has fallen short of receiving a consensus-based 
support from the Sunni world, something it was seeking. In fact, the network’s actions 
and reading of Islamic law were never seen as legitimate across the Muslim world. 
Muslims and Muslim scholars have also not categorically rejected the network’s actions 
and their justification in Islamic terms. Al-Qaeda, like other radical Islamist groups 
before it, continues to divide the ummah.  
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Chapter Five: Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, Pakistan, one of nine nuclear-armed states, has built its 
nuclear weapons programme outside the NPT framework. Additionally, the country is 
one of few not to have signed the CTBT and was the last country (excluding the tests 
conducted by the DPRK in the past decade) to conduct a nuclear test, in May 1998. 
Given its status as an Annex II1 country, this constitutes a great challenge to the Treaty 
coming into force and, therefore, the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Islamabad 
further blocked progress on negotiating the FMCT at the 2011 Conference on 
Disarmament. With 100-120 warheads2 and enough fissile material for 200 weapons,3 
Islamabad possesses the world’s fastest growing arsenal and.4  
Pakistan’s modest nuclear stockpile arouses global concern because Pakistan is also the 
world headquarters of al Qaeda; its stockpile faces a greater threat from Islamic 
extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth. Despite 
extensive security measures, there is a very real possibility that sympathetic insiders 
might carry out or assist in a nuclear theft, or that a sophisticated outsider attack 
(possibly with insider help) could overwhelm the defenses. Over the longer term, there 
is at least a possibility of Islamic extremists seizing power, or 
of a collapse of the Pakistani state making nuclear weapons vulnerable—though present 
evidence suggests both of these scenarios remain unlikely.5  
The aforementioned causes for concern highlighted by Matthew Bunn are exacerbated 
by a number of other factors. First, the founder of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
programme, A.Q. Khan, was also the head of the foremost trafficking and smuggling 
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network, which proliferated knowhow, weapons’ design, and nuclear materials and 
technology to a number of countries, including the DPRK, Iraq, Iran, and Libya. The 
network conducted its activities with the alleged knowledge and indirect approval of 
Islamabad. The government chose to disregard the network’s activities, ‘because it 
believed the benefit [Khan] provided outweighed the cost of corruption.’6 Second, 
Pakistan has been a safe haven for a large number of terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda, as 
well as the Haqqani network (HQN)7, LeT8, the Lashkar-e Jhangvi (LeJ)9, and the 
Taliban.10 This means that the threat of nuclear terrorism and the challenges posed to 
nuclear security are great in Pakistan. This threat becomes even more worrisome in light 
of the fragility of the Pakistani state.11 As discussed in Chapter Four, Al-Qaeda 
continues to constitute the greatest and most credible nuclear terrorism threat. Al-Qaeda 
and Taliban agents continue to operate and have attacked areas close to Pakistani 
nuclear sites, including Khushab.12 What is more, groups linked to the Taliban have 
conducted successful attacks against the Kamra Air Force Base, including a suicide 
attack 2009 and another attack by militias in 2012.13 Third, the country’s nuclear 
technicians have been kidnapped close to the Afghan borders in the past.14 Such events 
could reoccur and Pakistani nuclear scientists, engineers, and technicians could be led to 
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cooperate with terrorists pursuing a nuclear capability under duress. Fourth, as 
mentioned previously, the fragility of the Pakistani state means that the threat of a coup 
destabilising the current government or the state failing altogether could lead to 
scenarios in which nuclear weapons and/or materials would fall in to the hands of 
terrorists. The country’s ‘central government has serious trouble controlling the many 
corners of its territory. Its security services are infiltrated by an unknown number of 
jihadist sympathizers; a number of jihadist organizations are headquartered there and 
have relations with the government’.15 As noted by Feroz Khan, ‘Terrorists and violent 
extremism threaten to impose their will by continuous challenge to state authority.’16  
Nevertheless, if the status quo persists, Pakistani nuclear weapons are likely to continue 
filling two key functions: deterring India17 and offering a source of pride for the nation. 
As quoted by Khan, the Director General of the Strategic Plans Division, Lieutenant-
General Khalid Kidawi has suggested that, ‘Pakistani nuclear weapons would be used 
only if the very existence of Pakistan as a state is at stake…Nuclear weapons are aimed 
solely at India.’18 Khan further explains that Kidawi envisions several scenarios in 
which Pakistan would resort to using its arsenal in case deterrence fails. These scenarios 
include a successful Indian attack and subsequent conquest of a large part of the 
Pakistani territory, destruction of a large part of Pakistani land and air forces by India, 
economic strangling or political destabilisation of Pakistan by India.19 Khan quotes 
Musharraf stating that nuclear weapons would only be used as last resort. ‘Nuclear 
weapons could only be used if Pakistan is threatened with extinction’.20 However, it is 
not clear what role the growing Pakistani tactical nuclear weapons play in Pakistani 
calculations.   
This chapter sheds light on the relationship between religion and nuclear policy in 
Pakistan. Indeed, given the reasons enumerated above, it is crucial to understand the 
relationship between religious identity and security in the country, especially in the case 
of its nuclear weapons programme. These reasons include Pakistan’s fragile statehood, 
growing nuclear arsenal, and the continuous presence of radical elements both as non-
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18 Khan, Feroz (2013), 351 
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state terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda agents, but also within the government. This 
is particularly the case, as not only does ‘jihadism’ now threaten ‘the state of Pakistan 
itself,’ threatening ‘a Talibanized make-over’, the country will also ‘continue to remain 
a haven for jihadism unless the perception of the military changes.’21 However, this 
trend does not seem to be changing and ‘the Pakistani military de facto considers 
Islamist radical groups as part of the security establishment and uses them accordingly’. 
This chapter demonstrates that this relationship between Islamist groups and Islamic 
parties and the military has been instrumental in the country’s approach to the nuclear 
issue. At the same time, the two entities do not necessarily share a ‘worldview’ and their 
relationship has occasionally been confrontational.22 
The chapter argues that the Muslim faith has played a far from negligible role in the 
development of the Pakistani nuclear capability. First, the proliferation drivers of 
security and prestige, discussed in the introduction, are applicable on two levels in the 
Pakistani case: national and pan-Islamic. Indeed, the security considerations pushing the 
Pakistani leadership toward the bomb were not merely those of the nation but also of 
the wider ummah. Likewise, A.Q. Khan and Pakistani decision-makers were not only 
trying to find an element of pride for their new nation, but also for the entire Muslim 
world, thus putting it ‘on a par’ with the other major civilisations. Second, the faith was 
not only a national driver, but also a personal one for a number of key figures in the 
Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. This includes A.Q. Khan, who was inspired by 
his personal interests, including money and ego, as well as his faith, to proliferate 
weapons’ materials, technology, and design to other Muslim states. Third, thanks to the 
Islamic component of its nuclear narrative, Islamabad legitimised its nuclear weapons 
programme in the Muslim world, gaining political and financial support from Muslim 
states.  
This chapter discusses the results of the Pakistani Islamic nuclear discourse. It argues 
that, unlike Al-Qaeda and Iran’s discourses, which hold their basis in the legal and 
ethical causes and consequences of the possession and/or use of nuclear weapons, 
Islamabad’s has been void of any such discussion. Instead, the Pakistani leadership has 
made a pragmatic, security and prestige-driven decision, choosing to not interrogate 
Islamic jurisprudence on the question of the legality of the acquisition and use of 
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nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, by doing so, Islamabad has in effect taken a stance on 
the legal and ethical question. Its decision, not only to develop a nuclear weapons 
capability, but to justify it in Islamic terms, provides evidence of its belief that the 
possession and, perhaps, use of nuclear weapons are justified by the faith. Pakistanis 
may not believe the use of nuclear weapons to be allowed in Islam, but they believe the 
possession of these weapons and deterrence more generally to be allowed and even 
encouraged by the faith.23 Deterrence and defence, even by using indiscriminate means 
and methods of warfare, are, then, viewed as allowed by Islam. It is important to note 
that Islamabad’s ability to use Islam to gain political and financial support from Muslim 
countries shows that they do not believe nuclear weapons to be inherently prohibited by 
the faith.  
The present chapter first provides an overview of the creation of the Pakistani state, 
highlighting the key role of the Muslim faith in establishing Pakistan and shaping 
Pakistani national identity. Building on this background, the following sections examine 
two key sets of issues. First, the role of Islam in motivating Pakistan's leadership to 
pursue nuclear weapons, convincing other Muslim states’ leaders to support this 
endeavour financially and politically, and fashioning the Pakistani population’s views 
of its nuclear weapons are discussed. Second, the role of A.Q. Khan’s religious beliefs 
in inspiring the activities of his network is considered.       
 
Pakistan: the nascent nation, a history 
Pakistan is the archetypal product of colonialism, or more accurately, deconolisation. It 
was created ‘artificially’ to become home to a part of India’s population, namely those 
adhering to the Muslim faith. Importantly, ‘Pakistan was born an insecure state […], 
and it remains so to date.’24 However, the very creation of a Muslim state was 
controversial and many of the subcontinent’s Muslims remained in India. Nevertheless, 
in the words of the Pakistani Constitution, the ‘Islamic ideology’ provides the ‘basis for 
the creation’ of the country.25 Yet, as discussed further, the founders of the new Muslim 
state did not all intend for politics and religion to be intertwined. However, the complex 
process of nation-building led the country gradually to centre many of its projects on the 
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24 Fair, Christine (2014), Fighting to the End – The Pakistan Army’s Way of War. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. P. 1 
25 ‘Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’, 10-04-1974. 
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axis of Islam. This is particularly the case of areas relevant to the country’s approach to 
foreign and nuclear policy. In fact, the idea of Islam as a determining component of 
Pakistani national identity defined the direction of its foreign policy, including its 
alliances. It further shaped the leadership’s approach to its nuclear ambitions and 
decision-making. At the same time, Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions were primarily aimed 
at addressing the nascent nation’s security concerns, borne out of the country’s rivalry 
with the former motherland, now seen as the archenemy.  
 
Constitution 
The Preamble to Pakistan’s Constitution establishes the role of Islam in the public 
sphere: ‘Wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social 
justice, as enunciated by Islam, shall be fully observed.’ Article 2 of the Constitution 
establishes Islam as the official state religion, based on this, Article 31 guarantees the 
state will take steps to promote the ‘Islamic way of life’. Most important, Article 40 
provides a substantial element determining the country’s foreign policy, that of 
Islamabad’s relations with the rest of the Muslim world, which in turn plays a decisive 
role in the success of the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. Article 40 provides 
that, 
The State shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim 
countries based on Islamic unity, support the common interests of the peoples of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America, promote international peace and security, foster goodwill and 
friendly relations among all nations and encourage the settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means.26  
 
Article 230 lays the functions of the Islamic Council, created to oversee the law-making 
process, to ensure their compatibility with Islam.  
Make recommendations to [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] and the Provincial 
Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Muslims of 
Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in accordance 
with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;  
(b) to advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any 
question referred to the Council as to whether proposed law is or is not repugnant to the 
Injunctions of Islam;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ibid. 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  160	  	  
(c) to make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into 
conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures should 
be brought into effect.27 
This Article is particularly interesting in the context of the debate surrounding the 
legality of nuclear weapons under shari’a. Indeed, had nuclear weapons been 
considered against the prescriptions of the faith in Pakistan, this Council would have 
stepped in, advising the president not to pursue them. Furthermore, the president and 
prime minister (as well as virtually all other Pakistani officials), in their respective 
oaths, provided by Articles 42 and 91 (3), swear they believe in ‘all the requirements 
and teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah’ and to ‘strive to preserve the Islamic 
ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan.’28  
The constitution of Pakistan sheds light on two key issues. First, as discussed 
previously, Pakistan was established as a Muslim state with Islam and its values at its 
heart. Second, the founding fathers of this new Muslim state strived to build a 
mechanism into the law-making process to provide for the development of new laws 
and to assure their compatibility with the Muslim faith. This has implications for the 
Islamic legal debate surrounding nuclear weapons: it shows that there was no opposition 
to the legality of said weapons under Islamic law from Pakistani religious scholars. 
Hence, this demonstrates that the prohibition of nuclear weapons by Islam is not clear 
and widely accepted across the Muslim world. As noted in Chapter Three, this stems 
from the lack of a consensus and unified stance on the legality of nuclear weapons in 
the Sunni world. Had this been the case, Islamabad’s ability to use Islam as an enabler 
would have been challenged both at home and abroad.  
The next section examines the history of Pakistan from its independence to the 
acquisition of the bomb.  
 
The Hindu-Muslim divide 
The roots of the Pakistani quest for the world’s greatest deterrent and the view that the 
country should enhance its security can be found in the inception of the states of India 
and Pakistan. The India-Pakistan separation occurred following the end of the British 
colonial presence in the subcontinent. However, the threat perception and feeling of 
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insecurity among the subcontinent’s Muslims holds its roots in the historical presence of 
these faiths in the region and the very foundations of their values. Indeed, the two 
religions scarcely have anything in common. On the one hand, upon Islam’s advent in 
the subcontinent in the eleventh century, Hindu temples and sculptures were destroyed. 
These temples represented the very philosophy the Prophet had a divine mission to 
combat: idolatry. Hence, a parallel could be drawn between the specific Arabian 
tradition and belief that Muhammad was ordered by God to combat, and the Hindu, 
polytheist culture the Muslims were encountering in the Indian subcontinent. What is 
more, as Hindus are not considered as ‘peoples of the Book’, unlike Christians, Jews 
(and Zoroastrians in Iran), they did not receive the same protections as these groups. 
Additionally, as they did in other lands they conquered, Muslims undertook to convert 
the population to their faith. On the other hand, Hindus viewed Muslims as another 
caste, of which they tried to remain separate.29 Therefore, the conflict was brewing for 
centuries between two ways of life and philosophies, fundamentally different from one 
another: ‘Hinduism, which was tolerant of dissent and absorptive; and Islamic, which 
was militant, exclusive, and dogmatic’.30 By the time India became colonised, it had 
become a deeply fragmented society, where ‘two radically different ways of life 
competed for the allegiance of the population’.31 After decades of British presence in 
the subcontinent, the decolonisation process began in a society marked by cleavages. 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who led the Muslims to establish their own state to avoid 
prosecution, expressed these differences in the following words: 
How can you even dream of Hindu-Moslem unity? Everything pulls us apart: We have 
no intermarriages. We have not the same calendar. The Moslems believe in a single 
God, and the Hindus are idolatrous. Like the Christians, the Moslems believe in an 
equalitarian society, whereas the Hindus maintain their iniquitous system of castes and 
leave heartlessly fifty million Untouchables to their tragic fate, at the bottom of the 
social ladder.32  
Yet, despite these differences and the deep disparity and mistrust between these two 
factions, there was no consensus around the idea of separation within the Muslim 
population of the subcontinent. In fact, ‘before independence, there was a significant 
split among the influential ulama and the religious ideologues about the desirability of 
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creating Pakistan.’33 However, Jinnah successfully convinced those sceptical and rallied 
them around the new Muslim state’s flag. The Hindus for their part gathered around 
Mahatma Gandhi, who despite his prominence was unable to unite the two factions of 
the population. In fact, his role in shaping Indian nationalism was conducive to 
emphasising the difference between the Hindus and Muslims. Gandhi and his nationalist 
movement highlighted ‘mass participation, majority rule, and Indian (Hindu) tradition’, 
which in turn deepened the gap between Hindus and Muslims.34 This led the Muslims to 
become apprehensive of the Hindus’ intent and concerned that the majority rule would 
serve to marginalise them. They believed that ‘Hindu revivalism would undermine their 
faith and dim their political future’.35 For this reason, despite his enormous influence, 
Gandhi was unable to forge Indian nationalism into a cohesive whole. The Muslims 
always viewed the Congress with suspicion, fearing that with independence, they would 
be persecuted against.36  
The result of these irreconcilable differences was the 1947 creation of two new states in 
South Asia: India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, as noted in the previous section, Pakistani 
unity was not all comprehensive and Jinnah and the ulamā had divergent visions for 
their new state. While Jinnah and ‘the majority of the middle-class intelligentsia who 
formed the government acknowledged Islam as the fountain head of the new state, they 
had little interest in creating an Islamic state.’ This was in contrast to the position of the 
ulamā, who naturally envisioned their new state as an Islamic one. However, to make 
matters more complex, the ulamā could not reach an agreement among themselves on 
anything beyond the ‘centrality of the Shariah law and some form of hierarchical 
separation of non-Muslims from Muslims’.37 This conflict between the two factions 
gave birth to the Pakistani Constitution, which as noted above, established an Islamic 
Republic, governed by laws created in accordance with ‘the Quran and the Sunnah’. 
Nevertheless, ‘no mention was made of the term Shariah’. Hence, ‘the result was a 
reasonably balanced compromise.’38  
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The India-Pakistan nexus 
Following the addition of India and Pakistan to the community of nations, Muslims and 
Hindus began a process of mass exile, respectively from east to west and vice versa. 
Among those who made the trip to the newly founded Muslim state, were the parents of 
A.Q. Khan. The experience marked Khan, who ‘could never utter the words “Hindu” or 
“Hindi” without embellishing them with a curse’.39 This deep mistrust of Hindus and 
India shaped Khan and many Pakistanis’ threat perception, leading to their pursuit of a 
nuclear capability for their new country. The dispute over Kashmir made this already 
complicated picture even more complex. It led the two countries to engage in armed 
conflict a number of times and continues to have a great impact on their relations. The 
First Kashmir War erupted in 1947 with neither India nor Pakistan being able to secure 
a ‘decisive military victory’. India brought the case before the Security Council in 1948, 
arguing that Pakistan had waged a war of aggression against it. Islamabad in turn 
denounced India’s illegal occupation and accused it of genocide in Kashmir.40 The 
Security Council imposed an immediate ceasefire, which went into effect in 1949 only 
for the conflict to resume in 1965 and again in 1999. During the 1950s, Pakistan began 
to militarise, while striving to build alliances with the west. In the following decade, 
utilising the opportunity provided by a Sino-Indian territorial dispute, Islamabad formed 
an alliance with Beijing. ‘By the mid-1960s Pakistan was in the unique position of 
being a member of two Western military alliances and at the same time enjoying the 
friendship of the People’s Republic of China.’41 The war came to an end thanks to 
Soviet intervention but was far from settled. To make matters even more complicated, 
an internal Pakistani conflict was added to the equation six years later, when a civil war 
erupted in the Bengal.  
East and West Pakistan scarcely shared anything aside from the Muslim faith. While the 
East, was overpopulated and underprivileged, the western territories were only 
inhabited by forty-percent of the Pakistani population, home to two-thirds of the 
country’s ruling class, and received most of the aid and resources received from the 
country’s western allies.42 These matters, along with a devastating cyclone and the 
postponement of the free-elections promised by President Yahya Khan, further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Venter, Al (2007), 54 
40 Stoessinger, John (2008), 185-6 
41 Ibid., 187-89 
42 Ibid., 191 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  164	  	  
aggravated the situation. To make matters worse, the elections favoured Bengali leader, 
Sheik Mujibur Rahaman, rather than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, for the position of prime 
minister. The leader of the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP), Bhutto was a highly 
charismatic, eloquent, and profoundly ambitious man.43 ‘In his own eyes, Prime 
Minister Bhutto was a man of destiny, the heir of the Mogul emperors […] He was the 
chosen leader of his people, with unbounded ambition to put himself and his wretched 
and impoverished nation at the top of the entire Third World.’44 The West, fearing a 
Bengali majority in the National Assembly, and the East, striving for it, entered a civil 
conflict. Bhutto stood by the army, and secured his position as prime minister of the 
country thanks to the majority vote of Western Pakistanis, but also to the trust of the 
military.45 To be sure, during the conflict, ‘the military used Islamist groups to keep 
secular leaders elected by the Bengali population out of power.’ This trend continued 
after the East Pakistan War of secession and accelerated after the civil war in 
Balochistan (1973-77), where ‘Islamist groups, both armed and unarmed, were 
systematically rewarded in order to create national cohesion through religion.’46 The 
conflict had a devastating outcome for Pakistan, as indiscriminate rape, mutilation, and 
the massacre of Bengalis led eight million people to flee to India and the Hindu state 
was requested to step in.47 
The picture became complete when India, ‘eager to cripple’48 its rival, began to support 
the Bengali aim for secession under the leadership of Indira Gandhi. ‘As the conflict 
intensified in early December, the elements of a fierce religious war made their 
appearance. Gradually all restraint was lost, and the religious basis of the struggle was 
revealed in all its fanaticism and ferocity.’49 The rhetoric around the conflict was no 
longer one of territorial unity and integrity, but rather one of sheer faith, mirroring the 
discourse of the Prophet, depicting himself as the monotheist opposing the idolaters and 
their wrong path. This was a jihad against the Hindu idolaters. This religious element 
became the centrepiece of the Pakistani nuclear issue and the conflict became the real 
trigger for Pakistani nuclearisation. The war ended with a devastating Pakistani defeat, 
giving birth to yet a new state: Bangladesh. Bhutto ‘spoke of Pakistan’s defeat and 
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humiliation in the war with India, and vowed that he would vindicate the country’s 
honor.’50 Today, Pakistan continues to view ‘ its eastern neighbour, India, as an eternal 
foe that not only seeks to dominate Pakistan but also to destroy it if and when the 
opportunity arises.’51 
 
Shaping a Muslim state and the quest for the bomb 
Following the secession of Bangladesh, India joined a select group of nations to have a 
nuclear deterrent when it successfully conducted a nuclear test in 1974, three years after 
the bitter Pakistani defeat. Islamabad was not far behind its rival, as former Pakistani 
President and Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, determined to develop a nuclear 
capability for Pakistan, had decided to follow course in his first few days in office.52 He 
embarked on the project to put Pakistan on a par with India but also, to close the nuclear 
gap between the Islamic and Hindu, Jewish, and Christian civilisations. To him the 
quest for the bomb was so crucial that when ‘asked what Pakistan’s response would be 
if India were to “go nuclear”, [h]e responded, “Then we should have to eat grass and get 
one, or buy one, of our own.”’53  
To secure funding for his project, Bhutto ‘embarked on a whirlwind tour of twenty 
countries, mostly in the Middle East […] Bhutto’s former press secretary, Khalid Hasan 
who travelled with him called the trip the president’s Islamic offensive’.54 Bhutto’s 
presentation of a plan for a Muslim bomb was met with positive responses from across 
the Muslim world. Iran, Libya, and Saudi Arabia all financially contributed to 
Islamabad’s project.55 This was especially the case of Arab leaders, who viewed the 
Pakistani bomb as an easier solution to their security needs than developing a nuclear 
capability of their own. Their calculations were that, ‘the world and particularly Israel, 
would not tolerate a nuclear weapons program in the volatile, oil-rich region’ of the 
Middle East. In contrast, Pakistan’s programme ‘stood a better chance of avoiding 
international interference because its bomb might be seen as a counter to India’s 
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superior forces and its rumored nuclear program.’56 In 1974, against the backdrop of the 
oil crisis, having ‘sent prices through the roof’, Bhutto ‘planned to cash in on his allies’ 
bonanza under the guise of an Islamic summit’. The idea was to ‘[use] the forum to lay 
out a broad vision of a new Muslim alliance that would join poor Islamic countries with 
their wealthy brothers to fight the Zionists and their Western backers.’ He saw a new 
role, that of a leader of the Muslim world, for a nuclear-armed Pakistan.57  
Hassan, described Bhutto’s ambitions as follows: ‘He wanted the bomb […] because he 
wanted Pakistan to walk tall’; to be sure, ‘he knew that proliferation will come, and that 
more countries will become nuclear, and that there’s nothing that can stop it. So, if 
everybody’s going to have a bomb in the basement, he said, ‘Okay, if we have the 
capability, let’s do it.’58 This endeavour was as popular in Pakistan as it was in India 
and seen as an element of ‘national pride’.  
Today, nuclear weapons, as an element of national pride, continue to shape the 
Pakistani approach not only to security culture and national identity. In Feroz Khan’s 
words: ‘Pakistan has procured, built, secured, and managed one of the most advanced 
technologies in the world and has good reason to be proud of its capability. There is 
almost no other comparable achievement in the country’s history.’59 As discussed in the 
following sections, the Pakistani general public feels the same way about what it 
perceives as the greatest achievement in the country’s history. Given the short history of 
Pakistan as a nation-state, one that has been marked by various security challenges, and 
both national and international, this view of nuclear weapons as an element of national 
pride is crucial. Therein lies another key difference between Pakistan and neighbouring 
Iran, a nation that – as discussed in the next chapter – prides itself in its historical, 
cultural, literary, and scientific contributions. Hence, Tehran’s nuclear programme is a 
component of its greater scientific ambitions, rather than its only such endeavour. 
Likewise, by contrast, the Iranian approach has been one of nuclear hedging.  
In Pakistan, ‘the nuclear factor is so deeply embedded in national security thinking that 
any step toward disarmament would be met with stiff resistance.’60 This idea is 
reinforced by the fact that nuclear weapons are not only perceived as a security tool for 
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Pakistanis, but have also become a source of pride and, perhaps, even a pillar of their 
national identity. As discussed in Chapter Two and the introduction to this chapter, this 
opposition to stripping Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal or limiting its ability to further 
expand it has already manifested itself in Islamabad’s attitude toward the FMCT.61 
Indeed, ‘the people of Pakistan have paid a heavy price, and many of their economic 
woes are the consequence of national security decisions taken since 1972.’62 These 
sacrifices have been inspired by the leadership’s security and Islamic discourses. This 
idea perfectly illustrates the Pakistani view of national identity and its creation and 
existence in opposition to an equal or perhaps superior Hindu state.  
 
Acquisition of the bomb  
Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, an event that some argue ‘showed that 
for a part of the world, nuclear weapons, which had contributed so much to defining the 
Cold War, were a weapon of the future, not merely a relic of the past.’63 Yet, the 
country had ‘reached the testing threshold’ in 1984.64 Indeed, a decade prior to that, in 
1974, Bhutto had ‘publically pledged that Pakistan would go ahead with its own nuclear 
programme but as far as tests were concerned he stressed that Pakistan would not seek 
to explode a device.’ However, the country’s ‘limited technological capabilities’ led 
U.S. intelligence experts to believe that this ‘was largely an expression of psychological 
bravado to bolster morale.’65 As the Pakistani nuclear ambitions progressed, the United 
States, under the Reagan administration, concluded a bilateral agreement with 
Islamabad. This 1981 agreement ‘served as the foundation for the revival of the 
American-Pakistani alliance in years to come.’ The agreement had two components: 
Funding and training the mujahidin in Afghanistan against the Soviets (discussed in the 
previous chapter), and the nuclear issue. On the latter, given the U.S.-Pakistani 
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partnership in Afghanistan, Washington would allow Islamabad to proceed with its 
nuclear programme, turning ‘a blind eye’ to it. This meant that Pakistan was able to 
continue working on its programme without testing, as this would ‘publically 
[embarrass] the Reagan administration.’66  
Today, nuclear weapons play a key role in Pakistan’s military strategy. Islamabad’s 
nuclear weapons programme was established to overcome its conventional inferiority 
against India and continues to fill that void. While some nuclear states have come to 
rely less on tactical nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War, Pakistan still views 
them as a key component of its military and nuclear strategy. As of 2013, the Pakistani 
nuclear arsenal was estimated to comprise a stockpile of between 90 and 110 (some 
studies estimate it at 120) nuclear warheads.67  
Pakistan’s ‘first accomplishment was on 6 April 1978 when full enrichment was 
accomplished. Ninety-percent weapon grade enrichment was in 1982. Core test started 
later in 1983 [without using fusion material in the exploding centre].’68  
The Khushab Complex is one of Pakistan’s key facilities, providing the country’s 
weapons-grade plutonium. Khushab is located in Punjab and is composed of three 
operational reactors and one reactor under construction, as well as a heavy water plant 
(as of January 2014). The construction of the Khushab 1, a 40-50 Megawatt (MW) 
reactor, began in 1987 and went online a year later. It was followed by the construction 
of the two 50MW plutonium production reactors. All three reactors are moderated by 
heavy water. A fourth reactor would allow the country to produce 24-48 kg of weapons-
grade plutonium each year,69 ‘doubl[ing] its output of nuclear weapons.’70 
Established in 1975, the Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL - also known as the Khan 
Research Laboratories) are Pakistan’s main uranium enrichment facility, located in 
Punjab. The facility has played a key role in the country’s nuclear weapons programme 
and has been home to the country’s advanced centrifuges, including P-3 and P-4 
centrifuges, introduced throughout the 1980s and 90s. As of 2010, the facility was 
believed to have produced 2.7 tonnes of HEU. The facility has become a source of 
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concern following a suicide attack against a bus transporting its workers, which 
occurred in 2009.71 
Another key site in Pakistan’s nuclear sector lies in the Wah Cantonment Ordnance 
Complex. The facility, which produces conventional weapons, is also where the 
country’s main nuclear weapons assembly takes place. The site is also notable due to it 
being the target of suicide attacks in 2008.72  
Neither KRL nor Khushab are under IAEA safeguards and inspections. What is more, 
given the track record of terrorist attacks against the country’s nuclear facilities 
mentioned above, these sites are a source of concern from a nuclear security 
perspective. This is especially the case given that Pakistan, along with neighbouring 
Afghanistan and Iraq, was home to more than half (fifty four-percent) of all terrorist 
attacks in 2012.73 In addition to the proliferation and nuclear security threats represented 
by Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and arsenal, the country also continues to 
engage in the illicit trade and procurement of nuclear technology.74 
The following sections discuss the role played by national and religious identities in the 
development of the nuclear weapons programme. They further assess the role of the 
Islamic discourse in shaping the country’s nuclear narrative and examine its impact on 
illicit trade and proliferation.  
 
The programme and Islamic discourse 
As discussed in the introduction, the proliferation drivers model is a useful tool in 
framing Pakistan’s decision to nuclearise. The ‘security model’ can only be partially 
applicable to the case of Pakistan. The model follows the typical ‘defence realist’ point 
of view that states ‘develop nuclear weapons when they face a significant [external] 
military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative means’. In this 
sense, ‘most decisions to develop nuclear weapons “appear to be best explained by the 
security model.”’75 The national security model, based on the Hobbesian view of 
international relations, holds that due to the international system’s anarchic nature, 
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states will do whatever they see as necessary in order to guarantee their security.76 This 
view is one shared by the Pakistani leadership, which, sceptical of foreign intervention 
in case of an armed conflict with India, was of the belief that it must do everything in its 
power to ensure the safety and security of the Muslim state. According to this view, 
when threatened, a state must match its rival’s nuclear arsenal or risk its very existence. 
This view, providing a basis for an arms race, holds that ‘proliferation begets 
proliferation’. As noted by Scott Sagan, ‘Every time one state develops nuclear 
weapons to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear threat to another 
region, which then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its 
national security’.77 Christine Fair warns, however, that the argument shaped around the 
security element should not be overstated, as has been the case in ‘the current and past 
US policy approaches to Pakistan.’ These policies have ‘assumed that Pakistan is a state 
that is motivated largely by security concerns that can be satisfied with some territorial 
concession and thus capable of abandoning its revisionism with the appropriate 
allurements.’ Fair argues that if Pakistan is indeed a ‘purely greedy state, driven by 
ideological motives, then appeasement is in fact the more dangerous course of policy 
prescription. She attributes Islamabad’s revisionism to its willingness ‘to increase its 
prestige or spread its political ideology or religion, even when doing so is not strictly 
speaking needed to preserve the state’s security or, worse, when doing so puts at risk the 
integrity or even viability of the state’.78   
Pakistan, certainly, pledged to match its rival’s arsenal, not only to ensure its survival, 
but also in order to ensure its Hindu neighbour’s prestige would be matched by the 
Muslim world. Yet, as mentioned previously, this view alone cannot explain Pakistan’s 
nuclear endeavours. In this sense, two other models must be considered.79  
According to the domestic politics model, proliferation should be viewed as a political 
payoff to powerful domestic electoral or bureaucratic constituencies. This approach sees 
states as units made up of competing internal factions, within which influential 
bureaucratic and military actors can lead a state to nuclear weapons. This view also 
identifies three sets of dominant roles in nuclear decision-making: scientists, soldiers, 
and policymakers, of which the last group are the most important as they have the final 
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say on such matters.80 This has been particularly true in the case of Pakistan, as 
discussed further in the following sections. Second is the norms model, in which 
proliferation is viewed as the product of a state’s quest for acceptance as a legitimate 
modern member of international society.81 The prestige model emphasises the symbolic 
value of the ultimate weapon and their view as a prerequisite for ‘great power status.’ 
This view has been key in the Pakistani quest for nuclear weapons and become 
increasingly important in light of the sacrifices the population has had to make to 
achieve its goal. The country had a perception of what makes a state modern, legitimate, 
and strong, based on the Indian example, which it was trying to match in power and 
prestige.82 The two models of technological determinism and the economic approach do 
not play as key roles in the case of Pakistan as the three former. Furthermore, for the 
case of Pakistan the following statement holds particularly true: ‘“the driving forces of 
future proliferation” will include not only security and prestige considerations but also a 
“proliferation momentum”. It was thus assumed that at some future point nuclear 
proliferation “may become a self-reinforcing process.”’83 
 
Legitimising and financing nuclear weapons 
A.Q. Khan’s journey from Bophal to the Netherlands and his work, involving classified 
material in the Ultra-Centrifuge Nederland (UCN) enrichment facility is well known. So 
is the effect of the 18 May 1974 nuclear test (Smiling Buddha) conducted by India both 
on him and his subsequent letter to Bhutto.84 As noted previously, Khan’s view of India 
was key in his decision to become involved in the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
programme. At the time of the Smiling Buddha test,85 Islamabad had already embarked 
on a nuclear weapons programme of its own and welcomed Khan’s interest.86 By 1969, 
Bhutto had made the decision to prioritise security and territorial integrity over 
economic development: ‘although such development and self-reliance contribute to the 
strengthening of the nation’s defence capability, the defence requirements of her 
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sovereignty have to be met first.’ He stressed that ‘a non-industrialized country, without 
even the basis of a heavy industry, cannot depend entirely on the traditional defence 
system of a small, though highly efficient, armed force equipped with conventional 
weapons.’87 The Dutch, however, did not welcome his newfound interest in nuclear 
projects and classified information. In December 1975, Khan left Holland with ‘a batch 
of classified Urenco blueprints, together with lists of European suppliers, many of 
whom he would be contacting in the years to come.’88 Upon his return to Pakistan, 
Khan began to work on ‘centrifuge-related projects within the confines of the Pakistan 
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)’, before being given ‘autonomy and control over 
Pakistani uranium-enrichment programs from July 1976 onwards.’89 As Khan and his 
colleagues made progress toward the establishment of the Pakistani nuclear weapons 
programme, the west, dubious of the activities, began to set obstacles on their way. By 
1979, the United States had made a decision to cut Islamabad off from its financial and 
military support. This disruption was, however, only for a brief period, as, with the 
Soviet Union now in Afghanistan, Washington could not afford to lose Pakistan’s 
support. By the early 1980s, Khan had ‘managed to acquire the plans for Beijing’s first 
atom bomb, which was tested fifteen years before at Lop Nor. The event made the man, 
and Khan was showered with plaudits. From then on, there would be no looking 
back.’90  
11 May 1998 marked the detonation of five nuclear devices by India. A.Q. Khan 
interpreted the tests as a direct message to Pakistan, omitting any mention of India’s 
threat perception shaped by China.  
India’s new government was more fundamentalist, they wanted to prove their 
superpower status. They wanted to show the world that they were a ‘big’ country too 
and wanted to be in the ‘superpower’ category. 
Also, they thought Pakistan was bluffing [about having the bomb]. And wanted to teach 
Pakistan a lesson – tell us to walk with our heads down. When it was our turn, we 
showed our own demonstration in response.91  
Less than three weeks after New Delhi’s tests, Pakistan’s response was formulated in 
the form of its first six nuclear tests, marking the country’s official entry into the 
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‘nuclear club’.92 However, Islamabad had crossed that line earlier and had developed a 
nuclear capability. In his response to the question ‘when was the real date at which 
Pakistan had the bomb’, A.Q. Khan replied: 
84 – We gained the ability to release a bomb within one week. Zia ul-Haq was very 
happy. But government and military focus was on Afghanistan at the time; they made 
the decision that if they released the information that we are a nuclear power, while in 
the middle of a war as we also receive U.S. aid to fight the rebels the United States 
would not be happy.93 
Pakistan had started working toward a nuclear capability decades prior, however. To 
this end, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was founded in 1956, but ‘it 
was for many years a ramshackle operation. In contrast, by 1959, the Atomic Energy 
Commission of India in Trombay had over 1,000 scientists working on civilian nuclear 
technology.’94 India’s nuclear policy changed with the Sino-Indian war of 1962 and the 
Chinese 1964 nuclear test. ‘Given that India’s scientists were speaking privately about 
the need to develop a nuclear bomb while its leaders publicly sought a civilian nuclear 
capacity, it is not improbably that rumors of these discussions reached the Pakistan 
military or the intelligence agencies.’95 
Nevertheless, by the 1990s, when Pakistan was in a position to conduct nuclear tests, 
Nawaz Sharif was reluctant to do so, as he did not want to ‘upset’ the United States. In 
A.Q. Khan’s words: ‘Due to sanctions. He was scared about aid cut-off. The finance 
minister scared him about funds that would be cut-off [if we displeased the Americans 
and by extension the west].’ Khan sent Sharif a letter, urging him to act to avoid 
Pakistan going ‘down in history as a fearful coward.’ Saudi Arabia’s petrodollars came 
to Islamabad’s rescue, as Pakistan was hit by sanctions. The Saudi role in financing 
Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions provides grounds for many to expect Islamabad to provide 
Riyadh with a ‘sort of nuclear umbrella’, should Iran develop nuclear weapons.96 This 
scenario also entails a potential ‘secret agreement on “nuclear cooperation”’ which 
would establish an exchange of nuclear technology for oil. Al Venter suggests that such 
an agreement may already have been reached.97 Indeed, ‘both Pakistan and Saudi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Venter, Al (2007), 58 
93 Ibid. 
94 Fair, Christine (2014), 229 
95 Ibid.  
96 Venter, Al (2007), 150 
97 Ibid., 151 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  174	  	  
Arabia see a world that is moving from nonproliferation to proliferation of nuclear 
weapons.’98  
The Pakistani leadership’s decision to nuclearise was mainly security-driven, at first, 
and aimed to address a particular security concern, the Indian threat. In fact, Pakistan’s 
bomb is ‘an India-specific bomb’, and Pakistani deterrence ‘is a carefully crafted 
notion, only [against] India.’99 But, as Pakistan invested in the bomb, often at the 
expense of other economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and educational endeavours, 
the bomb became an element of national pride, in addition to its being a deterrent. Islam 
was both a driver for some of the key figures in Pakistan’s nuclear programme 
(including both Bhutto and A.Q. Khan), but also a tool to galvanise support and seek 
funding from the Muslim world. Therefore, traditional international relations models, 
which seek to theorise and explain nuclearisation, fall short of explaining the Pakistani 
endeavours.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Pakistani self-image is highly fashioned around 
Islam. The Pakistani nation was created based on one major element of distinction from 
the rest of the subcontinent: the Muslim faith. This self-image has determined the 
country’s attitude toward nuclearisation and continues to play an important role in the 
way the country sees the non-proliferation regime. Two factors shape this view. First, 
the Pakistani nation self-identifies as a part of the ummah. Hence, unlike Iran, it is key 
for the Pakistani government to justify its actions, including in the nuclear field, as in 
accordance with the will of God, as reflected by His Messenger. Second, the country’s 
religious identity plays a key role in the country’s view of its own status in the Muslim 
world and beyond, as well as its relations with the rest of the ummah, and ultimately, its 
foreign policy. The previous sections examined the role of the Muslim faith in 
fashioning the views of key figures in Islamabad’s nuclear programme, as well as its 
broader implications for nuclear policy in Pakistan. The following sections examine 
how the Islamic faith has shaped Islamabad’s nuclear narrative. 
 
At home 
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In Pakistan, ‘various Islamic traditions have been used to construct a distinct identity to 
counter the hegemonic Islamic modernism of the state’, which Oskar Verkaaik refers to 
as the ‘ethincization of Islam.’ This, he argues, ‘shows that religious nationalism in 
Pakistan has been relatively successful as even dissent is expressed in Islamic terms.’100 
In fact, as discussed by Gilles Boquérat and Nazir Hussain, in an opinion poll conducted 
in 2006-2007, where ‘the respondents ranged from 18 to 25’, with a large majority of 
students at Bachelors’ level, only thirteen-percent of them ‘considered that the influence 
of religious considerations should not be very significant in the determination of state 
policies.’ Moreover, ‘when asked about the reasons explaining the attraction of some 
Muslims for extremism, unsurprisingly it was first of all seen as a reaction against 
Western policies in the Muslim world.’101  
The Pakistani population seems more attached to its religious identity and Muslim 
values than many other Muslim societies. As suggested by a study conducted by the 
Pew Research Center in 2006, the majority of Pakistanis (eighty seven-percent of the 
country’s population, as of 2006) identify themselves as Muslims first, and Pakistani 
nationals second. It is worth noting that this number expanded from seventy nine-
percent to eighty seven-percent in one year.102 Hence, developing an Islamic dimension 
to foreign and nuclear policy is key to galvanising support in Pakistan. This 
distinguishes Pakistan from neighbouring Iran, where, as discussed in Chapter Six, there 
is a more complicated relationship to religion and national identity, less intertwined 
with the Muslim faith. In fact, in the case of Pakistan, Islam was the determining factor 
behind the nation-state’s creation. In the Iranian case, Shiite Islam was a tool or means 
to preserve the nation’s cultural and political independence rather than the end. 
Therefore, while much of Iran’s Islamic nuclear discourse is produced for foreign 
consumption, in the case of Pakistan, the discourse is as important at home as it is 
abroad.  
Likewise, opinion polls in Pakistan suggest that the population overwhelmingly 
supports the country’s nuclear capability and views it positively. According to Gallup 
Pakistan, for instance, eighty seven-percent of the Pakistani population supported 
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nuclearisation in 1987.103 In 2009, despite a decline in national pride among Pakistanis 
(falling from ninety five-percent in 1985 to seventy nine-percent in 2009), the 
development of a nuclear capability was identified as the country’s ‘greatest 
achievement since its creation’.104 This sense of ‘achievement’ becomes incredibly 
important when one compares Pakistan to its archenemy. Indeed, ‘in a country that has 
made only modest gains in the areas of innovation, science, and education (especially in 
comparison with its rival, India), the Pakistani nuclear program has played an outsized 
role in the building of national self-esteem.’ Therefore, ‘critiques […] are deeply 
wounding. They produce feelings of distrust.’105 The lack of correlation between the 
decline in national pride and the country’s nuclear weapons being consistently viewed 
positively is especially interesting in light of their relation to the economy. Indeed, there 
is a contradiction between the positive views of the country’s growing nuclear arsenal, 
despite it being responsible for much of the country’s poor economy,106 and ‘the decline 
in national pride amongst Pakistanis over the years is a product of political, social and 
economic upheavals in the past few decades.’107 The population does not seem to equate 
the country’s economic troubles with the nuclear weapons programme. This is despite 
‘nearly a quarter of the government budget go[ing] to the military’, while ‘some 60 
percent of Pakistanis survive on less than $2 a day.’108 Hence, despite a general decline 
in the nationalist sentiment, the country’s nuclear capability continues to hold a place of 
esteem in the population’s views. A.Q. Khan, as the ‘father’ of the Pakistani bomb and 
perhaps the person viewed as the main contributor to national security, is also held in 
high esteem in the views of Pakistanis, many of who view him as a national ‘hero’. 
Khan himself underlines this fact: ‘What I have accomplished – I have given the people 
calm and peace and sense of security; that is no less of a blessing. Our nation can sleep 
soundly knowing now that there is no fear that Hindus can come over and invade us.’109  
Pakistan’s relationship to its nuclear weapons programme and arsenal, as well as the 
deep connection between this capability and the faith, which shapes the views of the 
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majority of the country’s population, is problematic. Indeed, criticism of the nuclear 
weapons programme, or the arsenal and facilities’ safety and security, is met with 
distrust. What is more, Pakistani fears of an American intervention to denuclearise the 
country also revolve around the country’s Muslim identity and the notion of an inherent 
western and American opposition to Islam and Muslims. These views reflect those of 
A.Q. Khan and the notion of an on-going crusade against Islam. As discussed in the 
next chapter, similar views have been expressed by the Iranian leadership and other 
non-aligned states, which argue that the west does not want Muslim and developing 
states to reach the same technological status, especially in areas relating to defence. 
However, these views are more widespread in Pakistan, where the majority of the 
population considers the United States to be an enemy (seventy four-percent, in 2012, 
ten-percent increase since 2009).110 
As discussed previously, the debate around the nuclear weapons programme in Pakistan 
has been shaped by the Islamic discourse, without engaging in ethical and legal debates. 
However, the fact that the Pakistani population, which identifies itself as a 
predominantly Muslim one, has not only accepted the development of a nuclear 
weapons capability, but also takes pride in it, shows that it does not believe these 
weapons to be illegal under its faith. As the next section demonstrates, the general 
support, both political and financial, received by Pakistan from the rest of the Muslim 
world, also indicates that other Muslim populations and leaders endorse the view that 
Islam does not prohibit the development and, potential use of nuclear weapons. As 
noted by Feroz Khan, ‘a nuclear weapon capability is [not] prohibited [by the faith]. 
Islam encourages Muslims to “prepare against their enemies”. That is deterrence. 
Deterrence is a fundamental concept of war. Islam tells Muslims to show off strength.’ 
In his analysis, Khan relies on the Qur’anic verses provided and discussed in Chapter 
Three. Nevertheless, he explains that in Pakistan, like in Iran, ‘Islamic scholars believe 
that the use of nuclear weapons is not actually allowed in Islam. You cannot kill 
anybody who is innocent. You cannot kill innocents. The problem with nuclear 
weapons is that they kill innocents.’ Hence, ‘if you strictly interpret Islamic law, nuclear 
weapons are not allowed unless you use very precision targeting, then, yes, they are 
allowed.’ In response to how deterrence would be effective without the legality of the 
use, Khan argues: ‘this is why it’s not a theological bomb, but instrument of state. But 
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[…] deterrence is not credible unless usable.’ Nevertheless, ‘public discourse, the 
rhetoric of Islam, helps in domestic politics, but it is not what the real policy is.’111  
 
Abroad 
As discussed in the previous sections, Pakistan was established as a Muslim nation and 
state. Its independence marked not only the establishment of a new nation and state, but 
also a departure from the people and culture it had been part of for centuries. This 
departure also meant that Pakistan would associate itself with the rest of the ummah, in 
particular Middle Eastern Arab states, but also Turkey and Iran. Pakistan’s relationship 
with the Arab states was an important factor for the newly established state. Yet, once 
independent, Pakistan chose a different approach to foreign policy from India. While 
India chose the non-aligned path to establish itself outside the communist and western 
blocks, the new Muslim nation ‘clung firmly to the West.’ It ‘proudly called itself the 
“most allied ally” of the United States’, signing a Mutual Defense Pact in 1954, 
followed by a Mutual Security Pact in 1959.112 Field Marshal Ayub Khan supported this 
position and helped secure security guarantees from the United States, when he claimed 
before Congress that ‘if there is real trouble, there is no other country in Asia on whom 
you will be able to count. The only people who will stand by you are the people of 
Pakistan.’113 Ayub Khan’s beliefs that Islamabad’s alliance with Washington would 
secure it from India were not shared by key figures in Pakistani foreign policy. 
Likewise, Ayub Khan’s views stood in stark contrast from Bhutto’s vision of a nuclear 
Pakistan. Khan questioned the utility of a nuclear capability when the people of a ‘poor 
country’ could not afford ‘schools, hospitals, and industry.’114 Bhutto did not believe 
that in case of a war with India, the United States would come to Pakistan’s rescue. As 
such, he viewed these matters to be secondary to the nation’s security concerns. 
Ultimately, Bhutto’s position became the dominant one as Pakistan embarked on a 
nuclear weapons programme and continues to shape Pakistani attitudes toward its 
deterrent.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 INT002SNT 
112 Weissman, Steve and Krosney, Herbert (1981), The Islamic Bomb. New York: Times Books. P. 50 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  179	  	  
1999 saw new developments, as Pervez Musharraf staged a coup, overthrowing Nawaz 
Sharif. This event and those following it were crucial to defining the balance of power 
in South Asia and the role of nuclear doctrines in it.  
Within hours of the coup in Pakistan and perhaps not coincidentally, the United States 
Senate, by a vote of 51-48, defeated one of President Bill Clinton’s most cherished 
foreign policy objectives: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Opponents, pointing to 
the actions of India and Pakistan, argued that the treaty was unenforceable. But Carl 
Levin of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee defended the treaty. “We no longer 
have standing when we defeated this treaty, to tell India or Pakistan ‘don’t test nuclear 
weapons’,” he exclaimed, “the Senate majority has turned its back on fifty years of 
American leadership against the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”115  
South Asian nuclear arsenals became especially worrisome in light of the escalations 
resulting from the 2001 terrorist attacks in Kashmir and the 2002 attack against the 
Indian parliament. The nuclear standoff came to an end when Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee declared in 2003 that he would be sending an ambassador to 
Pakistan and attempting to initiate peace talks.116 The initiative was reciprocated by 
Islamabad and the two parties normalised their relations in the following months. 
Nevertheless, these events shaped the two countries’ approach to their respective 
foreign policies and nuclearisation.  
The 1970s marked the beginning of the economic and political growth of Saudi Arabia 
and other Arab states in the Persian Gulf. Several Arab countries used their resources to 
assist Pakistan when it became engaged on the Bengali front. These included Saudi 
Arabia’s financial aid and Jordan’s transfer (with approval from Washington) of F-
104’s (during a time when the United States implemented an arms embargo). This aid 
‘was largely symbolic, and had only partially offset India’s overwhelming superiority in 
the air.’117 This conventional superiority is what Islamabad sought to counter by 
developing a nuclear capability. However, India’s nuclear ambitions preoccupied 
Bhutto. In 1969, he wrote that, ‘India is unlikely to concede nuclear monopoly to others 
and, judging from her own nuclear programme and her diplomatic activities (…), it 
appears she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate a nuclear bomb’. Bhutto 
contends: ‘if Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it would not only 
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enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage, but would impose a 
crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan’s science and technology.’118  
It was only natural for Pakistan to attempt to appeal to the rest of the Muslim 
community, especially Middle Eastern states, when it reached a decision to develop a 
nuclear capability. Indeed, while the aid provided by Muslim states did not prevent 
Pakistan from losing the war, ‘to Bhutto, the brotherly support suggested the possibility 
of far greater cooperation in the future.’119 However, the pursuit of the Pakistani 
leadership’s ‘pan-Islamic mission’ was challenging, as it was met with ‘suspicion 
among Arab leaders.’ In fact, the general view among Arabs seemed to be one of 
Pakistan as the ‘“Trojan horse” of British imperialism’ and Islamabad’s attempts to 
portray itself as the natural leader of ‘Islamic solidarity’ were not welcomed. While 
Pakistani leaders viewed their country’s central location among Muslim states and its 
‘large population’ as a positive attribute, which could help the cause, Arab states viewed 
it as conflicting with their interests. Among the Arab states, Egypt was especially 
opposed to Islamabad’s ambitions, as Cairo has seen itself as the leader of the Arab 
world. 
Pakistan’s efforts in the 1950s to move pan-Islamic organisation from the transnational 
to the interstate level proved fruitless. Its military alliances with the United States in the 
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and with Great Britain in the Baghdad 
Past alienated it further from Arab states. But the non-governmental, transnational 
dimension to pan-Islam continued to develop.120 
Nevertheless, the idea of Pakistan as a Muslim nation has shaped the country’s identity, 
self-image, and consequently, its foreign policy, including in the field of nuclear arms 
control. To be sure, the Pakistani bomb was created thanks to Muslim states ‘chipping 
in’ to make the Islamic bomb a reality: 
Where would an impoverished country like Pakistan ever find the money to build 
nuclear weapons? For Ali Bhutto, the answer was obvious. Only hours after he had 
finished meeting with his top scientists under the tent in Multan, the Pakistani leader set 
off a whirlwind tour of the major Islamic capitals of the Middle East.121 
Among these countries were ‘Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, as well as 
Turkey, Syria, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya.’ These stops gave Bhutto 
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an opportunity to criticise ‘bitterly his country’s Western allies, especially the United 
States and Great Britain’ for ‘betraying’ Pakistan.122 The result of this Muslim world 
tour was the political legitimation and securing of funds for the programme. In 1974, 
Bhutto met with Libyan leader, Muammar Gadhafi at the Lahore Summit. He secured 
Libya’s political support: Gadhafi declared that he supported the right of ‘the fortress of 
Islam’ (Pakistan) to pursue nuclear technology.123 Islamabad and Tripoli also concluded 
a financial deal, worth two hundred million dollars provided to Pakistan in 1975-76. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia also contributed several hundred million dollars each to 
Pakistan.124 
Outside the Muslim world, however, Pakistan’s official discourse before it conducted 
its first nuclear test was one of ambiguity. In a 1993 interview, A.Q. Khan called the 
statements according to which Pakistan’s uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta was 
meant for nuclear weapons ‘just propaganda’. He noted that both the president and 
prime minister had reiterated the nuclear programme’s peaceful nature and that 
Islamabad did not need a nuclear weapons capability. He did, however, state that the 
facility gave ‘Pakistanis sense-respect and a sense of security.’125 
As argued above, Pakistan’s nuclear discourse was an effective tool for it to receive 
financial and political support for its nuclear weapons programme from the ummah. 
However, it has not translated into real policy. Indeed, while some in Pakistan argue 
that Islamabad ought to provide extended deterrence to other Muslim states, the idea 
does not resonate with the ‘security establishment’. Likewise, Feroz Khan argues 
against some western non-proliferation circles, which contend that Pakistan could 
provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear weapon. He noted that, the policy pursued by 
Pakistan is to become ‘mainstream’ and accepted as a member of the ‘Nuclear Suppliers 
Groups’, like neighbouring India. Much of its ‘policy is geared toward that’ and 
proliferating nuclear weapons in the volatile Middle East would be counterproductive in 
its pursuit of against this goal. According to Khan, ‘the Saudis tried a lot to get 
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Pakistanis to help them but Pakistanis have rejected.’126 The following section will 
present opposing views to those presented by Khan.   
 
The military and command and control 
A key concern regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal lies in the relationship between the 
military and Islamist militants. Indeed, ‘Pakistan has relied on non-state actors to 
prosecute its policies in Kashmir since its birth in 1947.’127 Former Pakistani 
ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani explains that he ‘pursued a political 
solution whereby Pakistan secured nuclear legitimacy in return for shutting down jihad.’ 
This solution ‘found no interest in the Pakistan Army, the Inter-Services Intelligence 
(ISI), or the American administration.’128  
The second concern regarding Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal lies in the fact that the 
Pakistani military does not share the command and control of the country’s nuclear 
forces with the civilians. The key civilian decision-makers in the country, including the 
prime minister, are largely ‘unaware of the extent of the program and its components’ 
and do not play a key role in nuclear decision-making. ‘To soften critics of the system 
and to bring a sense of calm to those alarmed at the fuzzy accountability, a Nuclear 
Command Authority headed by a troika of the president, the prime minister, and the 
army chief was created in 1989’. However, ‘the key player in this structure, the army 
chief, candidly admitted that this arrangement was a sham and only for public 
consumption.’129 To preserve this status quo, the military has also been known to use an 
Islamic discourse to justify its firm grasp on the country’s nuclear weapons programme. 
For instance, the military was wary of Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the PPP, despite her 
being Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s daughter, whose key role in the country’s acquisition of 
nuclear weapons has been discussed at length. To undermine her credibility, it used two 
key arguments, both fashioned around her ‘fitness’ to govern a Muslim nation. First, her 
ability as a woman to lead a Muslim nation was questioned. Second, her ‘loyalty’ to the 
United States was portrayed as grounds not to trust her with the country’s ‘nuclear 
secrets’. These arguments were instrumentalised ‘to ensure […] that the political forces 
did not unite and remained divided so that the military could play the arbiter. Hence, the 
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‘military’s covert intelligence wing,’ known as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 
formed an alliance with other parties against Bhutto and her party, the PPP. This 
alliance was ‘built around the Pakistan Muslim League led by Nawaz Sharif who had 
been promoted by General Zia, and endorsed by the Islamic parties.’130 
 
The transfer of nuclear kit to other Muslim states 
The pan-Islamic motivation and opposition to western control on nuclear technology 
played a key role, not only in shaping Khan’s views on the creation and proliferation of 
the ‘Islamic bomb’, but also that of Pakistani government and military officials 
including Bhutto. 
Bhutto’s perception was this – Pakistan would be a leader in this field and would be 
able to protect them with a nuclear umbrella. Make a pact with Saudi Arabia and Iran -- 
similar to what the U.S. had done with other countries like Canada, Japan, Korea etc—
and Pakistan could protect them.  This was his thinking and that it would also increase 
Pakistani legitimacy. And this he believed made America very nervous. ‘He’ll unite the 
Muslims and this will be a threat.’131 
Both Bhutto and General Zia ul-Haq ‘used religious ideologues and religious parties to 
score short term gains.’ They were both eager for Islamabad to develop ties to the 
Middle East and the rest of the ummah and, to achieve this end, ‘portray[ed] themselves 
as good and true Muslims in front of their own people and Muslims worldwide’. Hence, 
they ‘both promoted Islamization by their rhetoric about such nebulous concepts as 
Islamic economics, Islamic television, Islamic clothing and even Islamic bomb.’132 
These were part of a bigger effort undertaken by Bhutto, which ‘provided for the 
creation of an Islamic state within the constitution allowing an opportunity for the 
future Islamization of the country.’133 Since, democracy and religion have had a 
complex relationship in a country where, both two key factions, the military and Islamic 
parties, have accepted the former, ‘as long as it serves their special interests’, while at 
the same time ‘remain[ing] fundamentally opposed to it.’134  
Islamic parties have been instrumental in preserving the status quo, as the military has 
often used them to advance its own agenda. This, as discussed in this chapter, has been 
the case regarding the command and control of the nuclear forces. This gradual increase 
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in the role and place of Islam in the country’s domestic politics also manifested itself in 
its foreign policy and facilitated A.Q. Khan’s endeavours, by promoting a pan-Islamic 
discourse, which enabled the country to build trust with fellow Muslims across and 
beyond the Middle East. While Bhutto developed good ties with Iran and even signed 
an agreement with Tehran, Haq’s Sunni allegiance led him to drift away from 
Pakistan’s western neighbour and move toward Saudi Arabia. The result of this move 
was the establishment of good Saudi-Pakistani relations, which further promoted 
Islamisation in Pakistan, given Saudi Arabia’s role in supporting the export of 
Wahhabism.135 Both men (Bhutto and Haq) further promoted the implementation of 
shari’a and the increasing Islamisation of Pakistan.136 Zia ul-Haq considered Pakistan 
as the ‘Citadel of Islam’ and ‘embarked upon a process of Islamization’. By doing so, 
he wanted Pakistan to ‘unitedly […] establish Islam as a way of life’ and to unite ‘more 
so in the matter of religion.’137 Likewise, Pakistan, with the help of Saudi Arabia, 
provided support to the mujahidin in Afghanistan.138  
In response to whether there ‘was a soft spot/or concern about North Korea and Iran 
getting this technology/information?’, A.Q. Khan responded: ‘Well, it was this – they 
were our friends. It is not a crime to help out friends.’139 He further asserted, with 
regards to allegations regarding Iran’s attempts to produce the bomb, ‘they have signed 
the NPT and we had not so we could do anything we wanted. Iran is not allowed to go 
to high enrichment levels, and if they do in secret it will violate the NPT and will be 
subject to Security Council sanctions.’ Yet, Khan supported Iran’s right to develop the 
bomb in face of threats: ‘If they have a threat they should do it – every country has a 
right.’ These views are close to those of Bhutto as expressed by Khalid added, ‘I think 
Bhutto had always been a believer in Third World countries having the nuclear option’.  
As a Third World leader, and intellectual, someone who knew the West because he had 
been trained in the West, he questioned the basic assumption that only the Western 
powers and the Soviet Union were capable of having nuclear weapons and handling 
them with responsibility.140 
Bhutto viewed the non-proliferation regime as biased and complained about the status 
quo being accepted as such. ‘Why is it that only the Western countries and the Soviet 
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Union can have nuclear weapons and not be questioned? And why is it that everybody 
takes it for granted as part of the world as it is?141  
These ideas persist and shape Pakistan’s view on the non-proliferation regime. 
Mushahid Hussain, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence 
expressed similar views in 2012 regarding the Iranian nuclear dossier. ‘Hussain told the 
visiting Iranian delegation that Pakistan rejects any double standards on the nuclear 
issue and strongly feels that the standoff with Iran on the nuclear issue should be 
resolved peacefully, without threat or use of force.’142 According Feroz Khan, this view 
on the non-proliferation regime stems from Pakistan’s own experience and its view of 
the bias toward Muslims. Indeed, the opposition of the west to Islamabad’s 
nuclearisation is viewed ‘not just a non-proliferation concern, but a reaction to a 
Muslim bomb. Israel and India have developed nuclear weapons, but one is Hindu, the 
other Jewish. So, the view is that the obstacles were created because [Pakistan] was a 
Muslim country.’ Nevertheless, Khan notes that, ‘the security establishment is happy 
that there are negotiations with Iran’. This is due to three factors. First, the role of the 
A.Q. Khan network in providing Tehran with nuclear technology remains an issue for 
Pakistan. Second, a successful and peaceful resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis 
would in turn mean a decrease in ‘pressure from the UAE and Saudi Arabia’ on 
Pakistan. Third, Pakistan would not find itself ‘between a nuclear Iran and a nuclear 
India’, both of which, share a ‘special relationship’.143 
Pakistan’s accession to a nuclear weapon state status had greater implications for 
nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Muslim world. The father of the Pakistani bomb 
also became the father of the greatest and most effective illicit trade and procurement 
network in history. Khan’s faith greatly influenced his striving to assist the ummah in 
proliferating. The Pakistani nuclear programme was largely dependent on illicit trade 
and this procurement activity has heightened since at least 2004.144  
Khan and his associates slowly expanded their import operation […] into a 
transnational illegal network that also exported gas centrifuges and production 
capabilities, as well as design for nuclear weapons, to other mostly Muslim countries to 
turn a profit and provide additional business for their international collaborators. In 
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addition to money, Khan was also motivated by pan-Islamism and hostility to Western 
controls on nuclear technology.145 
As noted throughout the present chapter, the Pakistani nuclear narrative is a 
predominantly pan-Islamic one. In the words of former president Zia ul-Haq: ‘It is our 
right to obtain nuclear technology. And when we acquire this technology, the entire 
Islamic world will possess it with us.’146 This idea was implemented in two ways. First, 
as discussed in the first half of this chapter, the acquisition of the bomb by Pakistan, 
fulfilled this idea. Yet, as noted in the previous sections, this has not translated into 
actual policy, even though it served Pakistan secure funding and political support form 
Muslim states. In a way, the benefits of the pan-Islamic nuclear narrative were one way, 
as they served Islamabad’s purposes, without offering funders with the protection they 
have sought. Second, this section demonstrates, the statement had a literal meaning and 
implication, implemented by A.Q. Khan, through his illicit trafficking network, which 
benefited Muslim states. The extent to which Khan and Pakistani decision-makers were 
driven by pan-Islamic ideals to proliferate nuclear knowhow, technology, and materials, 
has been debated by those who have discussed the topic. While some argue that this 
motive was merely secondary to Khan’s own interests and greed,147 there are clear 
indications that Khan’s faith shaped his views on proliferation and defence. This faith 
seems to have strengthened upon Khan’s return to Pakistan from the Netherlands: ‘he 
became devout and cite[d] Allah’s name more and more in his public appearances.’148 
As such, he supported the idea of an Islamic bomb, which would allow the ummah to 
collaborate on defence issues. In fact, even the North Korean case, one of a communist, 
‘Godless’ state, can be explained by Khan’s dichotomist view of world politics and 
security, one in which the west’s biases dictate the actions of the rest. Therefore, 
empowering ‘the rest’, regardless of their allegiance, would in turn help the Muslim 
community by undermining the west. The wish for the Muslim world to be able to 
protect itself and to be ‘on par’ with other dominant civilisations was not only realised 
thanks to the acquisition of the ‘Muslim Bomb’ in Pakistan, but also an endeavour 
transcending its borders, facilitated by the A.Q. Khan network. As noted previously, 
much like Bhutto, Khan himself was driven by pan-Islamic ideals and opposition to the 
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non-proliferation regime, which he viewed as biased and promoting the interests of the 
west, at the expense of the rest.149 In A.Q. Khan’s view, ‘the West has been leading a 
crusade against the Muslims for a thousand years’.150 These views, Feroz Khan notes, 
‘on the street, A.Q. Khan’s view is popular. Non-proliferation is not taken seriously 
because of Pakistan’s experience’ and the normalisation of the Indian case despite the 
two countries developing a nuclear arsenal outside the NPT. Therefore, many Pakistanis 
‘see it as, “why not Iran?”’151 
After the success of Khan’s illicit procurement network in Pakistan, he and ‘his 
associates slowly expanded their import operation into a trans-national illegal network 
that exported whole gas centrifuges and production capabilities, as well as designs for 
nuclear weapons, mostly to Muslim countries.’152 Iran and Libya were Khan’s ‘main 
costumers’ in the Muslim world, along with North Korea, and ‘other countries, 
including Egypt, Iraq, and Syria’. Additionally, ‘questions remain about whether 
members of the Khan network, including Khan himself, offered nuclear weapons 
assistance to terrorists in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban.’153 By doing so, 
the network ‘evolved into an organization that could provide “one-stop shopping” for 
the wherewithal to produce weapons-grade uranium and for nuclear weapons designs 
and instructions.’154 What is more, as noted by Bruno Tertrais, the network became 
autonomous from the Pakistani state, thus taking ‘nuclear cooperation among states’ to 
a different level, ‘transforming the nature of proliferation phenomenon.’155 The network 
brought two key, well-preserved secrets on the market: ‘uranium enrichment technology 
and the conception of nuclear weapons.’156 
In 1984, Tehran was in the middle of the Iran-Iraq War, during which Baghdad used 
chemical weapons. Having decided to resume the nuclear programme undertaken under 
the Shah, the Iranian leadership approached Islamabad for equipment and training.157 
While Zia ul-Haq was interested in cooperating with Iran, a number of issues, including 
Iran’s regional status and its rivalry with Pakistan’s ‘godfather’, Saudi Arabia, limited 
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this cooperation. A.Q. Khan travelled to Tehran and Bushehr in 1986 to meet with one 
of the key players in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohammad 
Eslami,158 before officially visiting the country again a year later. During a meeting at 
Tehran’s Amir Kabir University of Technology, he advised the Iranians to pursue 
weaponisation through uranium enrichment, rather than via Bushehr.159 Starting in 
1987, [the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran – AEOI] interns are sent to Pakistan160 
and Iran becomes Khan’s ‘first major customer’.161 Khan went beyond his mandate in 
assisting Iran.162 Indeed, Zia ul-Haq had ‘refused Tehran’s request to provide it with the 
entire nuclear cycle.’163 This was due to ‘Zia’s pro-Sunni, anti-Shia credentials.’164 
What Khan accurately told the officials was that he merely offered Iran ‘obsolete 
materials’, including P-1 centrifuges, no longer needed by Pakistan. Nevertheless, while 
Zia ul-Haq was perhaps not involved or aware of the entire affair, other officials 
certainly were. In fact, ‘some key generals envisioned forming an alliance allowing for 
the dependence on the United States to end, in which Afghanistan, Iran, and perhaps 
even Turkey participated’.165 These included Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of Army 
Staff. Cooperation between the two countries expanded in 1988, with the end of the 
Iran-Iraq War, enabling Tehran to allocate more resources to revive its nuclear 
programme. This was facilitated by a number of other developments in Iranian domestic 
politics, including, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, who did not fully endorse nuclear 
technology, pro-nuclear Rafsanjani acceding to presidency, and Zia ul-Haq’s death in 
Pakistan.166 What Iran received from the network included ‘centrifuge designs and 
sample centrifuges’, including the P-1 in the 1994-95 period and drawings of the P-2 in 
1995 or 1996.167 ‘The Khan network’s assistance, even if limited to drawings and a few 
components, was apparent and allowed Iran to skip many difficult research steps.’168 
Once back in power, Benazir Bhutto is informed upon her visit to Tehran by Rafsanjani 
in 1996 of the scope of Pakistani-Iranian nuclear cooperation. She had previously 
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objected to such cooperation, but ‘[was] not able to oppose Abdul Qadeer Khan’s 
army.’169 As discussed in the next chapter, the Iranian nuclear programme was revealed 
in 2002 and the collaboration between Tehran and the network effectively ended around 
that time.  
The Khan network also offered to assist Saddam Hussein’s Iraq ‘in building centrifuges 
and making nuclear weapons.’170 Baghdad had begun to ‘[invest] heavily in facilities to 
develop and make nuclear weapons’ in 1988-1989.171 But, the beginning of Operation 
Desert Storm on 17 January 1991, bringing the coalition forces to Kuwait, marked the 
end of the discussions between Iraq and the network.172 By then, ‘Iraqi experts still had 
many theoretical and experimental questions to answer. They were also having trouble 
developing the precision electronic equipment needed in a nuclear weapon – and efforts 
to obtain the equipment abroad had been thwarted.’173  
Likewise, Syria was eager to equal Israel’s conventional and nuclear forces by acquiring 
a missile and chemical capability. Starting in 1997, Khan attempted to persuade 
Damascus not only to embark on a nuclear programme, but also to serve as an 
intermediary in the exports to Iran.174  
The network’s ‘most ambitious sale was to Libya’, where it ‘committed to supply […] a 
wide range of items, including a turnkey gas-centrifuge plant; the wherewithal to make 
centrifuges, nuclear weapons designs, uranium hexafluoride, and the ability to make 
uranium hexafluoride.’ Nevertheless, ‘by the time Libya renounced nuclear weapons in 
late 2003, it had not yet received many of these items.’175 As discussed in the previous 
section, Libya was a great financial contributor to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons 
programme and ‘even served as an intermediary in some of its imports (uranium from 
Niger), hoping to benefit in exchange from the research conducted by Islamabad.’176 
Bhutto’s arrest in 1977 ended ‘the hopes of a quick access to the bomb for Libya,’ but 
the 1986 bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi by the United States further determined 
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Gadhafi to develop a nuclear capability.177 In 1997, the Khan network made an 
unprecedented offer to Libya: providing it with ‘the complete installations allowing the 
acquisition of the bomb in a few years.’178 In September 2000, the network delivered 
two P-2 centrifuges to Libya, which resulted in an order of ten thousand centrifuges 
(enough to produce enough fissile material for up to ten nuclear weapons per year) to be 
delivered the following year.179 At that point, the network extended its activities to 
Malaysia, where it began to produce several components of the P-2 centrifuges.180 By 
the time the network became ready to deliver the centrifuges, the Libyan government 
announced its decision to end its nuclear and chemical weapons programmes and 
abandon its ballistic missile capability.181 Indeed, Saddam Hussain’s fall, arrest, and 
conviction, convinced Gadhafi to give up his nuclear ambitions.  
This event, combined with the revelation of Natanz in Iran and the satellite imagery in 
North Korea, providing evidence of a C-130 aircraft belonging to the Pakistani Air 
Force, made it ‘impossible for Musharraf to deny A.Q. Khan’s activities any longer’. As 
a result, Musharraf distanced himself from Khan, who was put under house arrest.182 
Later, Khan confessed to a ‘strictly clandestine operation’ and ‘having been solely 
responsible for unauthorized proliferation activities’. This confession ‘was, in reality, a 
ruse to cover up the fact that the covert trade in the nuclear bazaar resulted from the 
foreign policy of a nation, plotted and supervised by Pakistan’s military rulers.’183 
Nevertheless, these revelations ‘generated significant concerns about the true nature and 
scale of nuclear black market’ and ‘the apparent shortcomings of the current non-
proliferation regime with regard to deterring and thwarting illicit nuclear activities’.184 
As illustrated throughout this section, the Muslim faith played a key role in shaping the 
views of A.Q. Khan and his endeavour to provide his country with a nuclear capability 
and other countries across the ‘House of Islam’ with the ability to develop such a 
capability. Hence, the Muslim faith played a key role in the creation of the ‘Islamic 
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bomb’ among key Pakistani proliferation decision-makers. Islam’s influence on the 
matter goes beyond the country’s core leadership and key scientists. ‘Sympathy for 
jihadist-oriented groups among at least some Pakistani military men has been 
acknowledged for years, even inside Pakistan.’ In fact, ‘different aspects of the military 
and security services have different levels of sympathy for the extremists. The navy is 
high in sympathy.’185 In September 2014, for instance, a new branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), developed in response to ISIS, recruited 
Pakistani naval officers to lay siege on a dockyard to seize the frigate.186 ‘Organizations 
across South Asia have adapted and expanded their structures to support not only 
militancy but also political and social activities.’ What is more, ‘some militant groups 
have created political structures to provide a façade of legitimacy and to grow their 
political visibility’.187 These groups attempt to fill the void left by governments in the 
region, including the Pakistani government, and thereby securing popular support, 
‘providing goods and services like justice, health care, and education.’188  
Islamic discourse has shaped much of Pakistan’ nuclear narrative, allowing it to 
legitimise its nuclear weapons programme among Muslim states. This legitimisation 
generated political and financial support for Islamabad’s nuclear ambitions and fulfilled 
another function: building a base for what became A.Q. Khan’s nuclear black market. 
What is more, A.Q. Khan’s worldview and faith were instrumental in shaping his views 
on nuclear proliferation and international affairs, leading him to naturally gravitate 
toward ‘fellow Muslims’.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the role of the Muslim faith in shaping nuclear policy and 
narrative in Pakistan. It provided an overview of the country’s history from 
decolonisation in South Asia, the birth of the Muslim state, and the various conflicts 
marking its existence. It argued that the ‘whole idea of Pakistani sovereignty is based on 
Islam. Moreover, ‘Pakistan may have legitimate security concerns, but at the root of its 
revisionism is not security but rather deep ideological commitments that predate the 
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independence of the state.’189 So, the perceived threat from a country that didn’t accept 
[its sovereignty] in first place’ served as a vehicle to develop nuclear weapons to secure 
the nation, but also do so with the support of the ummah.190 It highlighted the 
determining role of Islam as the pillar of the Pakistani nation and state, and in 
fashioning the views of the leadership in its nuclear endeavours. It argued that the 
Islamic discourse in Pakistan, unlike in the cases of Al-Qaeda and Iran, albeit with 
conflicting rationales, is deprived of any legal and ethical debate. Instead, it has been 
shaped around the notions of security needs and the element of prestige. It discussed 
how Bhutto’s views of the ummah and A.Q. Khan’s religious beliefs shaped their 
respective attitudes toward the pursuit of the Pakistani bomb and proliferation beyond 
Pakistan’s borders. The previous sections further assessed Islamabad’s effective 
outreach campaign to Muslim states to secure both political and financial support for its 
nuclear ambitions, without developing an ‘active policy’ for extended deterrence for its 
funders.191 The chapter further noted the importance of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal in 
the country’s national identity, which in turn dictates its approach to the non-
proliferation regime. ‘Difficult though this is to employ, it is vital for Pakistan to give 
the greatest possible attention to nuclear technology, rather than to allow herself to be 
deceived by an international treaty limiting this deterrent to the present nuclear 
Powers.’192 Pakistan, therefore, presents a successful model for the utilisation of a 
religious discourse to shape nuclear policy and narrative, as it achieved its goals of 
receiving support at home and abroad. Chapter Six examines Iran’s nuclear programme 
and narrative, and finds that, unlike Pakistan, Tehran’s utilisation of the Islamic 
discourse has fallen short of achieving the goals pursued by the leadership. This has led 
Tehran to increase the role of nationalism in its nuclear narrative. 
Domestically, this is mainly due to one of the major differences between Pakistan and 
its western neighbour, which lies in the fact that unlike Iran, Pakistan was created as a 
Muslim state. Hence, the Islamic faith is the centrepiece of Pakistani identity and 
security, nationalism, and religion are all much more intertwined in Pakistan than in 
Iran. Therefore, the Pakistani leadership fashioned its nuclear narrative on the idea that 
nuclearisation is not merely a project for the security of the nation, but also for the 
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entire Muslim world and the perseveration of the faith and tradition established by 
Muhammad. In order to understand these two approaches, one must underline the 
difference between the ideas of nationhood as understood in each country. As 
highlighted throughout this chapter, Pakistan was created as a Muslim state and an 
inherent part of the ummah. By contrast, as discussed in the next chapter, the Iranian 
notions of nationalism and nationhood are based on historical, cultural, and linguistic 
ties. What is more, as discussed in the next chapter, Shiite Islam was a tool, which 
served the purpose of keeping Iran independent both culturally and politically, despite 
military defeats. This effectively stopped Iran from becoming Arabised first and 
dissolved in the Ottoman Empire later. The following chapter argues that unlike that 
which is commonly believed beyond Iran’s borders, Shiite Islam continues to be a 
means, rather than an end, in the country’s foreign policy, which manifests itself in its 
nuclear policy. Hence, while the creation of the state of Pakistan was a means to 
preserving Islam in the subcontinent and protect the lives of Muslims,193 in Iran, the 
opposite has generally been true: with religion being an instrument to preserve national 
unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity. Each people’s relationship to national and 
religious identity determines the impact of the Islamic nuclear discourse at home but 
also abroad. As discussed in the case of Pakistan, this discourse has been very effective 
in rallying the Pakistani people around their flag and gaining their support for the 
creation of Allah’s bomb. The Iranian response to this religious nuclear narrative has 
been more complex, as it will be discussed in the last chapter. This is due to the fact 
that, ‘there has been what appears to be an unchallenged acceptance in Pakistan of the 
idea of the centrality of the umma, the community of believers that links the modern 
state of Pakistan with the history of Islam in the Indian subcontinent.’194 By contrast, as 
demonstrated in Chapter Six, the notion of ‘ummah’ is widely rejected by Iranians, who 
see themselves and their country as inherently different from the rest of the Muslim 
community. 
Abroad, Islamabad’s Islamic discourse has been as successful in legitimising and 
securing funding for its nuclear programme. As discussed in the next chapter, Tehran’s 
discourse has not been as effective. This is due to several factors, which are further 
discussed in the next chapter and the conclusion. Among these are the lack of a 
complicated historical relationship and rivalry between Pakistan and other Muslim 
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states. This in turn is due to Pakistan’s short history, the context in which it was created, 
its creation as a Muslim state, the lack of territorial disputes between Pakistan and other 
Muslim states, and the lack of deep religious and ideological disagreements between 
Pakistan and the rest of the ummah.  
 
Chapter Six: Fatwās and centrifuges: The Iranian nuclear dossier 
Introduction 
 
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a dissident organisation, 
revealed an undeclared nuclear facility, located in Iran’s Esfahan province.1 A few 
months later, in February 2003, the Iranian government declared the Natanz enrichment 
facility to the IAEA. The incident marked the beginning of the Iranian nuclear crisis. 
Since, the Iranian nuclear dossier has become one of the main issues in international 
affairs and security. In its 2014 Threat Assessment, the U.S. Director of National 
Intelligence concluded that, ‘Iran is trying to balance conflicting objectives.’ He 
identified these objectives as the willingness ‘to improve its nuclear and missile 
capabilities while avoiding severe repercussions-such as a military strike or regime-
threatening sanctions’; adding that, ‘we do not know if Iran will eventually decide to 
build nuclear weapons.’ However, the report noted that ‘Iran has the scientific, 
technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes 
the central issue its political will to do so.’2   
In the decade following the revelation of Natanz, Tehran developed an intricate nuclear 
narrative, which comprises several layers, fashioned around two key themes: religion 
and nationalism. These two themes are shaped around two central ideas. First, the 
religious theme is based on the idea that Islam inherently prohibits nuclear weapons, by 
virtue of being indiscriminate in nature. Second, the nationalist theme is centred on the 
notion of technological innovation and progress. The main points made by the Iranian 
leadership are that the nation has been able to make considerable scientific and 
technological progress, especially in areas related to defence, despite western attempts 
to stop this advancement. This is part of the regime’s wider revolutionary narrative, 
centred on self-sufficiency and what I call the ‘enemy narrative’. This chapter analyses 
the role of the former and assesses its relationship with the latter. To do so, it discusses 
the complex history and dynamics of nationalism and religion in Iran, shedding light on 
how the Islamic Republic's narrative has been refashioned since its establishment in 
1979. The following sections offer a more nuanced investigation of Iran’s nuclear 
narrative, going beyond the current debate on the Iranian nuclear programme in the 
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west, often dominated by ill-informed analyses, painting it with a broad brush. It first 
provides an overview of Tehran’s nuclear aspirations, from the pre-revolutionary era to 
the November 2014 interim deal, before reviewing the country’s legal system and 
political structure. It then assesses the various audiences targeted by Tehran, as well as 
their response to the Islamic nuclear discourse.  
This chapter raises a key question: what is the purpose of the Islamic nuclear discourse 
created by Tehran? In particular, what are the role and impact of the Islamic legal 
discourse as crafted by the Islamic Republic? The chapter argues that the religious 
discourse certainly serves to appease certain factions, most important, regime 
supporters, in Iran, and convince the Muslim world to legitimise the programme. Its 
main target audience, however, is the west and the NAM. Indeed, like much of Tehran’s 
post-revolutionary foreign policy narrative, the nuclear narrative is shaped around the 
concept of an ‘enemy’ (the west), which has imposed its will on the rest of the 
international community. According to the Iranian leadership, international laws and 
organisations are the vehicle for the imposition of western values. In response, Tehran 
has formulated a religious discourse, to undermine the west. Paradoxically, the Islamic 
Republic continues to claim that it is in compliance with its international legal 
obligations. Its main talking points for domestic audiences are based around 
nationalism. The chapter discusses the nature of Ayatollah Khamenei's nuclear fatwā 
and notes that the decree, of which the scope seems to have changed, has resonated 
more in the west than in Iran, where indigenous technological progress, despite the 
‘enemy’s sabotage and sanctions, has been emphasised as a source of pride.  
 
Iranian nuclear aspirations: a history 
The Shah, his nuclear programme and the revolutionaries 
The Iranian quest for a nuclear programme began under the reign of Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi, the last king of Iran. As part of the social and military modernisation process 
undertaken by his father, Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, the Shah 
invested in a nuclear programme. The project was supported by the United States in the 
context of its civil Atoms for Peace programme, launched by U.S. President Dwight 
Eisenhower, which aimed to provide U.S. allies with nuclear facilities and materials for 
research, medial, and energy purposes, while stopping proliferation. The United States 
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supplied Iran with the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and HEU fuel. In 1973, the Shah 
established the AEOI, with Dr. Akbar Etemad as its head. According to Etemad, the 
Shah did not believe it was necessary for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, as he saw his 
army as the most powerful in the region. However, he believed that the country should 
be able to adjust its policy and programme if the situation changed and more countries 
proliferated.3 At the same time, Iran became a signatory to the NPT and ‘concluded a 
comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as far back as December 1974.’4 
The same year, Iran proposed what later developed into the concept of a WMDFZ in the 
Middle East: the creation of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the region. The civil 
nuclear project advanced with the support of western powers, and in partnership with 
U.S., German, and French companies, until the Islamic Revolution shook the country 
and overthrew the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979.5 
Officially, Iran articulated much of the same rhetoric about nuclear weapons and 
nuclear energy under the Shah and the Islamic Republic. The peaceful nature of the 
programme, the importance of scientific and technological progress, and the eagerness 
to help neighbouring countries, have all been consistent planks of the Iranian nuclear 
narrative regardless of leadership. In the words of Prime Minister Amir-Abbas 
Hoveida’s (under the Shah): ‘The atomic bomb does not interest us […] we want to 
master nuclear technology.’6 Likewise, the medical component of the nuclear 
programme (the production of radioisotopes) was emphasised then, as it is now. In fact, 
the Tehran Nuclear Research Centre was ‘an expression of [the Shah’s] hope that such 
“peaceful possibilities of nuclear energy” might be used for the benefit of the region as 
a whole.’7 
The difference between the Iranian nuclear narrative under the Shah and the Islamic 
Republic, however, lies in two main issues. First, the Shah’s rhetoric was mainly 
fashioned around nationalism and he did not engage in a religious discourse. Second, 
the Shah’s foreign affairs team did not antagonise the west or criticise international laws 
and institutions. However, contrary to the claims of David Patrikarakos, the ‘reasoning’ 
behind the ‘public rejection’ of nuclear weapons is not ‘almost entirely different’ in the 
nuclear narratives of the two regimes. It is further not representative of ‘the antithetical 
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nature of the two regimes’. In fact, beyond the religious dimension of the Islamic 
Republic’s narrative, much of the narrative remains the same. Indeed, ‘the Shah rejected 
nuclear weapons on the largely practical grounds that they were a danger to both Iran 
and the world; that, anyway, Iran would not be able to compete with superpower 
arsenals; and that his conventional forces were adequate enough.’8 The Islamic 
Republic’s officials and sources close to them have made similar arguments, especially 
regarding nuclear weapons undermining rather than increasing security:  
Does deployment of nuclear weapons-if possible and of the weak kind such as those of 
Pakistan-bring us security or insecurity against large countries such as the U.S.? 
Certainly the answer is insecurity since Iran does not have the superior military 
technology of the U.S. and these weapons cannot play a deterrent and security role 
against the U.S. On the other hand, Iran has befriended the small countries of the region 
and at least for now has no critical problems. Deploying such weapons not only cannot 
solve any problems for Iran; it will further add to its problems.9 
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif reiterated these points years later, questioning whether 
anyone could argue that Pakistan is safer or stronger than Iran with its nuclear 
weapons.10  
Like many of the projects the Shah had embarked on, the programme was criticised by 
revolutionaries, as yet another ‘treachery’ of western imperialists and their puppet 
regime.11 Arguments against this endavour encompassed some that are presented today 
in the west by those fundamentally opposing the programme. One such argument lay in 
the country’s oil and gas resources, according to which the nation would not need 
nuclear energy, as it had enough fossil fuel for energy purposes for decades to follow.12 
The programme, the revolutionaries argued, was a costly enterprise, irresponsibly 
pursued by the previous regime.13 The revolutionaries ‘seemed determined to 
delegitimize the program on any grounds and thereby dismantle the deposed Shah’s 
grandiose development plans.’ This was the case with a number of projects undertaken 
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by the Shah. ‘Given the genuine economic case for nuclear power, for both electricity 
and longer-term goals such as the preservation of oil reserves, it was clear that 
governmental determination was about more than purely practical concerns.’14 
The Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from a reliable partner to a mysterious and 
impenetrable puzzle. As noted by Kenneth Pollock, ‘the Iranian regime is often a 
mystery […] If it were ruled by a less paranoid, less antagonistic government, we would 
not be asking these questions [about the potential change in its behaviour should it go 
nuclear] at all.’ Indeed, without the revolution, the nuclear issue would look very 
different. ‘But Iran is ruled by the same theocracy that emerged as the victor of Iran’s 
revolution in 1979.’15 Pollock goes on to argue that Iran has changed drastically since 
the revolution but that ‘it has retained many of its most important features  - its fears, its 
pathologies, its ideology, its belligerent insecurity, and its impenetrability.’16 In fact, 
contrary to Pollock’s assertions, many of these features were not inherent to the Islamic 
Republic when it emerged, but were rather created or amplified as a result of the Iran-
Iraq War. 
 
1980-1988: WMD, international law, and martyrdom  
The Iran-Iraq War, referred to as the ‘imposed war’ by Iran, left a great number of 
casualties, combatants and non-combatants alike, victims of chemical weapons, and a 
lasting economic impact. The war continues to haunt the Iranian psyche. It had three 
major strategic implications for the country’s security thinking and nuclear policy: it 
created a deep mistrust of the international system in Iran, prompted Tehran to rethink 
its WMD policy, and shaped the image of the newly established Islamic Republic in the 
West.  
Prior to 1979, Iran did not view Iraq as a significant threat. The country had one of the 
five greatest military powerhouses in the world and had effectively pushed back 
Baghdad when it had made claims to the south-western Iranian province of Khuzestan. 
After the fall of the Shah, however, Iraq decided to resume its efforts to seize 
Khuzestan. During the war, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq used chemical weapons on Iran and 
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its own Kurdish minority. The west, led by the United States, was reluctant to take 
action or denounce the use of chemical weapons by Baghdad, instead suggesting both 
sides had used such weapons.17 This position manifested itself in UNSC Resolutions, 
including UNSCR 582 (1986), which ‘deplored’ the use of such weapons, without 
singling out Iraq. This failure to hold Baghdad responsible for what Iran believed to be 
a war of aggression, as well as the use of chemical weapons, stemmed from the United 
States’ role at the UNSC and its interest in isolating and weakening the Islamic 
Republic. This in turn was due to a traumatic chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations: The 
hostage crisis (1979-1981). Iranian revolutionaries took members of the American 
diplomatic corps hostage inside the U.S. embassy in Tehran for 444 days. This episode 
transformed Iran’s status from friend to foe in the eyes of Washington.  
Therein resides the first implication of the war. Iran’s deep wariness of international law 
and institutions stems from the UNSC’s failure to denounce Iraq’s act of aggression and 
use of chemical weapons. This is illustrated by former president Hashemi-Rafsanjani’s 
statement following the war: ‘the war taught us that international laws are only scraps of 
paper.’ Likewise, the commander of the IRGC, Yahya Rahim-Safavi questioned the 
effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime in promoting security, arguing that 
conventions would not protect the country.18 
This view led to the second implication of the war. The international community’s 
inaction led the Iranian leadership to reconsider its posture, adopting a very strong 
defensive posture, one based on self-sufficiency and self-reliance. As part of this, the 
Islamic Republic invested heavily in weapons programs, including WMD. Many argued 
that the country should become self-reliant. Self-reliance, a key goal for the 
revolutionaries, was now even more central to the Islamic Republic’s worldview. Some 
went so far as to argue for the acquisition of WMD, describing them as necessary to the 
security of the country. It was ‘Rafsanjani who made the decision to resume the 
programme.’ Following this, ‘they [the Islamic Republic] went and bought centrifuges 
from Pakistan, and tried to enrich uranium. From the beginning, they wanted to have all 
the options. The reason is that they only went after enrichment.’19 In 1988, the year the 
war between the two neighbours ended, Rafsanjani stated that, ‘chemical bombs and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Human Rights Watch. Middle East Watch. Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds - 
A Middle East Watch Report. New York: 1993. 
18 Takeyh, Ray, in Clary, Christopher (2006), 58 
19 INT001SNT 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  201	  	  
biological weapons are poor man’s atomic bombs and can easily be produced. We 
should at least consider them for our defense.’20 He later changed his position – albeit 
without ever acknowledging he had made such a statement. In 2010, he declared that 
‘curiosity, the need for defence and deterrence, and above all, greed in some human 
beings and societies have unfortunately led them to step on a path’, where they would 
hurt the health and life of their own kind.21 Likewise, in 1997, in response to the 
question ‘are you after the bomb’, Rafsanjani claimed, ‘definitely not. We despise these 
weapons’ and added ‘we are not going after the atomic bomb, we are not after 
biological weapons, we will not pursue chemical weapons.’22 Despite this, Tehran 
admitted to having developed a chemical weapons capability.23 As noted in Chapter 
Three, Iran argues that the non-use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, when 
Iraq was using them, serves as a precedent, showing its commitment to the Shiite ethical 
and legal principles prohibiting their use. Khomeini believed indiscriminate means and 
methods of warfare to be strictly forbidden under the faith and would not consider them. 
As a result, the Iranian defence doctrine does not include WMD. Nevertheless, as 
argued previously, Tehran did pursue a nuclear weapons capability (which according to 
U.S. intelligence it decided (temporarily, at least) not to continue in 2003), and it also 
sought a chemical weapon capability. As noted by the Iranian Foreign Ministry Director 
General Mohammad Alborzi, during the last years of the war, Tehran pursued ‘an 
effective means of deterrence’. He added, ‘this particularly became an absolute 
necessity when threats were made of chemical bombardment of the cities in the final 
stages of the conflict, and some indeed were carried out against civilian centers’. Hence, 
‘the decision was made that, on a strictly limited scale, capability should be developed 
to challenge the imminent threat’. This led Iran to develop a policy of possession but no 
use of such weapons: ‘We declared, at the time, that Iran had chemical weapons 
capability […], while maintaining the policy not to resort to these weapons and rely on 
diplomacy as the sole mechanism to stop their use by the adversary.’24  
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21 ‘Hashemi Rafsanjani: Combat against chemical and biological weapons with deeds not with speeches’. 
JARAS. 28-06- 2010.  
22 Wallace, Mike, Interview with Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. 8-03-1997.  
23 OPCW Conference of the States Parties, Fourth Session 28 June – 2 July 1999, ‘Report of the 
Organisation on the Implementation of the Convention (1 January – 31 December 1998), C-IV/5, para. 6 
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The last implication of the war was that it fashioned the image of the Islamic Republic 
in western minds. The war provided critics of the Islamic Republic, and especially the 
nuclear programme, with a shortcut to justify their position. They argue that the ‘human 
wave’ tactic25 Iran used during the war provides evidence of the importance of the 
notion of martyrdom. They further describe Iran’s obsession with martyrdom and its 
messianic, apocalyptic, and mystic rationale and agenda would lead the country to 
become emboldened and commit ‘mass-suicide’.26 These assertions are based on the 
idea that, ‘Iran indeed defied the kind of rational behavior that might have been 
expected of a state in its identical situation’, supporting their claims with Khomeini’s 
early statements on nationalism,27 discussed further throughout this chapter. However, 
these analyses stretch a tactic to explain all arenas of the Islamic Republic’s decision-
making and fail to consider the evolution of its rhetoric and policies. These analogies 
are problematic, as the tactics used during the war served a particular and limited 
purpose. In fact, the Islamic Republic’s policies have been generally pragmatic, albeit 
not necessarily in accordance with Iranian national interests as defined by other factions 
in the country. As highlighted by Menashri, ‘Khomeini could theorize about an ideal 
Islamic state; once in power, he (and even more so his disciples) realized that they had 
to make compromises as a pragmatic response to the exigencies of the situation.’28 Even 
during the Iran-Iraq War, the leadership was ‘trying to make rational decisions about the 
best way to prosecute the war and to consolidate the Islamic Republic.’29 This includes 
what Dore Gold sees as yet another piece of evidence of Iran’s irrationality: The 
decision to prolong the war for six years, once it recovered its lost territories from Iraq 
after two years.30 This decision was made because Iranian leaders believed this would 
be the only way to deter Baghdad.31 Therefore, while the effectiveness and costs of this 
decision can be questioned, it cannot be argued that this was a suicidal move. Hence, 
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Gold supports his claims by quoting Khomeini saying that ‘we do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. 
For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land burn. I say let this go up in smoke, 
provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world.’ 
28 Menashri, David (1997), ‘Revolution at a Crossroads – Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional 
Ambitions’. Policy Brief No. 43. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. P. 
xiii 
29 Tracy Samuel, Annie (2011), ‘Attacking Iran: Lessons from the Iran-Iraq War’, Policy Brief, Belfer 
Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, M.A. P. 7 
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critics of the Islamic Republic and its nuclear programme continue to use the Iran-Iraq 
War as evidence of the accuracy of their claims. These analyses should be viewed with 
scepticism, as they do not take into account the complexity of Iranian political culture. 
Instead, they are based on erroneous readings of Shiism and its role in Iranian strategic 
thinking. Hence, claims according to which Tehran cannot be deterred or contained, 
based on these readings, are fundamentally flawed.32  
 
The post-war era 
Iran’s nuclear programme was resumed during the war despite initial reticence from 
revolutionaries to invest in such technology. During the last year of the war, the AEOI 
paid the Applied Research Institute in Argentina (INVAP) to convert the TRR from 
HEU to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). The reactor began operating with LEU in 
1993.33 The following year, Tehran signed an agreement and began to construct the 
Voda Voda Energo Reactor (VVER) 1000WMe LWR with Russia in Bushehr.34 In an 
effort further to develop its nuclear programme, as discussed in Chapter Five, Iran 
procured P-1 and P-2 centrifuge designs and other technology form the A.Q. Khan 
network. In 2003, news of covert nuclear activities surfaced internationally, leading to 
concerns regarding their possible military dimension. The programme quickly became 
one of the most controversial issues in contemporary security. In fact, ‘the fear of the 
Iranian threat […] is more widespread today than fear of the Soviet threat was in 1985, 
even though at that time the Soviet Union possessed the largest nuclear arsenal in the 
world and today Iran doesn’t have a single nuclear weapon.’35  
Iran’s nuclear programme has been the source of many controversies, leading many to 
question its ‘true’ nature. The IAEA has expressed its concerns over the ‘possible 
military dimensions’ of the Tehran’s nuclear programme.36 As of November 2012, Iran 
had produced an estimated 137.3 kg of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) enriched up to 
twenty-percent U-235. The programme currently includes uranium mining, milling, 
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33 ‘Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)’, The Institute for Science and International Security.  
34 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), The Nuclear Threat Initiative. 
35 Asal, Victor. Early, Bryan. ‘Are We Focusing on the Wrong Nuclear Threat?’ Foreign Policy. 24-05-
2012.  
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conversion, and enrichment capabilities.37 The following sections provide an overview 
of Iran’s key nuclear facilities and alleged activities. 
 
Key contentious facilities 
Iran’s key nuclear facilities include research reactors such as the TRR, mentioned 
previously, and a thermal heavy water reactor under construction in Arak (IR-40), the 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), enrichment-related facilities including the 
Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Natanz Enrichment Complex the Uranium 
Conversion Facility (UCF) at Isfahan, the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories 
(JHL) in Tehran, and weaponisation sites, including the Parchin Military Complex.38  
 
Enrichment 
Enrichment has been one of the key controversies of the Iranian nuclear programme, 
given the proliferation concerns surrounding it. Many Iranians, regardless of their views 
of their country’s nuclear programme, believe enrichment to be a necessary component 
of it, given Iran’s experience of technology and fuel denial since the revolution.39 
Natanz houses the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel enrichment Plant 
(PFEP).  It consists of three underground buildings, which have the capacity hold fifty 
thousand centrifuges. ‘Iran covertly moved its gas centrifuge research, development and 
assembly operations to Natanz’ when it decided to dismantle the R&D workshops of 
Kalaye Electric Company in 2002.40 Critics have pointed out that Iran’s ambitions, as 
formulated by its leadership, do not match its capability. They highlight that once 
finished, Natanz would only produce twenty tonnes of fuel per year, an amount not 
sufficient for a single reactor.41  
The Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant is another controversial site. It is located near Qom 
and can hold sixteen IR-1 centrifuge cascades with a total of 3,000 centrifuges. The 
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International Atomic Energy Agency.  
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40 ‘Natanz Enrichment Complex’. Nuclear Threat Initiative.  
41 Tertrais, Bruno (2007), Iran – La Prochaine guerre. Pris : Le cherche midi. P. 36 
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facility was revealed to the IAEA in 2009 but its location was disclosed by the United 
States, France, and the U.K.42  
Both Natanz and Fordow have been controversial due to three reasons. First, the role of 
external actors in unveiling the activities and location respectively of the two sites has 
led the international community to be suspicious of Tehran’s intent. Second, the two 
facilities are either partially (Natanz) or completely (Fordow) underground, arousing 
doubts around the activities, which take place in them. The Iranian government, 
however, maintains that its facilities are concealed underground to protect them against 
potential aerial strikes by Israel or the United States. Lastly, the two sites are 
enrichment facilities. The very existence of an indigenous enrichment programme in 
Iran has been a source of contention in the west, with some arguing that Tehran does not 
need such a programme and should procure its uranium from the international market. 
According to this viewpoint, the only possible explanation for domestic enrichment is 
Tehran’s willingness to enrich to a higher percentage and eventually to weaponise. Iran, 
however, contends that its efforts to buy the uranium needed for its Tehran reactor were 
left unanswered, leading it to become self-sufficient. Indeed, the notion of self-reliance 
in meeting its ‘practical needs’ is a key element of Iran’s reasoning behind its nuclear 
endeavours. Additionally, Iran’s ability to reach energy independence is questioned, 
given its limited uranium. Moreover, Bruno Tertrais has also drawn a parallel between 
the Iranian discourse on enrichment and that of Pakistan in the 1990s, pointing out that 
both are shaped around the notion of ‘technological progress’ and ‘national 
independence’.43 Such claims, however, do not take into account the complexity of the 
two narratives. The Iranian narrative, as discussed in this chapter, is based on the 
fundamental prohibition of nuclear weapons in Islam and the country’s compliance with 
its international obligations, supporting its claims that its nuclear programme is merely 
peaceful. What is more, Iran argues that nuclear weapons are not a source of pride.44  
 
Reactors 
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43 Tertrais, Bruno (2007), 37 
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The TRR is a 5 MWt pool-type light water research reactor, capable of producing up to 
six hundred grammes of plutonium annually.45 The reactor was initially designed to run 
on HEU fuel but was converted to LEU by Argentina’s Applied Research Institute in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.46 This period is also the source of some controversy 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme at the Reactor, as undeclared experiments 
with irradiated fuel pellets were conducted at TRR in that timeframe.  
[These included] sintered UO2 pellets prepared at ENTC using depleted uranium that 
had been exempted form safeguards in 1978. The capsules containing the pellets had 
been irradiated in TRR in connection with a project to produce fission product isotopes 
of molybdenum, iodine and xenon.’47  
In August 2008, Iran began the construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak, 
with a declared power of 40 MWt, which was due to achieve criticality in 2013. This 
HWR was planned to replace the aging TRR.48 If operated efficiently, IR-40 is 
estimated to be capable of producing nine kg of plutonium annually, enough for one-
and-a-half nuclear weapons.49 During the negotiations between the EU3+3 and Iran,50 
the west argued that Tehran should convert Arak to a light water reactor. The proposal 
was, however, rejected by Iran. This, Zarif argued is due to the fact that Iran does not 
have LWR technology. ‘We would have to rely on others for it and we can’t rely on 
others.’51 To be able to use the plutonium produced in Arak in a nuclear weapon, Iran 
would need to separate the plutonium from irradiated fuel. To do so, it would need to 
develop a reprocessing capability. Tehran asserts that it does not have any plans for 
reprocessing.52  
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Nuclear power plants 
The construction of the Middle East’s first nuclear power plant in Bushehr started in 
1975. After the revolution, construction at BNPP ceased and the facility was bombed a 
number of times during the Iran-Iraq War. Construction resumed after the war and it has 
been an ongoing project since. Two key issues have surrounded the plant’s construction. 
First, from a nuclear safety perspective, the plant is a source of concern. Indeed, 
according to Etemad, the modifications made in Bushehr since the revolution are the 
source of these problems: ‘The Russians have modified the structure of the reactor, 
especially in the basement, which we had calculated to withstand 7.5 Richter magnitude 
earthquakes. I think this can have affected the infrastructure.’ Hence, Etemad expresses 
his concern over the safety of the reactor: ‘I can’t say I am a hundred-percent sure of 
Bushehr’s safety. The Russians don’t have a safety culture and the Iranians just don’t 
get it.’53 Reports of cracks found in the facility’s walls following an earthquake in 2013 
added to these concerns. Second, Bushehr’s need for enriched uranium beyond that used 
by the TRR has been questioned. What is more, Russia is responsible for providing the 
plant with fuel and operating it until 2021, before handing it to Iran.  
 
Other contentious facilities 
Lastly, the Parchin Military Complex, subordinate to the Defence Industries 
Organisation, is another key area of controversy in Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Allegations of secret experiments conducted in the complex by Iran were made in 2004, 
according to which, Tehran tested ‘high explosive shaped charges with inert core of 
depleted uranium’.54 The IAEA inspected the site in 2005, without finding traces of any 
‘unusual activities’ or indications of ‘the presence of nuclear material’ in the 
environmental samples.55 Yet, allegations of covert weaponisation at Parchin continue 
to persist, especially in light of the presumed construction of an underground tunnel 
system. According to Iran, the secrecy around the site is due to the fact that it is a 
conventional military base.56 
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Missile programme 
A key dimension of Iran’s military endeavours, widely seen as evidence of the military 
aspect of the country’s nuclear programme, lies in Tehran’s ballistic missile 
programme. Iran has the largest and one of the most sophisticated missile programmes 
in the Middle East.57 The country has procured infamous Soviet Scud-B and Scud-C 
missiles and developed the Shahab line, including the single-stage liquid-fuel Shahab-3, 
identical to the North Korean Nodong missile, with a range of 1,000 km, which was 
tested in 1998 and became operational in July 2003.58 Following that the country test-
fired the Ghadr-1 with a range of 1,600 km in 2004.59 2008 marked Iran’s successful 
testing of the Sejjil, a two-stage, solid-propellant 2,000 km medium-range ballistic 
missile (MRBM).60  
 
Summary 
Iran’s nuclear programme has become a key project for the nation and the regime, with 
high political, economic, and security costs in the past decade. These costs include 
backbreaking sanctions, political isolation, and the threat of military escalation. The 
project, which was once denounced as an imperialist endeavour of the west’s puppet, 
the Shah, now transcends politics in Iran. The programme was established over four 
decades ago, as part of the modernisation efforts undertaken by the Shah, who believed 
that his country needed to have an alternative to fossil fuel. However, the Shah’s plans 
were not limited to fuel production, rather covering other energy sources. For instance, 
plans for Bushehr included a desalination plant next to the power plant.61 He also 
envisioned Iran as a key regional power and perhaps, a threshold state. He was aware of 
the security concerns of the country and sought to reinstate the Persian Empire’s lost 
glory and power. As such, prestige and national security models were key drivers in his 
nuclear ambitions. After the Islamic Revolution, there was a lack of consensus around 
the nature, usefulness, and future of the nuclear programme. Many of the 
revolutionaries opposed the programme. Consequently, they suspended the programme, 
before resuming it a few years later. Iran’s experience during the Iran-Iraq War played a 
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key role in shaping its security concerns and attitude toward international law and 
institutions in the decades to follow, shaping its nuclear narrative. Despite a decade of 
backbreaking sanctions, political isolation, and threat of military escalation, Tehran has 
pursued its nuclear programme, including the development of its most controversial 
element: the front of the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment). Iran’s plans for the near future 
include the construction of ‘seven or eight reactors’ and ‘to have a water desalination 
plant next to each reactor.’62 Etemad does not believe this goal to be realistic.63 
Concerns over Iran’s programme continue to shape regional and international security 
debates. They stem from Tehran’s controversial foreign policy and rhetoric, combined 
with its missile programme and the revelation of key nuclear facilities by actors outside 
the regime, as well as the mismatch between the vocalised nuclear ambitions and the 
country’s actual capability to utilise the technology it is acquiring.  
The following sections discuss the complex dynamics between national identity and 
religion in Iran, before dissecting Tehran’s nuclear narrative as fashioned around these 
two key ideas.  
 
Islam, nationalism, and political culture in Iran 
The following sections provide the context for understanding the Iranian nuclear 
ambitions and narrative. They first offer a brief survey of nationhood and nationalism, 
including the dynamics between nationalism and religion, in Iran, before discussing 
Islamic governance since 1979.  
  
Nationhood and nationalism in Iran 
Understanding nationhood and nationalism in Iran is vital to any discussion around its 
politics, nuclear or otherwise, as it has shaped the rapport between the Islamic Republic 
and the nation. The relationship between Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage and post-Islamic 
culture has shaped the Iranian nuclear narrative, leading to the emergence of its two key 
strands: the nationalist and Islamic nuclear discourses. The former has been used to 
assert the country’s ‘inalienable right’ to pursue a peaceful nuclear programme, while 
the latter has been used to stress the peacefulness of it.  
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In order to understand nationhood in Iran, one must go beyond generalisations regarding 
the idea of nationalism in the non-western world. Many scholars base their theories of 
nationalism on an east-west dichotomy, which does not take into account the 
specificities and diversity of either the ‘west’ or the ‘east’. The latter, they argue, sees 
the idea of nation as ‘a political unit centering around the irrational pre-civilized folk 
concept.’ Therefore, ‘non-western’ nationhood ‘found its rallying point in the folk 
community, elevating it to the dignity of an ideal or a mystery’.64 While such theories 
can be held as true in the case of some non-western countries they are not applicable to 
Iran.  
Unlike Pakistan, Iranian national identity is not based on religion. Instead, ‘there are 
many different emphases in Iranian nationalism, including linguistic, territorial, ethnic, 
and religious.’65 A key concept in Iranian nationhood lies in the cohabitation of 
different ethnicities under the reign of the Emperor (Shāhanshāh).66 Hence, the king 
reigned a territory composed of ‘different peoples with different traditions and 
languages,’ part of a ‘single nation’.67 Therefore, kingship was seen as an institution 
that guaranteed a ‘lasting unity’ and the defence of the people’s ‘interests’ by defending 
its right to decision-making. This is referred to as the Persianate (Iranshahri) 
conception of kingship, which through a ‘just reign’ transformed ‘an unstable balance of 
peoples to the lasting “nation”’.68  
The idea that nationalist sentiments in the Muslim world only exist in their relationship 
to the west is not applicable to the case of Iran. Indeed, according to some nationalism 
scholars, ‘nationalist sentiments often originated in the confrontation with the European 
powers in the nineteenth century and subsequently’, and were viewed as a confrontation 
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between ‘religious communities’, namely Islam and Christendom.69 This generalisation 
is often based on the assumption that the ‘Muslim world’ is a single, coherent entity. 
Hence, this approach fails to take into consideration the country’s distinctive legacy, 
which has shaped its national identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, this idea 
holds true in the case of Pakistan, which was a product of decolonisation, but not Iran, 
which was never formally colonised and, as noted above, established over the course of 
centuries and defined from within rather than by external forces. Such statements are a 
manifestation of, and have contributed to, the poor understanding of Iran in the west, as 
they fail to take into account the country’s culture and history, beyond post-Islamic 
Revolution, and its particularities demarking it from many of its neighbours.  
Iranian nationalism is key to understanding the country’s domestic politics and foreign 
policy. Indeed, ‘the most contentious and least enduring aspects of Iranian nationalism 
have occurred in the sociocultural sphere, whereas the most persistent themes have 
concerned the nation’s territorial integrity.’70 Nationalism serves as a vehicle effectively 
to oppose the values and policies of the Islamic Republic. Despite much effort by the 
Islamic Republic to replace this national identity with a religious one, the regime itself 
has had to adjust its positions and rhetoric to reflect this nationalism. Hence, ‘the 
clerical regime has thus far proven less effective in implementing Islam as a vehicle to 
resolve the mounting social, economic and political problems that led to the revolution 
in the first place.’71  
The country’s contemporary political culture is, therefore, the result of this blend of two 
traditions. On the one hand, Islam, particularly Shiite Islam, is not only the official 
religion of the country, governing every aspect of Iranian citizens’ lives, both public and 
private; it is also a faith to which many Iranians continue to adhere. Shiite Islam is 
further an inherent part of Iranian national identity: It serves to differentiate Iran from 
its neighbours for Iranians.72 On the other hand, Iranian culture, stripped of its Islamic 
component, continues to have a great influence on the lifestyle and outlook of most 
Iranians, and religious and secular Iranians alike seek its ideals. This is not to say that 
the continuity of Iranian identity is total and unbroken. Instead, elements of modern 
Iranian identity find their roots in pre-Islamic Persia but Iranians today do not 
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understand themselves as their ancestors did. The modernising state, especially under 
the Pahlavi dynasty, created an educational system and standardised grammar to instil a 
homogenous and all encompassing understanding of what it means to be ‘Iranian’. This 
endeavour has been very successful and, as will be discussed, plays a great role in 
shaping Iran’s nuclear narrative by both the Pahlavi and Islamic Republic. It projected 
this notion back into history through history books, modern nationalist archaeology… 
This complicated cohabitation of pre-Islamic and Islamic traditions manifests itself in 
the complexity of the Iranian situation, its government, the relationship of the people 
with the governing bodies and, by extension, the country’s nuclear programme. As 
discussed in the present chapter, the nuclear narrative is shaped by this dichotomy, and 
the response of the population to this rhetoric also illustrates these dynamics within 
Iranian society. Moreover, the nuclear programme, as part of a larger narrative of 
scientific and technological progress, fits into this understanding of the Iranian identity, 
as highlighted, and, to some extent, adopted, by the Islamic Republic. This is while the 
country was behind other countries on a number of fronts, such as the ‘development of 
modern socio-economic factors, including a national infrastructure, industry, major 
urbanization, and large-scale trade’. This in turn meant that the country did not undergo 
developments that in other countries ‘accompanied the development of a national 
market and other ties among different parts of bordered nations. This meant that modern 
nationalism appeared later in Iran than in many other countries’. Nevertheless, ‘once it 
developed it soon spread to be passionately believed in by many in all strata of the 
population, however much its forms differed in different periods’.73  
It is further important to note that ‘the major transformations of the Iranian revolution 
occurred not in 1978-1979 but with the coming of age of a new generation of Iranians 
who were not even born at the time of the revolution.’ These ‘include a greater sense of 
autonomy for both women and men and the emergence of a public sphere in which 
politics and religion are subtly intertwined, and not always in ways anticipated by Iran’s 
formal religious leaders.’74 Instead, in some instances, it seems to be contrary to what 
the revolutionaries had envisioned when they established the new regime.  
Indeed, while the Iranian revolutionaries saw their cause as a universal Islamic 
revolution for the worldwide ummah, Iranian identity had a major influence on the 
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Islamic government. Although religious discourse has always been paramount, the 
revolutionaries realised that by ‘sanctifying the nation’, the revolution would have 
‘greater ideological potential’, leading to a particular — if subtle — form of ‘Iranian 
Islam’.75 Khomeini himself embodied this as the new Islamic constitution was written, 
agreeing with those arguing for Iranian nationality as a requirement for the president.  
He also took broader steps to appeal to democrats and nationalists through populism, by 
confirming the right of women to vote and stating that, ‘the affairs of the country must 
be administered on the basis of public opinion expressed by means of election.’76  Thus, 
the process of politicisation and nationalisation that came with running a complex 
modern state resulted in contradictory tensions within the Islamic government that 
continue to affect politics and public discourse today.  
Those tensions came to a boil under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who broke 
precedent on emphasising Iranian nationalism and pushed back on the power of the 
Islamic clergy. Although known in the west for his vitriolic religious rhetoric, 
Ahmadinejad was able to synthesise ‘Iranian-ness with his brand of radical Islam’, 
essentially ‘sacralising the Iranian nation to the point of portraying Iranians as a “chosen 
people”.’77 Ahmadinejad went so far as to publicly praise the achievements of Persia’s 
founding father, Cyrus the Great, and to invite 20 heads of state to celebrate Nowruz, 
the Iranian New Year celebration – symbols of Iran’s pre-Islamic history that had 
previously been derided by key clerics in government.78  
It has been suggested that Ahmadinejad’s strong nationalist appeals were at least in part 
a reaction to growing Iranian dissatisfaction with the economic hardship and heavy 
handed tactics faced under the Islamic government, ironically including Ahmadinejad’s 
own re-election in 2009, widely suspected of being rigged.79 Sensing this public 
sentiment, Ahmadinejad turned away from the Islamic establishment and used 
nationalism as a tool to unify Iranian society and restore his own political legitimacy.  
His efforts at a particularly Iranian form of Islam seem to have backfired on his political 
ambitions–he has been effectively ‘excommunicated from the political elite’ in Iran and 
Khamenei has openly speculated about abolishing the office of the presidency 
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altogether.80 However, his presidency did reinvigorate Iranian nationalism as an 
alternative to Islamic narratives as the basis for policy decisions, bringing the complex 
dynamic between religion and nation back to the forefront of Iranian society and 
political realities. Moreover, the nationalist and religious components of the nuclear 
narrative developed during the Ahmadinejad years continue to shape the Iranian nuclear 
narrative. These components were inherited by the Rouhani government and used to 
ornate the Iranian nuclear negotiating team’s narrative during the diplomatic process, 
serving Tehran’s posture abroad and helping it sell the process and deal at home.     
 
Islamic governance since 1979 
As stated previously, Khomeini’s aim was completely to reshape Iranian identity.81 His 
‘doctrine was a departure from Islamic theory and practice of recent centuries and thus, 
in ideological terms, represented a revolution in modern Islamic thought no less than an 
Islamic revolution.’82 Yet, as demonstrated in this chapter, the Shah had planted the 
seeds of much of the Islamic Republic’s narrative, and arguably, some of its policies. 
Indeed, as explained by Ali Ansari,  
196383 did mark the beginning of the Islamic Revolutionary movement, but the prime 
mover in this reinfusion of the religious and revolutionary thought into the political 
culture of Iran was not Ayatollah Khomeini but the Shah himself. It was the Shah […] 
who introduced the notion of religious, empathetic monarchy, limited not by legal, or 
constitutional procedure, but by some vague spiritual ethic which situated the monarch 
as the lynchpin of the chain connecting the Iranian people to the Divine, arguably 
identified in the oath, Khoda, Shah, Mihan (God, King, and Country).84    
In fact, the Shah viewed Shiite Islam as a useful tool against what he believed to be the 
‘true’ threat: Communism. To this end, ‘the Shah’s government [promoted] the concept 
of continuous revolution, [seeking] to mobilise people in a basij, encourag[ing] the 
descrition of Iranian servicemen killed in actions as “martyrs”, and increasingly 
identif[ying] Iran as a regional power’. Likewise, he ‘encouraged the development of an 
extensive religious network, financed sections of the ulema, and alternatively promoted 
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and tolerated religious thinkers’.85 In this sense, the Shah’s vision of the monarchy was 
closer to the supreme leadership established by Khomeini, than that envisioned by the 
Constitutionalists.86 As discussed in the following sections, the pre- and post-revolution 
nuclear narratives also overlap extensively.  
This section provides a survey of the Islamic Republic’s political and legal structure, as 
relevant to the nuclear debate. By doing so, it attempts to offer the legal and political 
framework established by Ayatollah Khomeini. The broader politico-legal framework 
of Iran governs its nuclear programme and narrative.  
 
The Constitution 
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has evolved and has been amended 
since its first draft, produced shortly after regime change, in 1979 and ratified in 1982. 
This amendment (bāzbīnī-e ghānoon-e asāsī) occurred following Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
death and Khamenei’s accession to power in 1989 and entailed a different future for 
decision-making in Iran. The first key change in the new Constitution was the inclusion 
of the notion of the absolute rule or supreme leadership (velāyat-e motlaghe). Indeed, 
under the first version of the Islamic Republic’s Constitution, supreme leadership was 
not yet absolute. The second change was the removal of the requirement of marja’īyat 
for the supreme leader. As discussed in Chapter Three, this meant that the supreme 
leader no longer had to be a prominent cleric, but could be a mere ‘religio-politician’, 
which is the case of Khamenei. The notion of supreme leadership and its 
implementation in the Islamic Republic is assessed in greater detail in the next section. 
The following paragraphs provide a brief overview of the 1989 amended Constitution.87  
The Preamble to the Constitution clearly indicates the Islamic Republic’s values and 
ideology. Its opening sentence highlights two trends, which have played a key role in 
shaping the country’s domestic and foreign policies, and consequently its nuclear 
narrative. It establishes that the various institutions shall be ‘based on Islamic principles 
and norms, which represent an honest aspiration of the Islamic Ummah’.88 First, the 
omnipresence of Islamic law and its governance of all societal matters are made clear. 
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Second, the importance of the ummah in the regime’s ideology is evident. The 
following sentence strengthens this idea: ‘This aspiration was exemplified by the nature 
of the great Islamic Revolution of Iran, and by the course of the Muslim people's 
struggle, from its beginning until victory, as reflected in the decisive and forceful calls 
raised by all segments of the populations.’ Therefore, while the preamble of a nation’s 
Constitution generally highlights the idea of nationhood, the Islamic Republic’s 
Constitution places emphasis on the notion of the ummah. Furthermore, the Iranian 
nation is defined as ‘the Muslim people of Iran,’ thus separating non-Muslim citizens. 
Hence, the idea of citizenship is clearly secondary to religion, as the nation is secondary 
to the ummah.  
Perhaps the single most important manifestation of the regime’s ideology and approach 
to foreign affairs can be found in the following paragraph, which defines the Islamic 
Republic’s stance on the ummah by supporting this view through a Qur’anic verse.  
In the development of international relations, the Constitution will strive with other 
Islamic and popular movements to prepare the way for the formation of a single world 
community (in accordance with the Koranic verse "This your community is a single 
community, and I am your Lord, so worship Me" [21:92]), and to assure the 
continuation of the struggle for the liberation of all deprived and oppressed peoples in 
the world.89 
This idea has helped fashion Tehran’s foreign policy narrative, especially the view of 
the west and Israel as the ‘enemy’, as having prevented the creation of this single, 
united community. It also serves to justify Iran’s support of HAMAS and Hezbollah. It 
has further provided the basis for the Iranian leadership’s projection of its nuclear 
programme as a source of pride, not just for Iranians, but also for the entire community. 
As discussed throughout this chapter, this has become increasingly rhetorical, as, the 
Islamic Republic’s strategic calculations have been pragmatic rather than driven by 
ideology for the most part. Likewise, the basis for the opposition to the west and its 
values, which is assessed in detail in this chapter, also manifests itself in the 
Constitution.  
In strengthening the foundations of the economy, the fundamental consideration will be 
fulfilment of the material needs of man in the course of his overall growth and 
development.  This principle contrasts with other economic systems, where the aim is 
concentration and accumulation of wealth and maximization of profit. 
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As noted in the Islamic legal chapter, the Qur’an (8:60) invites believers to be prepared 
to fight and deter the enemy of Allah. This idea is reflected in the Constitution, where 
this verse is quoted. 
The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
are to be organized in conformity with this goal, and they will be responsible not only 
for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the 
ideological mission of jihad in God's way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God's 
law throughout the world (this is in accordance with the Koranic verse "Prepare against 
them whatever force you are able to muster, and strings of horses, striking fear into the 
enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them" [8:60]).90 
Article 109 of the Constitution defines the required qualifications of the supreme leader 
as: ‘scholarship’, ‘justice and piety’, as well as, ‘right political and social perspicacity, 
prudence, courage, administrative facilities, and adequate capability for leadership.’ 
 
Supreme leadership and raison d’État 
The idea of supreme leadership (velāyat-e faghīh) has gone through two stages of 
inception and development, leading to the existence of two theories. The first can be 
found in Khomeini’s early writings, where he promoted the rule of shari’a. At that time, 
he only tasked the supreme leader with implementing the Will of God. The theory’s 
second stage of development saw the supreme leader gain the status of the absolute 
leader (solutus legibus), not bound by law. This development took place during the 
revision of the Constitution. It is at this stage of the evolution of the Islamic Republic’s 
theoretical foundation that the notion of raison d’État (maslahat-e nezām) expanded the 
scope of the supreme leader’s power, a notion that is contradictory to the original idea 
of the supreme leader.  
Raison d’État has become central in the Iranian nuclear debate. The term maslahah ‘is 
usually translated as “welfare,” “public interest or utility,” and “common good” in 
various contexts.’ The concept was considered a ‘primarily judicial term’ in pre-modern 
Islamic thought. Maslahah is foreign to the traditional Shiite school of thought and was 
adopted by Khomeini, who formulated the notion for the preservation, at all costs, of 
the Islamic state. This idea should not be confused with that of maslahah, which was 
incepted in the Sunni school and developed by the prominent medieval Sunni thinker, 
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Ghazali.91 Maslahah is the notion of the ‘interest of the community’ as a criterion in the 
interpretation of shari’a. Hence, in the Sunni doctrine, ‘Maslahah is the legal principle 
of the consideration of public interest or public welfare in interpreting Islamic law.’92  
[In its traditional sense, maslahah] declares that when there is a choice among several 
possible interpretations of the Quran or Sunna on a particular point of jurisprudence the 
jurist should proceed according to a descending ladder of priorities: first, necessities 
(daruriyyat), then needs (hajiyyat), and finally improvements (tahsinat).93  
The notion as developed by Khomeini, is similar to that of raison d’État (of which the 
roots are examined in Chapter Two). Yet, the concept of raison d’État in its modern, 
abstract sense does not exist in Islamic theory. This thesis argues that the notion of 
maslahat-e nezām would be considered as bīd’ah or ‘reprehensible innovation’ in the 
traditional understanding of the Shiite philosophy. Indeed, while nothing is supposed to 
trump religious principles in Islam, according to this theory, political reasons can 
undermine the faith’s core principles. Nevertheless, this new conception of supreme 
leadership also resulted in a new development, which would see great sins as wājīb in 
the case of the preservation of the Islamic state, including lying, espionage, and even the 
consumption of alcohol.94 Hence, the Constitution provides the supreme leader with 
tools to transcend shari’a itself when divine prescriptions go against regime interests. 
These tools include the very notion of supreme leadership and the absolute ruler’s 
ability to suspend any right or duty, be it ethical, legal, or even one of the pillars of the 
faith, should the very existence of the Islamic state be at risk. Maslahat-e nezām 
constitutes a crucial foundation of the Islamic state à l’iranienne.95 If regime interests 
are threatened, the supreme leader – whose ultimate goal is to ensure the preservation of 
the Islamic state – has the ability to overrule any religious decree, including explicit 
Qura’nic verses temporarily. This is even the case of the usūl al-dīn, or the very 
foundations of the faith, including the hajj and prayer – in order to safeguard the 
regime. This is while, in the years following the revolution, Khomeini ‘elaborated on 
one of the principal questions in Shi’i theology: the limits of government power.’ Later, 
he issued a ruling, which ‘represented another blatant retreat from his own doctrine. The 
authority to determine the state’s interest was thus entrusted to a mixed assembly (i.e., 
comprised of theologians, religio-politicians, and government officials with no Islamic 
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training), thereby depriving the Council of Guardians of its exclusive right to approve 
legislation.’96  
As discussed in Chapter Three, for several reasons, most prominent Iranian clerics did 
not support the notion of supreme leadership¸ neither in theory, nor in practice. First, 
Ayatollah Khomeini was not a leading cleric during times when a generation of 
outstanding Shiite clerics lived. Virtually none of these mujtahidīn endorsed 
Khomeini’s new theory of Islamic leadership. In turn, the Islamic Republic side-lined 
the country’s most prominent Shiite authorities, instead empowering ‘revolutionary 
“religio-politicians”’, many of who would not receive their status under traditional 
Shiite structure.  
Khomeini himself often sanctioned the primacy of state interests over both 
revolutionary philosophy and his own Islamic doctrine, and used the coercive power of 
state to silence prominent theologians and others who openly opposed the government’s 
policies.97 
Second, the notion of velāyat-e faghīh in traditional Shiite Islam signified a faghīh or an 
Islamic jurist who would take responsibility for one who does not have a parent or 
husband to take care of them. His duties did not include public affairs, which was a 
novelty, added by Khomeini. Prominent Shiite jurists did not view this novelty as being 
in accordance with Shiite principles.98 In fact, ‘Major Shi’i thinkers have even argued 
that having a single marja’ (guide) “ran counter to the principles of Shi’ism.”’ Hence,  
the leading theologians of 1979 were either resentful of the velayat-e faqih concept as 
practiced by the ruling clerics (as was the case for Kazem Shari’atmadari, ‘Abdollah 
Shirazi, and eventually Abul-Qasem Kho’i)99 or distanced themselves from daily 
politics (as was the case with Seyyed Shihab al-Din Najafi-Mar’ashi, Mohammad Reza 
Golpaygani and Mohammad ‘Ali Araki). Some vehemently opposed Khomeini’s 
doctrine and were forcibly silenced, others were less vocal or acknowledged his power 
and gave their blessing to the facts he or his disciples established. […] He [Khomeini] 
introduced new interpretations and gained support for them mainly from low-ranking 
clerics or religio-politicians over the heads of the senior theologians.100  
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Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari ‘opposed the inclusion of any 
principles relating to supreme leadership in the constitution and believed the governance 
of fiqh to be against national governance.’101 
Third, these mujtahidīn did not believe in political Islam. In fact, some clerics 
‘advocated the separation of religion and state’.102 Shariatmadari, for instance, opposed 
the very notion of an ‘Islamic Republic’, believing it to be ‘void of any legal meaning 
and believed the name “republic” for the regime to be enough.’ He further ‘advised 
Khomeini to remain in Qom and not to become involved in government.’103 Unlike in 
Sunni Islam,104 where regardless of who takes the power, whether just or unjust, he is 
considered as the leader, in Shiite Islam, only an infallible Imam can rule. Hence, before 
Khomeini’s access to power, the idea of an Islamic state was criticised by prominent 
Shiite authorities. Therefore, the Islamic Revolution did not only revolutionarise politics 
but also religion in Iran.   
Regardless of this opposition, the Islamic Republic was established, implementing 
Khomeini’s second version of the theory of velāyat-e faghīh, giving the supreme leader 
the last say on all domestic and foreign policy matters.105 As such, the absolute ruler’s 
opinion reflects that of the regime and the country’s stance on issues relating to security.  
 
Islamic governance and nuclear weapons 
The Iranian leadership has created a nuclear narrative transcending the international 
legal framework. By referring the international community to shari’a, Iranian officials 
show nations and decision-makers worldwide that divine law, superior to the legal 
system governing the conduct of states, is the framework providing them with a 
structure and limitations. Hence, Tehran tries to appeal to the international community 
by using its faith as a confidence-building measure, presented as superior, or at the very 
least, equal to international norms, regulations, and safeguards. To do so, nuclear 
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decision-makers ‘draw a practical landscape by referring to top documents and the 
guidance of the great supreme leader of the Revolution is one of the needed steps in the 
management of nuclear policy.’106 As such, they can only operate within the limits 
established by the supreme leader. 
In 2005, Tehran communicated for the first time to the IAEA that Khamenei had issued 
a fatwā, prohibiting the ‘production, possession, and use of nuclear weapons’.107 Former 
Iranian negotiator, Seyyed Hossein Mousavian claims in his memoir that even though 
he and his peers had not been informed about detailed technical aspects of Iran’s past 
and present nuclear activities, they were confident that the programme was merely 
peaceful since the revolution. This, he claims, is because of their trust in the edict issued 
by Khamenei.108 As discussed in Chapter Three, the scope of this prohibition was later 
limited to the ‘use’ of such weapons, creating some confusion in the west, mainly due to 
inaccurate translations, which did not highlight this shift in the leadership’s 
discourse.109 This change could have two underlying reasons. First, Khamenei’s 
position may have changed in light of the growing threat of a military conflict with 
Israel in 2008-2013. Second, this could be related to the imprecision of the debate in 
Iran. Hence, if a fatwā was, in fact, issued by Khamenei, it no longer seems to reflect 
his current stance on the issue. Regardless, a series of questions remain regarding the 
fatwā.  
First, whether or not such an edict was in fact issued by the absolute ruler remains 
debatable. This is stressed by the fact that the text of this important and so-called 
‘binding’ decree has not been released, including on his very comprehensive website. 
Hence, the fact that what is referred to by Iranian officials as the ultimate ruling 
regarding the foremost issue on Tehran’s agenda raises questions. Second, while there 
seems to be a consensus among the Iranian ruling class and diplomats that such a decree 
exists, the consensus does not seem to cover the date of this important ruling. Indeed, 
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various sources date the fatwā differently: 2003,110 November 2004,111 and 2005 have 
been offered as possible dates.112 This lack of clarity contributes to the dubiousness of 
the fatwā, as the date of a so-called key legal document regarding the most important 
issue in a given country’s foreign policy is normally set in stone.  
What is more, not only could the supreme leader overrule his own fatwā, but other 
clerics could too. As discussed previously, regime interests dictate the country’s policy 
and the declaratory policy can be changed accordingly. Indeed, the fatwā seems to be an 
illustration of the use of Islam for political expediency. As discussed later, however, 
such a reversal could also become a double-edged sword, leading to the regime losing 
all legitimacy and credibility, further undermining regime interests, and thus being 
counterproductive. In the words of Mowatt-Larssen, ‘if the fatwā is reversed that would 
mean that the government has not only lied to the west but also to Iranian people’.113 
 
Understanding the discourse   
As discussed previously, the legal debate is void of any political or strategic attribute, 
except its flexibility to be moulded into any discourse enables governments to tailor it to 
particular audiences for their own purposes. This quality is well understood by the 
Iranian leadership, which has based much of its nuclear narrative on this malleable 
structure. Unlike the Pakistani case, Iran’s Islamic nuclear narrative is mainly legal and 
does not glorify nuclear weapons as a guarantor of the country or Muslim community’s 
security and prestige. Instead, Tehran takes the opposite approach, stating that these 
weapons are illegal, unethical, and, indeed, inhumane. The religious basis for these 
claims has not been offered by the leadership, but as discussed in Chapter Three, this 
rationale can be found in the idea that nuclear weapons are inherently indiscriminate 
and, therefore, prohibited by the faith. Shiite Islam, Iranian Shiite scholars argue, 
categorically bans means and methods of warfare that are meant to destroy humans and 
the environment.114 This, they say, is stated in the Qur’an and can be found in the 
ahādīth attributed to the Prophet and the Imams. In the words of Grand Ayatollah 
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Montazeri, these weapons are against the shari’a and reason (‘aql).115 According to 
these precedents, using poison, closing bodies of water on the adversary’s camps, and 
burning trees were deemed illegal by the infallible models believers are to emulate. 
Therefore, WMD, which perform the same tasks on a wider scale, are also prohibited 
according to the same principles.116  
The Islamic Republic, as a revolutionary regime, relies heavily on propaganda. 
Therefore, political rhetoric plays a key role in policy and has been used both 
domestically and internationally to promote the regime’s doctrine to frustrate its 
adversaries. Rouhani discusses the challenging nature of the Islamic Republic’s reliance 
on rhetoric and slogans and its applicability to the country’s approach to nuclear policy 
in his 2011 memoir. He identifies the regime’s failure to adequately distinguish between 
rhetoric and policy and writes: ‘the problem is that we use slogans excessively’. This 
leads ‘collective thinking [to reach] the point of no return.’ This, he notes, contributes to 
Iran’s anarchical political culture, based on ‘slogans’ and ‘chaos’.117 
In order to understand the Iranian nuclear narrative, as shaped under the current regime, 
one must first comprehend the Islamic Republic’s view of the international community. 
This view supports a neo-colonialist ‘enemy’ narrative, dividing the world into those 
who rule and those who are ruled. This worldview is a constant framework through 
which the country approaches international affairs. This dichotomy is composed of a 
group of foes, encompassed by the former colonial powers, with the United Kingdom as 
their flag bearer, the world’s sole superpower, the United States, and Israel, on the one 
hand, and the friends, which include the non-aligned movement, and, particularly, the 
Muslim world on the other. The following sections analyse the Iranian leadership’s 
discourse aimed at each audience.  
 
The Non-Aligned Movement 
Iran’s relations with the west suffered with the Islamic Revolution and, especially, the 
hostage crisis. Throughout its history, the Islamic Republic has often been isolated. This 
isolation has been widely criticised domestically. Hence, it has become critically 
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important for Tehran to show to its domestic constituency that it does have ‘friends and 
allies’ throughout the world.  
The NAM’s membership (120 members as of 2013) makes it into a natural audience 
and support system for Tehran. Under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an important focus of 
Tehran’s policies toward the non-aligned world was Latin America. Ahmadinejad’s 
government made substantial investments in a region geographically and culturally 
remote from Iran.118 His government found its allies in Latin American leaders and 
attempted to appeal to them by criticising the policies of the west and especially the 
United States in the region.119 When Washington, fearing growing Iranian influence in 
its ‘backyard’ began to take measures to counter Tehran,120 Iran reacted by using its 
usual rhetoric. In the words of the country’s former Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 
Ramin Mehmanparast, ‘It is an overt intervention in Latin American affairs... that 
shows [the United States] are not familiar with new world relations.’ Mehmanparast 
further targeting Non-Aligned states, asserted that Washington ‘still lives in the Cold 
War era and considers Latin America as its back yard’.121 Ahmadinejad’s efforts to 
appeal to Latin America were not merely rhetorical. In 2010, Tehran and Sucre agreed 
to build a nuclear plant in Bolivia.122 Rouhani’s team has been less focused on Latin 
America, rather choosing to engage with the west, Russia and China, and Iran’s 
immediate neighbours, especially Arab states in the Persian Gulf.  
The revolutionary discourse, which calls for independence from foreign influence and 
the incorporation of cultural relativity in the legal system, is popular among non-aligned 
states. Iran tries to champion this cause and to galvanise key, influential states within 
the Movement. This is especially the case within a sub-group of the NAM, the Arab 
states, which generally follow the Egyptian lead.123 The Egyptian stance on regional 
security and arms control are similar to Iran’s in a sense, as the two countries are 
interested in Israel joining the NPT and dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This is while 
Tehran and Cairo’s relations have been complicated since 1979. Egypt, however, has 
championed the cause of the creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East for decades. The 
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narrative surrounding the efforts to create such a zone in the region is important as Iran 
presents itself as the creator and flag bearer of the project along with Egypt. In order to 
promote this idea, the Islamic Republic, which traditionally presents itself as the 
antithesis of the Imperial State of Iran, stepping away from its undertakings and 
undermining its achievements, entitles this particular enterprise to itself. This signals 
the consistency of Iran’s official stance on the creation of a WMDFZ in the region.  
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of chemical and nuclear weapons and 
the like a great and unforgiveable sin. We have proposed the slogan of a “Middle East 
free of nuclear weapons” and we stand by it. This does not mean giving up on the right 
to use peaceful nuclear energy and the production of nuclear fuel. The peaceful use of 
this energy, according to international law, is the right of all countries.124  
In this context, the very international legal system demonised in the same speech is used 
to give weight to the Supreme Leader’s argument. This is due to the country needing to 
demonstrate that its actions are in accordance with international norms, in order to 
receive NAM’s support. Indeed, while all members of the NAM can understand and 
relate to the international framework, fewer countries understand and value the Islamic 
system. What is more, even Muslim states, which could potentially be won by the 
Islamic legal discourse, for the most part adhere to a different sect of Islam. 
Furthermore, many may disagree with, or at least not fully accept, Iran’s Islamic legal 
discourse.   
The NAM’s ability to influence international affairs, especially in the realm of arms 
control, non-proliferation, and disarmament makes it of key importance to Iran. Yet, its 
diversity is a challenge to Iran’s Islamic nuclear discourse. Tehran’s attempts to secure 
the entire NAM’s support for its nuclear programme thanks to its legal reasoning, based 
on a system that is neither understandable nor relatable for its members falls short of its 
aspirations. However, while states have not condoned Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, they 
have also been reluctant to ‘exert pressure on Iran or condemn its violations of 
safeguards obligations.’ The NAM does not hold a unified front regarding the issue. 
Most of the movement ‘voted in favour of IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security 
Council resolutions finding Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, 
requesting that it suspend its enrichment and heavy-water-related activities and 
ultimately imposing sanctions.’125 The war against Iraq was key in shaping the NAM 
position, which leads them to remain sceptical of western allegations of non-
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compliance. They question a view prevalent in the west, especially until the election of 
Rouhani in June 2013, according to which Iran’s nuclear activities would not be limited 
to peaceful ones. The threat of military action against Iran was perceived by the NAM 
as yet another excuse for a military intervention to replace a hostile regime.126 Hence, 
without the Iraqi precedent, the NAM would perhaps have been more willing to 
condemn Iran’s nuclear activities. States abstaining to vote for these resolutions include 
Muslim states, such as Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, and Lebanon.127 Therefore, contrary to 
Khamenei’s claims, the NAM does not have a united stance regarding the Iranian 
nuclear issue:  
More than one hundred non-aligned countries and more than about fifty Muslim 
countries that come together in the Islamic Conference and in the Non-Aligned 
Movement […] the definite majority of the world, all support that nuclear energy comes 
out of the monopoly of a few claimant and expecting world powers and deeply praise 
and applaud the Iranian nation standing courageously.128  
Yet, the regime has been banking on the NAM, with which it shares many interests. 
Especially as Chair of the NAM (2012-2015), Iran has stressed the injustice of the 
international order, the bias of international law and its supporting institutions, and the 
failure of NWS to meet their end of the NPT bargain in initiate negotiations on nuclear 
disarmament. It has further stressed all countries’ ‘inalienable right to the nuclear fuel 
cycle’.129 Indeed, as discussed in the next sections, nuclear disarmament has become the 
NAM’s ‘highest priority.130 
 
Justice and the international order 
The ‘Annual Report on Military Power of Iran’ (2012) highlights one of the key strands 
of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.  
Iran continues to seek to increase its stature by countering U.S. influence and expanding 
ties with regional actors while advocating Islamic solidarity. Iran also desires to expand 
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economic and security agreements with other nations, particularly members of the 
Nonaligned Movement in Latin America and Africa.131  
NAM states have been the recipient of Iranian aid, ranging from financial support to 
Levant countries to the sale and transfer of ammunition to western Africa, the Great 
Lakes region, and Sudan during the events of Darfur, as well as political, financial, and 
military support of Bashar Al-Assad’s government in Syria.132 Likewise, the NAM is 
one of the key target-audiences of Tehran’s rhetoric. Various officials, including Iranian 
presidents (especially Ahmadinejad) and the supreme leader himself have tailored their 
discourses to this audience. In fact, one of Khamenei’s key talking points lies in the idea 
that the international system governing international affairs, which he views as a 
product of western imposition on the rest, must be changed fundamentally.133  
As noted previously, the UNSC’s failure to penalise Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War 
continues to haunt the Iranian psyche. As a result, Tehran views the institution as 
inherently unjust and unrepresentative of the current international order. The UNSC has 
become increasingly unpopular, especially among the non-aligned group, but also 
within progressive circles in the west, which see it as an anachronism. Tehran 
denounces the institution and its promotion of a biased approach to international 
governance.   
The UNSC is an illogical, unjust, and completely undemocratic institution and 
mechanism; it is an obvious dictatorship and a used and obsolete situation, with an 
expiry date that has passed. It is through the abuse of this wrong mechanism that 
America and its allies have managed to impose their bullying disguised as noble 
concepts.134  
Likewise, Iran has vocalised its views on international law, which it sees as being 
fashioned by the west to promote its interests. As noted by Khamenei: ‘They [the west] 
impose their interests under the name of “international law” and their dominating and 
illegal statements under the name of the “international community” to nations.’135 These 
‘illegal statements’ are the six UNSC Resolutions, the first of which, UNSCR 1696 
(2006), called on Tehran to cease enrichment, paving the way for the imposition of 
backbreaking sanctions. Tehran has continuously denounced these resolutions as illegal 
and unjust. Khamenei’s view of the world is one according to which a handful of 
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‘arrogant’ powers dictate their will to the rest of the planet through the norms and 
mechanisms they have established.136   
Despite its criticism of the international legal framework, Tehran continuously tries to 
show that its activities are in accordance with it. This is especially the case of the NPT, 
which despite denouncing as an inherently biased instrument, the Iranian leadership 
claims conforming to. In other instances, perhaps in an attempt not to offend Russia and 
China, Khamenei has portrayed the United States as the only obstacle to the pursuit and 
implementation of justice within the UNSC: ‘every time the Security Council wanted to 
pass a Resolution against the Zionist regime, America has blocked it, come forward and 
has defended [Israel] and has not allowed it.’137 
 
Disarmament and the nuclear watchdog 
The Islamic Republic has continuously denounced the failure of the NWS to take 
substantial steps toward the second pillar of the NPT: disarmament. The vast majority 
of NAM states (excluding India and Pakistan, which are non-NPT nuclear-armed states) 
are NNWS and has placed nuclear disarmament at the top of the list of the group’s 
priorities. This was formulated in a 2013 working paper, presented by the group to the 
NPT Preparatory Committee.138 Hence, this discourse is particularly appealing to the 
members of the NAM. The Iranian leadership, having understood this, has emphasised 
its discourse on disarmament during its period chairing the NAM.  
International peace and security is one of the sensitive issues of today’s world and the 
disarmament of catastrophic WMD, a pressing necessity and a general demand. […] 
Those who stockpile their inhumane weapons in their arsenal do not have the right to 
consider themselves as the flag bearers of international security. This, without a doubt, 
will not bring them security. Today, it is with a lot of regret that it is witnessed that the 
countries that have the largest nuclear arsenals do not have a serious and real motivation 
to remove these deathly tools from their military doctrines and continue to see them as 
an element of dissuasion and an important factor in their political and international 
status. […] Nuclear weapons are neither a guarantor of security nor a solidifier of 
political power, but rather a threat to both.139  
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Tehran often describes the IAEA as an institution manipulated to promote the interests 
of the west: ‘The IAEA is affiliated with the United Nations and was created to 
supervise the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Look at its treatment of countries, 
its discrimination, the influence of the political constituent in it, because force 
dominates it.’140 The Islamic Republic’s wariness of the Agency dates back to the early 
days of the regime’s establishment, when Iran ‘informed the IAEA of plans to build a 
reactor powered by indigenous uranium at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre (with 
yellowcake bought from South Africa and imported in 1981). The IAEA inspected the 
facilities in early 1983’. Following this, it ‘agreed to assist Iran in various areas’, under 
the Technical Assistance Programme. However, pressure from the United States forced 
the Agency to terminate its assistance until a further review.141 Since, various Iranian 
officials have criticised the Agency for having become ‘a mere tool in political power 
games’.142  
Therefore, Tehran accuses the west of pushing the Agency to become involved in non-
technical activities. This discourse is aimed at NAM as it is based on the ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategy. The regime’s depiction of international institutions as the fulfilment 
of ‘Manifest Destiny’ is essentially an attempt to show the non-aligned world that the 
colonial era has not ended and that the current world order is a manifestation of this. 
Iranian officials portray the Islamic Revolution, what it represents, and the nuclear 
programme as resistance against this order. As such, the Islamic legal discourse is 
presented to these nations as an alternative to the ‘Manifest Destiny’. Hence, this 
alternative legal justification is destined to convince the NAM that the country’s nuclear 
programme is indeed merely for peaceful purposes and that Islamic law is the guarantor 
of this fact. Consequently, if the nuclear programme does not have a military 
dimension, it is not because it is striving to submit to these ‘western impositions’ but 
rather because its faith prevents it from doing so.  
The Islamic Republic’s raison d’être resides in its opposition to the west and its 
influence. In order to be able to maintain a certain level of legitimacy, both domestically 
and internationally, the regime needs to justify itself by appealing to a given 
constituency.  
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NAM’s ideals are still alive and standing; ideals such as anti-colonialism, political, 
economic, and cultural independence, non-alignment to poles of power and a united and 
cooperative progress in all member states. The reality of today’s world is distancing 
itself from these ideals, but the collective will and comprehensive effort to go beyond 
these realities and achieve the ideals, regardless of the challenges, is a consequential 
source of hope.143   
Despite all these efforts, the Iranian leadership has failed to achieve its goal of securing 
overwhelming political support across the movement for its nuclear ambitions. At the 
same time, the Islamic Republic’s authorities have tailored their nuclear narrative to fit 
this particular group to show domestic audiences that the programme may suffer from a 
lack of support from the west, but that its efforts are backed by the majority of the 
planet’s population, including the NAM. At the peak of its political isolation under 
Ahmadinejad, Tehran’s pursuit of NAM’s chairmanship enabled it to show domestic 
and western audiences that the attempts to isolate it from the international community 
have been unsuccessful. It also allows them to legitimise the regime and the 
programme. This attempt has failed on two fronts. First, as demonstrated in this section, 
NAM states do not overwhelmingly support Tehran’s nuclear ambitions as suggested by 
the Iranian narrative. Second, as will be discussed later, the majority of Iranians are 
scarcely concerned with NAM support, preferring to have the west’s friendship. With 
Rouhani’s election in 2013, Iran’s foreign policy and discourse has changed to reflect 
this. Despite protests from hardliners,144 Rouhani’s foreign policy team has undertaken 




Among the NAM states, Muslim countries hold a special place in Iran’s foreign policy. 
The Muslim world is naturally one of the foremost audiences of the Iranian leadership’s 
nuclear narrative, especially, the Islamic discourse. Yet, given Iran’s complex relations 
with Muslim states, and its neighbours, in particular, Tehran’s failure to secure the 
support of the this group does not come as a surprise. This section assesses the Iranian 
nuclear narrative, especially the Islamic legal discourse, as relevant to the Muslim 
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world, before identifying the areas of success and failure and the cause in the case of 
each regional group or country.145 
 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
The relationship between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and most other Arab states in the 
Persian Gulf, became more complex with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. 
This is due to several factors. First, the rivalry between Iran and the Arab states to its 
south is historical and transcends the political system in place. It is political, military, 
strategic, and economic in nature and stems from the Arab-Persian and Shiite-Sunni 
rivalries.146 Second, ‘the war [with Iraq…] weakened whatever hold Iran might 
otherwise have had on other Muslim states’.147 The mistrust between Iran and Arab 
states in the region amplified with the war, as the rivalry between them was no longer 
merely political but a real armed conflict. During the war, ‘Saudi Arabia and most of the 
smaller Arab monarchies of the Gulf opted to align with Iraq.’148 Third, these countries 
leverage their threat perception of Iran exporting its values and ideals beyond its borders 
and its narrative to receive benefits from the west.149 In the years following the 
revolution, this was the case to some degree. Indeed, ‘even before he came to power in 
Tehran, in late 1978, Khomeini appointed “representatives” to Shi’i communities of 
Kuwait and Bahrain.’150 Following the revolution, ‘as the shah’s regime fell, a wave of 
Shi’i unrest swept the Arab states.’151 As the new regime became institutionalised, this 
goal was integrated into the Islamic Republic’s Constitution. This was significant 
because it showed the new regime’s commitment to promoting its ideology beyond its 
borders. Under the Shah, Iran played the role of the ‘policeman’ of the Gulf. The Gulf’s 
monarchies certainly ‘distrusted the shah’s regional ambitions’ but ‘they knew that he 
did not seek to destabilize them domestically.’ The Islamic Republic, while ‘weaker’, 
was ‘much more aggressive toward them politically’ and encouraged ‘domestic 
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opposition and openly proclaim[ed] that monarchy was “non-Islamic.”’152 This meant 
that, ‘in the Gulf, as elsewhere in the Muslim world, Iran served as a catalyst for an 
opposition whose primary causes were indigenous factors such as the political and 
economic grievances of Shii minorities in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait.’153 
Menashri argues that, ‘Iran’s lack of support for the Shi’i uprising in Southern Iraq in 
1991’ shows that this fear of an ideologically-driven Iran, one which wants to export its 
revolution, is overstated. Indeed, ‘Tehran did not come unequivocally and substantially 
to their aid, and with good reason: it feared that they would ultimately fail and that 
Iran’s support would harm its own interests – a clear sign of a preference for national 
interests over pure dogma.’154 This has further strengthened the threat perception of the 
Arab states vis-à-vis Iran, which has ‘proved exaggerated’.155 Nevertheless, during the 
Iran-Iraq War, most Arab states in the region supported Baghdad, ‘organiz[ing] the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (the GCC) and [throwing] their substantial support to Iraq.’156  
Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric has been utilised by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states in 
the Persian Gulf to receive security guarantees, enhance economic and commercial ties, 
and expand influence and alliances with western countries, especially the United States. 
Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for instance, have concluded 
arms deals with the United States, receiving billions of dollars worth of weapons, cruise 
missiles, fighter jets, and bunker buster bombs among other weapons and military 
technology from American companies, some of which can be attributed to their 
adversarial relations with Tehran.157 Hence, when an interim deal was reached between 
Iran and the EU3+3, Saudi Arabia, fearing the end of its alliance and privileges received 
from the United States, expressed concerns regarding the outcome.158  
Saudi Arabia’s frustration with the Iranian deal has little to do with nuclear weapons, 
and everything to do with insecurity […] It comes from a profound and exaggerated 
fear that a nuclear deal with Iran is a prelude to an American-Iranian geopolitical 
agreement that in essence leaves Iran as the dominant power in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq 
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[…] the Saudis have pieced together a convincing narrative of abandonment that is 
causing them to lash out in unpredictable ways.159 
The GCC itself is divided on the Iran question, as some states, such as Oman enjoys 
good relations with Tehran. Nevertheless, the general stance of the GCC on Iran is one 
driven by rivalry and suspicion.  
 
Turkey 
Turkey and Iran have historically had a more egalitarian relationship than Iran and some 
of its other neighbours and continue to maintain such relations. Indeed, both countries 
are the succeeding states to large and influential empires and both states underwent a 
period of reformation in the beginning of the twentieth century. However, while that 
modernisation in Turkey has led to its current laïque governance; that of Iran was 
completely overturned by the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Hence, with the advent of the 
revolution in Iran, the two countries’ politics and policies diverted from each other. Yet, 
‘regardless of ideological disparities and conflicting interests’, both countries are too 
dependent on each other for economic and strategic reasons to be able to afford conflict. 
As such, the two countries have maintained relations ‘between cooperation and 
competition, between tranquility and tension.’160 Tehran and Ankara have a number of 
common economic and strategic interests, including in the areas of energy, trade, and 
counterterrorism.  
Turkey’s attitude toward the Iranian nuclear programme is shaped by four key factors. 
First, as noted previously, Ankara has a number of common interests with Iran and 
relies on its eastern neighbour for its energy needs. Second, Turkey is pursuing a 
nuclear energy programme of its own. Third, under Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, 
Turkey has begun to shift toward the Muslim world.161 These factors have led Turkey to 
support Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme, stating that there is no evidence 
the country is pursuing nuclear weapons, and to oppose a military intervention against 
its nuclear facilities.162 Fourth, Turkey is a member of NATO and enjoys cordial 
relations with the United States, which has pressed Ankara to enforce sanctions and has 
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attempted to show that it is complying with the sanctions.163 Yet, Turkey has tried to 
maintain its ties, including in trade, with Iran and has sought alternative means of 
preserving them, including the gold trade. What is more, Ankara has made efforts to 
find a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis by joining forces with Brazil. These efforts 
were, however, fruitless.   
 
The Muslim world and Iran’s nuclear programme 
Despite often being depicted as a ‘sectarian’ actor, Tehran has in fact  
been ecumenical about its support to terrorists and other violent extremists, helping out 
Shi’a groups (such as Hizballah and Jaysh al-Mahdi in Iraq), Sunni groups (such as 
Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and even some indirect 
support to al-Qa’ida itself, secular Marxists (the anti-Turkish PKK and the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine), Christians (Armenian guerrillas fighting the Shi’a 
Azeris), and others.164  
Nevertheless, partly due to its image as a sectarian actor, and partly for strategic, 
political, and cultural reasons enumerated throughout this chapter, Iran’s Islamic 
nuclear discourse has received mixed results in the Muslim world. This is while the 
regime’s divide and conquer strategy provides grounds for its leadership to attempt to 
win over regional audiences.  
They made the security of our region, the security of the Persian Gulf, of Afghanistan, 
of Iraq, into chaos and turmoil; to counter the Islamic Republic – and of course to fill 
the pockets of weapon companies – they flooded the countries of the region with arms; 
they supported the Zionist regime without any conditions.165  
Such statements are directed at a regional and, predominantly, Muslim audience, 
blaming the lack of regional security and stability on external (i.e. western) powers. 
Hence, it supports the idea that these audiences should support a strong Iran, as it 
counters these powers and aspires to promote regional stability.  
However, due to the factors underlined above, the Iranian leadership has failed to 
convince not only its own constituency but also the Arab world that the former rivals 
pursue the same goals, share the same values and interests, and can trust each other. 
These include a historical explanation. The Arab-Persian rivalry holds its roots in the 
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Arab conquest of Persia.166 Moreover, ‘revolutionary Iran saw its neighbours not as 
independent nation states, but, as parts of the Islamic world for which the “Islamic 
republic” and “Islamic revolution” had duties in mind which included what others 
would call “intervention.”’167 Shahram Chubin’s statement does not fully capture the 
Iranian view of its neighbours. Indeed, it is not only revolutionary Iran that views them 
as ‘parts of the Islamic world’. As discussed in the section on Iranian nationalism, 
Iranians, regardless of political allegiance, see themselves as different from the rest of 
the region. They consider themselves as a continuous nation-state and countries around 
them as collections of tribes, which have been brought together under a modern flag by 
colonial powers. This is based on the fact that ‘the concept of territorial nationalism is 
relatively new in the Middle East.’168 As discussed in the previous sections, the case of 
Iran is different. This has also helped shape Tehran’s view of sub-state actors as an 
integral part of the regional security landscape in the Middle East. This, however, does 
not necessarily translate into an ‘interventionist’ mind-set.169 Nevertheless, this Iranian 
self-image does play a key role in its place in the region, as it is understood by the 
Arabs, who in turn do not trust Iran.  
The second reason behind this mistrust lies in Iran’s official religion. Indeed, Iran is one 
of a few majority Shiite countries, a school of thought that many Sunnis do not even 
consider as Islamic. Hence, with the Islamic Republic widely publicising and 
emphasising its Shiite nature, pledging allegiance to the denomination, while supporting 
and sponsoring Shiites across the Muslim world, including in Iraq, Assad’s Syria, and 
the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, majority Sunni States see Iran as a threat to their 
domestic stability.  
The third reason, which ties the two previous ones together, is a strategic one. Muslim 
countries, especially those located in the Middle East, have no interest in Iran 
progressing and expanding its sphere of influence. The status quo benefits many 
countries in the region, including all Iran’s neighbours in the Persian Gulf and Turkey. 
These countries increasingly gained political and economic influence in the region, after 
1979, and even more so with developments stemming from the Iranian nuclear 
controversy and the country’s progressive alienation from the rest of the international 
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community 2003-2013. This is especially illustrated by Saudi Arabia’s readiness to 
boost its oil production to meet the demands resulting from a ban on Iran’s oil,170 as 
well as Turkey’s attempt to play a central role in the negotiations between the west and 
Tehran, through the role of the intermediary.  
Iran’s isolation from the international community, especially the ‘great powers’ has also 
helped its Persian Gulf neighbours in advancing their own agendas, among which lies 
the case of the dispute over the three islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu 
Musa.171 In its 2012 Joint Statement, the GCC reiterated its statement rejecting the 
‘Iranian occupation’ of the islands ‘belonging’ to the UAE.172 Using Tehran’s 
increasing isolation, the GCC concluded that ‘Any acts or practices implemented by 
Iran on the three islands will be deemed null and void and should not entail any change 
in legal or historic status of the Islands which confirm the right of supremacy of the 
United Arab Emirates over its three Islands.’173 Furthermore, in 1980, shortly after the 
Islamic Revolution, the UAE brought the case before the Security Council, which ruled 
against the UAE.174 It is not surprising that in the same document, the GCC called the 
Iranian nuclear programme a threat to the stability of the Persian Gulf region. 
Some Arab states, including Egypt, see the Iranian nuclear issue through a regional lens, 
which is fashioned by Israel, thus ‘fram[ing] the problem in political terms’. Hence, 
Egypt has raised the question of wider regional security and arms control in the context 
of resolutions addressing the Iranian nuclear controversy. By doing so, Egypt has 
undertaken to advance its goal of reaching a WMDFZ in the Middle East.175 The ‘Arab 
Spring’ was welcomed by the Iranian leadership, which saw new opportunities in the 
popular uprisings, many of which were calling for an establishment more in line with 
Islamic values.176  
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Iran’s relations with its western neighbour have been extremely complicated. The eight-
year war between the two countries was devastating and has left a great stigma on the 
Iranian population, which suffered great economic and humanitarian consequences. 
Since the fall of the Baathist regime, however, relations between Tehran and Baghdad 
have resumed. What is more, many analysts, especially in the United States, view 
Tehran as the winner of the U.S. and U.K intervention in Iraq.177  
Iran continues to use a multipronged strategy in Iraq, including engagement with leaders across 
the political spectrum, outreach to the Iraqi populace, and continued support to Iraqi Shia 
militants and terrorists [...] to protect and preserve Iran’s security interests, including threatening 
the residual U.S. presence.178  
Tehran’s influence in Iraq has become more apparent since the advent of ISIS and 
Iran’s ability to effectively influence Baghdad. Therefore, it is not surprising that in his 
statement at the General Debate of the First Committee, the Permanent Representative 
of Iraq to the United Nations stressed, ‘the legitimate right of States to obtain nuclear 
technology for all peaceful purposes that serve their development project, and support 
their economies and the diversity of energy sources.’179  
Despite decades of considerable political and financial support from Tehran, the 
Palestinian Authority does not support Iran. In the wake of the interim deal between 
Tehran and the EU3+3 reached in November 2013, senior Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) official and chief negotiator with Israel, Saeb Erekat, issued a 
statement. The statement, which ‘lack[ed] specificity and conviction’, described the 
negotiations as ‘a unique precedent and platform for the international community to 
resolve differences avoiding war and violence.’ It went on to ‘call upon the international 
community to make use of the same efforts in order to end decades of occupation and 
exile for the people of Palestine’. The Palestinian reluctance to welcome the news as a 
great success was due to two factors. First, Palestinians ‘don’t trust the Iranians any 
more than any other Middle Eastern government does.’ Second, ‘the Palestinians are 
concerned that the United States – after undertaking a huge risk in its Middle East 
diplomacy with regard to Iran and Israel – will have no stomach for embarking on any 
other project of such a magnitude’.180 This is turn, they feared, would lead to a lack of 
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political will on Washington’s part in pushing for a comprehensive peace agreement 
solving the Israel-Palestinian issue. Therefore, Palestinian interests are prioritised over 
allegiance to Iran, rendering Iran’s rhetoric one-sided. Unlike Ahmadinejad, the 
Rouhani government has toned down the anti-Israeli rhetoric, and has been less vocal in 
its support for Palestine. This was especially the case during the 2014 Gaza conflict. 
This is illustrated by Rouhani’s 2014 speech at the General Assembly’s Annual 
Conference.181  
Azerbaijan, with a non-Arab and majority Shiite population, sharing historical, cultural, 
and linguistic ties to its southern neighbour has not supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
In fact, it has allegedly facilitated the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear programme by helping 
out Israel in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists.182 Several hypotheses can be 
put forward as to explain the Azerbaijani attitude. First, since its independence, the 
former Soviet territory has attempted to ‘reunify’ with the two north-western Iranian 
provinces of Eastern and Western Azerbaijan. According to Baku, these two provinces 
with a considerable Azeri-speaking population should be part of its territory. In an 
attempt to convince the Iranian Azeri population that they should join the minority 
separatist movement, Azerbaijan has led many campaigns, including one to rename 
itself, ‘North Azerbaijan’, thus giving the country the same status in relation to the 
Iranian provinces as North and South Korea. Second, these disputes are not merely 
territorial but also encompass some disagreements regarding the territorial waters of 
each country in the Caspian.183 Third, Iran has historically had close ties with 
neighbouring Armenia, a rival state of Azerbaijan. Hence, ‘while Iran officially adopted 
a neutral position and engaged in mediation, its policy was seen as amply pro-
Armenian.’ This is while, Armenia is a Christian country and Azerbaijan is one of very 
few countries to share Iran’s official religion. This further provides evidence of ‘Iran’s 
self-interested national attitude’ and pragmatic foreign policy, rather than one primarily 
driven by ideology.184 Indeed, Iran is home to a number of Armenian nationals and 
Armenian-Iranians and a weak Azerbaijan serves its national interests. Therefore, 
Azerbaijan’s national interest lies in a weak and isolated Iran.  
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Summary 
Iran’s relationship with the Muslim world is very complex. On the one hand, the Islamic 
Republic has tried to appeal to the Muslim community since its inception. On the other 
hand, in many ways, and despite communicating the contrary, the regime’s view of the 
Muslim world is not much different from the previous regime. Indeed, as argued 
throughout the chapter, Tehran continues to have a generally pragmatic foreign policy, 
one where its interests (primarily those of regime) trump revolutionary ideals. Hence, 
despite a pan-Islamic rhetoric, in practice Iranian foreign policy has been tailored to its 
particular country and situation. Likewise, different countries have responded to Iran’s 
nuclear narrative differently. Saudi Arabia, a Muslim state governed by the shari’a, has 
repeatedly rejected Iran’s claims and tries to leverage the Iranian nuclear programme to 
receive security guarantees from the United States. Turkey’s position on the Iranian 
programme has been dictated by its twofold stance on international affairs, its own 
identify as a laïque, member of NATO, traditionally close to the west, and a 
predominantly Muslim state. This has been increasingly the case as Ankara has shifted 
toward the Muslim world under Erdogan. Turkey has expressed concerns over the 
Iranian nuclear programme and its potential military dimensions, while at the same time 
supporting Tehran’s right to a peaceful programme, stemming from Ankara’s own 
nuclear ambitions.  
The previous chapter argued that the pan-Islamic nuclear narrative developed by 
Pakistan was highly successful in galvanising the support of Muslim nations. It 
discussed that this is due to the fact that none of those countries had conflicting interests 
with Islamabad, as none of them viewed it as a threat, given its perceived lack of power 
and influence in the region or the Muslim world. Iran, however, has a long history of 
regional rivalry with states in the Middle East and is viewed as a regional power. 
Therefore, states have responded to the Iranian nuclear narrative according to their own 
specific interests. For instance, as noted above, while Turkey has been reluctant to 
condemn Tehran given its own pursuit of nuclear energy and its energy dependence on 
Iran, Saudi Arabia has been very vocal in its exaggeration of the Iranian threat.  
As noted previously, in addition to the NAM and the Muslim world, Tehran’s nuclear 
narrative is also aimed at the west. The west has responded to the religious discourse, by 
acknowledging the supreme leader’s fatwā, with efforts to reach a diplomatic solution to 
the nuclear crisis. In response, Tehran has adjusted in discourse as geared toward the 
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west. Yet, the enemy narrative, which is an overarching component of the revolutionary 
rhetoric, persists. The following section discusses this discourse, as well as the Iranian 
views of the international legal framework and institutions as a product of the west, bias 
and inefficient.     
 
The enemy narrative  
This ‘distinction of friend and foe’, referred to as the ‘enemy narrative’ in this thesis has 
been the central component of the Islamic regime’s ideology and discourse since its 
embryonic stage. It is a central element of the regime’s political system and holds the 
‘arrogant powers’ of the west, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel as 
their flagship. Yet, the narrative also holds deeper roots, which transcend the Islamic 
Republic, and, more generally, even Iran, and spread to the entire Middle East: 
conspiracy theories. Indeed, even though they exist everywhere, conspiracy theories are 
particularly widespread in that region.185 The enemy narrative is shaped around this 
idea, to which even otherwise well-educated and well-adjusted individuals adhere. 
These conspiracy theories are popular in part because Iran has been the object of foreign 
conspiracies.186 These conspiracy theories fall into two categories. First, particularistic 
theories implicate all Western powers competing for influence in the country, and are 
often the subject of the Islamic Republic’s enemy narrative: the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and to a lesser extent, Russia. Secondly, universalistic theories blame 
global forces, including Zionism, which is the flagship of the enemy narrative.187 In 
addition to shaping Iranians’ views of their country and regional and international 
affairs, these conspiracy theories also shape their approach to the nuclear issue. Indeed, 
many Iranians, regardless of their political views and social status, believe that their 
country is being treated differently from the rest of the international community. This, 
they claim, is designed to keep Iran behind scientifically and to weaken it. In the Islamic 
Republic’s terminology, ‘the enemy’ is stopping Iran from achieving its full potential 
and gaining its rightful status among nations. Hence, the nuclear narrative is shaped by 
this idea of an enemy. German political theorist, Carl Schmitt described the role of 
political foes as follows:  
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As long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if only in the 
most extreme case-and whether this point has been reached had to be decided by it-
determine by itself the distinction of friend and enemy. Therein resides the essence of 
its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the will to make this 
distinction, it ceases to exist politically.188 
This statement captures the essence of the Islamic Republic’s enemy narrative.  
 
The west 
Even when Tehran has cordial relations with the west or is attempting to reestablish a 
relationship with the United States, it continues to use the ‘enemy narrative’. The 
supreme leader, in his statement at the 2013 Conference for Islamic Unity defines the 
religious foundation for this animosity: 
How does one adhere to the rope of God? With faith to Allah and disbelief in tyranny. 
Today the great tyrant in the world is the regime of the United States of America; 
because it is the United States that has created Zionism and confirms it. America 
replaces the previous great tyrant, meaning England. […] We do not invite countries, 
governments, and nations to rush into a war with America, we invite them not to 
surrender to America.189   
Nevertheless, while western governments are portrayed as the bullies, the Iranian 
discourse describes the nations as a victim of the policy of its leadership. This is an 
attempt to show the public opinion in these nations, which play an important role in 
their decision-making process, that Tehran’s animosity is not toward the nations, but 
rather the governments and their actions. Hence, the Iranian leadership never fails to 
take the opportunity to utilise international disagreements and, especially, unrest and 
protest movements to show its own population, but also the populations of these 
countries that it is these governments that are on the wrong side of history: ‘This flawed 
and harmful situation is no longer sustainable. Everyone is tired of this wrong 
international geometry. The 99% movement of the American people […] also shows 
that the vase of patience of these nations in this situation is overflowing.’190 This idea 
has been reiterated a number of times in various contexts and by different Iranian 
officials.191  
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Additionally, while the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric is generally based on the idea that 
the enemy equals the west, without defining what the ‘west’ is, the supreme leader, in a 
rare attempt to make such a distinction asserted that: 
Our people do not have a bad memory of many European countries. We do not have a 
bad memory of France, of Italy, of Spain. Yes, we have many bad memories from 
England. […] But other European countries, no. With what they are doing, which is 
cooperating with America, which according to us is unwise, they are attracting the 
Iranian nation’s animosity, they make themselves despised in the eyes of the Iranian 
nation.192  
Regardless, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel have remained a stable 
component of the enemy narrative. Washington and Israel are presented as inseparable 
by the leadership. All of Israel’s policies are portrayed as endorsed by the United 
States.193  
Iranian officials have tried to minimise the extent of the country’s isolation from the 
international community in their speeches. They offer two contradictory lines of 
reasoning. On the one hand, they claim that the sanctions regime is unjust and hurts 
average Iranians. On the other, they downplay their impact and claim that they are not 
effective. In the words of Khamenei: ‘the threats, the sanctions, they impose, except for 
America and the Zionist regime [Israel], no one else is a beneficiary of these sanctions. 
They force and pressure and corner others to undertake these things.’194 According to 
the Iranian leadership, the majority of the world’s population is dominated by a few 
‘arrogant powers’, which impose their own will on them. As such, these ‘governments’ 
want to maintain their monopoly on knowledge, in order to keep this power in their own 
hands, alienating the rest of the world. Iran, on the other hand, they claim, wants to 
make scientific and technological progress, and share it with the rest of the non-aligned 
world, especially the Muslim world. More generally, according to the official Iranian 
narrative, while the west tries to divide and conquer, Iran promotes an egalitarian 
understanding of international affairs.195  
Khamenei also criticises the west’s approach to diplomacy. According to him, the west 
does not respect the foundations of diplomacy in its approach to the Iranian nuclear 
issue, not only by implementing a sanctions regime that is ‘barbaric’, but also by openly 
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expressing satisfaction when the sanctions regime impacts the country’s economy.196 
One of the talking points of the Iranian leadership is to present the Islamic Republic and 
the Iranian people as victims of the ‘arrogant powers’, which threaten their security and 
insult them. According to them, however, these threats and insults have not affected the 
Iranian nation.197 
Furthermore, Tehran insists that any steps taken toward nuclear disarmament and the 
role of the P5 in nuclear arms control are irrelevant. 
The bitter irony of our time is that the American government, which possesses the 
deadliest and greatest number of nuclear weapons and other WMD and the only 
perpetrator of their use, today wants to the flag bearer of opposition to nuclear 
proliferation! They and their western allies have provided the Zionist regime with 
nuclear weapons, creating a great threat for this sensitive region; but this very deceiving 
unity, does not accept the peaceful use of nuclear energy for independent countries and 
even opposes the production of nuclear fuel for radiomedication and other peaceful, 
humane purposes with all its might […] I insist that the Islamic Republic is not 
pursuing nuclear weapons, and will never give up on its nation’s right to peacefully use 
nuclear energy. Our slogan is “nuclear energy for all, nuclear weapons for no one”. We 
will stand by both these statements and we know that breaking the monopoly of a few 
western states in the production of nuclear energy, in the context of the NPT, is in the 
interest of all independent states, among which, the member states of the Non-Aligned 
Movement.198 
With the postponement of the meeting scheduled in late 2012 to discuss the potential 
creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East, Iranian officials seized the opportunity to use 
the enemy narrative to gain support from states in the region. The postponement was 
blamed on the United States and its attempt to help maintain the Israeli nuclear status. 
As discussed previously, one of the strands of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear narrative 
resides in the idea that the country’s nuclear programme is in accordance with 
international norms and safeguards. Yet, its development of the religious legal discourse 
is a response to the international legal framework and its supporting institutions, which 
it denounces as the rule of power of the west, failing to take the values of the ‘rest’ into 
account. In this sense, the Iranian demonisation and constant undermining of 
international law rejects what Onora O’Neil calls a ‘relativised’, as opposed to an 
‘idealised’ theory of justice. The second stresses ‘the need to abstract from the 
particularities of persons […] painting justice as blind to gender and nationality. Its 
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principles are those that would regulate the action of idealised “abstract individuals”’.199 
The former ‘not only acknowledge[s] the variety and differences among mankind but 
ground principles of justice in the discourse and traditions of actual communities’.200  
 
Israel 
Perhaps the paramount concern in the west, regarding Iran’s potential nuclearisation, 
lies in the Israeli factor. As noted previously, much Iranian political rhetoric has been 
focused around the opposition to the existence of the state of Israel in the past few 
decades. This is one of the key areas of divergence between Iranian foreign policy and 
narrative before and after the revolution. Indeed, the two countries had cordial relations, 
based on cooperation on many levels, including national and regional security.201 Yet, 
Iran abstained in the second session of the General Assembly’s Special Committee on 
Palestine, voting on the recognition of the state of Israel in 1947.202 This was due to the 
Shah’s recognition of the intricacies of the region and the sensitive issue of a Muslim 
state voting in favour of the creation of Israel, as well as the complexities of Iran’s 
domestic politics, with several movements evolving in parallel. Even so, Khomeini 
criticised the growing relations between the two countries and what he described as the 
increasingly affluent Iranian Jewish community’s help to Israel during the 1960-70s.203 
This held its roots in the secular and nationalist approach of the Shah and his father. 
Hence, according to Khomeini, the Shah was helping Iranian Jews help Israel. 
Khomeini’s view of Iranian citizenship was drastically different form the Shah’s, as he 
held the Muslim faith, especially of the Shiite denomination, as a determining factor in 
Iranian identity and strived to substitute nationhood with the sense of belonging to the 
ummah.  
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After the Revolution, the complex nature of Iran and Israel’s relations continued to 
persist, as Israel was one of few countries to stand by Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, 
facilitating arms deals between Tehran and Washington. The hostility between the two 
countries began to escalate even further after the end of the eight-year war between Iran 
and its western Arab neighbour and was stressed even further in the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, with the Iranian nuclear crisis. It is interesting to note that, while 
the anti-Israeli rhetoric has been viewed superior to national interests, by the leadership, 
during the Iran-Iraq War, regime interests trumped the anti-Zionist agenda. Indeed, 
Israel was one of few countries to support Iran, albeit covertly, by providing Tehran 
with weapons, including in the context of the Iran Contra scandal.204 Since then, 
Tehran’s ‘anti-Israeli stance has [further] enhanced its credentials as a major regional 
power and a leading Islamic state’.205 Hence, despite its belligerent policy and covert 
operations against Israel, Tehran has not escalated the conflict and maintains the status 
quo.206 Takeyh further underlines that ‘the invocation of the Israeli military threat is 
largely rhetorical, employed by the clergical regime as a means of mobilizing regional 
and domestic opinion behind a range of policy initiatives.’ He points out that Israel is 
not a driver behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions and that Tehran ‘has opted for a low-
intensity challenge to Israel by fuelling terrorist actions against the Jewish state while 
avoiding direct military confrontation.’207 Takeyh’s core argument is correct with two 
caveats. First, while not consistently endorsing the peace process, Iran has not opposed 
it. In fact, former president Khatami had told an Israeli reporter in 2004 that he favoured 
a peaceful solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.208 Even his successor, 
Ahmadinejad, whose notoriously belligerent rhetoric was widely reflected in the west, 
backed the process.209 Second, as discussed in the section on the Iran-Iraq War, this 
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evolution does not only date back to the 1990s, as Takeyh seems to claim, but rather to 
the 1980s and the war.  
  
Domestic support and legitimacy 
Perhaps the single most complex component of the Iranian nuclear narrative resides in 
the discourse aimed at domestic audiences, especially the factions of the population that 
do not support the regime. This is shaped around the argument that the nuclear 
programme is a matter of ‘national pride’, transcending political allegiance and 
affiliation.210 The complexity of the issue comes from the ambivalent sentiment of the 
nation toward the nuclear programme. On the one hand, the programme is indeed seen 
as an element of national pride and the ‘obvious right’ of the nation. This is the idea 
promoted by the supreme leader.   
Nuclear energy and nuclear technology are your obvious right, you, the Iranian nation, 
and no one has the right to [disregard it] If today you do not get hold of this right, the 
Iranian nation will go tens of years backward. No responsible individual, no follower of 
the great Prophet would be satisfied. The world also accepts these rights. Now, they 
have threatened with the Security Council, as if the Security Council was [vital]. We 
have also tasted the Security Council. During the imposed war, when the Iraqis had 
stepped a few thousand kilometres onto our land, this very Security Council issued a 
resolution that [Iran] must put an end to the war, do not defend or resist; because it was 
against the interest of our country, we did not accept it. We will not accept anything that 
is against the interests of our country.211 
The idea that the nuclear programme is the ‘obvious right’ of the nation and consistent 
with its national interests is supported both by regime supporters and those 
fundamentally opposed to it. The programme was, after all, initiated during the Shah’s 
reign and has made progress in the field, in spite of the backbreaking sanctions and the 
virtually constant threat of a war with the world’s sole superpower in the past decade. 
Many believe that the nuclear programme is an investment for the country’s future. 
Therefore, the technological determinism driver plays a great role in shaping the 
country’s nuclear endeavours and nuclear narrative. Indeed, much of the leadership’s 
rhetoric is based on the idea that the country has made great technological progress in 
spite the west and Israel’s attempts to stop such achievements. Sanctions and isolation 
from great powers are presented as a few challenges overcome by the ‘Iranian nation’ in 
its pursuit of nuclear energy. Hence, even having a nuclear weapon capability would 
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allow the leadership to maintain this position and promote the idea that the country does 
indeed belong to the select group of nations with a nuclear weapon capability. In this 
sense, Stephen Meyer’s argument does not hold true in the case of Iran.  
Technological imperative hypotheses contend that ‘governments “decide” to go nuclear 
because the technology is available, thereby making the technical/financial costs 
manageable and the opportunity irresistible.” By contrast, “motivational” hypotheses 
counter that “nuclear weapons do not generate spontaneously from stockpiles of fissile 
material”. To go nuclear requires making a tough political choice, and that choice will 
reflect the top leadership’s assessment of its likely costs and benefits.212   
A great number of people see the programme’s price as too high and not worth the 
sacrifice of Iran’s reputation, relations with the world’s great players, and economic 
standing.213 Hence, the economic model, as in the case of Pakistan, does not play an 
important role in shaping Iran’s nuclear narrative, or aspirations. Because Iran is not an 
inward-looking system, its leadership has had to make adjustments in its policies. 
Rouhani’s efforts reflect this idea. In light of a number of developments, the Iranian 
leadership has realised that it needs to take a different approach to the matter.214 These 
include the growing discontent linked to the nuclear programme, and more generally, 
what can be called, not only the Islamic Republic’s greatest crisis of legitimacy in the 
past thirty three years but also a major blow to the Islamic faith, resulting from the 
contested 2009 presidential election and its resulting unrest. One manifestation of this 
different approach was Rouhani’s election in 2013.  
Khamenei has found it essential implicitly to project the issues many Iranians view as 
the direct result of the Islamic Republic’s policies and, by extension, the faith, on 
external factors. Hence, he instructs the nation not to blame the current hardship on the 
leadership or the religion it bases its laws and policies on, but rather on the west: ‘They 
[the west] place sanctions in order to weaken the country economically, so they think, 
for others to look and say that Islam has held the country back economically.’215 By 
doing so, he continues the Islamic Republic’s strategy of blaming the ‘enemy’ for the 
country’s crises, shifting the responsibility. However, this narrative is no longer viable. 
Hence, the centrepiece of the discourse has been replaced with the notion that the 
Islamic Revolution had made every effort to obliterate: nationalism. As discussed 
above, the revolution sought to replace national identity with religious identity. The 
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Imperial State of Iran’s last prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar complained following one 
of the biggest demonstrations of the revolution that the only Iranian flag was taken 
down, thus ridding it of all national symbols.216 Yet, since the revolution, a growing 
number of speeches feature predominantly nationalistic themes. For this reason, 
Khamenei chooses to support an opposing argument to his usual talking point, 
according to which the ‘arrogant’ powers are the only ones opposing Iran’s nuclear 
programme, revealing the inconsistency of the regime’s nuclear narrative: ‘Our nation 
has witnessed that the whole world, led by America, protested against Iran’s nuclear 
move, argued, threatened to take military action, said we will attack, we will do 
everything.’217 It is important to note that this is precisely the same line of reasoning as 
the west’s, especially that of the United States, stating that the world is united against 
Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Nevertheless, in an effort to gain the support of all Iranians, 
regardless of political affiliation, the regime has developed a discourse with the 
potential to gain the consensus of the nation. This is the idea of technological and 
scientific progress, which is inarguably in the interest of the nation. This argument is 
not new and, as discussed earlier in the chapter, it was already a component in the 
Shah’s nuclear narrative. The idea of scientific and technological progress is not limited 
to mastering the front-end nuclear fuel cycle. Instead, the regime presents nuclear 
energy as part of greater development plans. Indeed, Iran has greatly invested in 
technology, both before and after the revolution. In that sense, it is different from 
Pakistan, where, as discussed in the previous chapter, the nuclear weapons programme 
is a standalone effort, almost developed at the expense of other sciences and 
technological developments. On the contrary, Iran presents its nuclear programme as a 
part of a greater ambition to be a modern and technologically developed country.  
In the field of technology – petro- chemistry, petroleum, steel, defence production and 
industry – the progress is amazing […] In high technology, which is talked about in the 
world with pride, [the west] has been forced, despite all the animosity, to say that Iran is 
one of ten countries that has mastered the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not a small thing.218   
The regime insists that this progress has been made, in spite of the enemy’s best efforts 
to stop it from such achievements. 
From the womb of all sorts of sanctions, which have been forced upon the country for 
many years, all of a sudden a satellite of Hope [paronomasia on the name of the Omid – 
hope – satellite] comes out and is projected into space. From the womb of all the 
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concentrated efforts they have made, all of a sudden the ability to enrich uranium – 
which is limited and in the monopoly of the great powers and which should not go 
anywhere without their authorisation – grows in this country and comes to life and 
shows itself. This is proof that the enemy has not succeeded, its sanctions are not 
effective, its threat is also ineffective. Why? Because this nation has kept its firm 
determination, which is based on its deep faith, and moves on and goes forward and 
they cannot [stop it].219 
As noted previously, Khomenei considered nationalism to be ‘against Islam,’ ‘God’s 
prescription’, and ‘the Holy Qur’an.’ He viewed nationalists as nothing other than the 
‘troops of Satan’ and the ‘opponents of the Holy Qur’an.’220 Hence, nationalism was 
frowned upon and symbols reminding the nation of what it saw as its past glory were to 
be destroyed. This was notably the case of Persepolis, the capital of the first Persian 
kings.221 However, as discussed previously, the regime’s pan-Islamic rhetoric has not 
been successful, but rather counterproductive domestically. Indeed, people, and 
especially the youth, have used Iranian history and nationalism as a means to protest 
against unpopular ideals and policies. Hence, the authorities have adjusted to this and 
stress the nationalist element in nuclear discourse, with such ideas as ‘national pride’ 
and ‘technological progress’ at its core.222 These statements serve to show the west that 
there is a consensus on this matter in Iran, even in the face of hardship.  
Former Foreign Minister and the head of the AEOI Aliakbar Salehi attempted to make 
this point when he stated that, ‘we can be homogeneous and united regarding the 
interests of our country, even with the existence of differences that are resulted from 
different thoughts and with respect to each other’s votes.’ In his statement, he indirectly 
hinted at the 2009 elections and their contested outcome.223 The consensus is 
highlighted with the inclusion of the Iranian Diaspora, typically against the regime: 
‘Even the Iranians abroad who have different opinions about the regime, emphasise the 
sovereign right to use peaceful nuclear energy and we hope that they also will accept the 
truth of the Islamic Revolution.’224 Despite sometimes questioning the way the nuclear 
file has been handled, often pointing fingers at the Ahmadinejad government, rather 
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than recognising mismanagement by the regime more broadly, the nuclear programme 
is seen as a national endeavour, transcending administrations. This has extended to 
enrichment, which presidential candidate Mohsen Rezai proposed could be a joint 
project on Iranian soil with the United States, the European Union, Russia, and Iran. 
Hence, Rezai, one of few establishment figures to challenge Iran’s nuclear policy, did 
not fundamentally challenge the rationale of having an enrichment programme, despite 
proposing a different and more economically viable approach.225  
Tehran’s criticism of the sanctions regime includes the fact that they do not stem from 
the nuclear programme. Instead, many sanctions were in place before the nuclear crisis. 
In Khamenei’s words, ‘They pretend that if the Iranian nation gives up on nuclear 
energy, they will lift the sanctions; they lie!’226 The Ayatollah has further noted:  
Based on their grief and grudge, they decide to implement illogical sanctions, that [are] 
unreasonable and, in fact, barbaric. In reality, they are a war against a nation. 
Nevertheless, in this war, with the help of God, they will be defeated by the Iranian 
nation. […] They can cause problems. Yes. Some incompetence will increase these 
problems. […] But these are nothing the Islamic Republic won’t be able to solve. […] 
Greater problems, difficulties, have been solved by the Iranian nation and the country’s 
officials; these are nothing!227  
These statements target a domestic audience that sees value in establishing a 
relationship with the United States and that criticises the country’s isolation from the 
international community and the west. It is further designed to appease the hardliners, 
including the IRGC and Basij, who view cordial relations with the west as undermining 
their interests. Indeed, this faction benefits from the status quo, including the 
prolongation of the sanctions regime. The IRGC, for instance, has long benefited from 
the isolation of Iran and the sanctions regime, solidifying its grip on Iranian politics and 
the economy.228  
The Islamic legal discourse is not aimed at the general Iranian public, but rather to a 
small portion of the population, which has already pledged allegiance to the regime. 
This faction is composed of regime supporters, including but not limited to the IRGC 
and Basij. The target audiences of this discourse are the previous audiences identified in 
this chapter, namely, the west, NAM, and the Muslim world. As discussed previously, 
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the Iranian leadership has learnt that it cannot solely rely on religious discourse, if it 
wants to have the country’s support on security issues. This is especially the case in 
such a controversial and costly endeavour as the nuclear programme. Hence, it has 
effectively developed a nationalist discourse, fashioned around the idea of scientific and 
technological progress as a matter of national pride.  
This nationalist discourse is increasingly relied upon and targets two other audiences 
besides the domestic constituency. First, it serves to appeal to the NAM. Indeed, these 
countries are most likely to sympathise with Iran’s criticism of the bias of international 
law and institutions, and the west’s policies toward Iran. Hence, Tehran’s claims that 
the west is undermining the nation’s sovereignty and will are aimed at the NAM. 
Second, Iran is trying to reflect an image of a united front, by stating that there is a 
national consensus around the nuclear programme. This serves to strengthen Iran during 
negotiations, by allowing the government to draw a ‘redline’ on enrichment,229 claiming 
it to be a matter of national pride and therefore non-negotiable.   
Critics of the Islamic Republic have inaccurately depicted the nuclear programme and 
narrative as one aiming to valorise ‘the nation, the faith, and the regime’. They claim 
that an Iranian bomb would be ‘“a Persian” bomb, a “Shiite” bomb, and a 
“revolutionary” bomb.’230 Careful scrutiny of the Iranian nuclear narrative, however, 
suggests that this reading of the regime and its narrative is an oversimplification, 
showing a lack of deep understanding of the country, its identity and culture, and 
politics. As discussed in the previous chapter, Islamabad developed a nuclear arsenal 
using the ‘Islamic bomb’ narrative. Ultimately, however, what the country developed 
was a Pakistani bomb, not an Islamic or Sunni bomb. Likewise, and despite their 
differences, if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, it will simply be an ‘Iranian bomb’, not a 
Shiite bomb or an Islamic bomb. The previous sections demonstrated that Tehran’s 
religious discourse does not valorise nuclear weapons, but insists on the opposite. In 
that sense, while the infamous fatwā may not have a strong religious impact, it does 
have political implications. Overturning over a decade of insistence upon the 
prohibition of such weapons and their unethical nature and glorifying them as a ‘Shiite’ 
bomb would not help the Islamic Republic gain prestige, but rather undermine such an 
effort.  
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Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter assessed the political and legal framework of the Islamic 
Republic. It outlined the different tools provided by its Constitution to the supreme 
leader and the rest of the regime to guarantee its longevity. These include instruments 
allowing the supreme leader to overcome the restrictions set by the shari’a. The idea 
that regime interests must trump everything and the resources given to the supreme 
leader by his very status fall under this category. The second part of the chapter 
explored the Islamic Republic’s nuclear narrative, particularly the Islamic legal 
discourse underlining and justifying the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. It 
then identified the different audiences Tehran has tried to convince thanks to its nuclear 
narrative based around shari’a as a limiting factor. It argued that this religious legal 
justification of the nuclear programme has not been predominantly constructed for 
domestic consumption, even though it also targets a faction of the domestic audience, 
especially the IRGC and Basij. This specific discourse, instead, is aimed at Muslim 
states, the NAM, and western public opinion. Indeed, a great number of Iranians are too 
disillusioned with the faith, too critical of the religious state, and too busy trying to 
maintain its living standards to respond positively to the Islamic legal nuclear narrative.  
The Muslim world has been more difficult to persuade for various reasons enumerated 
previously. The Iranian leadership has tried to convince western governments that 
Islamic law’s stance on nuclear weapons was that of its supreme leader, thus providing 
evidence of the peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear programme. However, the 
west’s acknowledgement of the supreme leader’s claims and the fatwā is merely 
political and in an attempt to further the diplomatic process. The main western audience 
targeted by the Islamic Republic lies in public opinion, which Iranian officials try to 
separate from their governments. In an effort to do this, Tehran has asserted time and 
time again that its criticism concerns the governments and not peoples of these 
countries. 
Tehran has pursued its nuclear programme, in spite of backbreaking sanctions and 
political pressure. Its enrichment programme grew substantially between the imposition 
of the first UNSCR, calling on it to stop enrichment, and the conclusion of the interim 
deal in November 2013 with the EU3+3, when Tehran suspended enrichment. In fact, 
Iran’s attempts to reach out to several different audiences, as surveyed in this chapter, 
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illustrate how crucial the nuclear dilemma has become to the Iranian regime. The ability 
to tell these audiences, both domestic and foreign, that the country has overcome the 
obstacles set by the powers, as well as the conspiracies designed to stop its progress, has 
become a key endeavour for Tehran. Hence, while Iran has limited its programme a 
number of times to seek sanctions relief (as in the case of the interim deal), the 
dismantlement of key parts of the programme, especially enrichment, has consistently 
remained out of the question. The emphasis on domestic enrichment has become the 
symbol of Iran’s persistence and described as the ‘redline’ during the Geneva talks.231 
Domestic enrichment is described as the key achievement of the Iranian nation, both 
technically and politically. Hence, the Iranian leadership relies on the narrative that it 
has ‘mastered’ the fuel cycle to show that the costs of the nuclear programme have been 
worthwhile. It further shows that international pressure, including the UNSCR and 
sanctions, has not been successful and Iran has stood its ground in the face of the 
challenges. The nuclear programme is presented in almost exclusively nationalistic 
terms, in Iran, which terms emphasise both the nation’s resistance to foreign forces 
trying to dictate terms to Iran and its indigenous scientific and technological progress. 
Regardless of its criticism of international law and international institutions, and its 
creation of a parallel legal discourse to defy the international community, the Islamic 
Republic has, nonetheless, maintained that it has been in compliance with its 
international obligations. Iran maintains that its programme is within the non-
proliferation regime’s framework and in accordance with international norms and 
safeguards. The EU3+3, however, cites the example of the disclosure of the sites of 
Natanz and Arak, as well as Iran’s undeclared activities, including fissile materials and 
dual-use objects. It further highlights Iran’s breaches of Article 2 of the NPT and its 
failure to comply with UNSCR 1696. Iran, on the other hand, denounces the UNSC as 
biased toward the west and the UNSCR as illegal. It accuses the Board of Governors of 
acting outside its mandate.  
The Iranian leadership has attempted to use Islam as an indicator of its morality in order 
to build trust. In other words: the fatwā and the overall ‘prohibition’ of nuclear weapons 
under Islamic law are used to promote the idea that the Islamic Republic is indeed 
bound by its religious, and thus, moral obligations. As noted by Kadivar: shari’a stems 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Rouhani, Hassan, address at Majles, 10-09-2013. 
G o d , 	   C o u n t r y , 	   a n d 	   t h e 	   B o m b 	   	   T a b a t a b a i 	  |	  254	  	  
from morality and morality stems from shari’a in this belief.232 This morality is 
presented as transcending mere international legal norms, which are to be contrasted 
from moral obligations based on faith. Indeed, the Islamic Republic, only sees morality 
in religion and, based on its narrow understanding of the notion, it views modern 
international legal instruments as secular and consequently, deprived of all morality, in 
the image of the west, which shaped it to reflect its own immorality.233 Hence, the 
Islamic Republic uses morality, which it sees as superior to secular law and equating 
shari’a, in order to show that its stance is indeed to be trusted. However, as this chapter 
has demonstrated, Tehran’s views on the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Islam stem 
from political pragmatism.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
 
The argument 
The aim of this thesis is to contribute to understanding of the role and implications of 
the justification of nuclear ambitions in Islamic terms. The key question at the heart of 
this discussion is: what are the strategic implications of the Islamic legal discourses on 
nuclear weapons? Throughout this thesis it has been argued that there is no single stance 
on the matter in the Sunni world. However, given the political nature of the topic in 
Iran, some Iranian Shiite scholars have been approached to discuss it. Among these 
scholars, there seems to be a consensus that nuclear weapons are prohibited by the faith. 
Still, this prohibition remains unclear in many aspects, including its scope. Indeed, it 
remains unclear whether this prohibition is limited to the use or also to development of 
nuclear weapons. Generally, however, the notion of distinction is the key driver behind 
rulings according to which Islam prohibits nuclear weapons. The principle of distinction 
is clear-cut under international humanitarian law, but it is rather intangible under 
shari’a. Nevertheless, the central argument according to which Islam prohibits nuclear 
weapons lies in their indiscriminate nature. 
Nevertheless, this thesis argues that whether one considers nuclear weapons to be legal, 
or prohibited, is not significant. What is crucially important is the use of the Islamic 
legal discourse as an enabling or limiting factor in political terms. To be sure, the faith 
does not generally have an impact on policymaking per se, but the way it is used to 
fashion narrative and justify and legitimise policy certainly does. Yet, the impact of the 
faith on decision-making can also not be discounted, as the late Ayatollah Khomeini is 
said to have refrained from allowing the use of chemical weapons to counter Iraq’s 
chemical use, at the height of the Iran-Iraq War. More generally, the potential of divine 
law to be moulded into any narrative and to justify any position regarding general 
security issues -- and nuclear arms control, proliferation and disarmament, in particular 
-- is key to the understanding of the nuclear narratives and policies of Muslim state and 
non-state actors with a nuclear capability, programme, or aspiration. In other words, 
interests fashion discourse and discourse galvanises support. The justification of 
policies in Islamic terms is crucial because the faith plays a key role in shaping the 
worldview of individuals and nations. As such, the stance that an actor using Islam to 
fashion a nuclear discourse takes -- defining its nuclear programme or ambitions in 
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Islamic terms -- can only be reversed at great domestic and/or international political 
cost.  
 
Comparing the three discourses 
There are three key differences between the nuclear narratives of the cases examined in 
the thesis. These were identified and assessed in the context of national interests, 
regional stability, and international peace and security. 
First, the Pakistani attempt to acquire nuclear weapons was mainly justified and funded 
by emphasising the security and prestige of the Muslim world and its need for an 
‘Islamic bomb’, which would put it on a par with the ‘Christian, Jewish and Hindu 
civilizations’.234 Islamabad’s discourse did not have an explicit legal or ethical 
component. Instead, by virtue of acquiring nuclear weapons, Pakistan implicitly 
espouses the view that these weapons are not fundamentally against the faith and 
prohibited by it. Likewise, Al-Qaeda, aiming to secure political and financial support, 
has presented a religious basis, albeit flawed and void of any authority, for its nuclear 
ambitions. The terror network has explicitly declared that the faith encourages Muslims 
to equip themselves with nuclear weapons, and to use them if/when needed. By 
contrast, Iranian rhetoric, also centred on a legal justification, categorically rejects the 
morality and legality of nuclear weapons and embraces the idea of a fundamental 
prohibition of nuclear weapons under Islamic law. On the one hand, then, Pakistan 
presented its nuclear weapons programme as an indispensible source of pride for all 
Muslims and as a guarantor of the ummah’s security, and Al-Qaeda has called the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons a religious duty. On the other hand, the Iranian 
leadership has emphasised the peaceful aspect of its programme and the fact that it aims 
to provide the country with nuclear energy, also depicting it as a source of pride for all 
Muslims. In summary, the utilisation of the faith by Islamabad and Al-Qaeda is 
enabling, while Tehran’s has been limiting.  
The second difference resides in the goals pursued by each state. The Al-Qaeda and 
Pakistani narratives aimed to secure political support and funding from potential 
Muslim donors for their programmes, while Iran has stressed self-sufficiency and 
pursued its programme despite sanctions and with no external funding. As such, the 
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purpose of the rhetoric destined to a Muslim constituency is solely to gain support 
across the Muslim world in order to create a counter-movement to the west’s opposition 
to the programme. By doing so, at the peak of its unpopularity, the Islamic Republic 
tried to show its domestic and international audiences that it had friends and allies 
globally. 
The final difference between the discourses is that of their effectiveness. Pakistani 
rhetoric has been widely successful, as it reached its goal of securing funding for the 
programme from Muslim States. Iran, however, has fallen short of achieving its goal, 
and its rhetoric has even been counterproductive. Several factors are at the core of these 
dissimilar results, the nuances of which many analysts in the west have not captured. 
Contrary to Weissman and Krosney’s claims,235 the Muslim world is very far from 
being a single entity. The factors contributing to the dissimilar results obtained by Iran 
and Pakistan were outlined in the previous chapters as historical, strategic, and 
economic ones. Pakistan justified its nuclear weapons programme as a response to the 
vital threat presented by India. Al-Qaeda’s discourse has been effective to the extent 
that there has not been any categorical and complete rejection of its ambitions and their 
foundation across the Muslim world. However, the network has failed to receive the 
unified support of the ummah.  
 
Reflection: Why does it matter? 
The use of the Islamic legal discourse to shape nuclear narrative has three key concrete 
strategic implications. While these are discussed in this thesis in the context of 
nuclearisation, they can also be applied to broader WMD and security issues.  
First, Islam plays a key role in shaping identity and galvanising support, both political 
and financial. Therefore, as demonstrated throughout the thesis, the justification of a 
given programme or ambition in Islamic terms can be a ‘game changer’. Islam ‘has 
proven to be a major force in the public life of Muslim societies, confounding the 
presuppositions of a development theory predicted on the progressive Westernization 
and secularization of society’ since the 1970s.’236 This growing reliance on Islam as an 
instrument shaping identity and policy is part of a greater global trend, specifically the 
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return of religion into the political life of nations. While in the mid-twentieth century 
most developments seemed to indicate that religion was rapidly becoming ‘a thing of 
the past’, since the 1970s, domestic and international events seem to prove the 
opposite.237 Understanding that political Islam can be ‘a formidable force even though 
Islamic movements or organizations often constitute a minority of the community’, the 
governments of Muslim countries often utilise the Islamic discourse to rally fellow 
Muslims around their cause. Hence, the use of Islamic terms in security and nuclear 
narratives to legitimise policies is a defining factor for states. This is even the case if the 
faith and the narrative shaped by it does not ultimately directly translate into concrete 
policy. The faith ‘has increasingly reemerged in Muslim political discourse and politics 
and has been effective in providing or reinforcing national identity and political 
legitimacy.’238 To be sure, ‘Islamist movements and organizations have proliferated 
across the Muslim world.’239 In fact, out of the three key events identified by David 
Hawkin as illustrating the significance of religion ‘not just in the lives of individuals, 
but also in the lives of nations’, two are linked to Islam.240 These two were assessed 
comprehensively in the context of this thesis and their role in shaping nuclear policy. 
They are the 1979 revolution in Iran and the 9/11 attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda 
against the United States.241 However, another event can be added to this list, that of the 
conflict between the United States and the Soviet bloc in Afghanistan. The U.S. role in 
supporting the creation of the movement that lead to the birth of Al-Qaeda has been 
widely discussed as one of the greatest failures of U.S. foreign policy in recent decades. 
However, Al-Qaeda is only the tip of the iceberg in U.S. efforts to support, train, and 
arm radical Muslim groups to counter what it then perceived as the greatest threat to its 
national interests: communism. Indeed, ‘Pakistan’s status as a “front-line” state in the 
battle against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan […] was too central to permit too 
close a scrutiny of the corrosive longer-term implications of this process of Islamization 
of Pakistan.’ Yet, ‘as the war wound down and the interest of America waned following 
the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan, Pakistan was left with jihadism and jihadis 
threatening to rent asunder the society and politics of Pakistan.’242  
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Understanding the potential of Islam as a galvanising factor, Al-Qaeda, Pakistan, and 
Iran have tried to appeal to various audiences by putting forward the idea of a nuclear 
ambition -- nuclear weapons, and nuclear energy, respectively -- as a rallying point for 
the ummah. Yet, they have received different responses to their claims, which stem 
from broader historical, cultural, religious, political, and strategic dynamics. The two 
previous chapters showed that the nature of religious and national identities is extremely 
different in Iran and Pakistan. They demonstrated that national identity in Iran is shaped 
around the ‘Persianate’ idea, which has been holding Iran together, preserving its 
political, cultural, and territorial integrity and sovereignty. In Iran, as in other ‘older 
national states, language, history, religion, geography, and culture are basic to national 
identity, but in Pakistan, they all worked to divide the nation.’243 Hence, the country’s 
‘brief history […] calls upon a large store of dreams having to do with the idea of 
Pakistan as a Muslim – or Islamic – state.’244 This is also the case of the dynamics 
between the two. Indeed, Pakistani national identity is inherently linked to the Muslim 
faith and the creation of the state of Pakistan was a means to preserve Islam and protect 
Muslims in the subcontinent. This is very different from Iran where historically the 
opposite has occurred, with religion being used as a means to preserve the Iranian state 
and its people’s cultural and political independence and ‘exceptionalism’ from the 
invading powers of the day. This thesis argues that this is precisely the reason why 
attempts to sell foreign policy and a nuclear programme in pan-Islamic terms was much 
more effective in Pakistan than in Iran. Moreover, it is this relationship of these 
respective peoples with nationalism and religion that has shaped their attitude toward 
Islamic discourses in foreign and nuclear policy, defining how these discourses are used 
in each domestic context. Al-Qaeda’s use of the Islamic discourse to justify inflicting 
mass-casualties has neither been categorically embraced, nor categorically rejected by 
the ummah. Instead, it continues to divide the Muslim world. Indeed, as noted in 
Chapters Three and Four, Al-Qaeda’s leadership does not have the religious authority to 
issue religious decrees condoning or prohibiting means and methods of warfare or 
calling Muslims to unify under the banner of Islam and fight the ‘House of War’. 
However, the general exasperation of Muslims with their governments, their inability to 
effectively solve national and regional security challenges, and western interference in 
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their countries and regions, has led many to endorse, if not embrace, Al-Qaeda’s vision 
and tactics.  
Second, beyond its ability to shape politics and the collective consciousness, Islam is, 
first and foremost, an individual matter. It shapes the individual’s beliefs, moral and 
political stance, and worldview. Decision-makers, scientists, and engineers are also 
individuals with religious and political convictions. These fashion their views on 
security and proliferation. Few individuals have transformed the landscape of 
contemporary international security and non-proliferation to the same extent as A.Q. 
Khan. Khan, as key Pakistani political and military decision-makers, was driven by his 
faith. Likewise, members of Al-Qaeda and the Iranian revolutionary establishment are 
also driven by their faith and the worldview generated by it and their decisions to 
proliferate or refrain from it are also fashioned by it. These figures were inspired by the 
Muslim faith and their worldview shaped by the dynamics between the Muslim 
community and the rest of the world, especially the great powers. Evidence suggesting 
that A.Q. Khan had visited Taliban-controlled Afghanistan several times and met with 
bin Laden and his lieutenants245 certainly ties into the Islamic nuclear discourse. Indeed, 
A.Q. Khan’s religious convictions played a key role in convincing him to return to 
Pakistan and assist the country to ‘upgrade’ to a nuclear weapon state status.  
Lastly, the attitude of individuals, governments, and regimes toward the international 
system is also shaped by their views of Islam and the place of the Muslim world within 
it. Therefore, both Iran and Pakistan share a common view of the international order. 
They both frame this worldview in pan-Islamic terms and emphasise that the ‘House of 
Islam’ is under attack by the west. This view is based on mistrust and, in some cases, 
contempt for international law and institutions. This view is also shared by Al-Qaeda, 
but with the caveat that unlike state actors, the network fundamentally rejects any 
international order outside its narrow definition of an Islamic one. In the case of Iran, 
this mistrust stems from the country’s experience with the UNSC during the Iran-Iraq 
War and the institution’s failure to condemn the war of aggression and use of chemical 
weapons by Baghdad. In this sense, the international community, with the United 
Nations and international law as its flagship, is not viewed as a means for states to 
cooperate and promote international peace and security, but rather as an obstacle to 
overcome. The narrative according to which the country is unfairly targeted to promote 
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western and Israeli interests and to punish the country for its opposition to imperialism 
and its defence of victimised peoples has led the leaders of the Islamic Republic to 
believe that this is the case. Mahmoud Sariolghalam describes this ‘negative attitude 
toward the international order as a result of our [Iran’s] weakness’. He points out that 
had Iran been able to establish a system capable of competing abroad and substantiating 
at home (as Brazil, South Korea, and other countries do), it would not feel weak and 
compelled to oppose the west.246 Yet, ‘to reject the system of treaty-based international 
law rather than build on its many strengths is not only unwise, it is extremely 
dangerous.’ These words are a criticism of the United States’ ‘disregard of its 
international legal obligations,’ which the authors describe as ‘abandon[ing] the best 
that its history has to offer to the world’.247 This idea also describes the consequence of 
Iran and Pakistan’s referral to their particular religious and cultural beliefs at the 
expense of universal norms.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, international law completes several tasks, which help 
govern international affairs. First, they ‘embody a set of universally applicable 
expectations, including prohibited and required practices and policies,’ thus 
‘articulat[ing] important global norms’. Second, ‘treaties and regimes they establish are 
a “framework for collective action to meet common challenges.” They provide a 
measure of predictability and accountability and promote learning.’ Furthermore, they 
‘contribute to the development of international consensus’ in addition they ‘provide 
important reference points and criteria to guide States’ activities and domestic 
legislation and provide a focal point for discussion and negotiations on the subject 
matter of the convention.’ Most important, ‘treaties also provide a foundation for further 
progress. States are able to accumulate expertise and confidence by participating in the 
structured system for pursuing a particular policy of mutual or collective benefit.’ 
Thanks to this acquired ‘experience and confidence,’ states can ‘shape further 
development and implementation of the policy.’248 
The interpretation, explanation, and justification of modern legal issues, especially in 
the context of challenges to international peace and security – such as nuclear arms 
control – in the context of shari’a is problematic. As argued in Chapter Three, the 
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Islamic legal framework will inevitably fall short of offering adequate and satisfactory 
solutions to these challenges, as it does not provide for nuanced thinking on security 
issues. Indeed, as a legal system, shari’a has major areas of incompatibility with the 
universal system, giving birth to the international norms regulating the conduct of 
warfare and arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament. The shortcomings of the 
Islamic system, in addition to its being an out-dated and complicated legal framework, 
include such issues as the lack of distinction between private and public law and its 
being opinion-based. Hence, while international norms are developed by experts who 
have studied the subject matter, Islamic law-making is conducted by clerics with 
opinions on all matters and no real expertise on them. This in turn makes it extremely 
difficult to implement their opinions, and thus laws, in public affairs, especially in the 
case regarding foreign policy. As noted earlier, Mostashar Al-Doleh identifies a 
difference between modern legal systems, of which the international legal framework is 
a result, and the Islamic legal system. 
[One such difference,] which is great and important, is the fact that the Code only 
encompasses worldly interests, in a manner that anyone, regardless of their religion, 
will agree to it, and religious matters have a separate special book. However, in the 
Muslims’ book of shari’a, worldly matters have been combined and confused with 
those of the other world. Consequently, this is damaging to public politics.249  
While Mostashar Al-Doleh merely attempted to highlight the differences between 
Islamic law, as applicable in Muslim countries, and specific domestic legal systems, this 
point is of significant value in the consideration of the role of the Islamic legal debate in 
the context of nuclear policy. Indeed, nuclear rhetoric, based on Islamic law, is 
engrained in the particular context of Islamic law, which is not comprehensible for the 
majority of the international community. Therefore, a fatwā issued by a country’s leader 
is not relevant to the non-Muslim members of the international community, cannot be 
implemented or verified by its watchdogs, which operate in the context of a single 
universal legal framework. Therefore, no fatwā can replace the implementation of 
universally established norms and agreements. Mostashar al-Doleh adds another 
distinction between the two legal systems, noting that the Code contains customary and 
ordinary laws, while in the Muslim legal system, the problems concerning customs are 
in people’s minds (not fixed). As such, ‘in the name of customs, justice is done to 
people’.250 Hence, the Islamic legal system, while being very rigid, can also be flexible, 
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in fact, too flexible. Indeed, a fatwā can be issued ‘in the name of customs’ but it can 
also be revoked ‘in the name of customs’ or alternatively, the interests of the Muslim 
community. Nevertheless, the political impact of such a reversal would make it 
counterproductive. 
To conclude, Islamic law views nuclear weapons through the same lens as international 
law, formulated in the latter as the ‘cardinal norms’ of international humanitarian law. 
However, the shari’a’s main shortcoming lies in its lack of effective and concrete 
solutions to real security challenges, and its cultural specificity. Hence, while the law is 
implementable on a global-level, various Muslim actors have effectively used it to 
promote their interests. Hence, while, ultimately, Islamic law does not always dictate 
policymaking, the Islamic narrative has been very effective in providing its users with 
financial and political support, as well as recruitment. Nevertheless, this success has, in 
turn, also been subject to power dynamics, national interests, and other considerations 
stemming from realpolitik.  
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